Jump to content

Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Johnfos (talk | contribs) at 20:58, 7 January 2012 (→‎References). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company was formed June 7, 2011 by the Japanese government as an independent body to investigate the March Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.[1] The Investigation Committee issued an interim report in December, 2011, and is expected to issue its final report summer, 2012.

The interim report was "a scathing assessment of the response to the Fukushima disaster", in which the investigative panel "blamed the central government and the Tokyo Electric Power Co., saying both seemed incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks after the disaster".[2]

Investigation reports

Interim Report - Issued 2011.12.26.

For the interim report, the committee interviewed 456 people over a total of 900 hours of hearings by Dec. 16, 2011. The report attaches blame to Japan's central government as well as Tokyo Electric Power Co., "depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the disaster".[3] The 507-page interim report, said Japan's response to the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi was flawed by "poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the facility", and poor planning also worsened the disaster response, noting that authorities had "grossly underestimated tsunami risks" that followed the magnitude 9.0 earthquake. The 40-foot-high tsunami that struck the plant was twice as tall as the highest wave predicted by officials, and the erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system continued to work after the tsunami struck worsened the disaster. "Plant workers had no clear instructions on how to respond to such a disaster, causing miscommunication, especially when the disaster destroyed backup generators. Ultimately, the series of failures led to the worst nuclear catastrophe since Chernobyl".[3]

The report concluded “It's inexcusable that a nuclear accident couldn't be managed because a major event such as the tsunami exceeded expectations.”[4] An account said "[t]he report, which is highly critical of Tepco [Tokyo Electric] as well as the authorities contrasts with the conclusions of a separate exercise by Tepco, which laid blame for the crisis squarely on the natural disaster."[5] NISA, Japan's nuclear regulatory agency, received "some of [the] strongest criticism" in the report.[4]

The full report is expected in the summer of 2012, when among other additions it will include interviews with former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and other Cabinet officials.[4]

Membership

  • Yotaro Hatamura, Chairperson; Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo, Professor of Kogakuin University
  • Kazuo Oike, Director, International Institute for Advanced Studies, Former President of Kyoto University
  • Shizuko Kakinuma, Team Leader, Research Center for Radiation Protection, National Institute of Radiological Science
  • Yukio Takasu, Project Professor, Institute for Advanced Global Studies, The University of Tokyo, Former Permanent Representative, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, and the United Nations in New York
  • Toshio Takano, Attorney-at-Law, Former Superintending Prosecutor of Nagoya High Public Prosecutors Office
  • Yasuro Tanaka, Professor of Meiji Law School, Former Chief Justice of the Sapporo High Court
  • Yoko Hayashi, Attorney-at-Law
  • Michio Furukawa, Mayor of Kawamata Town, Fukushima Prefecture
  • Kunio Yanagida, Writer, Critic
  • Hitoshi Yoshioka, Vice-President of Kyushu University[6]

Technical Advisors

  • Seiji Abe, Professor, Kansai University
  • Masao Fuchigami, Advisor, Komatsu Ltd., Ph.D. in Engineering[6]

References

  1. ^ Ito, Masami, "Official probe begins into nuclear disaster", Japan Times, 8 June 2011, p. 1.
  2. ^ "Report: U.S. nuclear renaissance unlikely after Fukushima". LA Times. December 28, 2011.
  3. ^ a b "Report: Japan, utility at fault for response to nuclear disaster". LA Times. December 26, 2011.
  4. ^ a b c "Fukushima Probe Puts Regulator, Cellphones on List of Failures", Bloomberg Businessweek, December 27, 2011. Retrieved 2011-12-26.
  5. ^ Nakamoto, Michiyo, "Report scathing of response to Fukushima nuclear crisis", Financial Times, December 26, 2011. Retrieved 2011-12-26.
  6. ^ a b "Member [plural] of the Investigation Committee ...", committee webpage. Retrieved 2011-12-27.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Investigation_Committee_on_the_Accident_at_the_Fukushima_Nuclear_Power_Stations_of_Tokyo_Electric_Power_Company&oldid=470145977"