Lancaster's chevauchée of 1346
|Lancaster's chevauchée of 1346|
|Part of the Edwardian Phase of the Hundred Years' War|
|Kingdom of England||Kingdom of France|
|Commanders and leaders|
Henry, Earl of Lancaster|
Ralph, Earl of Stafford
|John, Count of Armagnac|
Lancaster's chevauchée of 1346 was a large-scale mounted raid (chevauchée) undertaken by Henry, Earl of Lancaster, between 12 September and 31 October 1346, as a part of the Hundred Years' War. Lancaster commanded approximately 2,000 English and Gascon soldiers, all mounted, and met no effective resistance from the French. The chevauchée burned and looted large areas of Saintonge, Aunis and Poitou in south-west France. Numerous towns, castles and smaller fortified places were captured by Lancaster.
The year had started with a "huge" French army besieging the strategically important town of Aiguillon in Gascony. Lancaster refused battle and harassed the French supply lines while preventing Aiguillon from being blockaded. After a five-month siege the French were ordered north to confront the main English army, which on 12 July had landed in Normandy under Edward III of England (r. 1327–1377) and commenced the Crécy campaign.
This left the French defences in the south west both weak and disorganised. Lancaster took advantage by launching two subsidiary offensives and himself marching 160 miles (260 km) north and storming the rich city of Poitiers. He then took the surrender of a large number of towns and castles in Saintonge and Aunis before returning to Gascony seven weeks after he set out. The chevauchée completely disrupted the French defences, and shifted the focus of the fighting from the heart of Gascony to 50 miles (80 km) or more beyond its borders.
Since the Norman Conquest of 1066, English monarchs had held titles and lands within France, the possession of which made them vassals of the kings of France. The status of the English king's French fiefs was a major source of conflict between the two monarchies throughout the Middle Ages. French monarchs systematically sought to check the growth of English power, stripping away lands as the opportunity arose. Over the centuries, English holdings in France had varied in size, but by 1337 only Gascony in south western France and Ponthieu in northern France were left.
The Gascons had their own language and customs. A large proportion of the enormous quantity of red wine that they produced was shipped to England in a profitable trade. The Gascons preferred their relationship with a distant English king who left them alone to one with a French king who would interfere in their affairs. Following a series of disagreements between Philip VI of France (r. 1328–1350) and Edward III of England, on 24 May 1337 Philip's Great Council in Paris agreed that the Duchy of Aquitaine, effectively Gascony, should be taken back into Philip's hands on the grounds that Edward was in breach of his obligations as a vassal. This marked the start of the Hundred Years' War, which was to last one hundred and sixteen years.
During the first half of the 14th century well over 1,000 ships a year departed Gascony for England. Among their cargos were over 100,000,000 litres (110,000,000 US qt) of wine. The duty levied by the crown on wine from Bordeaux was more than all other customs duties combined and by far the largest source of state income. Bordeaux, the capital of Gascony had a population of over 50,000, greater than London's, and Bordeaux was possibly richer. However, by this time English Gascony had become so truncated by French encroachments that it relied on imports of food, largely from England. Any interruptions to regular shipping were liable to starve Gascony and financially cripple England; the French were well aware of this.
Although Gascony was the cause of the war, Edward was able to spare few resources for it and previously when an English army had campaigned on the continent it had operated in northern France. In most campaigning seasons the Gascons had had to rely on their own resources and had been hard pressed by the French. In 1339 the French besieged Bordeaux, the capital of Gascony, even breaking into the city with a large force before they were repulsed. Typically the Gascons could field 3,000–6,000 men, the large majority infantry, although up to two-thirds of them would be tied down in garrisons.
The border between English and French territory in Gascony was extremely unclear, to the extent that the idea of a "border" is anachronistic. Most significant landholders owned a patchwork of widely separated estates, perhaps owing fealty to a different overlord for each. Each small estate was likely to have a fortified tower or keep, with larger estates having castles. Fortifications were also constructed at transport choke points, to collect tolls and to restrict military passage, and fortified towns grew up alongside all bridges and most fords over the many rivers in the region. Military forces could support themselves by foraging so long as they moved on at relatively frequent intervals. If they wished to remain in one place for any length of time, as was necessary to besiege a castle, then access to water transport was essential for supplies of food and fodder and desirable for such items as siege equipment. Warfare was usually a struggle for possession of castles and other fortified points, and for the mutable loyalty of the local nobility; the region had been in a state of flux for centuries and many local lords served whichever country was stronger, regardless of national ties.
By 1345, after eight years of war, English-controlled territory mostly consisted of a coastal strip from Bordeaux to Bayonne, with isolated strongholds further inland. During 1345 Henry, Earl of Lancaster,[note 1] had led a whirlwind campaign at the head of an Anglo-Gascon army. He had smashed two large French armies at the battles of Bergerac and Auberoche, captured French towns and fortifications in much of Périgord and most of Agenais and given the English possessions in Gascony strategic depth. During the winter following this successful campaign Lancaster's second in command, Ralph, Earl of Stafford, had marched on the vitally important town of Aiguillon, which commanded the junction of the Rivers Garonne and Lot; the inhabitants had attacked the garrison and opened the gates to the English.
John, Duke of Normandy, the son and heir of Philip VI, was placed in charge of all French forces in south-west France, as he had been the previous autumn. In March 1346 a French army numbering between 15,000 and 20,000, "enormously superior" to any force the Anglo-Gascons could field, marched on Aiguillon and besieged it on 1 April. On 2 April an arrière-ban, a formal call to arms for all able-bodied males, was announced for southern France. French financial, logistical and manpower efforts were focused on this offensive.
The French were aware of Edward III's efforts, but given the extreme difficulty of disembarking an army other than at a port, the deterioration of the English position in Flanders, and the existence of friendly ports in Brittany and Gascony the French assumed that Edward would sail for one of the latter; probably Gascony, in order to relieve Aiguillon. To guard against any possibility of an English landing in northern France, Philip VI relied on his powerful navy. This reliance was misplaced given the naval technology of the time and the French were unable to prevent Edward III successfully crossing the Channel and landing in the Cotentin Peninsula on 12 July with an army between 12,000 and 15,000 strong. The English "achieved complete strategic surprise" and marched south, cutting a wide swath of destruction through some of the richest lands in France and burning every town they passed.
Philip VI recalled his main army, under John of Normandy, from Gascony. After a furious argument with his advisors, and according to some accounts his father's messenger, John refused to move until his honour was satisfied. On 29 July Philip VI called an arrière-ban for northern France at Rouen. On 7 August the English reached the Seine. Philip VI sent orders to John of Normandy insisting that he abandon the siege of Aiguillon and march his army north. Edward III marched south-east and on 12 August his army was 20 miles (32 km) from Paris. On 14 August Normandy requested a formal suspension of the siege. Lancaster, well aware of the situation in the north and in the French camps around Aiguillon, refused. On 20 August, after over five months, the French abandoned the siege and marched away in considerable haste and disorder. The Duke of Normandy did not rejoin the French army in the north until after it had been heavily defeated at the Battle of Crécy six days later.
The withdrawal of the Duke of Normandy's army led to the collapse of the French positions in southern Périgord and most of Agenais. The French only held on to their strongholds in the Garonne valley, Port-Sainte-Marie, Agen and Marmande downstream of Aiguillon. The English extended their control to include the whole of the Lot valley below Villeneuve and most of the remaining French outposts between the Lot and the Dordogne, during late August. Lancaster was able to capture most towns without a fight. John, Count of Armagnac, was appointed French royal lieutenant in the region after the Duke of Normandy's withdrawal. He struggled to offer effective resistance due to lack of troops; insufficient funds; and repeatedly having his orders countermanded by Philip VI. He formally offered his resignation within three months of his appointment.
Lancaster now held the operational initiative. In early September he launched three separate offensives. Local English sympathisers in the Agenais under Gaillard I de Durfort blockaded Agen and Porte Sainte Marie and raided into Quercy to the west. A large detachment of Gascons was split up to reoccupy the French-held territory to the south and west of the Garonne under the overall command of Alixandre de Caumont, in a mopping up operation. Lancaster personally led 1,000 men-at-arms and approximately the same number of mounted infantry north on 12 September; most of this force was Gascon.
The force in the Agenais raided deep into Quercy, penetrating over 50 miles (80 km). Gaillard, leading 400 cavalry, captured the small town of Tulle. This sparked widespread panic in the province of Auvergne. The army of John of Armagnac was diverted to Tulle, which it besieged from mid-November until late December, when the Gascon occupiers surrendered on terms and were taken prisoner; all were ransomed. The whole French field army of the south west was tied down by Gaillard's 400. Modern historian Jonathan Sumption describes this as "dislocating the royal administration in central and southern France for three months".
The troops under Caumont swept through the Bazadais, capturing numerous French-held towns and fortifications for little or no loss. Many of these were handed over after negotiations; Bazas itself for example surrendered after negotiating access for its products through English occupied territory on favourable terms. French presence in the area was all but extinguished.
Lancaster was daringly targeting the rich provincial capital of Poitiers, 160 miles (260 km) north of his starting point. He marched from the Garonne to the Charente, 80 miles (130 km), in eight days, arriving at Châteauneuf-sur-Charente which he captured. He then diverted 40 miles (64 km) to Saint-Jean-d'Angély to rescue some English prisoners. Saint-Jean-d'Angély was stormed, captured, and sacked. Leaving a garrison, Lancaster turned back towards Poitiers, covering 20 miles (32 km) a day and taking the towns of Melle and Lusignan on the way. Lancaster reached Poitiers late on 3 October.
Poitiers occupied a naturally strong position, but its defences had seen little maintenance for centuries. The city had no royal garrison and the townspeople and local notables had fallen out of the habit of maintaining a guard. Defensive responsibilities were split between the town and three different church bodies, which had the effect of preventing any effective action. The English launched an immediate assault, but were repulsed by an improvised force organised by some local noblemen. During the night the English found a breach in the wall, which had been deliberately created years before to allow easy access from the city to a nearby watermill. In the morning they seized it and forced their way into eastern Poitiers, killing everyone they came across. As was usual, only those who appeared wealthy enough to afford a ransom were spared. Most of the population fled the city, but over 600 were killed. The town was thoroughly sacked for eight days.
Lancaster was unable to take the royal mint at Montreuil-Bonnin, 5 miles (8.0 km) west of Poitiers, and marched rapidly back to Saint-Jean-d'Angély. He made no attempt to hold Poitiers; in the province of Poitou he only left troops at Lusignan, a small town with good walls and a strong, modern castle. Once back in Saintonge he took control of the Boutonne valley all the way to the sea, including the major port of Rochfort and the well fortified island of Oléron. Lancaster then marched south, taking a large number of small towns and fortifications. The French were left in control of much of Saintonge: the eastern parts; the larger fortifications such as the province's capital, Saintes, and its strongest castle, Taillebourg; and several strategically important strongholds on the east bank of the Gironde. Lancaster arrived in Bordeaux, the capital of English Gascony, on 31 October seven weeks after he set out on his chevauchée. He returned to England in early 1347.
Lancaster left garrisons in the captured towns and castles throughout Saintonge and Aunis, with an especially large garrison at Saint-Jean-d'Angély. The Anglo-Gascons supported themselves by raiding French-held and French-leaning territory; they "were not so much expected to control territory as to create chaos and insecurity". Whole provinces, securely held by the French only months before, became overrun by bandits, freebooters, deserters and retained troops of both sides. The population moved away from the villages to the relative safety of the towns, townsfolk who could moved away from the area, much of the agricultural land went uncultivated. The French ability to counter-attack was lost as they concentrated on attempting to defend the host of newly vulnerable locations or on recovering towns captured deep in what had been considered safe territory, as at Tulle. Lancaster had moved the focus of the fighting from the heart of Gascony to 50 miles (80 km) or more beyond its borders.
Notes, citations and sources
- During the 1345 campaign he was known as the Earl of Derby, but his father died in September 1345 and he became the Earl of Lancaster.
- Prestwich 2007, p. 394.
- Harris 1994, p. 8.
- Crowcroft & Cannon 2015, p. 389.
- Lacey 2008, p. 122.
- Sumption 1990, p. 184.
- Rodger 2004, pp. xix–xx, 79.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 39–40.
- Rodger 2004, pp. 79–80.
- Fowler 1961, pp. 139–40.
- Rogers 2004, p. 95.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 273, 275.
- Fowler 1961, pp. 143–44.
- Vale 1999, pp. 75, 78.
- Burne 1999, p. 100.
- Vale 1999, pp. 72–73, 76.
- Gribit 2016, p. 1.
- Wagner 2006, p. 3.
- Fowler 1961, p. 215.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 485–486.
- Sumption 1990, p. 485.
- Sumption 1990, p. 484.
- Fowler 1961, p. 234.
- Sumption 1990, p. 494.
- Rodger 2004, p. 103.
- Burne 1999, p. 150.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 514–515.
- Rogers 2010.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 539, 541.
- Sumption 1990, p. 541.
- Sumption 1990, p. 549.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 549–560.
- Sumption 1990, p. 550.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 542, 544.
- King 2002, pp. 269–70.
- Sumption 1990, p. 544.
- Gribit 2016, pp. 142–143.
- Sumption 1990, p. 547.
- Fowler 1961, p. 238.
- Ormrod 2005.
- Sumption 1990, pp. 547–550.
- Burne, Alfred (1999). The Crecy War. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 978-1-84022-210-4.
- Crowcroft, Robert; Cannon, John (2015). "Gascony". The Oxford Companion to British History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 389. ISBN 978-0-19-967783-2.
- Fowler, Kenneth (1961). Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310–1361 (PDF) (Thesis). Leeds: University of Leeds.
- Gribit, Nicholas A. (2016). Henry of Lancaster's Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345-1346: Military Service and Professionalism in the Hundred Years War, Volume 42 of Warfare in history. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer. ISBN 978-1-78327-117-7.
- Harris, Robin (1994). Valois Guyenne. Royal Historical Society Studies in History. 71. London: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-0-86193-226-9.
- King, Andy (2002). "According to the Custom Used in French and Scottish Wars: Prisoners and Casualties on the Scottish Marches in the Fourteenth Century". Journal of Medieval History. 28. ISSN 0304-4181.
- Lacey, Robert (2008). Great Tales from English History. London: Folio Society. OCLC 261939337.
- Ormrod, W. M. (2005). "Henry of Lancaster, First Duke of Lancaster (c.1310–1361)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/12960. (Subscription or UK public library membership required.)
- Prestwich, M. (13 September 2007). J.M. Roberts, ed. Plantagenet England 1225–1360. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-922687-0.
- Rodger, N.A.M. (2004). The Safeguard of the Sea. London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0140297249.
- Rogers, Clifford J (2004). Bachrach, Bernard S; DeVries, Kelly; Rogers, Clifford J, eds. The Bergerac Campaign (1345) and the Generalship of Henry of Lancaster. Journal of Medieval Military History. II. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1-84383-040-5. ISSN 0961-7582.
- Rogers, Clifford J (2010). "Aiguillon, Siege of". In Rogers, Clifford J. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 12. ISBN 978-0195334036.
- Sumption, Jonathan (1990). Trial by Battle. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 978-0571200955.
- Vale, Malcolm (1999). "The War in Aquitaine". In Curry, Anne; Hughes, Michael. Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer Ltd. pp. 69–82. ISBN 978-0-85115-755-9.
- Wagner, John A. (2006). "Auberoche, Battle of (1345)". Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Greenwood. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-313-32736-0.