Leipzig Salient

Leipzig salient
	Part of the Battle of the Somme, World War I
	; Battle of the Somme 1 July – 18 November 1916
Date	July 1916
Location	Picardy, France50°1′N 2°41′E / 50.017°N 2.683°E
Result	British victory
Belligerents
Britain	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Douglas Haig	General Erich von Falkenhayn
	Albert (Leipzig salient) class=notpageimage\| Leipzig salient

The Leipzig Salient lies south-west of the Thiepval Memorial, north-east of the La Boisselle–Authuille and Thiepval–Aveluy crossroads. A grass path leads across the fields with trenches. A clumb of trees and bushes marks the location of center of the Leipzig Redoubt. The German front line bulged forward around a quarry and Hindenburg Trench had been dug further back across the chord of the salient. The [Wundt Werk] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) ("Wonderwork") redoubt lay further back on a reverse slope and Nab Valley lay on the east side; Thiepval was to the north and to the north-west were the fortified Mouquet Farm and the village of Pozières

On 1 July 1916, the 32nd Division attacked the salient. The 1/17th Highland Light Infantry crept forward at 7.23 a.m., ready to rush the German defences as soon as the British barrage lifted at 7:30 a.m. The Scots advanced to within about 40 yards (37 m) of the German front line and when the barrage lifted, rushed forward and took the redoubt, catching the Germans in their dugouts in the quarry at the centre of the Redoubt. The Scots then pressed on to the next objective but were forced back to the Leipzig Redoubt, where they consolidated with help from troops of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

Later they were joined there by men from the 11th Border Regiment, 1st Dorsets and 19th Lancashire Fusiliers (3rd Salford Pals) but further advance from the redoubt proved impossible. The small advances made here, in taking the Redoubt, were the only success for the 32nd Division on 1 July. The position was strengthened and held against several German counter-attacks.

German defences on the Somme, 1915–1916

Despite considerable debate among German staff officers, Falkenhayn continued the policy of unyielding defence in 1916.^{[Note 1]} On the Somme front Falkenhayn's construction plan of January 1915 had been completed. Barbed wire obstacles had been enlarged from one belt 5–10 yards (4.6–9.1 m) wide to two, 30 yards (27 m) wide and about 15 yards (14 m) apart. Double and triple thickness wire was used and laid 3–5 feet (0.91–1.52 m) high. The front line had been increased from one trench line to three, 150–200 yards (140–180 m) apart, the first trench occupied by sentry groups, the second ([Wohngraben] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)) for the bulk of the front-trench garrison and the third trench for local reserves. The trenches were traversed and had sentry-posts in concrete recesses built into the parapet. Dugouts had been deepened from 6–9 feet (1.8–2.7 m) to 20–30 feet (6.1–9.1 m), 50 yards (46 m) apart and large enough for 25 men. An intermediate line of strongpoints (the [Stutzpunktlinie] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help)) about 1,000 yards (910 m) behind the front line was also built. Communication trenches ran back to the reserve line, renamed the second line, which was as well-built and wired as the first line. The second line was beyond the range of Allied field artillery, to force an attacker to stop and move field artillery forward before assaulting the line.^[2]

After the [(Herbstschlacht] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) or Autumn Battles) of 1915, a third defence line another 3,000 yards (2,700 m) back from the [Stutzpunktlinie] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) was begun in February 1916 and was almost complete on the Somme front when the battle began. German artillery was organised in a series of [sperrfeuerstreifen] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (barrage sectors); each officer was expected to know the batteries covering his section of the front line and the batteries ready to engage fleeting targets. A telephone system was built, with lines buried 6 feet (1.8 m) deep for 5 miles (8.0 km) behind the front line, to connect the front line to the artillery. The Somme defences had two inherent weaknesses which the rebuilding had not remedied. The front trenches were on a forward slope, lined by white chalk from the subsoil and easily seen by ground observers. The defences were crowded towards the front trench, with a regiment having two battalions near the front-trench system and the reserve battalion divided between the [Stutzpunktlinie] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) and the second line, all within 2,000 yards (1,800 m) and most troops within 1,000 yards (910 m) of the front line, accommodated in the new deep dugouts. The concentration of troops at the front line on a forward slope guaranteed that it would face the bulk of an artillery bombardment, directed by ground observers on clearly marked lines.^[3]

German strong points

[Schwaben] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) Redoubt was not the only strong point the Germans made on the battlefield of the Somme.

Notes

^ Falkenhayn implied after the war that the psychology of German soldiers, shortage of manpower and lack of reserves made the policy inescapable, since the troops necessary to seal off breakthroughs did not exist. High losses incurred in holding ground by a policy of no retreat, were preferable to higher losses, voluntary withdrawals and the effect of a belief that soldiers had discretion to avoid battle. When a more flexible policy was substituted later, decisions about withdrawal still reserved to army commanders.^[1]

Footnotes

^ Sheldon 2005, p. 223.
^ Wynne 1939, pp. 100–101.
^ Wynne 1939, pp. 100–103.

References

Edmonds, J. E. (1932). Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916: Sir Douglas Haig's Command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. I (IWM & Battery Press 1993 ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-89839-185-7.
Gliddon, G. (1987). When the Barrage Lifts: A Topographical History and Commentary on the Battle of the Somme 1916. Norwich: Gliddon Books. ISBN 0-947893-02-4.
Miles, W. (1938). Military Operations in France and Belgium: 2 July to the End of the Battles of the Somme. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. II (IWM & Battery Press 1992 ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-89839-169-5.
Rogers (ed.), D. (2010). Landrecies to Cambrai: Case Studies of German Offensive and Defensive Operations on the Western Front 1914–17. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 978-1-906033-76-7. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help)
Sheldon, J. (2005). The German Army on the Somme 1914–1916 (Pen & Sword Military 2006 ed.). London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 1-84415-269-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Wynne, G. C. (1939). If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (Greenwood Press 1976 ed.). London: Faber. ISBN 0-8371-5029-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)

External links

[2] Falkenhayn implied after the war that the psychology of German soldiers, shortage of manpower and lack of reserves made the policy inescapable, since the troops necessary to seal off breakthroughs did not exist. High losses incurred in holding ground by a policy of no retreat, were preferable to higher losses, voluntary withdrawals and the effect of a belief that soldiers had discretion to avoid battle. When a more flexible policy was substituted later, decisions about withdrawal still reserved to army commanders.^[1]

[FOOTNOTESheldon2005223-1] Sheldon 2005, p. 223.

[FOOTNOTEWynne1939100–101-3] Wynne 1939, pp. 100–101.

[FOOTNOTEWynne1939100–103-4] Wynne 1939, pp. 100–103.

[Note 1]

[2]

[3]

[1]