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Kautz's men did not arrive until noon, however, having been delayed en route by numerous enemy pickets. They assaulted the Dimmock Line where it crossed the Jerusalem Plank Road (present-day [[U.S. Route 301]], Crater Road). The Confederates' Battery 27, also known as Rives's Salient, was manned by 150 militiamen commanded by Maj. Fletcher H. Archer. Kautz first launched a probing attack, then paused. His main attack was by the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry against the Home Guard, a group consisting primarily of teenagers, elderly men, and some wounded soldiers from city hospitals. The Home Guards retreated to the city with heavy losses, but by this time Beauregard had been able to bring reinforcements from Richmond to bear, which were able to repulse the Union assault. Kautz, hearing no activity on Gillmore's front, presumed that he was left on his own and withdrew. Confederate casualties were about 80, Union 40. Butler was furious with Gillmore's timidity and incompetence and arrested him. Gillmore requested a court of inquiry, which was never convened, but Grant later reassigned him and the incident was dropped.<ref>Davis, p. 33; Kennedy, p. 352; Salmon, p. 403.</ref>
Kautz's men did not arrive until noon, however, having been delayed en route by numerous enemy pickets. They assaulted the Dimmock Line where it crossed the Jerusalem Plank Road (present-day [[U.S. Route 301]], Crater Road). The Confederates' Battery 27, also known as Rives's Salient, was manned by 150 militiamen commanded by Maj. Fletcher H. Archer. Kautz first launched a probing attack, then paused. His main attack was by the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry against the Home Guard, a group consisting primarily of teenagers, elderly men, and some wounded soldiers from city hospitals. The Home Guards retreated to the city with heavy losses, but by this time Beauregard had been able to bring reinforcements from Richmond to bear, which were able to repulse the Union assault. Kautz, hearing no activity on Gillmore's front, presumed that he was left on his own and withdrew. Confederate casualties were about 80, Union 40. Butler was furious with Gillmore's timidity and incompetence and arrested him. Gillmore requested a court of inquiry, which was never convened, but Grant later reassigned him and the incident was dropped.<ref>Davis, p. 33; Kennedy, p. 352; Salmon, p. 403.</ref>


Sukc MY LONG SCHLONG NIGGERS
===Meade's assaults (June 15&ndash;18)===
[[File:Petersburg June15-16.png|thumb|400px|Siege of Petersburg, assaults on June 15&ndash;18]]
{{Further|[[Second Battle of Petersburg]]}}
Inexplicably, Grant selected Butler's Army of the James, which had performed poorly in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, to lead the expedition toward Petersburg. On June 14 he directed Butler to augment the [[XVIII Corps (ACW)|XVIII Corps]], commanded by [[Brigadier general (United States) | Brig. Gen.]] [[William Farrar Smith|William F. "Baldy" Smith]], to a strength of 16,000 men, including Kautz's cavalry division, and use the same route employed in the unsuccessful attacks of June 9. Since Beauregard had insufficient men available to defend the entire Dimmock Line, he concentrated 2,200 troops under Brig. Gen. [[Henry A. Wise]] in the northeastern sector. Even with his concentration, infantrymen were spaced an unacceptable 10 feet apart. His remaining 3,200 men were facing Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred.<ref>Trudeau, pp. 38-39; Davis, pp. 37-39.</ref>

Baldy Smith and his men crossed the Appomattox shortly after dawn on June 15. Kautz's cavalry, leading the advance, encountered an unexpected stronghold at Baylor's farm northeast of Petersburg. Brig. Gen. [[Edward W. Hinks]]'s men launched two attacks on the Confederates and captured a cannon, but the overall advance was delayed until early afternoon. Smith started his attack after delaying until about 7 p.m., deploying a strong skirmish line that swept over the earthworks on a 3.5 mile front, causing the Confederates to retreat to a weaker defensive line on Harrison's Creek. Despite this initial success and the prospect of a virtually undefended city immediately to his front, Smith decided to wait until dawn to resume his attack. By this time Maj. Gen. [[Winfield S. Hancock]], the [[II Corps (ACW) | II Corps]] commander, had arrived at Smith's headquarters. The normally decisive and pugnacious Hancock, who outranked Smith, was uncertain of his orders and the disposition of forces, and uncharacteristically deferred to Smith's judgment to wait.<ref>Trudeau, pp. 37-45, 51; Davis, pp. 39-44; Salmon, pp. 403-05.</ref>

Beauregard wrote later that Petersburg "at that hour was clearly at the mercy of the Federal commander, who had all but captured it." But he used the time he had been granted to good advantage. Receiving no guidance from Richmond in response to his urgent requests, he unilaterally decided to strip his defenses from the Howlett Line, which was bottling up Butler's army in Bermuda Hundred, making the divisions of Maj. Gens. [[Robert Hoke]] and [[Bushrod Johnson]] available for the new Petersburg defensive line. Butler might have used this opportunity to move his army between Petersburg and Richmond, which would have doomed the Confederate capital, but he once again failed to act.<ref>Fuller, p. 226; Davis, p. 43.</ref>

By the morning of June 16, Beauregard had concentrated about 14,000 men in his defensive line, but this paled in comparison to the 50,000 federals that now faced him. Grant had arrived with Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside [[IX Corps (ACW) | IX Corps]], addressed the confusion of Hancock's orders, and ordered a reconnaissance or weak points in the defensive line. Hancock, in temporary command of the Army of the Potomac until Maj. Gen. George G. Meade arrived, prepared Smith's XVIII corps on the right, his own II Corps in the center, and Burnside's IX Corps on the left. Hancock's assault began around 5:30 p.m. as all three corps moved slowly forward. Beauregard's men fought fiercely, erecting new breastworks to the rear as breakthroughs occurred. Upon the arrival of General Meade, a second attack was ordered and Brig. Gen. [[Francis C. Barlow]] led his division forward. Although Barlow's men managed to capture their objectives, a counterattack drove them back, taking numerous Union prisoners. The survivors dug in close to the enemy works.<ref>Davis, pp. 44-45; Trudeau, pp. 47-48.</ref>

June 17 was a day of uncoordinated Union attacks, starting on the left flank where two brigades of Burnside's IX Corps under Brig. Gen. [[Robert B. Potter]] stealthily approached the Confederate line and launched a surprise attack at dawn. Initially successful, it captured nearly a mile of the Confederate fortifications and about 600 prisoners, but the effort eventually failed when Potter's men moved forward to find another line of entrenchments. IX Corps assaults at 2 p.m., led by the brigade of Brig. Gen. [[John F. Hartranft]], and in the evening, by Brig. Gen. [[James H. Ledlie]]'s division, both failed.<ref>Davis, pp. 45-46; Salmon, p. 405; Trudeau, pp. 48-49.</ref>

During the day, Beauregard's engineers had laid out new defensive positions a mile to the west of the Dimmock Line, which the Confederates occupied late that night. Robert E. Lee had systematically ignored all of Beauregard's pleas for reinforcements until now, but dispatched two divisions of his men, exhausted from the Overland Campaign, to Petersburg, beginning at 3 a.m. on June 18. With the arrival of Lee's two divisions, under Maj. Gen. [[Joseph B. Kershaw]] and [[Charles W. Field]], Beauregard had over 20,000 men to defend the city, but Grant's force had been augmented by the arrival of Maj. Gen. [[Gouverneur K. Warren]]'s [[V Corps (ACW) | V Corps]] and 67,000 Federals were present. The first Union attack began at dawn, started by the II and XVIII Corps on the Union right. The II Corps was surprised to make rapid progress against the Confederate line, not realizing that Beauregard had moved it back the night before. When they encountered the second line, the attack immediately ground to a halt and the corps suffered under heavy Confederate fire for hours.<ref>Davis, pp. 46-50; Salmon, pp. 405-06; Trudeau, pp. 51-53.</ref>

At noon on Jun 18, Maj. Gen. [[Orlando B. Willcox]]'s division of the IX Corps led a renewed attack but it suffered significant losses in the marsh and open fields crossed by Taylor's Branch. Warren's V Corps was halted by murderous fire from Rives's Salient, an attack in which Col. [[Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain]] of the [[20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment | 20th Maine]] was severely wounded. At 6:30 p.m., Meade ordered a final assault, which also failed with more horrendous losses. One of the leading regiments was the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, which lost 632 of 900 men in the assault, the heaviest single-battle loss of any regiment during the entire war.<ref>Davis, pp. 49-52; Eicher, p. 690; Salmon, p. 406; Trudeau, pp. 53-54.</ref>

Having achieved almost no gains from four days of assaults, Meade ordered his army to dig in, starting the ten-month siege. Union casualties were 11,386 (1,688 killed, 8,513 wounded, 1,185 missing or captured), Confederate 4,000 (200 killed, 2,900 wounded, 900 missing or captured).<ref>Bonekemper, p. 313. The author presents casualty figures from a wide variety of sources and provides his best estimate. Trudeau, p. 55, agrees with the 4,000 Confederate losses, but cites Union killed and wounded at 8,150, with an additional 1,814 missing. Kennedy, p. 353, cites 9,964&ndash;10,600 for the Union, 2,974&ndash;4,700 for the Confederates; Salmon, p. 406, cites 8,150 Federal and 3,236 Confederate casualties.</ref>


==Initial attempts to cut the railroads (June 21&ndash;30)==
==Initial attempts to cut the railroads (June 21&ndash;30)==

Revision as of 19:54, 12 May 2009

Siege of Petersburg
Part of the American Civil War

Union soldiers in the Siege of Petersburg[1]
DateJune 9, 1864 – March 25, 1865
Location
Petersburg, Virginia
Result Union victory
Belligerents
United States United States of America (Union) Confederate States of America Confederate States of America
Commanders and leaders
Ulysses S. Grant Robert E. Lee
Strength
67–125,000 average of 52,000

The Richmond–Petersburg Campaign was a series of battles around Petersburg, Virginia, fought from June 9, 1864, to March 25, 1865,[2] during the American Civil War. Although it is more popularly known as the Siege of Petersburg, it was not a classic military siege, in which a city is usually surrounded and all supply lines are cut off, nor was it strictly limited to actions against Petersburg. The campaign was nine months of trench warfare in which Union forces commanded by Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant assaulted Petersburg unsuccessfully and then constructed trench lines that eventually extended over 30 miles from the eastern outskirts of Richmond, Virginia, to around the eastern and southern outskirts of Petersburg. Petersburg was crucial to the supply of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's army and the Confederate capital of Richmond. Numerous raids were conducted and battles fought in attempts to cut off the railroad supply lines through Petersburg to Richmond, and many of these caused the lengthening of the trench lines, overloading dwindling Confederate resources.

Lee finally yielded to the overwhelming pressure—the point at which supply lines were finally cut and a true siege would have begun—and abandoned both cities in April 1865, leading to his retreat and surrender in the Appomattox Campaign. The Siege of Petersburg foreshadowed the trench warfare that would be common in World War I, earning it a prominent position in military history. It also featured the largest concentration of African American troops employed in the war, who suffered heavy casualties at such engagements as the Battle of the Crater and Chaffin's Farm.

Background

In March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all the Union armies. He devised a coordinated strategy to apply pressure on the Confederacy from many points, something President Abraham Lincoln had urged his generals to do from the beginning of the war. Grant put Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in immediate command of all forces in the West and moved his own headquarters to be with the Army of the Potomac (still commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade) in Virginia, where he intended to maneuver Lee's army to a decisive battle; his secondary objective was to capture Richmond, but Grant knew that the latter would happen automatically once the former was accomplished. His coordinated strategy called for Grant and Meade to attack Lee from the north, while Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler drove toward Richmond from the southeast; Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel to control the Shenandoah Valley; Sherman to invade Georgia, defeat Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, and capture Atlanta; Brig. Gens. George Crook and William W. Averell to operate against railroad supply lines in West Virginia; and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks to capture Mobile, Alabama.[3]

Most of these initiatives failed, often because of the assignment of generals to Grant for political rather than military reasons. Butler's Army of the James bogged down against inferior forces under Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard before Richmond in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Sigel was soundly defeated at the Battle of New Market in May and soon afterward he was replaced by Maj. Gen. David Hunter. Banks was distracted by the Red River Campaign and failed to move on Mobile. However, Crook and Averell were able to cut the last railway linking Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's Atlanta Campaign was a success, although it dragged on through the fall.[4]

In early May, Grant and Meade's Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and entered the area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, beginning the six-week Overland Campaign. At the bloody but tactically inconclusive Battle of the Wilderness (May 5–7) and Battle of Spotsylvania Court House (May 8–21), Grant failed to destroy Lee's army but, unlike his predecessors, did not retreat after the battles; he repeatedly moved his army leftward to the southeast in a campaign that kept Lee on the defensive and moved ever closer to Richmond. Grant knew that his larger army and base of manpower in the North could sustain a war of attrition better than Lee and the Confederacy could. This theory was tested at the Battle of Cold Harbor where, on June 3, Grant lost over 12,000 men. It was a battle that he regretted more than any other and Northern newspapers thereafter frequently referred to him as a "butcher". Although Grant suffered high losses during the campaign—approximately 50,000 casualties, or 41%—Lee lost even higher percentages of his men—approximately 32,000, or 46%—losses that could not be replaced.[5]

On the night of June 12, Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to the James River. He was able to disguise his intentions from Lee, and his army crossed the river on a bridge of pontoons that stretched over 2,100 feet (640 m). What Lee had feared most of all—that Grant would force him into a siege of the capital city—was poised to occur, but Grant's immediate objective was now Petersburg, not Richmond. Petersburg, a prosperous city of 18,000, was a supply center for Richmond, given its strategic location just south of the capital, its site on the Appomattox River that provided navigable access to the James River, and its role as a major crossroads and junction for five railroads. The taking of Petersburg by Union forces would make it impossible for Robert E. Lee to continue defending Richmond. This represented a change of strategy from that of the preceding Overland Campaign, where confronting and defeating Lee's army in the open was the primary goal. Now, Grant selected a geographic and political target and knew that his superior resources could besiege Lee there, pin him down, and either starve him into submission or lure him out for a decisive battle. Lee at first believed that Grant's main target was Richmond and devoted only minimal troops under Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard to the defense of Petersburg.[6]

Opposing forces

Further information: [[:Confederate order of battle, Union order of battle]]
Key Union commanders

At the beginning of the campaign, Grant's Union forces consisted of the Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, and the Army of the James, under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler. The Army of the Potomac included:[7]

The Army of the James included:[11]

On December 3, 1864, the racially integrated X Corps and XVIII Corps were reorganized to become the all-white XXIV Corps and the all-black (officers excepted) XXV Corps.[12]

Grant made his headquarters in a cabin on the lawn of Appomattox Manor, the home of Dr. Richard Eppes and the oldest home (built in 1763) in what was then City Point, but is now Hopewell, Virginia.

Key Confederate commanders

Lee's Confederate force consisted of his own Army of Northern Virginia and a scattered, disorganized group of 10,000 boys and men defending Richmond under Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard. The Army of Northern Virginia was initially organized into four corps:[13]

Beauregard's Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia had four depleted divisions commanded by Maj. Gens. Robert Ransom, Jr., Robert F. Hoke, and William H. C. Whiting, and Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt. (Later in the campaign, Beauregard's department would be expanded and reorganized to consist of the divisions of Maj. Gens. Hoke and Bushrod Johnson.)[16]

Grant's armies were significantly larger than Lee's during the campaign, although the strengths varied. During the initial assaults on the city, 15,000 Federal troops faced about 5,400 men under Beauregard. By June 18, the Federal strength exceeded 67,000 against the Confederate 20,000. More typical of the full campaign was in mid-July, when 70,000 Union troops faced 36,000 Confederates around Petersburg, and 40,000 men under Butler faced 21,000 around Richmond.[17] The Union Army, despite suffering horrific losses during the Overland Campaign, was able to replenish its soldiers and equipment, taking advantage of garrison troops from Washington, D.C., and the increasing availability of African-American soldiers. By the end of the siege, Grant had 125,000 men to begin the Appomattox Campaign.[18] The Confederate army, in contrast, had difficulty replacing men lost through battle, disease, and desertion.

Initial attempts to capture Petersburg

Richmond–Petersburg Theater, fall 1864
  Confederate
  Union

Butler's assault (June 9)

Further information: [[:First Battle of Petersburg]]

While Lee and Grant faced each other after Cold Harbor, Benjamin Butler became aware that Confederate troops had been moving north to reinforce Lee, leaving the defenses of Petersburg in a vulnerable state. Sensitive to his failure in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, Butler sought to achieve a success to vindicate his generalship. He wrote, "the capture of Petersburg lay near my heart."[19]

Petersburg was protected by multiple lines of fortifications, the outermost of which was known as the Dimmock Line, a line of earthworks 10 miles long, east of the city. The 2,500 Confederates stretched thin along this defensive line were commanded by a former Virginia governor, Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise.[20]

Butler's plan was formulated on the afternoon of June 8, 1864, calling for three columns to cross the Appomattox and advance with 4,500 men. The first and second consisted of infantry from Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore's X Corps and U.S. Colored Troops from Brig. Gen. Edward W. Hinks's 3rd Division of XVIII Corps, which would attack the Dimmock Line east of the city. The third was 1,300 cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. August Kautz, who would sweep around Petersburg and strike it from the southeast. The troops moved out on the night of June 8, but made poor progress. Eventually the infantry crossed by 3:40 a.m. on June 9 and by 7 a.m., both Gillmore and Hinks had encountered the enemy, but stopped at their fronts. Gillmore told Hinks that he would attack but that both of the infantry columns should await the cavalry assault from the south.[21]

Kautz's men did not arrive until noon, however, having been delayed en route by numerous enemy pickets. They assaulted the Dimmock Line where it crossed the Jerusalem Plank Road (present-day U.S. Route 301, Crater Road). The Confederates' Battery 27, also known as Rives's Salient, was manned by 150 militiamen commanded by Maj. Fletcher H. Archer. Kautz first launched a probing attack, then paused. His main attack was by the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry against the Home Guard, a group consisting primarily of teenagers, elderly men, and some wounded soldiers from city hospitals. The Home Guards retreated to the city with heavy losses, but by this time Beauregard had been able to bring reinforcements from Richmond to bear, which were able to repulse the Union assault. Kautz, hearing no activity on Gillmore's front, presumed that he was left on his own and withdrew. Confederate casualties were about 80, Union 40. Butler was furious with Gillmore's timidity and incompetence and arrested him. Gillmore requested a court of inquiry, which was never convened, but Grant later reassigned him and the incident was dropped.[22]

Sukc MY LONG SCHLONG NIGGERS

Initial attempts to cut the railroads (June 21–30)

After failing to capture Petersburg by assault, Grant's first objective was secure the three remaining open rail lines that served Petersburg and Richmond: the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad; the South Side Railroad, which reached to Lynchburg in the west; and the Weldon Railroad, also called the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which led to Weldon, North Carolina, and the Confederacy's only remaining major port, Wilmington, North Carolina. Grant decided on a wide-ranging cavalry raid (the Wilson-Kautz Raid)[23] against the South Ride and Weldon railroads, but he also directed that a significant infantry force be sent against the Weldon closer to his current position. Meade selected the II Corps, still temporarily commanded by Birney,[24] and Wright's VI Corps.[25]

Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21–23)

Siege of Petersburg, movements against the railroads and A.P. Hill's counterattack, June 21–22
Further information: [[:Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road]]

On June 21, elements of the II Corps probed toward the railroad and skirmished with Confederate cavalry. By the morning of June 22, a gap opened up between the two corps. While the II Corps moved forward, the VI Corps encountered Confederate troops from Maj. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox's division of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill's corps and they began to entrench rather than advance. Brig. Gen. William Mahone observed that the gap between the two Union corps was widening, creating a prime target. Mahone had been a railroad engineer before the war and had personally surveyed this area south of Petersburg, so he was familiar with a ravine that could be used to hide the approach of a Confederate attack column. At 3 p.m., Mahone's men emerged in the rear of the II Corps division of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, catching them by surprise, and Barlow's division quickly collapsed. The division of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, which had erected earthworks, was also surprised by an attack from the rear and many of the regiments ran for safety. The II Corps troops rallied around earthworks that they had constructed on the night of June 21 and stabilized their lines. Darkness ended the fighting.[26]

On June 23, the II Corps advanced to retake its lost ground, but the Confederates had pulled back, abandoning the earthworks they had captured. Under orders from General Meade, the VI Corps sent out a heavy skirmish line after 10 a.m. in a second attempt to reach the Weldon Railroad. Men from Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Grant's 1st Vermont Brigade had begun tearing up track when they were attacked by a larger force of Confederate infantry. Numerous Vermonters were taken prisoner and only about half a mile of track had been destroyed when they were chased away. Meade was unable to urge Wright forward and called off the operation. Union casualties were 2,962, Confederate 572.[27] The battle was inconclusive, with advantages gained on both sides. The Confederates were able to retain control of the Weldon Railroad. The Federals were able to destroy a short segment of the Weldon before being driven off, but more importantly, the siege lines were stretched further to the west.[28]

Wilson-Kautz Raid (June 22 – July 1)

Further information: [[:Battle of Staunton River Bridge, Battle of Sappony Church, and First Battle of Ream's Station]]
Wilson-Kautz Raid, June 22 – July 1

In parallel to Birney's and Wright's infantry action at the Jerusalem Plank Road, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson was ordered by Meade to conduct a raid destroying as much track as possible south and southwest of Petersburg. Grant considered Wilson's 3rd Division of the Cavalry Corps too small to conduct the operation alone—particularly since Meade required Wilson to leave 1,400 men behind for picket duty—so he directed Butler to contribute Brig. Gen. August Kautz's small division (2,000 troopers) to the effort. Early on the morning of June 22, 3,300 men[29] and 12 guns, organized into two batteries, departed Mount Sinai Church and began to destroy railroad track and cars of the Weldon Railroad at Reams Station,[30] 7 miles south of Petersburg. Kautz's men moved to the west to Ford's Station and began destroying track, locomotives, and cars on the South Side Railroad.[31]

On June 23, Wilson proceeded to the junction of the Richmond and Danville Railroad at Burkeville, where he encountered elements of Rooney Lee's cavalry between Nottoway Court House and Black's and White's (modern-day Blackstone). The Confederates struck the rear of his column, forcing Col. George A. Chapman's brigade to fend them off. Wilson followed Kautz along the South Side Railroad, destroying about 30 miles (50 km) of track as he advanced. On June 24, while Kautz remained skirmishing around Burkeville, Wilson crossed over to Meherrin Station on the Richmond and Danville and began destroying track.[32]

Commanders of the Wilson-Kautz Raid

On June 25, Wilson and Kautz continued tearing up track south to the Staunton River Bridge at Roanoke Station (modern-day Randolph), where they encountered approximately 1,000 "Old Men and Boys" (the Home Guard), commanded by Capt. Benjamin L. Farinholt, dug in with earthworks and prepared artillery positions at the bridge. The Battle of Staunton River Bridge was a minor affair in which Kautz attempted multiple frontal assaults against the Home Guard, but his men never came closer than 80 yards. Lee's cavalry division closed on the Federals from the northeast and skirmish with Wilson's rear guard. Casualties on the Union side amounted to 42 killed, 44 wounded, and 30 missing or captured; Confederate losses were 10 killed and 24 wounded. Kautz's men gave up and retreated to the railroad depot at 9 p.m. Despite these relatively minor losses, the two Union cavalry generals decided to abandon their mission, leaving the Staunton River bridge intact and having inflicted only minor damage on the railroads.[33]

As Wilson and Kautz turned back to the east after their defeat at Staunton River Bridge, Rooney Lee's cavalry pursued and threatened their rear. Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee ordered Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton's cavalry, which had been engaged with Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's cavalry at the Battle of Trevilian Station on June 11–12, to join the pursuit and attack Wilson and Kautz. Before leaving on his raid, Wilson had received assurances from Meade's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, that the Army of the Potomac would be immediately taking control of the Weldon Railroad at least as far south as Reams Station, so Wilson decided that would be an appropriate place to return to Union lines. The Union defeat at Jerusalem Plank Road made those assurances inoperable. Wilson and Kautz were surprised on the afternoon of June 28 when they reached Stony Creek Station, 10 miles south of Reams, as hundreds of Hampton's cavalrymen (under Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss) and infantry blocked their path. In the Battle of Sappony Church, Wilson's men tried to break through, but had to fall back when Confederate Brig. Gen. Matthew C. Butler and Thomas L. Rosser threatened to envelop Wilson's left flank. Kautz's division, following Wilson's, took a back road in the direction of Reams Station and was attacked by Rooney Lee's division late in the day. The Union cavalrymen were able to slip out of the trap under the cover of darkness and rode north on the Halifax Road for the supposed security of Reams Station.[34]

"Dictator" siege mortar on the U.S. Military Railroad at Petersburg

In the First Battle of Reams Station on June 29, Kautz approached Reams Station from the west expecting to find the friendly infantry promised by Humphreys, but found Confederate infantry instead—Mahone's division blocking the approaches to the Halifax Road and the railroad behind well constructed earthworks. Kautz's attack by the 11th Pennsylvania and the 1st District of Columbia Cavalry along the Depot Road was unsuccessful and Mahone counterattacked against the flank of the Pennsylvanians. On the Stage Road to the north of the station, the brigades of Brig. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax and William C. Whitcomb maneuvered around the 2nd Ohio and 5th New York Cavalry, turning the Federal left flank. Wilson sent a messenger north who was able to slip through the Confederate lines and urgently requested help from Meade at City Point. Meade alerted Wright to prepare to move his entire VI Corps to Reams Station, but he realized that it would take too long on foot and requested help from Phil Sheridan's cavalry as well. Sheridan demurred, complaining of the effect on his "worn-out horses and exhausted men." After the war, arguments persisted between Sheridan and Wilson about whether the former had adequately protected the raiders from the Confederate cavalry of Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Sheridan did reach Reams Station by 7 p.m., only to find that the VI Corps infantry had in fact arrived but that Wilson and Kautz had departed.[35]

Caught in a trap without promise of immediate aid, the Wilson-Kautz raiders burned their wagons and destroyed their artillery pieces and fled to the north before the reinforcements arrived. They lost hundreds of men as prisoners in what was called "a wild skedaddle." At least 300 escaped slaves who had joined the Union cavalrymen during the raid were abandoned during the retreat. The raiders reentered Federal lines around 2 p.m. on July 1. They had destroyed 60 miles of track, which took the Confederate several weeks to repair, but it came at the cost of 1,445 Union casualties, or about a quarter of their force (Wilson lost 33 killed, 108 wounded, and 674 captured or missing; Kautz lost 48 killed, 153 wounded, and 429 captured or missing). Although Wilson counted the raid as a strategic success, Ulysses S. Grant reluctantly describe the expedition as a "disaster."[36]

First Deep Bottom (July 27–29)

First Battle of Deep Bottom, July 27–29
Further information: [[:First Battle of Deep Bottom]]

In preparation for the forthcoming Battle of the Crater, Grant wanted Lee to dilute his forces in the Petersburg trenches by attracting them elsewhere. He ordered Hancock's II Corps and two divisions of Sheridan's Cavalry Corps to cross the river to Deep Bottom by pontoon bridge and advance against the Confederate capital. His plan called for Hancock to pin down the Confederates at Chaffin's Bluff and prevent reinforcements from opposing Sheridan's cavalry, which would attack Richmond if practicable. If not—a circumstance Grant considered more likely—Sheridan was ordered to ride around the city to the north and west and cut the Virginia Central Railroad, which was supplying Richmond from the Shenandoah Valley.[37]

When Lee found out about Hancock's pending movement, he ordered that the Richmond lines be reinforced to 16,500 men. Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw's division and brigades from Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox's division moved east on New Market Road and took up positions on the eastern face of New Market Heights. Hancock and Sheridan crossed the pontoon bridge starting at 3 a.m., July 27. The II Corps took up positions on the east bank of Bailey's Creek, from New Market Road to near Fussell's Mill. Sheridan's cavalry captured the high ground on the right, overlooking the millpond, but they were counterattacked and driven back. The Confederate works on the west bank of Bailey's Creek were formidable and Hancock chose not to attack them, spending the rest of the day performing reconnaissance.[38]

While Hancock was stymied at Bailey's Creek, Robert E. Lee began bringing up more reinforcements from Petersburg, reacting as Grant had hoped. He assigned Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson to take command of the Deep Bottom sector and sent in Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's infantry division and Maj. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalry division. Troops were also hurriedly detailed from the Department of Richmond to help the man the trenches.[39]

On the morning of July 28, Grant reinforced Hancock with a brigade of the XIX Corps. Sheridan's men attempted to turn the Confederate left, but their movement was disrupted by a Confederate attack. Three brigades attacked Sheridan's right flank, but they were unexpectedly hit by heavy fire from the Union repeating carbines. Mounted Federals in Sheridan's reserve pursued and captured nearly 200 prisoners.[40]

No further combat occurred and the expedition against Richmond and its railroads was terminated on the afternoon of July 28. Satisfied that the operation had distracted sufficient Confederate forces from his front, General Grant determined to proceed with the assault against the Crater on July 30.[41]

Union casualties at the First Battle of Deep Bottom were 488 (62 killed, 340 wounded, and 86 missing or captured); Confederate casualties were 679 (80 killed, 391 wounded, 208 missing or captured).[42]

The Crater (July 30)

Siege of Petersburg, Battle of the Crater, June 30
Further information: [[:Battle of the Crater]]

Grant wanted to defeat Lee's army without resorting to a lengthy siege—his experience in the Siege of Vicksburg told him that such affairs were expensive and difficult on the morale of his men. Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, commanding the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps, offered a novel proposal to solve Grant's problem. Pleasants, a mining engineer from Pennsylvania in civilian life, proposed digging a long mine shaft underneath the Confederate lines and planting explosive charges directly underneath a fort (Elliott's Salient) in the middle of the Confederate First Corps line. If successful, Union troops could drive through the resulting gap in the line into the Confederate rear area. Digging began in late June, creating a mine in a "T" shape with an approach shaft 511 feet (156 m) long. At its end, a perpendicular gallery of 75 feet (23 m) extended in both directions. The gallery was filled with 8,000 pounds of gunpowder, buried 20 feet (6.1 m) underneath the Confederate works.[43]

Burnside had trained a division of United States Colored Troops (USCT) under Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero to lead the assault. Two regiments were to leave the attack column and extend the breach by rushing perpendicular to the crater, while the remaining regiments were to rush through, seizing the Jerusalem Plank Road. Burnside's two other divisions, made up of white troops, would then move in, supporting Ferrero's flanks and race for Petersburg itself. However, the day before the attack, Meade, who lacked confidence in the operation, ordered Burnside not to use the black troops in the lead assault, claiming that if the attack failed black soldiers would be killed needlessly, creating political repercussions in the North. Burnside protested to General Grant, who sided with Meade. When volunteers were not forthcoming Burnside selected a replacement white division by having the three commanders draw lots. Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie's 1st Division was selected, but he failed to brief the men on what was expected of them and was reported during the battle to be drunk, well behind the lines, and providing no leadership. (Ledlie would be dismissed for his actions during the battle.)[44]

Sketch of the explosion seen from the Union line.

At 4:44 a.m. on June 30, the charges exploded in a massive shower of earth, men, and guns. A crater (still visible today) was created, 170 feet (52 m) long, 60 to 80 feet (24 m) wide, and 30 feet (9.1 m) deep. Between 250 and 350 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast. Ledlie's untrained white division was not prepared for the explosion, and reports indicate they waited ten minutes before leaving their own entrenchments. Once they had wandered to the crater, instead of moving around it as the black troops had been trained to do, they moved down into the crater itself. The Confederates, under Maj. Gen. William Mahone, gathered as many troops together as they could for a counterattack. In about an hour's time, they had formed up around the crater and began firing rifles and artillery down into it, in what Mahone later described as a "turkey shoot". The plan had failed, but Burnside, instead of cutting his losses, sent in Ferrero's men. Now faced with considerable flanking fire, they also went down into the crater, and for the next few hours, Mahone's soldiers, along with those of Maj. Gen. Bushrod Johnson and artillery, slaughtered the men of the IX Corps as they attempted to escape from the crater. Some Union troops eventually advanced and flanked to the right beyond the Crater to the earthworks and assaulted the Confederate lines, driving the Confederates back for several hours in hand-to-hand combat. Mahone's Confederates conducted a sweep out of a sunken gully area about 200 yards (180 m) from the right side of the Union advance. This charge reclaimed the earthworks and drove the Union force back towards the east.[45]

Grant wrote that, "It was the saddest affair I have witnessed in the war."[46] Union casualties were 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured), Confederate casualties were approximately 1,500 (200 killed, 900 wounded, 400 missing or captured). Many of these losses were suffered by Ferrero's division of the USCT. Burnside was relieved of command.[47]

Second Deep Bottom (August 14–20)

Second Battle of Deep Bottom, August 14–20
Further information: [[:Second Battle of Deep Bottom]]

On the same day the Union failed at the Crater, Confederate Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early was burning the town of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, as he operated out of the Shenandoah Valley, threatening towns in Maryland and Pennsylvania, as well as the District of Columbia. Robert E. Lee was concerned about actions that Grant might take against Early and sent the infantry division of Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw from Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's corps and the cavalry division commanded by Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee to Culpeper, Virginia, where they could either provide aid to Early or be recalled to the Richmond-Petersburg front as needed. Grant misinterpreted this movement and assumed that Anderson's entire corps had been removed from the vicinity of Richmond, leaving only about 8,500 men north of the James River. He determined to try again with an advance toward the Confederate capital led by Hancock. This would either prevent reinforcements from aiding Early or once again dilute the Confederate strength in the defensive lines around Petersburg.[48]

On August 13, the X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. David B. Birney, and Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry division crossed pontoon bridges from Bermuda Hundred to Deep Bottom. The II Corps crossed by steamships the night of August 13–14. Birney's X Corps troops successfully pushed aside pickets on the Kingsland Road, but were stopped by the fortifications on New Market Heights. The II Corps units moved slowly into position, suffering numerous deaths from heat stroke.[49]

It was not until midday on August 14 that the Union made contact with the Confederates, manning rifle pits on the Darbytown Road just north of the Long Bridge Road. The Union generals were surprised at the Confederate strength. On the right, a full Confederate division commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field was dug in. Chaffin's Bluff was defended by a division under Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and reinforcements were arriving. Bri. Gen. Francis C. Barlow's 10,000 men in two divisions of II Corps attacked Fussell's Mill. They were able to drive away two Confederate cavalry regiments at the mill, but they were repulsed by Brig. Gem George T. Anderson's brigade. When Field took Anderson's brigade from his right flank, it weakened the line in front of Birney's corps, which moved forward and occupied some of the Confederate entrenchments and captured four guns.[50]

Although the Union attacks had been generally unsuccessful, they had some of the effect Grant desired. Lee became convinced that the threat against Richmond was a serious one and he dispatched two infantry brigades of Maj. Gen. William Mahone's division and the cavalry divisions of Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton and W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee. Hancock ordered Birney's corps to make a night march to join Barlow's end of the line. Birney's movement was delayed by difficult terrain for most of August 15 and Hancock's plan for an attack was abandoned for the day.[51]

On August 16, Gregg's cavalry swept to the right and rode northwest on the Charles City Road toward Richmond. They found Rooney Lee's cavalry division blocking the road and a full day of fighting resulted. Confederate Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss was killed during the fighting. The infantrymen of the X Corps had a better start to the day, as Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry's division broke through the Confederate line. Wright's Brigade was hit hard and retreated, opening a significant gap. The heavily wooded terrain prevented Birney and Hancock from understanding that they had reached a position of advantage and they were unable to exploit it before Field rearranged his lines to fill the gap and drive back the Federals.[52]

Lee planned a counterattack against the Union right for 11 a.m. on August 18, but it was poorly coordinated and made no significant gains. On the night of August 20, Hancock withdrew his force back over the James. Union casualties were approximately 2,900 men, some due to heat stroke. Confederate casualties were 1,500.[53]

Operations against the Weldon Railroad

Siege of Petersburg, capture of the Weldon Railroad, August 18-19

Globe Tavern

Further information: [[:Battle of Globe Tavern]]

While Hancock's command demonstrated north of the James River at Deep Bottom, the Union V Corps and elements of the IX and II Corps under command of Gouverneur K. Warren were withdrawn from the Petersburg entrenchments to operate against the Weldon Railroad. At dawn on August 18, Warren advanced, driving back Confederate pickets until reaching the railroad at Globe Tavern. In the afternoon, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's Confederate division attacked driving Ayres's division back toward the tavern. Both sides entrenched during the night. On August 19, William Mahone, whose division had been hastily returned from north of James River, attacked with five infantry brigades, rolling up the right flank of Crawford's division. Heavily reinforced, Warren counterattacked and by nightfall had retaken most of the ground lost during the afternoon's fighting. On August 20, the Federals laid out and entrenched a strong defensive line covering the Blick House and Globe Tavern and extending east to connect with the main Federal lines at Jerusalem Plank Road. On August 21, Hill probed the new Federal line for weaknesses but could not penetrate the Union defenses. With the fighting at Globe Tavern, Grant succeeded in extending his siege lines to the west and cutting Petersburg's primary rail connection with Wilmington, North Carolina. The Confederates were now forced to off-load rail cars at Stony Creek Station for a 30-mile (50 km) wagon haul up Boydton Plank Road to reach Petersburg.[54]

Second Reams Station

Further information: [[:Second Battle of Ream's Station]]

On August 24, the Union II Corps moved south along the Weldon Railroad, tearing up track, preceded by Gregg's cavalry division. On August 25, Heth attacked and overran the faulty Union position at Reams Station, capturing 9 guns, 12 colors, and many prisoners. The old II Corps was shattered. Hancock withdrew to the main Union line near the Jerusalem Plank Road, bemoaning the declining combat effectiveness of his troops.[55]

Union offensives, late September

New Market Heights

Further information: [[:Battle of Chaffin's Farm]]

During the night of September 28–29, Butler's Army of the James crossed the James River to assault the Richmond defenses north of the river. The columns attacked at dawn. After initial Union successes at New Market Heights and Fort Harrison, the Confederates rallied and contained the breakthrough. Lee reinforced his lines north of the James and, on September 30, he counterattacked unsuccessfully. The Federals entrenched, and the Confederates erected a new line of works cutting off the captured forts. As Grant anticipated, Lee shifted troops to meet the threat against Richmond, weakening his lines at Petersburg.[56]

Peebles Farm

Further information: [[:Battle of Peebles' Farm]]

In combination with Butler's offensive north of the James River, Grant extended his left flank to cut Confederate lines of communication southwest of Petersburg. Two divisions of the IX corps under Maj. Gen. John G. Parke, two divisions of the V Corps under Warren, and Gregg's cavalry division were assigned to the operation. On September 30, the Federals marched via Poplar Spring Church to reach Squirrel Level and Vaughan Roads. The initial Federal attack overran Fort Archer, flanking the Confederates out of their Squirrel Level Road line. Late afternoon, Confederate reinforcements arrived, slowing the Federal advance. On October 1, the Federals repulsed a Confederate counterattack directed by A.P. Hill. Reinforced by Maj. Gen. Gershom Mott's division, the Federals resumed their advance on October 2, captured Fort MacRae (which was lightly defended) and extended their left flank to the vicinity of Peebles' and Pegram's Farms. With these limited successes, Meade suspended the offensive. A new line was entrenched from the Federal works on Weldon Railroad to Pegram's Farm.[57]

Actions near Richmond, October

Siege of Petersburg, actions on October 27

Darbytown and New Market Roads

Further information: [[:Battle of Darbytown and New Market Roads]]

Responding to the loss of Fort Harrison and the increasing Federal threat against Richmond, Gen. Robert E. Lee directed an offensive against the Union far right flank on October 7. After routing the Federal cavalry from their position covering Darbytown Road, Field's and Hoke's divisions assaulted the main Union defensive line along New Market Road and were repulsed. The Federals were not dislodged, and Lee withdrew into the Richmond defenses.[58]

Darbytown Road

Further information: [[:Battle of Darbytown Road]]

On October 13, Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Federal brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road.[59]

Fair Oaks and Darbytown Road

Further information: [[:Battle of Fair Oaks and Darbytown Road]]

In combination with movements against the Boydton Plank Road at Petersburg, Benjamin Butler attacked the Richmond defenses along Darbytown Road with the X Corps. The XVIII Corps marched north to Fair Oaks where it was soundly repulsed by Field's Confederate division. Confederate forces counterattacked, taking some 600 prisoners. The Richmond defenses remained intact. Of Grant's offensives north of the James River, this was repulsed most easily.[60]

Boydton Plank Road

Further information: [[:Battle of Boydton Plank Road]]

Directed by Hancock, divisions from three Union corps (II, V, and IX) and Gregg's cavalry division, numbering more than 30,000 men, withdrew from the Petersburg lines and marched west to operate against the Boydton Plank Road and South Side Railroad. The initial Union advance on October 27 gained the Boydton Plank Road, a major campaign objective. But that afternoon, a counterattack near Burgess' Mill spearheaded by Henry Heth's division, and Wade Hampton's cavalry isolated the II Corps and forced a retreat. The Confederates retained control of the Boydton Plank Road for the rest of the winter. It marked the last battle for Hancock, who resigned from field command because of injuries sustained at Gettysburg.[61]

Hatcher's Run

Siege of Petersburg, actions preceding Five Forks
Further information: [[:Battle of Hatcher's Run]]

On February 5, 1865, Gregg's cavalry division rode out to the Boydton Plank Road via Ream's Station and Dinwiddie Court House in an attempt to intercept Confederate supply trains. Warren's V Corps crossed Hatcher's Run and took up a blocking position on the Vaughan Road to prevent interference with Gregg's operations. Two divisions of the II Corps under Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys shifted west to near Armstrong's Mill to cover Warren's right flank. Late in the day, John B. Gordon attempted to turn Humphrey's right flank near the mill but was repulsed. During the night, the Federals were reinforced by two divisions. On February 6, Gregg returned to Gravelly Run on Vaughan Road from his unsuccessful raid and was attacked by elements of Brig. Gen. John Pegram's Confederate division. Warren pushed forward a reconnaissance in the vicinity of Dabney's Mill and was attacked by Pegram's and Mahone's divisions. Pegram was killed in the action. Although the Union advance was stopped, the Federals extended their siegeworks to the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's Run.[62]

Confederate breakout attempt

Further information: [[:Battle of Fort Stedman]]

As the siege continued, Grant attempted to break or encircle the Confederate forces in multiple attacks moving from east to west, and both armies' lines were stretched out until they surrounded the city. By March 1865, the siege had taken an enormous toll on both armies, and Lee decided to pull out of Petersburg. He amassed nearly half of his army in an attempt to break through Grant's Petersburg defenses and threaten his supply depot at City Point. Led by Gordon, the pre-dawn assault on March 25 overpowered the garrisons of Fort Stedman and Batteries X, XI, and XII. The Confederates were brought under a killing crossfire, and counterattacks led by Maj. Gens. Parke and John F. Hartranft contained the breakthrough, cutting off and capturing more than 1,900 of the attackers. During the day, elements of the II and VI Corps assaulted and captured the entrenched picket lines in their respective fronts, which had been weakened for the assault on Fort Stedman.[63]

Aftermath

Grant's final assaults and Lee's retreat (start of the Appomattox Campaign)

After nearly ten months of siege, the loss at Fort Stedman was a devastating blow for Lee's army, setting up the Confederate defeat at Five Forks on April 1, the Union breakthrough at Petersburg on April 2, the surrender of the city of Petersburg at dawn on April 3, and Richmond that same evening.

After his victory at Five Forks, Grant ordered an assault along the entire Confederate line beginning at dawn on April 2. Parke's IX Corps overran the eastern trenches but were met with stiff resistance. At 5:30 a.m. on April 2, Wright's VI Corps made a decisive breakthrough along the Boydton Plank Road line. Wright's initial breakthrough was halted mid-day at Fort Gregg. Gibbon's XXIV Corps overran Fort Gregg after a heroic Confederate defense. This halt in the advance into the city of Petersburg allowed Lee to pull his forces out of Petersburg and Richmond on the night of April 2, and head for the west in an attempt to meet up with forces under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. The resulting Appomattox Campaign led to Lee's surrender on April 9 at Appomattox Court House.

Confederate soldier killed during the final Union assault against the trenches at Petersburg. Photo by Thomas C. Roche.

Richmond–Petersburg was a costly campaign for both sides. The initial assaults on Petersburg in June 1864 cost the Union 11,386 casualties, to approximately 4,000 for the Confederate defenders. The casualties for the siege warfare that concluded with the assault on Fort Stedman are estimated to be 42,000 for the Union, and 28,000 for the Confederates.[64]

Classifying the campaigns

Military historians do not agree on precise boundaries between the campaigns of this era. This article uses the classification maintained by the U.S. National Park Service's American Battlefield Protection Program.[65]

An alternative classification is maintained by West Point; in their Atlas of American Wars (Esposito, 1959), the Siege of Petersburg ends with the Union assault and breakthrough of April 2. The remainder of the war in Virginia is classified as "Grant's Pursuit of Lee to Appomattox Court House (3–9 April 1865)".[66] Trudeau's Last Citadel conforms to this classification.[67]

See also

References

  • Bonekemper, Edward H., III, A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military Genius, Regnery, 2004, ISBN 0-89526-062-X.
  • Davis, William C., and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg, Time-Life Books, 1986, ISBN 0-8094-4776-2.
  • Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
  • Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
  • Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C., Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship, Indiana University Press, 1957, ISBN 0-253-13400-5.
  • Greene, A. Wilson, The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign: Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion, University of Tennessee Press, 2008, ISBN 978-1-57233-610-0.
  • Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War, University of Illinois Press, 1983, ISBN 0-252-00918-5.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998, ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
  • Lankford, Nelson, Richmond Burning: The Last Days of the Confederate Capital, Viking, 2002, ISBN 0-670-03117-8.
  • Longacre, Edward G., Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac, Stackpole Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8117-1049-1.
  • Salmon, John S., The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide, Stackpole Books, 2001, ISBN 0-8117-2868-4.
  • Sommers, Richard J., Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg, Doubleday, 1981, ISBN 0-385-15626-X.[68]
  • Starr, Stephen Z., The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Volume II: The War in the East from Gettysburg to Appomattox 1863–1865, Louisiana State University Press, 1981, ISBN 978-0-8071-3292-0.
  • Trudeau, Noah Andre, The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864 – April 1865, Louisiana State University Press, 1991, ISBN 0-8071-1861-3.
  • Template:NPS.Gov

Notes

  1. ^ National Archives Civil War photo 115, "Soldiers in the trenches before battle, Petersburg, Va., 1865. 111-B-157."
  2. ^ Military historians do not agree on precise boundaries between the campaigns of this era. This article uses the classification maintained by the U.S. National Park Service. See Classifying the campaigns.
  3. ^ Eicher, pp. 661, 691-92; Davis, p. 18; Salmon, p. 251; Fuller, pp. 207-08.
  4. ^ Eicher, pp. 680-82, 691-93; Davis, p. 18; Hattaway and Jones, pp. 517-26; Fuller, pp. 207-08, 229-30.
  5. ^ Eicher, pp. 663-87; Hattaway and Jones, pp. 540-46, 552-67, 577-80; Salmon, pp. 251-58; Bonekemper, p. 190.
  6. ^ Davis, pp. 34-36; Eicher, p. 687; Hattaway and Jones, pp. 588-91; Salmon, pp. 395-96.
  7. ^ Trudeau, pp. 486-92.
  8. ^ Trudeau, p. 489.
  9. ^ Trudeau, p. 490.
  10. ^ Trudeau, p. 491.
  11. ^ Trudeau, pp. 492-95.
  12. ^ Trudeau, p. 485.
  13. ^ Trudeau, pp. 495-501.
  14. ^ Trudeau, p. 227.
  15. ^ Trudeau, p. 501.
  16. ^ Eicher, p. 680.
  17. ^ Davis, pp. 18, 49, 64.
  18. ^ Eicher, p. 806.
  19. ^ Salmon, p. 395; Davis, p. 27.
  20. ^ Kennedy, p. 352; Salmon, pp. 401-03.
  21. ^ Davis, pp. 27-31; Kennedy, p. 352; Salmon, p. 401.
  22. ^ Davis, p. 33; Kennedy, p. 352; Salmon, p. 403.
  23. ^ Salmon, p. 406, considers the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road to be the initial action of the Wilson-Kautz raid of June 22–30, but this is not a convention widely accepted by other historians.
  24. ^ Trudeau, p. 65. Despite Hancock's incapacitation, he chose to accompany the column.
  25. ^ Salmon, p. 406; Trudeau, p. 63-65.
  26. ^ Kennedy, pp. 353-54; Eicher, p. 690; Trudeau, pp. 69-74; Salmon, pp. 406-08.
  27. ^ Kennedy, 354. Trudeau, p. 78, lists the Union II Corps casualties as 650 killed and wounded, 1,742 captured; VI Corps casualties as 150. on the Confederate side, Trudeau, p. 80, lists Mahone's casualties as 421, Wilcox's 151.
  28. ^ Kennedy, p. 354; Trudeau, pp. 80-81.
  29. ^ Longacre, p. 289; Salmon, 397; Kennedy, p. 303, and Salmon, p. 410, cite 5,500 men.
  30. ^ Located at the currently unincorporated community of Reams, Virginia, this railroad station is referred to variously as Reams, Ream's, and Reams's Station.
  31. ^ Salmon, p. 397; Longacre, pp. 287-89; Starr, pp. 179-81.
  32. ^ Longacre, p. 289; Starr, pp. 181-91.
  33. ^ Salmon, pp. 411-13; Longacre, pp. 289-90; Starr, pp. 191-93.
  34. ^ Salmon, pp. 414-15; Longacre, pp. 290-91; Starr, pp. 193-96.
  35. ^ Salmon, pp. 414-15; Starr, pp. 197-204.
  36. ^ Longacre, pp. 292-93; Salmon, pp. 415-16; Starr, pp. 203-07. Casualty figures are from Starr. Kennedy, p. 355, cites the total of 1,445. Salmon claims 1,800.
  37. ^ Davis, 69-70; Salmon, p. 416; Horn, p. 102.
  38. ^ Horn, p. 103; Salmon, pp. 416-18.
  39. ^ Horn, p. 107.
  40. ^ Davis, p. 70; Salmon, p. 418; Horn, pp. 107-08.
  41. ^ Horn, p. 108.
  42. ^ Bonekemper, p. 314. Salmon, p. 418, estimates 488 Union, 650 Confederate. Horn, p. 108, estimates 488 Union, 700 Confederate. Kennedy, p. 355, estimates 1,000 total.
  43. ^ Eicher, pp. 720-21; Davis, pp. 67-69, 72; Trudeau, pp. 99-105; Kennedy, p. 355; Salmon, pp. 418-20.
  44. ^ Trudeau, pp. 106-07; Eicher, p. 721; Salmon, pp. 420-21; Davis, p. 74; Kennedy, p. 355.
  45. ^ Davis, pp. 75-88; Trudeau, pp. 109-26; Salmon, pp. 420-21; Eicher, pp. 721-22.
  46. ^ Kennedy, p. 356.
  47. ^ Bonekemper, p. 315. Trudeau, p. 127 cites 3,798 Union, 1,491 Confederate (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured). Davis, p. 89, cites 3,500 Union casualties, 1,500 Confederate. Eicher, p. 723, cites 4,400 total casualties. Kennedy, p. 356, and Salmon, p. 421, cite 3,798 Union casualties, 1,491 Confederate.
  48. ^ Davis, p. 95; Trudeau, pp. 142-43.
  49. ^ Trudeau, pp. 147-52; Horn, pp. 120, 127; Davis, pp. 95-97; Salmon, p. 423.
  50. ^ Horn, pp. 127-28; Trudeau, pp. 151-52; Davis, pp. 97-98; Salmon, p. 423.
  51. ^ Trudeau, pp. 153-54; Davis, p. 98; Horn, p. 128; Salmon, p. 423.
  52. ^ Trudeau, pp. 154-57; Horn, pp. 129-31; Kennedy, pp. 356-57; Davis, p. 99; Salmon, p. 423.
  53. ^ Kennedy, p. 357; Trudeau, pp. 160-61, 164, 170; Horn, pp. 131-32; Davis, p. 99; Salmon, p. 424. Casualty figures from Bonekemper, p. 314. Trudeau, p. 170, estimates 2,901 Union, 1,000 Confederate. Salmon, p. 418, and Kennedy, p. 357, estimate 2,900 Union, 1,300 Confederate. Horn, p. 108, estimates 2,901 Union, 1,500 Confederate.
  54. ^ NPS, Globe Tavern.
  55. ^ NPS, Reams Station II.
  56. ^ NPS, Chaffin's Farm and New Market Heights.
  57. ^ NPS, Peebles Farm.
  58. ^ NPS, Darbytown and New Market Roads.
  59. ^ NPS, Darbytown Road.
  60. ^ NPS, Fair Oaks and Darbytown Road.
  61. ^ NPS, Boydton Plank Road.
  62. ^ NPS, Hatcher's Run.
  63. ^ NPS, Fort Stedman.
  64. ^ Bonekemper, p. 323.
  65. ^ NPS campaigns. The references by Kennedy and Salmon also use this classification.
  66. ^ Esposito, maps 138-44.
  67. ^ Trudeau, pp. 355-98.
  68. ^ Despite the broad title chosen, Sommer's work covers only those battles between September 29 and October 2, 1864.

External links

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