Talk:Battle of the Coral Sea/Archive 1
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Archive 1 |
Draft entry
Replaced stub with draft entry. I'll tidy up details shortly - add links, check spelling, etc. Tannin 12:38 Dec 16, 2002 (UTC) Done. (At least for now). Tannin 13:34 Dec 16, 2002 (UTC) Just wondering, why does it say US had 2 large carriers and 3 cruisers? wouldn't it be better to write "2 large carriers and their escort"? because the cruisers didnt do anything, and generally they were used as escorts (at least in that time, when it was generally a defensive strategy to use carriers protected by anti-air destroyers/cruisers)... just a though. ugen64 01:47, Oct 7, 2003 (UTC) The convention when referring to larger naval task forces of the era is to name the aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers and to talk about the smaller ships in more general terms. That is simply a function of numbers, as the sheer number of smaller ships would overwhelm virtually any account with a massive amount of detail. David Newton 00:50, 9 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Invasion of Australia
There was never "a reasonable probability that northern Australia would be invaded"; IJA had neither the manpower nor the shipping for it. IJA could not have successfully occupied Hawaii. See Wilmott and Barhart. Trekphiler (talk) 07:38, 18 September 2005
- It depends whether "invaded" means "occupied" or "attacked by ground forces". Hawaii was a fortress compared to northern Australia in mid-1942. The Northern Territory had been at serious risk of some kind of surface attack since February, following the air raids on Darwin, February 19, 1942. The Battle of the Java Sea had all but destroyed Allied naval power in the eastern Indian Ocean and Arafura Sea; apart from subs, the main offensive presence was the obsolete cruiser HMAS Adelaide (1918). There were virtually no operational combat aircraft to the north west of a line between Perth and the tip of Cape York. Grant65 (Talk) 12:45, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
- Saburo Sakai, a Japanese aviator who fought in this theater during most of 1942 (April - August) describes it as a hard-fought campaign the whole way through. (Any aircraft in New Guinea could have been redeployed back to Australia in the event of a Japanese victory). The only way this would even be plausible is if Japan launched an invasion in lieu of the Midway Operation, which they were already committed to by May 1942. Even if you grant the Japanese overwhelming victories at both Coral Sea/Port Morseby and Midway, Japan would still only have a slight edge over Allied naval forces, and certainly would lack the decisive air, land, and seapower (let alone logistics) necessary to launch an invasion. Read the CombinedFleet article on the Hawaiian invasion and then remember that Eastern Australia alone is as big as the Eastern Front or the China Theater with a somewhat sizeable population. In short, the Japanese may have talked about it, but any serious study would have shown it was utterly impractical. Palm_Dogg 03:43, 30 October 2005 (UTC)
- Parshall's Shattered Sword (p. 52) states that Japan's military leadership was seriously considering an invasion of Australia if everything else went according to plan, such as a victory at Midway and successful operations against Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. The Japanese Army was also wary that they wouldn't be able to reallocate enough units from the Chinese and Burma/India fronts for an invasion of Australia, but an Australia operation was under consideration. Cla68 (talk) 12:51, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- "seriously considering an invasion of Australia" They were "seriously considering" an invasion of the Soviet Union in August 1945, too. That was as much a fantasy. IJA leadership had no chance of lifting the divisions it would take; even given the abysmal performance of the MkXIV, IJA shipping wasn't adequate for it. And IJN was d*mn unlikely to offer 'em any without a quid quo pro, like support for an invasion of Hawaii, Yamamoto's favorite pipedream. I wanna know what dope these guys were smoking. 13:47, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Parshall's Shattered Sword (p. 52) states that Japan's military leadership was seriously considering an invasion of Australia if everything else went according to plan, such as a victory at Midway and successful operations against Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. The Japanese Army was also wary that they wouldn't be able to reallocate enough units from the Chinese and Burma/India fronts for an invasion of Australia, but an Australia operation was under consideration. Cla68 (talk) 12:51, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Saburo Sakai, a Japanese aviator who fought in this theater during most of 1942 (April - August) describes it as a hard-fought campaign the whole way through. (Any aircraft in New Guinea could have been redeployed back to Australia in the event of a Japanese victory). The only way this would even be plausible is if Japan launched an invasion in lieu of the Midway Operation, which they were already committed to by May 1942. Even if you grant the Japanese overwhelming victories at both Coral Sea/Port Morseby and Midway, Japan would still only have a slight edge over Allied naval forces, and certainly would lack the decisive air, land, and seapower (let alone logistics) necessary to launch an invasion. Read the CombinedFleet article on the Hawaiian invasion and then remember that Eastern Australia alone is as big as the Eastern Front or the China Theater with a somewhat sizeable population. In short, the Japanese may have talked about it, but any serious study would have shown it was utterly impractical. Palm_Dogg 03:43, 30 October 2005 (UTC)
the current version is empty...due to last edit by Tommy515
Its pretty disturbing how often this article is being vandalised. Jeez Tommy515, if you want to say how great ur "mum" is say it elsewhere. Anyhow thanks to EricR for reverting it back. (Yamam 09:38, 17 February 2006 (UTC))
Clear one edit
I rewrote this:
- " the Allies had lost a dozen battleships and carriers, and had been unable"
It's far from clear how many of each were sunk; specify. Also, attribute the famous quote, "scratch one flattop", or take it out. OK?
I also deleted this:
- "a very close-fought encounter where an additional carrier might have tipped the balance."
It's far from clear this is so. Trekphiler 12:15 & 12:21, 19 November 2006 (UTC)
What does this mean: "two heavy cruisers, a large plane" Does it mean "Many planes?" " Aircraft carriers with their complements of planes? " While I'm here, what are the editors proposing to change?Witnessforpeace 03:08, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
- "A large plane" was old vandalism -- I've fixed it, along with various other things by reverting the article back a few weeks. I'm not sure what your last question refers to. Grant | Talk 04:35, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
The Lexington did NOT sink
Yes it was out of action for a few weeks.But it is undeniable that it fought in the Battle of Midway,so dont write that the U.S.S. Lexington was a "casualty".The battle was a strategic draw. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 76.22.84.93 (talk) 23:52, 15 April 2007 (UTC).
Excuse me,I was wrong,that was the Yorktown,do not change anything.
Tactical Draw
I think this is a well written article and with some additional work will get up to featured article quality. One point I'd like to make is that the analysis of the battle needs refinement:
"In tactical terms, the Japanese had achieved a narrow victory: one small carrier lost and a large carrier severely damaged against the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another. But from the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out almost even was close enough to a victory as not to matter."
This tactical analysis is debateable. I'm not saying it's wrong, but it is only partial. In terms of _ships_ sunk the Japanese won at Coral Sea. 1 American heavy carrier sunk (which sank hours later so the Japanese may not have been sure the day after) and a couple of smaller ships sunk vs. 1 light Japanese carrier and heavy damage to a heavy carrier plus some smaller ships sunk (destroyer at Tulagi and also a cruiser from the Shoho screen if I remember right).
Another analysis would look at aircraft. Because of the delay in the Lexington's sinking and interim repairs she was able to recover her planes and then when things went south a few hours later enough were flown over to the Yorktown that the she actually had a full complement of _undamaged_ planes the morning after the battle. The Japanese had to push undamaged planes over the side of the Zuikaku to make room for damaged planes of the Shokaku's. As I recall (it's been over 10 years) Saburo Sakai stated that the Japanese had only a couple of dozen planes ready to fly the morning after. Thus one could argue that tactically the U.S. owned the battlefield with the superior force intact (80 undamaged planes vs. 40 planes, some damaged). The Japanese may have had as many pilots able to fly after the battle but they lacked planes. --Erik
- The usual standard is ships lost. Also, if CVs were unable to launch, it made no difference how many planes were available. Trekphiler (talk) 01:10, 3 January 2008 (UTC)
By the numbers
Since the losses in Japanese aircraft is being mentioned, the U.S. number should be also, or delete the Japanese. Trekphiler (talk) 12:10, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
- Fixed, per Funk and Wagnalls. Carnac the Magnificent 13:58, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
Not Al Haig, either
I deleted Crace (not an independent command) & Inouye (not at sea), & added the IJN COs (independent commands & at sea); unless you intend to include Halsey, Ghormley, Kinkaid, et al., don't change it back. Trekphiler (talk) 13:58, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
- Fitch and Hara were placed in Tactical Command by their respective task force commanders, and that fact ought to be mentioned somewhere. The achievements of the carriers at Coral Sea were due their OTCs--Fletcher flew his flag in Minneapolis and was, at best, McClellanesque when it came to warfare.
- Don't talk to me about Fletcher. As far as I'm concerned, he was a coward at Guadalcanal & incompetent at Midway. Trekphiler (talk) 00:17, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Fletcher had his issues, but he did, basically, win at Coral Sea and the Eastern Solomons. Historians are divided on his effectiveness. John Lundstrom, whose opinion I respect, is outspoken in his support for Fletcher's decision-making. But, other historians make a good, reasoned point that Fletcher could have been more aggressive, especially when he was supposed to be helping the American Wake Island garrison. Bruce Loxton blames Fletcher for enabling the Allied defeat at Savo Island because of his precipitate withdrawal from Guadalcanal. I'd say that it's fair to say that Fletcher's legacy is a mixed one. Cla68 (talk) 13:04, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Mixed. That's for sure. He doesn't deserve the blame for Wake, tho. That's a bad rap. It came from Pye, who didn't want to risk losing his CVs, esp after what happened to Kimmel: getting court-martialed. Savo, he should get hammered. He pulled back to "fuel" for flimsy cause, & never bothered to inform his SOs or Turner, who was d*mn lucky (Kurita?) had less nerve than Fletcher. Which seems typical for IJN admirals, for reasons that escape me; cf Leyte. Except Tanaka, who was also smart; trouble was, he was too lippy, & they dumped him in a sewer in SWPA for it. He should've gotten Yamamoto's job. Or Yamaguchi's; if the damn fool hadn't decided to go down with Hiryū, he could've replaced Yamamoto. Be greatful he didn't. Be even more greatful he didn't have the job at the start of the war. Trekphiler (talk) 13:39, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Unfortunately for the Japanese, and similar to many other militaries, including, sometimes, the U.S., many of the senior naval leaders, including Yamamoto, were in their positions for political reasons, and not necesarily based on effective combat leadership skills. Hara's Japanese Destroyer Captain points out that unless a naval officer graduated in the top tier of his class from Eta Jima and had served most of his career in battleships, he had very little chance of promotion to the top positions in the Navy, such as a fleet commander or to the general staff. So officers like Tanaka, who specialized in leading cruiser and destroyer forces, never really had a chance no matter how well they did in actual operations. The U.S. Navy seems to have done a better job as the war progressed of selecting officers for increased responsibility based on proven effectiveness in operations, for example, Arleigh Burke, who specialized in leading destroyer squadrons but was quickly moved up to operations officer for Mitscher's fast carrier fleet. Cla68 (talk) 16:07, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Mixed. That's for sure. He doesn't deserve the blame for Wake, tho. That's a bad rap. It came from Pye, who didn't want to risk losing his CVs, esp after what happened to Kimmel: getting court-martialed. Savo, he should get hammered. He pulled back to "fuel" for flimsy cause, & never bothered to inform his SOs or Turner, who was d*mn lucky (Kurita?) had less nerve than Fletcher. Which seems typical for IJN admirals, for reasons that escape me; cf Leyte. Except Tanaka, who was also smart; trouble was, he was too lippy, & they dumped him in a sewer in SWPA for it. He should've gotten Yamamoto's job. Or Yamaguchi's; if the damn fool hadn't decided to go down with Hiryū, he could've replaced Yamamoto. Be greatful he didn't. Be even more greatful he didn't have the job at the start of the war. Trekphiler (talk) 13:39, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Fletcher had his issues, but he did, basically, win at Coral Sea and the Eastern Solomons. Historians are divided on his effectiveness. John Lundstrom, whose opinion I respect, is outspoken in his support for Fletcher's decision-making. But, other historians make a good, reasoned point that Fletcher could have been more aggressive, especially when he was supposed to be helping the American Wake Island garrison. Bruce Loxton blames Fletcher for enabling the Allied defeat at Savo Island because of his precipitate withdrawal from Guadalcanal. I'd say that it's fair to say that Fletcher's legacy is a mixed one. Cla68 (talk) 13:04, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Don't talk to me about Fletcher. As far as I'm concerned, he was a coward at Guadalcanal & incompetent at Midway. Trekphiler (talk) 00:17, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
- Fitch and Hara were placed in Tactical Command by their respective task force commanders, and that fact ought to be mentioned somewhere. The achievements of the carriers at Coral Sea were due their OTCs--Fletcher flew his flag in Minneapolis and was, at best, McClellanesque when it came to warfare.
Okinoshima
minelayer Okinoshima was not sunk during this battle. it was a week a later by a submarine. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Loosmark (talk • contribs) 03:49, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
- Fixed. Good catch. Credit Ollie Kirk (no relation) in S-42. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 05:33, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
Yorktown repairs
The sentence I've put in about repairs is sourced. That material should not be changed to say something that the source does not say. The source said 1,400 men worked on repairs. It did not say every man available to Nimitz, although that very well may be true. My formulation could be replaced by material from a better source, or additional information could be added using another source. I am thinking about nominating this article as a good article candidate and am hoping we can improve the use of inline sources. Thank you for your help.
I understand that Yorktown was not exactly battle-ready when she left Pearl Harbor. Repair crews were still on board and were finishing repairs as she steamed to Midway. This detail could be added if we can find a source. Jehochman Talk 10:42, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- In that case, I'd appreciate if you rv the delete "more/less". What I'm after is a) an indication of a level of great effort (without being too specific for the page, which "1400 men" is, IMO) & b) recognition she was fit to fight, but not 100% shipshape. If I can get my hands on Wilmott's Barrier & the Javelin, I think it'll substantiate that; if you beat me to it.... (This was no help, d*mnit.) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 11:08, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- I've added a source, but it is a somewhat tangential source that just mentions the repairs in passing. I am sure you can find something better to replace what I added. Jehochman Talk 11:19, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- FWIW, everything I've read suggests that's OK, I just can't give you a cite offhand. Soon, I hope. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 14:53, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- I've added a source, but it is a somewhat tangential source that just mentions the repairs in passing. I am sure you can find something better to replace what I added. Jehochman Talk 11:19, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Good article review
I've gone ahead and nominated it. Reviewer: please provide feedback and we will endeavor to make any needed improvements. See Talk:German submarine U-853/GA1 as an example of a review that I found particularly helpful. Jehochman Talk 10:51, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Pre-GA Review
I've got some comments to make about this article for its GA nom, which I'd suggest be worked on before it gets reviewed.
- The prose generally needs a good copy-edit, especially for spelling and punctuation
- The lead needs to be expanded, there are two paragraphs but they're very weedy thus far
- Referencing - this is the main problem with the article. There are entire sections that have no references, or at most have one or two when more are needed. Examples include 'Strategic Context', 'Prelude to Battle' and the majority of 'Battle'
- The three areas I've highlighted above also need to be drastically expanded; I'm no expert on the Pacific War, but even I know that this was a major battle covered by a number of texts. You have a fair few of them in the Bibliography, yet they've not been used to their full extent.
Solve these problems and the article will have a much better chance to pass GAN. Skinny87 (talk) 18:04, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- Thank you for this feedback. I have undone my nomination pending completion of these items to help avoid wasting the reviewers' limited time for conducting reviews. Jehochman Talk 21:52, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Listen to the radio
I can't seem to figure out where to put it, since I see no sign of Fletcher's decision-making process, but let me note this: an RIU provided by JICPOA told him Takagi was fuelling his aircraft, but Fletcher ignored it, allegedly out of pique. (From: Haufler, Herve. Codebreaker's Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II (New York: NAL, 2003), p.150.) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 19:22, 4 November 2008 (UTC)
- whats RIU and JICPOA ? Loosmark (talk) 20:07, 4 November 2008 (UTC)
- Serves me right.... RIU's a Radio Intercept Unit, for listening in on Japanese radio, & JICPOA is the Pearl Harbor intel outfit (better known as Hypo). TREKphiler hit me ♠ 21:48, 4 November 2008 (UTC)
Long list of references related to upcoming rewrite
Just to let anyone know who is wondering why that long list of references was just added to the article, it's that I plan on starting a major expansion of this article within the next month or so and I have, or have access to, all of those references that are listed and plan to use them. Cla68 (talk) 01:56, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
- Adding references is fine, but you appear to have deleted the journal references (Naval Institute Proceedings articles by Mason & Macintyre) author referenced in footnotes under dates 7 & 8 May. Can you restore those references or expand the footnotes to completely identify the articles by those authors? Thewellman (talk) 02:49, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
- Sorry, I'll restore it. Cla68 (talk) 02:51, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
- Thank you for fixing the inline citations for the Naval Institute Proceedings articles. In your revision of the present article, I suggest you consider modification of the statement in the first paragraph under Aftermath (Strategic) that the Japanese Port Moresby invasion force was the first to be turned back without achieving its objective. I believe the first Japanese Wake Island invasion force had been turned back the preceding December. Thewellman (talk) 08:44, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
- The Wake force came back, reinforced, & succeeded. Inouye turned around & didn't (couldn't, after Midway) come back. It's accurate, but maybe ref Wake is appropriate, to clarify. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 10:49, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 |
List of open questions
As I edit this article, I'm going to list questions here that I haven't been able to answer so far. I haven't read all of the references yet, but I want to get these down before I forget them. If someone has an answer to any of them and a source to back it up, your input is much appreciated. Cla68 (talk) 08:03, 30 March 2009 (UTC)
- Why didn't MacArthur's land-based army aircraft or the RAAF provide air cover for Crace's force on May 7 and 8? Was he too far away from land? Partial answer in Crave, p. 450 that there was poor coordination between Nimitz' and MacArthur's commands.
- Which destroyer did Takagi send to pick up the two downed aircraft crews from Indispensible Reef on May 7? Was it Ariake? Cressman appears to indicate that it was Ariake.
- Did Tamotsu Ema, Zuikaku's dive bomber group leader, survive the battle? A Japanese book listed here appears to have been written by Ema. If so, it appears that he survived the war.
- Was Kamikawa Maru anchored at Deboyne Island the entire time that that Japanese seaplanes were operating from there, or did it drop the air group off and then return to retrieve them later? What day did the Japanese evacuate the Deboyne base and which ships were involved? Gillison (p. 527) reports that B-25 bombers which attacked Deboyne on May 10 did not see the ship present, but several floatplanes were moored in the bay.
Did Zuikaku deliver the Zeros to the Tainan Air Group at Rabaul before returning to Truk after the battle?Yes.Which Japanese submarines were actually assigned as fleet scouts for the operation and which were in the area but on different missions? The sources on this are confusing, with some stating that four submarines were assigned for scouting, but others stating that five or six submarines were in the Coral Sea area.Fixed in article. Two subs off Port Moresby (RO-33 & 34), four in a scouting line in the Coral Sea (I-22, I-24, I-28, & I-29), and two sent to scout Noumea (I-21 and I-27).Did the US, based on radio intelligence, deploy submarines to try to intercept and sink Shōkaku and Zuikaku during their return trips to Japan after the battle? If so, which submarines were deployed and where?Yes, but the US was unable to decipher the coordinates giving the carriers' exact return route. Three subs (Gar, Greenling, and Tautog) were stationed off Truk. Four others were positioned along the direct route between Truk and Japan. Only one sub, Triton sighted one of the carriers (believed to be Shōkaku) but was unable to attack.(Holmes, p. 74). Shōkaku did not return via Truk, instead heading directly for Japan. Tautog sank I-28 as it returned to Truk.Exactly how many men were assigned to Neosho and how many died/survived?Pre-attack muster: 288. Known dead in attack: 20. Post attack muster: 110. Post-attack unaccounted for: 158. Number eventually rescued: 109 from ship, four from open ocean.How many Japanese SNLF troops were in the invasion convoy?Approximately 500 (Bullard, p. 147).Who exactly did Nielsen see at 08:15 on May 7, Marumo or Gotō? The sources aren't clear.Saw Gotō (Lundstrom 2006)How many Allied troops were defending Port Moresby?1,088 in Dec '41 (McCarthy, p. 12). 3,000 on 2 May '42 between New Caledonia, Port Moresby, and Portugese Timor (McCarthy, p. 31). Two additional battalions, but specific numbers not given, were sent in January '42 and these were the last sent to the city before the battle (McCarthy, p. 82, 112). Willmott (1983), p. 143 states that 4,250 troops were delivered on 3 Jan 42, giving a total of 5,333. That seems to me to mean that even had the Japanese been able to land their 5,500 invasion troops, their success in the land battle was not assured.How many Japanese transports in the invasion convoy? Some sources say 11, some 12.There were 11 transports originally in the convoy, but were joined by a special, anti-aircraft transport a day later. Six of the original 11 were large Army transports with and the remaining five were smaller Navy transports.- Morison, p. 38, reports that the B-17s which mistakenly attacked Crace's force on May 7 took photographs of Crace's ships during the incident. Are these pictures available somewhere? A picture of this incident is apparently included in Eric Salecker's "Fortress against the sun", Combined Publishing, ISBN 1-58097-049-4 opposite page 242 (upper image). I've ordered the book and will post my results once I get it. It's possible that AWM photo # 128127 is of the incident in question, but the caption doesn't confirm this.
- Gillison, p. 519 states that an RAAF Hudson attacked a Japanese submarine south of the Louisiades on May 7 and claimed two bomb hits. Also, on p. 527 three separate attacks on submarines by two Hudsons and a B-25 off Townsville on May 10. Do any of the TROMs for the Japanese submarines known to have been operating in the area confirm these? No.
- Tenryu's TROM states that seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru set up the seaplane base at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel to support the Tulagi landings and remained there while Kamikawa Maru went to set up the base at Deboyne. No other sources confirm this, instead saying that Kamikawa set up both bases and the base on Santa Isabel was in Thousand Ships Bay, not Rekata. Which is true? The seaplane tender TROMs appear to indicate that Kiyokawa Maru was not present but its aircraft unit complemented Kamikawa Maru's unit. The sources appear to indicate that once Tulagi was in operation the Santa Isabel base was abandoned.
- I just checked the Australian official histories for information on the first point, but found nothing. Pages 517-524 of Royal Australian Air Force, 1939–1942 imply that the force at Port Moresby was small and too busy preparing to resist invasion while searching for the Japanese ships to do anything else and that coordination between the air forces and navy was poor (Crace's force was attacked by USAAF aircraft who were totally unaware that an Allied force was in the area). I've read elsewhere that the small Australian fighter force at Port Moresby had suffered heavy casualties in raids on the town and had almost no aircraft left by the time of this battle. Nick-D (talk) 10:23, 30 March 2009 (UTC)
- Thank you. I need to add that source to the reference list. Once I have the information in the article I'll cross that question off of the list. Cla68 (talk) 02:26, 31 March 2009 (UTC)
- According to the translated version of the Japanese official history which was published by the Australian War Memorial, the Port Moresby invasion convoy was carrying all of the Kure 3rd SNLF other than the unit sent to Tulagi. It doesn't provide the number of troops this involved though. The book has a fairly detailed account of the Japanese perspective on the battle which might be useful by the way. Nick-D (talk) 07:27, 13 April 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks again. I'll try to hold off posting more questions until I read more of the remaining sources, including that one. Now that the unit is identified I'm fairly sure that I can figure out how many SNLF troops were probably embarked. Cla68 (talk) 07:49, 13 April 2009 (UTC)
- In regards to your question on the Japanese submarines, the book Sunk. The Stury of the Japanese Submarine Fleet 1942-1945 by Mochitsura Hashimoto states that six subs were involved - RO 33 and 34 reconnoitered Russell Island, the Deboyne Anchorages, the Jomard Channel and the route eastwards of Port Moresby. I 22, 24, 28 and 29 also formed part of the Japanese force used in the battle, though the book is vauge on where they were stationed - perhaps Combinedfleet.com will have some information? Nick-D (talk) 02:51, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
- I've just added information on the subs. It's unclear whether I-21 was involved in the battle, so I've removed the specific reference to her as this might be a case of mistaken identity - combinedfleet.com says that she left Rabaul with the invasion force on her tabular record of movement, but doesn't mention her on the other subs' records... She may have been bound for Australia and was passing through the area during the battle. Nick-D (talk) 03:30, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
- Your information and source look solid. Just in case, I asked about it at the CombinedFleet.com message board. Cla68 (talk) 04:18, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks for the help on the submarines. I think that the question on the Japanese sub involvement is now answered. Cla68 (talk) 00:07, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
- Excellent - happy to help. Nick-D (talk) 07:56, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
- "The US was apparently unaware that Shōkaku went directly to Japan without stopping at Truk (Holmes, p. 74)." Without Holmes (DES?) in front of me, I can't refute this, but Blair (pp.230-1 & 233) says U.S. intelligence underestimated her amount of damage, & hence rate of advance, hence Gar, Grampus, & Tautog couldn't catch her at Truk (& she only stayed there briefly), while Greenling was on the wrong side of the lagoon & didn't see her arrive, & Bob Rice's Drum, Pilly Lent's Grenadier, & Stan Mosely's Pollack (in Empire waters) all missed her, again due to underestimation of her roa, & Kilpatrick in Triton spotted her at 6700yd & couldn't close to firing position. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 05:17, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- Blair appears to be indicating that Shōkaku returned to Japan via Truk. The other sources I looked at, including her TROM at Combinedfleet.com, imply that she went direct to Japan while her sister ship only made a brief stop at Truk. To try to clear this up, I've again posted the question to the experts at Combinedfleet's discussion forum. Cla68 (talk) 06:43, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- I won't exclude Blair got it wrong, if (as it appears) it was widely believed at the time she had; it may not have been known in '75 she went straight home. Certainly no contact was made outside Empire waters.
- On Ryūkaku, my reading of Holmes suggests Hypo had IDd Shōhō already, & misread the kanji, adding Ryūkaku to IJN strength. I may, however, have misunderstood the situation. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 19:11 & 19:29, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- No one has answered my question yet on Tully's board, if no one does, I'll try the J-Aircraft forum. In the meantime, we can add the Blair info to the article. Which edition of Blair's book do you have? Also, I mentioned in footnote 13 about the US confusion about Shōhō's name. Cla68 (talk) 23:50, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- I missed the fn ref. :( I'm using the '76 Bantam PB. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 01:40, 13 May 2009 (UTC)
- Done, and thanks also for the copyediting help. Cla68 (talk) 04:09, 13 May 2009 (UTC)
- I missed the fn ref. :( I'm using the '76 Bantam PB. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 01:40, 13 May 2009 (UTC)
- No one has answered my question yet on Tully's board, if no one does, I'll try the J-Aircraft forum. In the meantime, we can add the Blair info to the article. Which edition of Blair's book do you have? Also, I mentioned in footnote 13 about the US confusion about Shōhō's name. Cla68 (talk) 23:50, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- Blair appears to be indicating that Shōkaku returned to Japan via Truk. The other sources I looked at, including her TROM at Combinedfleet.com, imply that she went direct to Japan while her sister ship only made a brief stop at Truk. To try to clear this up, I've again posted the question to the experts at Combinedfleet's discussion forum. Cla68 (talk) 06:43, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- "The US was apparently unaware that Shōkaku went directly to Japan without stopping at Truk (Holmes, p. 74)." Without Holmes (DES?) in front of me, I can't refute this, but Blair (pp.230-1 & 233) says U.S. intelligence underestimated her amount of damage, & hence rate of advance, hence Gar, Grampus, & Tautog couldn't catch her at Truk (& she only stayed there briefly), while Greenling was on the wrong side of the lagoon & didn't see her arrive, & Bob Rice's Drum, Pilly Lent's Grenadier, & Stan Mosely's Pollack (in Empire waters) all missed her, again due to underestimation of her roa, & Kilpatrick in Triton spotted her at 6700yd & couldn't close to firing position. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 05:17, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
- Excellent - happy to help. Nick-D (talk) 07:56, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks for the help on the submarines. I think that the question on the Japanese sub involvement is now answered. Cla68 (talk) 00:07, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
- Your information and source look solid. Just in case, I asked about it at the CombinedFleet.com message board. Cla68 (talk) 04:18, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
- I've just added information on the subs. It's unclear whether I-21 was involved in the battle, so I've removed the specific reference to her as this might be a case of mistaken identity - combinedfleet.com says that she left Rabaul with the invasion force on her tabular record of movement, but doesn't mention her on the other subs' records... She may have been bound for Australia and was passing through the area during the battle. Nick-D (talk) 03:30, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
Recent Edits
I just made a few modifications, this does not disrupt or remove any of your work, contrary to what -MBK004 assumed.
- "Who Won" to "Tactical and Strategic Implications"
- I lumped together the ship losses with the aircrew losses.
- I added back in the strategic implications about Port Moresby, as it includes links to related campaigns like the Kokoda Track campaign and the Battle of Milne Bay.
- Some minor changes to Midway.
GoldDragon (talk) 01:30, 9 April 2009 (UTC)
- Your edits seemed ok to me, but I think a couple of editors, in good faith, objected to the changes to some of the existing information and disagreed with one of the points that you made. You might try adding the edits a little at a time which should help at least some of them to "stick". Cla68 (talk) 06:39, 9 April 2009 (UTC)
Speaking of losses to aircrew and Japanese training programs, I suggest that it be moved to "A New Kind of Naval Warfare", along with the section where it says that the Japanese pilots performed better. GoldDragon (talk) 17:46, 9 April 2009 (UTC)
Miles & miles & miles
I realize this is a fairly big job, but I'm troubled by the casual use of "miles" & the presumption it means "statute miles" & can readily be converted to kilimeters. Navy writers (not least Morison) may habitually use nautical miles, especially in reference to sea distances.... So, what may be needed (& we would do with having here) is a) thoroughgoing check of mi/nm/km (which IMO is no small task) & b) standardization of usage where confusion may arise (presuming it doesn't already exist). My question amounts to, "What form is the source using, & has it been converted correctly?" Seeing Cla68 has already made a pretty careful pass through here, maybe this can be answered (even has already been handled); if not...? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 12:07, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
- I think that's probably a good catch. All the miles used in the sources are probably nautical miles. So I think I need to go through and change the nomenclature in the conversion templates from "mi" to "nmi". Cla68 (talk) 12:59, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
- Done. Cla68 (talk) 13:26, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
- Thx. (This is why I prefer to use km... ;D ). TREKphiler hit me ♠ 13:35, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
- Using kilometers as a measure only serves to obscure the REAL distances involved, by articifially inflating them. Couldn't we just stick with REAL measures of distances instead of the contrived metric ones? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 204.111.122.97 (talk) 16:11, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
- Have you missed the point? Those "real measures" leave in doubt what the actual distances were: 100 nmi (185 km) or 100 mi (161 km)? Because they're both "100 miles"... OTOH, 185 km can be converted to any other length measurement that suits you. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:06, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
- Using kilometers as a measure only serves to obscure the REAL distances involved, by articifially inflating them. Couldn't we just stick with REAL measures of distances instead of the contrived metric ones? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 204.111.122.97 (talk) 16:11, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
- Thx. (This is why I prefer to use km... ;D ). TREKphiler hit me ♠ 13:35, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
- Done. Cla68 (talk) 13:26, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
Copyedit comments from Maralia
- Lead & Section 1
- Why "May 4 – May 8, 1942"? MOS says not to repeat the month.
- Left an inline comment in the lead: Zuikaku is not explicitly mentioned, so it is difficult to understand why "the two Japanese fleet carriers were unable to participate" at Midway.
- If the parentheses in this quote are used to indicate inserted words, they should be square brackets instead: "(eject) British and American strength from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, (and) to establish a policy of autonomous self-sufficiency and economic independence."
More to come as I make my way through the article. Maralia (talk) 22:50, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
- I fixed the date and clarified the information about Zuikaku. The parentheses appear to have been included in the original quote. Cla68 (talk) 21:15, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
- Morning strikes
- Is it Nielson or Nielsen? Both spellings are used several times.
- This sentence needs some work: "At 08:15, a Yorktown SBD, piloted by John L. Nielsen, sighted Gotō's force screening the invasion convoy and, making an error in his coded message, reported it as..." In the first part of the sentence, the subject is the SBD; the latter half ("making an error in his coded message, reported...") states the actions of Nielson. Not sure which way to fix this one, since it's not clear whether Nielson himself sighted the force.
- Nielsen is the correct spelling and I made the necessary corrections and also split the problematic sentence [1]. Cla68 (talk) 12:43, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
- Remainder of the article
- I was left a little confused by the section about the sinking of Lexington. After reading that "the carrier's crew was rescued", the subsequent statement that "Two-hundred sixteen of the carrier's 2,951-man crew went down with the ship" was a bit discordant. Presumably the 216 were those who had been killed in the battle, explosions, and fires?
- The first two sources listed in Web sources need accessdates.
- In the Notes, the mentions of articles (for lack of a better word), such as those by Hackett and Tully, incorrectly use italics for the titles. They are all listed properly (in quote marks) in the web sources section, but the Notes need to be tweaked to match.
I think that's it. Thanks for being patient as it took me a while to get to (and through) it. A great read! Maralia (talk) 21:11, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
- Done. Thank you very much for the outstanding copyediting help. Cla68 (talk) 01:44, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
Picking nits
- "VF-2 Squadron". This is redundant. VF means "fighter squadron"; I deleted. I also tried to clear up the awk phrasing over squadron & ship where I noticed it.
- "near the maximum range for carrier aircraft." American or Japanese? The USN ROA was around 175nm; IJN's, AFAIK, was quite a bit longer.
- "The fighters were Type 0s". I changed this from Zero to stay consistent with the other types IDd. Throughout, I also deleted the redundant "Zero", or changed it to "fighter", where it's clear it's IJN; it's not like there were USN Zekes.
- "within range, about 200 nautical miles (370 km)"? Is this for IJN or USN?
- "Land-based B-17s attacked the approaching Port Moresby" I deleted "land-based", since I really doubt anybody thinks B-17s are carrier-based... I'd prefer to say where they flew from, rather than "land", anyhow; does anyone ;p know?
- Done. The B-17s were all based in Australia but staged through Port Moresby to extend their range into the Coral Sea, Louisiades, and Solomon Sea. I probably need to explain that somewhere in one of the footnotes. Thank you for the help in completing the article. I'm going to go ahead and nominate it for A-Class review. Cla68 (talk) 01:52, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
- No thanx needed. I want it as good as it can be, too.
Oh, & I see I wasn't clear: "within range" of IJN or USN, I mean, given the different ROA.(Already answered, I see...) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 15:20, 15:21 & 15:24, 3 June 2009 (UTC)- Looking at it again, I now see I didn't read carefully enough. :( The passage specifically mention's Takagi's staffers; obviously, they know their range. I was wondering if the writer was presuming the ROA was the same, but if this is taken from IJN sources (even indirectly), it would be using the right ones. In short, I goofed. *sigh*
- Looking at "orders to fly 277 degrees", I wonder, is that 277 relative or 277 true? (I can't keep the pic in my head where Takagi is relative to Fletcher & Crace...) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 15:30 & 15:38, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
Abbreviation for U.S.
Per Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style_(abbreviations), U.S. is more standard in American English that US. A change from U.S. to US should be discussed. Note that in most WW2 Pacific theater battle articles, as far as I am aware, U.S. has been used. An inconsistency in this article versus others and an inconsistency with the standard does not seem right, especially for an FAC. I've reverted the recent change. Please discuss here for consensus before making such a change.
- I've used both versions in articles I've submitted for FA and both were accepted by reviewers. I think either one is probably ok even though the MoS appears to favor U.S. Cla68 (talk) 00:28, 9 June 2009 (UTC)
- For consistency, I find U.S. preferable. See for example Battle of Guadalcanal (FA), Battle of Wake Island, and Battle of Iwo Jima. — ERcheck (talk) 00:32, 9 June 2009 (UTC)
- Then why didn't you change the instances of 'US' to 'U.S.' during your reversion of my edit? Consistency. Binksternet (talk) 01:08, 9 June 2009 (UTC)
- All I care about is that the same style be used from top to bottom, except for quotes and titles. When I took a look earlier today, it was half one way, half the other. Binksternet (talk) 04:00, 9 June 2009 (UTC)
Note on sources for readers interested in further reading
Why has no one included the older but best source? National Archives Footage – Battle of Coral Sea Here is part 3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3tQkgXDYlg — Preceding unsigned comment added by 1.132.104.169 (talk) 18:00, 26 April 2019 (UTC) Readers of this article may have noticed that the list of sources is quite long. That's because there currently isn't, as far as I know, an English-language "definitive" account of the battle using up-to-date western and Japanese sources which have become available within the last 20 years or so. John Lundstrom has stated in a off-site forum [2] that he and Jim Sawruk have a book on the battle in the works but it will be several years until it's published. Until then, I suggest the following books for those interested in reading more about the battle, because these books appear to have the most up-to-date details, although they limit the scope of their coverage somewhat:
- Lundstrom, John B. (2006). Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-475-2.
{{cite book}}
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(help) - Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 159114471X.
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(help); Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=
(help)CS1 maint: year (link) - Willmott, H. P. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-535-3.
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(help)
Cla68 (talk) 14:22, 21 June 2009 (UTC)
- Willmott is excellent on Midway, but IIRC, he treats Coral Sea a bit cursorily. For all that, his is the best account I've seen. (Which is not to say I've read them all. ;p) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 03:39, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
Size matters
Maybe I'm nitpicking for nothing, but I'm stumbling on "small" rather than "smaller". The custom I've seen reserves "small" for ships the size of PCs, & "smaller" for DDs or SSs. Do the accounts cited mean DDs damaged/sunk (as I'd presume, given few PT/PC-size craft involved)? If so, I suggest changing it back. Thoughts? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 03:39, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- Your suggestion seems fine to me. Cla68 (talk) 04:01, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- K. Also, would you say OK to remove the 40h's B-17? That strikes me an operational more than a combat loss. (I'm not strongly pro/con either way.) If you're OK, will you take it out? My eyes are starting to play tricks on me... ;p TREKphiler hit me ♠ 04:09 & 04:12, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- A few of the carrier aircraft losses, both US and Japanese, were also operational losses. For example, several US carrier aircraft became lost returning from missions and disappeared. Anyway, I don't mind taking out the B-17. I'll remove it from the total tally but leave a note about it in the footnote. Cla68 (talk) 04:21, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- There is no reason to remove the B-17. Loosmark (talk) 04:33, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- A few of the carrier aircraft losses, both US and Japanese, were also operational losses. For example, several US carrier aircraft became lost returning from missions and disappeared. Anyway, I don't mind taking out the B-17. I'll remove it from the total tally but leave a note about it in the footnote. Cla68 (talk) 04:21, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- K. Also, would you say OK to remove the 40h's B-17? That strikes me an operational more than a combat loss. (I'm not strongly pro/con either way.) If you're OK, will you take it out? My eyes are starting to play tricks on me... ;p TREKphiler hit me ♠ 04:09 & 04:12, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- As noted, I'm not fanatic either way, Loos, so if you want it back in, feel free. That sole B-17 running out of fuel just slapped me as an obvious operational loss that could be taken out. For most of the others, I think running out of fuel after an attack quals as "combat", just as Fletcher's DBs ditching at Midway would. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 20:54, 16 November 2009 (UTC)