Talk:Causality/Archive 2

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material cause

The familiar material examples are wood and bronze. I read Freudenthal 1995 as regarding blood and milk as materials. My mother does not stay unchanged while I change, and I hardly see her as very like wood or bronze. Do you have a good reason for regarding my mother as my material constitution? I don't see 'mother' appearing in the article on Substance theory. Nor on the page shown in your linked citation of Soccio. I would like to delete "one's mother or".

I am unhappy with the choice of examples that seems to more to muddy the distinctions than to clarify them, examples that seem to say that different kinds of cause often coincide. I don't deny that the cited text literally says so, but looking at Physics 198a referred to by Falcon, I have to say it doesn't seem the best of Aristotle's philosophy. The term essential cause seems to be muddled with the term formal cause, and the ideas also seem to be confounded. I would suggest that this is a transitional text, between the first four-cause theory and the second? I would not like to give this as a good example to expound the notion of formal cause. I am unhappy to see the long quotation from Falcon that you make a kind of footnote in the reference. Therefore I just this is not the best one can do here. I am not the only person who finds this section of the Physics appearing transitional: Graham says on page 169 he thinks it is a developmental text. Therefore I think this is not the best one can do here. That is to say, I think Falcon is not a good source here.

So I would like to remove the footnote quote.

Also I am still unhappy to see the word function used to define the formal cause. I would prefer to replace the words "the thing's properties and function" with the words 'its nature'.

Also I would prefer to change the words "the material from whence a thing has come or that which persists while it changes" to 'the material of which a thing is constituted, or that which persists while a thing changes'. Also I would like to remove the link "(see also substance theory)" because I didn't find much helpful for the present purpose there.Chjoaygame (talk) 03:31, 27 August 2013 (UTC)

OK, please go right ahead and find an WP:RS you WP:LIKE better... just stick close to it, make a suggestion and I'm sure we'll both find something agreeable.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:17, 27 August 2013 (UTC)

Ok, I will have a look.Chjoaygame (talk) 07:22, 27 August 2013 (UTC) I haven't forgotten about this. I am still looking!Chjoaygame (talk) 07:19, 2 September 2013 (UTC)

intend to remove self- or special-interest- or related-party- promotion, a link to a poorly written and hardly relevant page

Once by editor 81.4.149.90 here and once by Editor Mellon2030 here has an external link been added that seems to me more a kind of promotion than a properly relevant link. I intend to remove the second addition unless there is shown on this talk page some sound argument with evidence that is it devoid of some kind of promotional character. The link is to a very poorly written and only marginally relevant page, unsuitable to be linked to this article. True, the word 'causality' appears in the link, but that is not enough to establish adequate relevance and quality of workmanship.Chjoaygame (talk) 08:41, 18 October 2013 (UTC)

Three principles of causality

Salvatore J. Babones (6 August 2013). Methods for Quantitative Macro-Comparative Research. SAGE Publications. ISBN 978-1-4129-7495-0. p.138 states that three principles of causality, commonly presented in modern literature, are: correlation, precedence and nonspuriousness. This seems like a key fact to add to the article, but I am hesitant, as precedence links to a disambig page with no good choice...? PS. See Claire Selltiz for a bit more on Babones' statement. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 09:16, 6 December 2013 (UTC)

It is regrettable that causality is treated in this article and in the article Causality (physics) as if it were a plaything for logicians and other theorists, who have deeper understanding than is supplied by the idea of causality. I here refer to causality in the sense that an Aristotelian would refer to as efficient cause. People are afraid to think of causal powers. The problem is solved by the process ontology. The real things of the actual world are all and only processes. One process can be the efficient cause of another. The causal process has powers that are manifest in its effects, the processes of which it is a contributory cause. In this view, causality is one of the constitutive characteristics of the actual world, not reducible to anything more fundamental. This fact is a primary initial principle, not deducible from any principle more fundamental. There is no going behind it to find something more deeply explanatory of the actual world. It is a fundamental explanatory principle. These ideas are hot and people think they can be very clever and take a more fundamental approach, and mostly do not dare to face the basic character of causality. For example, the physics article instances classical force as a cause, which of course is misguided, because it is not thought of in terms of the process ontology. It is that ontology that gives the best expression of the 'common sense' notion of causality that appears in the lead of the present article but is hardly presented in the rest of the article. Perhaps what I am saying here is that many intellectuals are too clever by half to get the right idea about this.

What I am saying here is partly expressed by some ideas of Wittgenstein. You can't explain causal linkage by chatter. You have to experience it in action in order to understand it, and to express it fully to someone else you have to rely on their own experience or to show it to them.

Therefore I would say that the doctrine of Babones to which you refer is not fact, it is analytic reasoning and methodology. It is of course a fact that Babones expounds this doctrine. Babones is discussing how to establish causality empirically, a very important thing to discuss, but the terms you cite from him are terms of empirical methodology as distinct from directly philosophical terms for causality.

What I have just written above may be of only very little use to your concern to put in something about Babones' work. But perhaps it might be of some use, even if little.Chjoaygame (talk) 15:53, 6 December 2013 (UTC)

ref name=Cahalan 2013."Today,we still often call the material a thing is made out of a cause. “What caused that statue to be so easily broken?” “Its being made out of clay rather than granite.”

An edit "ref name=Cahalan 2013."Today,we still often call the material a thing is made out of a cause. “What caused that statue to be so easily broken?” “Its being made out of clay rather than granite.”" was posted; and then it was undone by someone who treated it as vandalism. I think it probably was not vandalism, but was a good faith edit, but posted by someone not possessed of the appropriate text editing skills for this article page. If the poster would like to put more detail of his proposed post on this talk page, we could help him put his edit in the format that fits this article page. The necessary thing is a fully detailed citation of the source, not just a name and date. Also desirable but not necessary would be an internet link to the source.Chjoaygame (talk) 02:04, 14 February 2014 (UTC)

The theory assumes probabilistic causation.

In the subsection Causal Powers, the article asserts:

"The theory assumes probabilistic causation. Pearl (2000) has shown that Cheng's causal power can be given a counterfactual interpretation, (i.e., the probability that, absent x and y, [then] y would be true if x were true) and is computable therefore using structural models. Within a Bayesian framework, the power PC theory can be interpreted as a noisy-OR function used to compute likelihoods (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005. Strength and Structure in Causal Induction. Cognitive Psychology 51: 334-384)."

This is badly muddled in its expression and would need correction in expression even if it were saying something that is basically correct. But it is not basically correct, and so fixing the faulty logic of expression would not be a good thing for this article. The comment should be deleted.

Why should it be deleted?

The theory of causal powers is a theory about the real structure of what is actual, not a theory about knowledge or belief or inference or induction. The theory of causal induction and probability theory in general in a Bayesian view is about how things come to be known or believed or inferred or induced, not a theory about the real structure of actuality. The assertion as written in the article muddles between actuality and knowledge, ontic muddled with epistemic.

The writer of the assertion was muddled in the writing. The clause "absent x and y, [then] y would be true if x were true" is nonsense. As it stands in the article, "absent" refers to what might actually exist but doesn't, while "if ... were true" refers to what can be inferred from given data. The sentence might have made sense if it had been written "absent knowledge of x and then y, [then] y would be true if x were true". But simply "absent x" is ontic, while "[then] ... would be true" is epistemic. Different worlds of discourse, muddled in one and the same grammatical construct. The muddle was apparently not a slip of expression by the writer, but was apparently a serious misunderstanding in his mind.

The theory of causal powers does not hold that causality must be probabilistic. It holds that it is real. It may or may not be probabilistic; the theory is neutral as to probabilistic causation.

The assertion in the article is muddled and wrong, and should be deleted, or moved to another place and expressed properly there. Talk of probability here is distracting and hardly relevant at the present level of detail of the article.Chjoaygame (talk) 11:45, 17 February 2014 (UTC)

Done.Chjoaygame (talk) 19:04, 25 February 2014 (UTC)

Proposed merge with Causal inference

Both articles inevitably touch upon both statistical and philosophical causality. Causality is per definition a type of inference: Causal inference. Sda030 (talk) 22:42, 27 February 2014 (UTC)

For a physicist, causality is not a type of inference. It is a principle of nature, a general physical fact. A stubborn reality of the world. One can use the principle in inferential argument, but that does not detract from its basis as a statement of physical fact.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:17, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

I see that, good point. I spoke from the standpoint of argumentation theory, which is admittedly a narrow POV. In hindsight Causal inference does capture a particular aim of inference not captured elsewhere. However, I still prefer Causal inference to be merged with Correlation does not imply causation, Causality or under an article which captures other types of reasoning objectives like Reasoning, etc. My worry is that Causal inference will not live on its own without major copying from these other articles. Sda030 (talk) 21:53, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

I am not very interested in causal inference so I have no opinion about what to do with the article about it.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:04, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

process (philosophy)?

I wasn't sure so I thought I'd ask about using the process (philosophy) disambiguation in the first paragraph of the article. It seems appropriate for the context but it isn't as complete as process link. (Requestion 01:07, 28 May 2007 (UTC))

In 'Counterfactual theories', it is claimed that David Lewis suggests a counterfactual theory as a solution, however in his article "Causation" (OUP, 1993) he suggests it specifically to refute it. luke 6/06/07

My apologies if this question is asked in the wrong section, but... "Salmon (1984) claims that causal processes can be identified by their ability to transmit an alteration over space and time. An alteration of the ball (a mark by a pen, perhaps) is carried with it as the ball goes through the air. On the other hand an alteration of the shadow (insofar as it is possible) will not be transmitted by the shadow as it moves along." I have difficulty understanding this. What if the alteration to the ball also alters its shadow? Were we to cut away part of the ball, instead of merely marking it, the alteration would be carried with the shadow and would the cut to the ball and the changed shadow not both be transmitted over space and time? Or am I just failing to understand the marked ball example? Goateeki (talk) 21:43, 21 May 2012 (UTC)

Goateeki, the underlying intuition is that the shadow has no internal constitution that would give it means to transmit anything. The word "transmit" is being used in a somewhat subtle way to suggest a local causal continuity between successive moments of a given thing. The ball is a real physical process. It is constituted by material in a localized dynamic flux, and it adheres with itself structurally over time. The shadow is a pseudo-process, in Salmon's terms. A change in the appearance of the shadow is not caused by anything the shadow "did" at any prior time. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in the 'causation' entry is a good source for ongoing debate on this issue.

Qphilo (talk) 10:17, 29 May 2014 (UTC)

I suppose no immediate editing action is being considered here. But I think it relevant to comment that the above comment of Qphilo does not exactly accord with the process philosophy notion of a given thing or process, at least in the view of A.N. Whitehead. The usual process philosophy view is that the ball is not a process. The ball is real, and is in a sense physical, but is not a process in the usual Whitehead sense. The sentence "It is constituted by material in a localized dynamic flux, and it adheres with itself structurally over time" is, for all I know, perhaps acceptable in some ontologies, but is not an overly happy one from the Whitehead viewpoint. The Whitehead viewpoint is that the ball is constituted by a continuum of processes, that is to say a continuum of occasions of experience (Whitehead would have said 'nexus' where I have said 'continuum').Chjoaygame (talk) 00:31, 30 May 2014 (UTC)

"causal nexus"

The term "causal nexus" was added here by an anonymous user. The expression of the addition was ambiguous and unsourced. The added sentence needs some work to be done on it. I have marked it in the article.Chjoaygame (talk) 21:37, 6 January 2015 (UTC)

detailed reasons for edit to lead

I am altering the lead by adding the word 'physical' to the sentence "Causality (also referred to as causation) is the relation between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first.[ref name="dict" Random House Unabridged Dictionary]"

In the above I have changed the bracketing to reveal the details of the second reference, to the Random House Unabridged Dictionary.

I think there are possible disadvantages to using explicit quotations or citations in the lead, which is an editorial summary. The lead is not a detailed exposition, for which of course detailed sourcing is appropriate. So I am not advocating a rule against detailed sourcing in the lead, just saying it can have disadvantages.

The problem I see with the just above cited definition is that it leaves vague the nature of the conequentiality it refers to. Is it logical consequence, physical consequence, or of some other kind?

I think the present Wikipedia article is not referring to logical consequence in its definition of causality. I think it is referring to physical consequence. For safety I give an example of what I mean here: "(A = B and B = C and '=' is a transitive relation) have the logical consequence that (A = C)" is a statement of logical consequence but not of physical consequence. "I threw my spear and it felled the animal that was my target" is a statement of physical consequence, but not of logical consequence."

The problem with direct citations in the lead is that they make it nearly impractical to alter the lead. For example, one too often finds copied unaltered citations in an edit to the lead, the copier apparently just assuming that he knows it all and doesn't need to check the citations to see if they support his new edit.

In adding the word 'physical' where I intend, I do not intend to mean that the cited source includes that word. Indeed, following the link from the present Wikipedia article to the cited dictionary, I find that it provides hardly any immediate direct explicit support for the words of the article. It agrees more or less, but I don't see it as an appropriate citation or link for the lead. The word 'consequence' does not appear there. The cited link says that its definition is "based on the Random House Dictionary", not that it is a quote from it. Nor do I regard such a citation as needed for the lead of the present Wikipedia article.

Therefore, as well as adding the word 'physical', I am removing that citation.

Both causality and physicality are very deep concepts. I regard physical causality as in a way logically prior to most other concepts that relate to the physical world. By 'logically prior' I intend that one can properly derive other concepts from physical causality, but one can hardly find a logical frame adequate for physics that can derive causality, without presupposing it, either implicitly or explicitly. As for physicality, I think it hard to derive a notion of physicality from a conceptual system that does not already contain it explicitly and axiomatically. I am saying that causality and physicality summarize such a vast range of experience that one can only elevate them to axiomatic status, not derive them as logical consequences of some more deeply based axiom system that does not contain them explicitly. They are basic, fundamental, rock-bottom, or primary, with nothing behind them. They explain other concepts but are not themselves explicable by other deeper concepts.

Therefore I add the word 'physical' intending that it refer to ideas at least as primal as causality. It is a proper word in this context.

I regard causality as a physical notion, and I think the article does so too. My edit intends to make that explicit in the lead.Chjoaygame (talk) 02:29, 13 July 2014 (UTC)Chjoaygame (talk) 05:56, 13 July 2014 (UTC)Chjoaygame (talk) 21:44, 6 January 2015 (UTC)

"A contributory cause ... must be contributory"

This passage was restored after I deleted it on the grounds of the importance of "truth to source". It contains no content whatsoever, so if the source really said this then the source should not be quoted or paraphrased on this point. Loraof (talk) 19:45, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

To judge from the above comment, the author of this edit did not check the source of the text that (s)he edited. The source is linked in the reference, and is therefore very easily accessible to editors. Moreover, there was a second reference (now removed by me) which linked to a dead source.

Thus it seems that the edit was an arbitrary paraphrase not checked against the proper source. Such is not good editing.

The above comment says that the passage in the source "contains no content whatsoever". It might more precisely be said that the source is tautological. Ordinary language is not compositional, so that it is not strictly tautological, because 'contributory cause' is a technical term and might be an abuse of language. The source is explicitly reassuring the reader that the technical term is not an abuse of language. Thus the above comment is inaccurate or misleading.Chjoaygame (talk) 21:05, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

Reading further I find that editor mentioned just above has now checked the source and has reacted appropriately. Good.Chjoaygame (talk) 21:40, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

Yes, I "reacted appropriately" by removing the copyright violation that you restored. And by the way, paraphrasing a source, unlike copyright violating, is "good editing". Loraof (talk) 14:51, 9 January 2015 (UTC)

Copyvio

[1] introduced a pile of copyvio stuff from Thich Nhat Hanh (1999), The Heart of the Buddha's Teaching, Three River Press

Over at Pratītyasamutpāda its properly ref'd, and not a copyvio. Although even there its arguably a rather over-lengthy quote.

William M. Connolley (talk) 19:41, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

undid facile edit

I have undone a facile edit that I think would need at least a talk-page justification or more.

The edit did not attend to the source that it left for the clause that it changed. The edit made the clause misrepresent its cited source. The edit trimmed the following sourced clause: "... where the second event is understood as a physical consequence of the first.<reference name="Mackie"/>". The edit removed the word "physical". The edit summary reads "Not necessarily physical." The unchanged source is about physical causation, not the more specialized historico-philosophical sense implied by the edit.

Perhaps it may be that the lead should be substantially changed, so as to use the word cause primarily in the historico-philosophical sense that is discussed in the article, and is apparently relied upon by the edit. At present the lead uses the word in the more customary sense of efficient cause. There are other senses of the word, for example, "The lawyer pleaded his client's cause". Such other senses are valid in their own contexts, but are not the primary sense of the word in the present version of the lead of the article. If this is to be changed, it should be done properly and thoroughly, not just as a passing touch without attention to sources.

The Wikipedia is not a dictionary. It presents articles about subjects, not about words as such.

I will be interested to see other comment on this.Chjoaygame (talk) 17:22, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

suggests physics

'Physical' strongly suggests relating to physics. Causation occurs in other domains, e.g. biology, economics, etc. in which there typically is no corresponding physical causation going on. E.g. the Chancellor's announcement caused a fall in the FTSE 100, but that's not physical causation (not least as the FTSE 100 isn't a physical entity). The fact that Mackie may use the word in the source doesn't make it a good word to use here. (Also incidentally, Mackie is not a definitive authority on causation since if I recall correctly his own formulation, the INUS condition, doesn't even cover indeterministic causation such as is required in economics.) Ben Finn (talk) 18:20, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

I agree that 'physical' suggests relating to physics. I am not sure that that is so very bad, but I agree it might reasonably be seen as objectionable. Your objection I think has mainly a paradigm that the FTSE is not a physical entity. I would see it as physical though too complicated to be understood by physics. I see most physical entities as too complicated to be understood by physics. I can see that some academic territoriality is involved here. Perhaps some satisfactory compromise can be found. For me, physical and natural are close enough in meaning here. I can see that you don't see 'physical' as I do, and I wouldn't say you are wrong. The problem is to find a suitable form of words. Some way of saying 'efficient causality'.

I think part of the problem arises from the word consequence. I think the meaning here should exclude logical consequence. I think of causality as either nomic or else singular. Nomic for me means 'as a rule', or 'usually', with a 'physical' link always involved. Singular for me means 'there is the right spatio-temporal set-up for a physical link', without too much reliance on the nomic aspect. I regard causality as the cement of the universe of actual entities, of real happenings in the world. I think it is so fundamental to our experience of the word that it doesn't matter too much whether we can put it into words or formulas such as INUS. If philosophy can't get it clear, that is too bad for philosophy; causality outranks reason in the reality stakes. That is why I like to call it physical. I can see that others might not see it in quite those terms. Still I want to make clear that it is fundamental for experience of reality, outranking any other demand of rationality.

The ordinary language uses 'do' and 'make' and 'act upon' and 'affect' and 'effect' to indicate what I see as efficient causality such as I think is the intention here.Chjoaygame (talk) 22:50, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

editorial attention

This could be easily modified with reasonable editorial attention to other sources on the subject. Simply site other sources. Without the sentence specifically attributing the source, I would say there are sources supporting "Not necessarily physical". The argument is fundamental to materialism. Time could be considered nonmaterial event causality, as time can be considered unreal, The Unreality of Time. Yes, the sentence should reflect the source. Yes the sentence can be modified with additional sources. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 20:10, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

For me a main problem with leaving out some such word as physical or a near concept is vagueness. Leaving out such a word opens the door to unintended readings including logical consequence You say it will be easy to fix this problem Let's hope so.

I don't see materialism as enlightening here.

I see time as a conceptual derivative of physical causality. I don't see it as enlightening to ask whether time is or is not "real". Time is a conceptual derivative of real causality. Local time is reliably indicated by natural vibrations of objects of atomic size. Causality links your local time with mine and with his.

Our problem is to find a wording that nearly satisfies nearly all of us.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:11, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

Following the source, "Mackie concludes that there is a difference regarding the extensionality of explanatory cause statements in that they are not interchangeable in the way that they might be in a regularity theory of causation."[2] Answer may be in the Extensionality and Intensionality term as to which is ultimatly subsuming the other. Physical may be conventional. There is little doubt that symbols ... left by man's intention as seen in languages ... cause events. I suggest following this path to an ontology source resolution. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 01:28, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

For this place in the lead, I think 'extensionality' is too technical. Moreover, it is inadequate because it omits the aspect of 'power' or 'prehension', which is essential, I think.Chjoaygame (talk) 05:44, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

Now I see the problem. It isn't with 'physical'. It's with 'consequence'.

Remedy: 'where the first event affects the second'. Affect and effect are the proper words here.Chjoaygame (talk) 06:02, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

Looking at this [3], perhaps the word "relation" in the lead can be modifed into "constructed explination" (or simular variant) as contrasted to the way things really are. Of course, better sources required. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 03:38, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

I think 'relation' is right for this job.Chjoaygame (talk) 05:44, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

Please do explain

[4] Zulu Papa 5 * (talk)

I noticed those edits and I think the sections moved down are both relatively unfinished and also not clearly relevant to the overall article. They both seem to refer to Karma, which is a bit more than just causation, and is perhaps better handled in other articles. In any case as the article currently stands, for better or worse, these sections do not fit in easily with the flow and so it is not unusual to see such sections moved around a bit so as not to break the connections between the rest. Most importantly, everything we do on Wikipedia is temporary. If these sections can be improved, great. If there is a case for moving them, let's discuss. And so on.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:03, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

The Aristotle section

Just reviewing this section. No quick fixes for now, but I see some things which strike me as odd. Several cite the same source: Graham, D.W. (1987). Aristotles's Two Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, ISBN 0-19-824970-5. If anyone has a copy of that they can maybe help confirm what was stated there.

• For me as someone who has edited some of the articles about what Aristotle said, it is odd that we do not mention that the whole point of Aristotle's naming 4 types of cause was that he was arguing against the position taken today, which is that science should try to see everything in terms of physical interactions. Just saying the following does not really explain this properly to readers: "Of Aristotle's four kinds or explanatory modes, only one, the 'efficient cause' is a cause as defined in the leading paragraph of this present article. The other three explanatory modes would now be called material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion." I am not really confident that the second sentence would be widely accepted by Aristotle commentators because Aristotle was clearly aware of the approach taken by modern science and did not accept it, whereas what we are presenting as straightforward modern translations are compatible with modern science.
• "In some works of Aristotle, the four causes are listed as (1) the essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4) the final cause." Aristotle wrote in Greek, not English, so clearly this sentence is not literally true and what it really refers to (different Greek or different translations) should be clarified.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:09, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

It is good to see your thoughts here on the talk page. It would be good if you enacted them as you think fit in edits to the article. If you have in mind improvements on the second sentence that you quote, I guess they would be well received.

As for the subsidiary listing of four explanatory modes, the next sentence in the article tries to clarify. The essential cause I think is just what is the explanandum, its definition, perhaps its ontological status. The logical ground is argument how we know it to be so, perhaps its epistemological status. Apparently it fails. Obviously it would be good if you should do something about it.

I have used Daniel Graham as a source. Perhaps someone can check my interpretation of that source. Graham is of the opinion that the two lists of four causes are not variations of translation. They are two different philosophical positions, the one beginning 'essential' an early view held by Aristotle, the one beginning 'material cause' a view he formed later. I think the latter details are probably not needed in the present article?Chjoaygame (talk) 14:48, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

Unfortunately I do not have a copy of Daniel Graham's book. Is it online anywhere? --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:17, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

I borrowed it from the university library. I don't know of a source on the internet.Chjoaygame (talk) 12:55, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

Perhaps you can give some notes from the book? Did you take down any direct quotes which could be used to give rationales for the text now in the article?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:56, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

• Here is a review article which seems to show the book contains at least some proposals which are not universally accepted. This is normal of course, but we need to be careful to indicate such things.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:08, 24 March 2015 (UTC)
• Here is the book on google books. (Not full searchable, but we can get an indication by searching for some terms from some of the questioned text I pasted above: "dynamics", "material composition", etc. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:09, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

I have read criticisms of Graham's book. Perhaps they are right. I have read the book repeatedly and carefully and have given it my best shot. Perhaps you have access to a library and could check my work or criticize it or overwrite or delete it.Chjoaygame (talk) 22:30, 24 March 2015 (UTC)

But starting with a basic point, if you look at the two bullets above, and the quotes in italics, was this wording from Graham or not?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:18, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

You ask about your bullet points.

Your first is that "it is odd that we do not mention that the whole point of Aristotle's naming 4 types of cause was that he was arguing against the position taken today, which is that science should try to see everything in terms of physical interactions. Just saying the following does not really explain this properly to readers: "Of Aristotle's four kinds or explanatory modes, only one, the 'efficient cause' is a cause as defined in the leading paragraph of this present article. The other three explanatory modes would now be called material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion." I am not really confident that the second sentence would be widely accepted by Aristotle commentators because Aristotle was clearly aware of the approach taken by modern science and did not accept it, whereas what we are presenting as straightforward modern translations are compatible with modern science."

That is your take on Aristotle. You speak of "the whole point". I think that is an over exaggerated reading. It is one way of considering Aristotle's views, but I think it goes too far to say it is "the whole point". I don't see that it is too obvious that Aristotle is clearly aware of of the approach taken by modern science. My formulation is intended to distance itself to some extent from the approach taken by modern science. I don't think Aristotle was so much arguing against anything in particular, as he was straightforwardly answering the question 'what kinds of explanation are there?' I think Aristotle did have a fair idea of material explanation as taken by modern science, though not quite the same; my reason for this is in <Freudenthal, G. (1995). Aristotle's Theory of Material Substance, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.>, though I admit I did not cite that source. It seems you don't like my list "material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion." That is my best effort to write a summary list. Perhaps you will say why you don't like it? If you have a better version, you could post it. The word 'dynamics' is mine. I think it expresses Aristotle's idea better than any other word in this context. I think Aristotle was not as static a thinker as some might make out. I accept that the notion of material explanation is not too simple.

Your second dot point is whether Graham says that "In some works of Aristotle, the four causes are listed as (1) the essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4) the final cause." Yes, he does say that. The possibly debatable question is not whether he says that, I think; it is whether that is really the same as or different from the other list of four causes, and if different, why? Since there is nothing in the article about that possibly debatable question, I am not persuaded that it is problematical for the article. I just put in the alternative list to let the very discriminating reader know, without discussion, that there might be more to this than meets the eye. I think such detail is not called for here.Chjoaygame (talk) 11:37, 25 March 2015 (UTC)

• Concerning the question of to what extent Aristotle developed his explanations of causality precisely in contrast to a materialist understanding like used in modern science (efficient causes only), we can surely look for sources and consider. I did not realize my talk page comments would seem controversial as I think this to be a very common understanding of Aristotle, and very well-known subject in the history of ideas. But I will split this out for separate discussion. [ADDED: You might want to check some of the sourcing already found in our four causes article.]
• If I understand correctly, you are saying that the wording "material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion" is purely your wording? But if you read the context, this means Wikipedia is now saying these terms you chose are common terms in our time. That seems inappropriate? Why do we need your terms and not just the normal ones used in most published sources?
• Concerning your third paragraph, the bit that I doubt is that Wikipedia is currently saying that Aristotle had two different sets of terminology, whereas if I understand correctly, you are now saying you are not sure if this is true or if anyone believes this? If he had two sets of terminology then we should make it clear of course. But if this is not clear, then we should not be saying this?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:18, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

It is a bit hard if you don't find a way to look at Graham's book.

""material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion"" Yes, those are my own words. We are paraphrasing Aristotle as well as translating him. I think there is no uniquely right way to that. I think my words summarise various writers' views. I think the Stanford Encyclopedia that seems to be relied on in Wikipedia's main four causes article is not uniquely reliable, and I think that to some degree it seems unintentionally to assume that Aristotle spoke English. The word 'cause' in English comes from the Latin, in which it had a good degree of forensic colour, just as it did for Aristotle. "The advocate pleaded his client's cause." This is a far cry from a purely scientific interest in aetiology. Teleological explanation does not mean explanation that supposes that the future exerts causal efficacy on the past. It means explanation that takes into account where something will end up. It is a very bad mistake to suppose that the future exerts causal efficacy on the past, and still there is tendency for people to fall into it. They need strong warnings to avoid it, and people who enjoy issuing strong warnings get their chance here to do their thing. The genetic information in the chromosomes acts as the present exerting causal efficacy in the generation of the future. But it also has the future implicit in itself. Physically, the remarkable thing is the near-uniformity of the members of species of living things; that screams for an explanation. Aristotle pointed out that in his day, it was not evident how the semen determined the future, but it was evident that it nevertheless did so. It thus provides teleological explanation without conflicting with the rule that the future does not exert causal efficacy on the past. Another source for my thinking that I did not cite is Richard Broxton Onians's mighty work, The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate (Cambridge UP, 1951). It gives a very illuminating account of the word τέλος. I guess that is my main reason for my phrase "criterion of completion", which I worked out as better than others I could think of. Probably I should have explicitly cited Onians.

If you don't like what I have written, you are of course free to improve on it. I think it would be fair to ask you to read Graham and Onians and perhaps Freudenthal first.

I think it is not good that an account of what Aristotle wrote and thought should be framed on a reading of modern science, which is to an apparent extent what you seem to do; not altogether, since you do say that materialism was current in his day. But still, I think you do to some extent seem over-influenced by the unconscious idea that Aristotle knew about modern science; you may say I am misrepresenting you, and I plead guilty to over-statement, but there is something in it still, as I see it.

I mentioned function as well as structure because I think there is such a thing as dynamical structure, and I think Aristotle was not as statically oriented as some regard him.

"Concerning your third paragraph, the bit that I doubt is that Wikipedia is currently saying that Aristotle had two different sets of terminology, whereas if I understand correctly, you are now saying you are not sure if this is true or if anyone believes this? If he had two sets of terminology then we should make it clear of course."

You are slightly misrepresenting me here. I am sure that there are two ways Aristotle listed four causes. That is what is in the article. Graham provides chapter and verse for that. He believes it and thinks it very important. The article does not discuss whether the two ways are merely variations of expression or are substantially different. The latter question may be debated, but I don't see the debate as very notable for an article on present-day conceptions of causal efficacy; that is why I did not put in that debate in this article. For the main article on Aristotle's four "causes", I think Graham's thesis should be mentioned or even discussed or criticized. That would be the place for the "clarification" you ask for.

Again, if you feel, after reading Graham, Onians, and perhaps some of Freudenthal, that they are outweighed by the sources of the main article and that you can improve on what I wrote, of course you should edit accordingly.Chjoaygame (talk) 12:48, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

• ""material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion"" Yes, those are my own words. We are paraphrasing Aristotle as well as translating him. I think there is no uniquely right way to that. No problem with paraphrasing in general but in this specific case we seem to be saying these are well-known translations used very often. That could seem misleading? Please check the way we are presenting these words.
• You are right, I have tended to equate ancient and modern materialism in some of my comments on talk pages here, and we should be careful about that. Nevertheless they are both materialism, and Aristotle addressed materialisms in general and made a big thing of it. Also I feel there is some level of agreement that this concern of Aristotle also separates him from modern science. Francis Bacon, and the great scientists of the 18th century who were to some extent guided by him, certainly felt that Aristotle's complaints about materialism were in conflict with the approach of the new science. I accept that there is a respected minority position who believe that Aristotle himself should not be seen this way but rather his medieval interpreters. Not sure this is critical to our discussion.
• I agree Aristotle was very "dynamically oriented" and this is something often misunderstood. Not sure if it is critical for our discussion.
• there are two ways Aristotle listed four causes. That is what is in the article. Graham provides chapter and verse for that. What I saw in the reviews is that Graham believe Aristotle changed his mind and had two different explanations. That would be different from two different sets of terminology, which is the way I read what Wikipedia is saying. If there are two different terminologies, we should give the Greek I feel and source it quite accurately. Can you help with that?
• No problem with the idea that we should mention Graham's thesis of course, but at the moment we are not saying "according to Graham" but just presenting his position as if it were the only one. Adding a few "according to Graham"s might well solve many of my concerns, but I think only you can do this easily?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:28, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

It is not fair that you carry on without reading the source Graham, but instead refer only to criticisms of it.

Your comment says "What I saw in the reviews is that Graham believe Aristotle changed his mind and had two different explanations. That would be different from two different sets of terminology, which is the way I read what Wikipedia is saying." Yes it is true that Graham believes Aristotle changed his mind. Since the article does not discuss Graham's belief in Aristotle's change of mind, what Graham believes about it is not strictly relevant here. The fact that made Graham hold that belief is that, as you would find by reading his book, Aristotle used different terminology. That is simple textual fact which you can check when you look at Graham's listing of chapter and verse. I am not convinced that this in important enough in this article to justify a list of Greek textual quotations. True, it might be argued that it is a defect of the main article on Aristotle's four causes that it fails to deal with this, but this talk page is not primarily concerned with that article, and neither am I.

Your comment says "just presenting his position as if it were the only one". No, it doesn't present Graham's position about the two systems. It reports the textual variations without comment on why they occur. 'Graham's position' is about the two system concept, not about the textual variations as such. Since I don't think it very relevant to this article to present Graham's position that there are two systems, I think it enough to report that there are variations in the text without attributing that to Graham with an "according to" comment.

Responding to your request for a check, I have changed "would now be called" to "might be rendered".Chjoaygame (talk) 00:36, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

User:Chjoaygame it is up to you to defend your own edits. See WP:BURDEN. I see no problem with the idea of including clear discussion of Graham's position, and also I see no problem with including clear discussion the Graham's parsing of the texts. But what you have in now seems unclear to me, even concerning what it is saying. I tried to explain it in my original posts. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:31, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

An obvious objection to "including clear discussion of Graham's position, and ... including clear discussion the Graham's parsing of the texts" is that it is fine detail hardly relevant to the present article. As it is currently constructed, this article is about causality as more or less synonymous with efficacy. As I read you, you are concerned that the following comment is unclear: "In some works of Aristotle, the four causes are listed as (1) the essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4) the final cause. In this listing, a statement of essential cause is a demonstration that an indicated object conforms to a definition of the word that refers to it. A statement of logical ground is an argument as to why an object statement is true. These are further examples of the idea that a "cause" in general in the context of Aristotle's usage is an "explanation".<"Graham 1987">" That looks clear to me. Perhaps you will kindly say here how you find it unclear. It may be part of the problem that you think it is untrue? Or that you think it creates puzzles about what Aristotle really thought? Those are not quite covered by the word 'unclear'. For the present article, Aristotelian scholars' use of the word 'cause' is marginally relevant, though it gains undue prominence, as the article is currently structured, because of the prominence of the history section. It is unfortunate that the article gives great prominence to the history, with consequent excessive prominence to Aristotle. It would be best to move the history section to the end of the article, but some considerable effort would be needed for that, for which at present I do not have energy available. If you don't like the paragraph just quoted, that you find unclear, just delete it, or re-write it to make it clear in your eyes. I don't see how I can make it clearer without giving it undue prominence.Chjoaygame (talk) 10:21, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

If you go back to the original bullets it is pretty straightforward and boring.

• Does Graham say that Aristotle uses two different sets of terms for the four different causes or not? The way it is written now we imply this without making it clear, and without making it clear whether this is important or not. From what I can see, it is not clear Graham even said this.
• Where you give your own "modern terminology" for Aristotle's four causes, is there any source at all? If not then indeed can we just remove it?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:54, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

lead sentence of article

I agree with Aristotle. Focusing on the material (physical) cause is a narrow point of view. This article lead sentence should be modified. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 15:30, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

In what respect? Removing the word "physical"? I wouldn't have a problem with that personally but if you want it well discussed this should be in a new section, so I insert a break. (I am not saying I agree with Aristotle, but I do admit that many people do, and that while it is a mystery what other types of causes might exist, if we discovered one that everyone could agree on we would probably call it a cause still.)--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:04, 27 March 2015 (UTC)

The direction of the article is about causal efficacy. Wikipedia is not a dictionary that intends to give all meanings of a word. It is about the particular topic of causal efficacy. If you think the direction of the article should change, a tweak to the lead is not the way to do it. The whole article would need to be re-written. I agree that the word 'cause' has many senses and meanings and shades of meaning far outside the notion of causal efficacy, and that one could make the article try to cover some or all of those; but that would be a big project, perhaps the right thing to do; but it would need general consensus here to change the direction of the article, not a change to one word of the lead. It may be that the present direction of the article is very wrong in focus, but still consensus with a wide base would be needed to change the focus.

Editor Zulu Papa 5 * seems to conflate material cause with physical cause. I think that indicates not agreement with Aristotle, but rather it indicates misunderstanding of Aristotle and of related matters.

Neither Zulu Papa 5 * nor Andrew Lancaster likes the word 'physical' where it is. I have already proposed that the problem lies in the ambiguity of the word 'consequence'. I suggested instead 'where the first event affects the second'. No one has responded to that. I have now removed the objectionable words 'physical' and 'consequence', and used other words that I think may make the meaning clear. I can imagine that this new edit may not please the desire of Zulu Papa 5 * to change the whole direction of the article, but I think such a change is not yet justified by consensus. The words I have used are 'where the first event exerts efficacy in the generation of the second'. 'Exerts' and 'efficacy' and 'generation' indicate Aristotle's moving or efficient cause. I think that is what the article is about. If the direction of the article should change, then the words would probably change accordingly. The lead is a summary, and specific references are usually not appropriate because the summary refers to the article as a whole.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:15, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

I find this hard to follow. I did not say I do not like the word "physical" but I can see that removing it does not really change the meaning of the sentence, and I can see how the word can be understood different ways. I can not understand why you think that the article would need to be completely changed? That seems a major exaggeration. I also do not understand why you think this article needs to be narrowly only about efficient causes. Obviously to discuss causation you need to discuss Aristotle, and to discuss Aristotle you need to discuss the argument he made that sticking only to efficient causes is not enough? Has there ever been any discussion about narrowing the coverage of the article in this way?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:25, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

As I read it, the article is at present about efficient cause. I didn't make it that way. I don't have a strong feeling that it ought to be that way. It's just the way it is. But to make it about a diversity of meanings of the word 'cause' would require a radical re-write. I think there is not enough momentum of consensus to justify such a radical re-write. It seems to me that we are at risk of incrementally creeping, by way of a few quibbles and fiddles, into an unplanned and probably untidy re-write along those radical lines. If you want to re-write the whole article, go right ahead, if you can get consensus. It is not obvious that a discussion of causal efficacy needs an analysis of how Aristotelian scholars have abused the word 'cause'. The discussion of Aristotle's four cause doctrine is a historical discussion of scholarly abuse of language, only marginally relevant to the topic of causal efficacy. The place for discussion of Aristotle on four "causes" is in the article with that title. You ask has there been discussion of the focus on causal efficacy? You could check that out by reading the talk pages. De facto it has turned out so, with or without explicit discussion. If you want to change it, go ahead, just making sure you advertise your project and get consensus for it. I would oppose incremental fiddling.Chjoaygame (talk) 10:51, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

There is not a diversity of things called cause. There is one subject. Aristotle was talking about the same causes and effects as Democritus, and indeed as Newton. They just approach it differently, but it is still recognized by everyone that they are talking about the same thing. Aristotle's approach asks us to describe every cause and effect with several dimensions. Not everyone agrees with him. Efficient causes are clearly going to be the main subject of the article, but if we discuss Aristotle's approach, which we must, then we must mention that he sees discussion of causation (the same causation modern scientists discuss) as too narrow if limited to what he called efficient causes.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:01, 28 March 2015 (UTC)

I am unhappy with the above comment and unhappy with the associated edit, but I can see that you are determined. At present I do not have time to resist.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:47, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Presentism

To clarify my intent, being that Presentism (philosophy) see [5] should be better addressed in this article. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 15:16, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

The foregoing looks like a link to a naked Google search. This is bad for the credibility of the editor who wrote it, and is ill-mannered.

Whatever. I am not favourably impressed with the proposal to address presentism in the present article.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:38, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Presentism changes the time frame perspective in this article, perhaps it violates a deterministic causality view. To be fair, might have to address Retrocausality too. There are underlying truth issues about time, which at present has at least 3 main views: past, present, future. Following, Two truths doctrine, past and future are relative while present can be ultimate. Probably good to move slow and avoid a Predestination paradox; sensing the causality and time issues have to be brought out first. [6] [7] Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 00:40, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

final vs ultimate cause

I know nothing of Hindu theories of cause. I am just asking a question about how they relate to Aristotle's aetiology. I read in the section Causality#History#Hindu philosophy the following: "The 4 types of causes identified by Aristotle (see above) are also recognized in the Vedic literature: the material cause (upādāna), the instrumental cause (nimitta), the formal cause (rūpa) and the ultimate cause (parāyana)."

This quoted sentence looks on the face of it mistaken. Aristotle's final cause is not best described as "ultimate cause". If the quote is right in saying that Vedic literature recognizes, as one of its four "causes", an "ultimate" cause, that does not well correspond with one of Aristotle's four causes. I note that a request for a reliable source has stood unanswered for nearly a year. Also, as a minor grammatical point, the "4" of the sentence would be better written 'four'; I won't 'correct' the grammar of a sentence that I think is substantially mistaken.

Moreover, I think it verging on a mistake to call Aristotle's moving or efficient cause an "instrumental cause". I think this needs changing, but again, I won't make a 'correction' to a sentence that I think is substantially mistaken. To check this point, a clarification is needed here as what nimitta really means, as well as a change to the word "instrumental".

It is a slight worry that there is a natural pairing of formal and material causes, but this is not kept in the questioned sentence. Is there such a natural pairing in the Vedic conception?

I think it reasonable to ask these questions and to expect an answer because Hindu and Vedic doctrines are primarily in Sanskrit, not familiar to English Wikipedia editors.

If there is no adequate response to this query of mine, I will likely delete the offending sentence.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:26, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the note, there is probable cause to keep. [8] [9] [10]. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 23:49, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

[11] looks to me like reason to delete.

[12] as it appears in the linked place does not explicitly address the question. I have NOT purchased or read the whole article. If you have done so, please give us details. If you have not done so, then this citation is reprehensible.

The same goes for [13].

The response is unsatisfactory.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:37, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

This one draws a relation to Aristotle and Buddhism [14]. Removed passage, I've exhausted my searching for tonight, my instincts say final and ultimate are the same; however along with the time frame, there are mind frame issues too [15] Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 01:26, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Searching around for sources like that is not the way to work. One should study sources over period of time, and if, after study, one finds a concurrence of reliable sources, one is in a position to post that concurrence. I am very distrustful of your instinct that "final and ultimate are the same".Chjoaygame (talk) 11:26, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Action

Ok, I believe the essence of the difference in Eastern and Western approaches to causality is in the relation between events. Where causality focusses on the events, karma focuses on the action between events (acts and effects) (Currently, represented as "relation" in the article's lead.) A focus on action and thus the agent's identity brings in the moralistic issues of the agent's methods, as well as the time frame and mindset. This is why I was so particular about the word choice "relation" and how they relations are constructed. Within various karma philosophical schools there is an issue as to if karma can be purified with intentional causes, and perhaps equanimity in action produces no karma. Eastern approaches seems to focus on an agents identity and basically abstract away determinism into authoritarianism. Seems like the eastern sections could be improved with these distinctions about action. This look like a good source to draw from [16] Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 02:36, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

Over a period of time one should study a wide range of sources. Eventually one may find a concurrence of reliable sources. Then one can post. It is not right to post if one lacks a mature understanding of the subject matter.Chjoaygame (talk) 11:32, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

topic of this article

It worries me that there seems to be some confusion as to the topic of this article. What is the topic of this article?

Reading the article, I think its primary topic is causality as referring to causal efficacy, which in the Aristotelian classification is moving or efficient cause. On the other hand, the length of the history section, and its focus on the word 'cause', might suggest that the topic of the article is that word 'cause', especially as it is used by philosophers who are working on Aristotle's philosophy.

I think it a mistake to have the four Aristotelian 'causes' as apparently primary in the structure and direction of the article. That would tend to see Wikipedia as a dictionary, and to make the topic of the article the word 'cause', as against the concept of causality referring to causal efficacy.

I think the topic should be causality as referring to causal efficacy, or in Aristotelian terms moving or efficient cause. The place in the article for the Aristotelian four cause doctrine should be secondary in the article, as explaining the history, and as elucidating the primary topic.Chjoaygame (talk) 21:49, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

It seems to me to be about both these topics, which are very much over-lapping? It is hard to imagine splitting the article into two, because the two would cover almost the same ground?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 12:40, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you for this response.

Yes, there is a large amount about both topics. But my point is that it is bad that it should be so. Aristotle's philosophical theory of aitia is more focused on the classification of explanatory programs, while the topic of efficient causality is definitely focused on the specifics of a particular concept. The two topics are divergent in concept, and do not overlap in their main thrusts. It is very far from the case that the two cover almost the same ground. That they are lumped into the same article does a disservice to both. To say that they cover "almost the same ground" is to gravely underestimate the philosophical gravity of Aristotle's logical work. There is already an article on the four causes as a topic in its own right. Mixing the topics in this article is an invitation to conceptual disorganization of the article, and the invitation has lured the obvious responses and would continue to do so if it persisted.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:41, 1 May 2015 (UTC)Chjoaygame (talk) 04:43, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

I am hesitant to support, but sure all are open to a proposal. In my view, the article is heavy on physical scientific examples which are largely the effect of industrialized education. Zulu Papa 5 * (talk) 12:16, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you for this response.

I think the main direction of the present article is, in the Aristotelian classification, efficient causation. I think it is not specifically the aspects of efficient causation that interest physicists. It is efficient causation in general, including biological, social, as well as the more nearly physical, as for example geographical, astronomical, and engineering. Perhaps one could say it is efficient causation in the world, or nature. I think in a very broad sense that means physical efficient causation is one aspect of interest from an abstract point of view, remembering that the word physics comes from the Greek for nature.Chjoaygame (talk) 23:11, 4 May 2015 (UTC)