Talk:Problem of other minds
|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Start-class, High-importance)|
|WikiProject Cognitive science||(Rated Start-class, High-importance)|
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I think the Soft Materialist view needs restating. While there's nothing technically wrong with it, it's written in high fluffy wording that's more difficult to follow than it needs to be. And it assumes the reader already has a good understanding of how the human eye works, when that has absolutely nothing to do with the subject of the page. Hamnox (talk) 04:56, 8 August 2009 (UTC)
No. I would like to see a disambiguation page for Other Minds so that we can create a page for the Other Minds music festival organization in San Francisco. See http://otherminds.org/ rchrd 21:28, 13 January 2007 (UTC)
The "Alternatives" part is really ridiculous. I mean sure somebody can believe that there are other minds. But the "arguments" given lack any sense of logic that should be requirement to being allowed to using the word "proof". The second sentence is also wrong. You cannot say "argue" and then just give a statement that is equally untestable - and this for the same reasons - as the statement in question. I know that there is freedom of belief but there are positions you really don't have to deal with. Drivehonor 21:27, 31 August 2007 (UTC)
- Wholeheartedly agreed, it's apparently sourceless claptrap and I don't see what it's doing here. Going to go ahead and remove it altogether. 18.104.22.168 (talk) 06:46, 5 March 2008 (UTC)
I think that this page needs a total overhaul. The main point is that the problem of other minds is no longer regarded as a purely epistemological problem. In his paper, 'What is the problem of other minds?', Colin McGinn argues that it is, in fact, a conceptual problem. Anita Avramides argues the same point in her book 'Other Minds'. So, the page certainly needs to include some information on this conception of the problem. Also, why is the problem elucidated by the step from qualia inversion to absent qualia? I've never seen the problem set up in this way, and I don't think it helps people to understand the problem at all. The responses are also poor, especially the 'Alternatives' section at the end. Sentences like, "all minds are fundamentally connected, we all differ in our own universes of thought but the overall universe is constant and binds us together", are unclear, unhelpful and, in my view, complete nonsense. So, what I propose is that the page needs to be entirely rewritten, taking into account the different aspects of the problem (i.e. epistemological, conceptual and metaphysical). The responses should include the argument from analogy (why isn't this already here? In the history of philosophy, this is the dominant form of argument offered as a solution to the problem of other minds), behaviourism (shows how moves in the metaphysics and concepts of other minds defuse the epistemological problem), solipsism, and perhaps some stuff from Strawson or Davidson. Perhaps it would be good to include something on the history of the problem as well? What do people think? Barn2107 (talk) 13:51, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Sorry, all a bit scrappy at the mo, and I will add references asap. Barn2107 23:04, 3 December 2007 (UTC)
I just read this article and noticed that solipsism is described in a bit unclear way in my taste.
"Solipsists argue that there are indeed no minds but one's own and that attempting to prove the existence of another mind is futile. Proponents of this view argue that the world outside one's own mind cannot be known and indeed might be nonexistent."
Here it is first said that a solipsist argues that there are no other minds than his own, i.e. that he claims he knows that, then a little later it says that the proponents claim that one can not know if there are other minds or not. This is contradictory, so either it should be reformulated or it should be clarified that solipsism comes in various versions, which one could maybe call strong and weak solipsism or so.
Magnus Andersson (2008-08-14)
I'm going to be doing a major rewrite of this article on my user-page. See User: Adorno Rocks/Problem of other minds. Constructive criticism greatly appreciated. &dorno rocks. (talk) 17:28, 11 February 2010 (UTC)
It has solipsism, but it lacks the opposite theory: that everything is conscious. It is in my opinion that acknowledging the conscious nature of fundamental particles explains the entirety of quantum physics. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 22.214.171.124 (talk) 14:36, 4 May 2013 (UTC)
What you are looking for is Panpsychism, Idealism or Neutral Monism. These ideas tend to presuppose the existence of another mind and then attempt to explain the nature of mind-stuff in relation to matter, rather than prove Solipsism wrong - as it is impossible to prove Solipsism wrong, you can only prove Solipsists ridiculous. 126.96.36.199 (talk) 18:47, 3 March 2016 (UTC)