Jump to content

Talk:Pseudophilosophy/Archive 1

Page contents not supported in other languages.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Archive 1Archive 2

Richard Dawkins remark

I moved the Richard Dawkins remark. He is neither a philosopher nor a relevant thinker in this matter. -Chomsky2093 20:04, 10 August 2007

I made some changes to the first line which might or might not seem controvesial. If they don't, then ignore the following.

Granted that the applications of the term "pseudophilosophy" are usually controversial, the qualifiers in the first line aren't helpful in making the definition NPOV. I changed three points (and just reorganized the rest a bit). (1) First, the article began by saying how the word is used; it is simpler to just describe what, if any, things it would apply to (See Use-mention distinction and Sense-reference distinction). (2) Second, and partly as a result, the line said that the term was used by the speaker to describe some philosophy-like subject that he/she has a particular kind of poor opinion of. While the NPOV sentiment behind this line is laudable, it's just confusing: it's like defining "horse" by saying that the word horse is used by people to describe what look to them like four-legged hooved mammals etc. Obviously a horse is any mammal with four legs and so forth; and obviously pseudo-philosophy is ill-conceived pretend philosophizing. There's no need to mention how people use the term in either case, and there's nothing contentious here because no mention is (yet) made of which systems are pseudo-philosophies; only of what people mean by the term. (3) Finally, psedo-philosophy is charactized as philosophy that one doesn't like. This seems manifestly false. Why? I greatly enjoy reading people like Frank Herbert and Robert A. Heinlein, or for that matter Tolstoy or Camus, but I would happily (or at least ruefully) agree if someone suggested to me that all of the former's and much or all of the latter's philosophizing is pseudo-philosophy. On the other hand I often dislike the work of Nozick, say, or of Bertrand Russell but I would never doubt that it's genuine philosophy. So it seems that anyone who sincerely uses the term uses it to say that a system is lacking in the standards suited to being philosophy, and not merely disliked. That kind of pejorative use deserves only a passing mention.

As I'm sure you're aware, a term like pseudophilosophy is very different from a term like horse. In a way I liked the previous intro better because it made it clear that, to a large extent, the use of the term pseudophilosophy is arbitrary - what is pseudophilosophy is, of course, very contentious. I like yours better in a way because it is clearer, but I'm wondering if there is a way to incorporate the feeling of arbitrariness from the first article in your text. I've been looking over it for the past 5 minutes or so and its not coming to me. -Seth Mahoney 19:12, 10 May 2004 (UTC)
Thanks. I have tacked on another sentence to point toward that arbitrariness; maybe it helps or should be embellished.
Fantastic. Excellent prose, btw. -Seth Mahoney 19:49, 10 May 2004 (UTC)

From the article:

A search on google.com for pseudophilosophy will produce (at the time of writing) several dozen hits – many of them referring to Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. It will be clear from reading most of these entries that the writer does not like Ayn Rand’s views and considers them unworthy of philosophical studies. However the quality of explanations for this dislike will generally be below what is generally considered acceptable in philosophical writing.

This kind of search engine research should not be discussed in the article, only the conclusions. --Eloquence 08:36 19 May 2003 (UTC)

I am not sure why this would be inappropriate - this provides an example of an (alleged) philosophical system that many people consider to be a pseudophilosophy. There is no departure from facts and, IFAICS, no departure from NPOV - since there is no suggestion that this view has any justification beyond the emotional state of the writers. --Michael Voytinsky

I'm restoring this, with some rewording, on the grounds that what is being shown in this paragraph is not "research" being "discussed" but instead an example of how the term "pseudophilosophy" is used in the real world using a real world example. Looking into other encyclopaedia resources I have available, it seems to be standard operating procedure to cite examples of social phenomena. -- Michael 12:28 20 May 2003 (UTC)

I'd still wonder, though, that the bit about the quality of explanations for this dislike will generally be below what is generally considered acceptable in philosophical writing. This does seem to be a partisan POV bit: the quality of Ayn Rand's own works is also generally below what is considered acceptable in philosophical writing; not surprising that she gets ranting in response as well. -- IHCOYC 15:53 10 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I've heard this term used to describe the new Matrix movie quite a bit lately. -- goatasaur

Well, our professor in "History of Philosophy" has used it several times in order to explain the views of historical thinkers, such as Descartes' solipsism. Anyway, this is a matter of discussion and probably not suitable in an article about the term, allthough the so-called philosophy of the brothers behind Matrix clearly is questionable. I haven't read any of what they've written, though.. -- Sigg3.net 16:41, 5 Dec 2003 (UTC)
Of course I'm a solipsist. Isn't everybody?
What? If you're a solipsist, 'everybody' doesn't exist, hence "isn't everybody?" is an invalid question.- Sigg3.net 19:00, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)
If you give quantifiers (everybody, somebody) a normal extensional interpretation (ranging over a domain of objects) and categorical sentences the usual truth-functional interpretaion, then the question asks after the truth of "Everyone is a solipsist", that is, every object is such that IF it is a person THEN it is a solipsist." This claim is true as long as there are no non-solipsists.
AAR, Descartean solipsism (or Berkelian idealism) and The Matrix strike me as staking out extremely similar, if not identical, positions. It's "pseudo" in the sense that a persistent, consistent fantasy is "just as good as" a "real" external world; it doesn't make any difference whether it "really" exists or not. -- Smerdis of Tlön 00:49, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)
Anything comparing external reality (Das Welt an Sich, to use Kant) to dreams, computergames etc. can be called solipsism. The mathematics, however, "proves" or states that everything follows the same order of numbers, I don't remember what the theory was all about but we had it in High School. Really interesting, actually. Matrix could just as well build on that, and not solipsistic ideas, or both (the one to prove the other etc.).. - Sigg3.net 19:00, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)

By the way, is astrology pseudoscience? Check out umbrellaology: http://physics.weber.edu/johnston/astro/umbrellaology.htm and the "solution": http://physics.weber.edu/johnston/astro/soln1030_umbrellaology.htm

- Sigg3.net 19:08, 6 Dec 2003 (UTC)

A recent poster removed a reference to falsifiability, stating that this is philosophy, not science. I would tend to disagree, but before starting a WikiWar :-) with the poster, I would like to get others' opinions on this.

I would say that falsifiability is part of philosophy as well as science. Whenever someone makes a claim in the form "X is true", it is reasonable to ask "How do you know that X is true?". If there is no answer to that, "X is true" is netierh philosophy nor science.

If we can meaningfully ask "How do you know that this is true?" it implies "What would it take to show that it is not true?", and thus implies falsifiability.

To suggest that philosophical claims are not subject to falsfiability is to place them on par with claims of astrology or personal religious faith.

---Michael Voytinsky 01:32, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I restored the bit about paranoid delusions --- the premise of The Matrix is a classic one. I do tend to agree that falsifiability of a sort --- in that you have to ask yourself, Does believing 'X' make a difference in anything? Given what we know of the energy requirements of computers, it seems unlikely that the apparent material universe is a verisimilar hallucination that runs off our body heat. But until we're handed the pill, choosing to say 'Yea' or 'Nay' to this belief system is a decision entirely free of consequence. Smerdis of Tlön 01:55, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)
It is useful for living your life to ask yourself that, but it isn't useful for discovering the ultimate reality of the world. Regardless, The Matrix doesn't describe a paranoid delusion, and to my knowledge no philosopher is making the claim that the world is a paranoid delusion (would belief in the existence of a world that doesn't exist have to be a *paranoid* delusion?) -Seth Mahoney 02:13, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The reasons I removed the reference to falsifiability are as follows:

  1. Karl Popper was talking about science, in a book on the philosophy of science when he suggested the using falsifiability as a tool for judging the validity of a *scientific* theory. Philosophical theories are different. In fact, you will often hear it said (though this particular example is arguable) that superstring theory isn't science, but philosophy, because (at least as of yet) it is not falsifiable. Have a look at the falsifiability page.
  2. Philosophy isn't subject to the same sources of falsifiability that science is. If I can deduce that the sky is, in fact, a lovely shade of green, and my deduction stands up, it doesn't in the end matter if every time I look at the sky I see blue - the sky *must* be green.
  3. Philosophy sometimes deals with topics that aren't falsifiable, at least in the sense that Popper talks about: God, noumena, the human mind, etc. One of the things that makes philosophy valuable is that it can go beyond the immediately observable (and therefore immediately falsifiable).
  4. Skepticism is a problem in philosophy because, to date, there has been no satisfactory way around it. Since David Hume, nearly every major philosopher has written a response to his skepticism. We have yet to come up with a reason that we should totally discount the idea that each (or even one, so long as the one of us in the vat is the one doing the experiencing) of us is just a brain in a vat. It may be useful to live our lives as if we aren't, but that doesn't mean that it isn't the case.
  5. As much as many people might like to state the contrary, philosophy is more exact than science. The requirement of falsifiability implies that there will never be a science that we can be sure exactly describes the universe (here comes that skepticism again). Ignoring for a moment the problem of deduction, this isn't the case for philosophy - moving from general truths to specific truths should be foolproof.

-Seth Mahoney 02:08, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Let me put it this way, then: do you accept Occam's Razor as a valid critique of a philosophical idea? So long as the fantasy of the world appears to be persistent and consistent, it doesn't make a difference if it's all a simulation or all in our heads. Beliefs without consequences can be treated as false or optional. Smerdis of Tlön 13:39, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Treating something as false because it isn't necessary to explain a phenomenon (including the phenomenon of reality) doesn't guarantee that your conclusion will be true, so I guess my answer is that it depends on the goal of your philosophy. If you're interested in a philosophy that people can live with, that adds to our lives in a way that directly relates to our experience, then by all means discount radical skepticism as optional. However, if you're interested in the truth of reality, the nature of existence, etc., then radical skepticism cannot be dismissed in this way because, though it is unlikely, we could be brains in vats (someone once argued that, in fact, it is highly likely that we are something similar to brains in vats or self-conscious simulations - I think there's an article floating around wikipedia about it). All possibilities must be considered and discounted only when they are deductively proven incorrect. -Seth Mahoney 23:05, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Rand

I deleted a reference comparing Ayn Rand to Socrates as a "self taught" philosopher, mostly because it's hard to tell what we have of Socrates; in a large measure, the philosophy of Socrates comes from the semi-fictionalized dialogues of Plato, in which Socrates is Plato's mouthpiece; and Plato was an academic philosopher.

I also restored the bit about not recognising degrees of dissent from Rand's teachings; this is central to the accusations of cultism. Nathaniel Branden (not an objective or an Objectivist source, to be true) reports that slight disagreements with Rand over æsthetic tastes were enough to eject you from the charmed circle of Rand's devotees. Smerdis of Tlön 13:30, 28 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Do keep in mind that the irrationality of her followers (devotees) is not a direct criticism of Ayn Rand. More importantly flaws in either Ayn Rand's followers or even Ayn Rand herself do not automatically invalidate the various ideas she has put forth. Having the support of fools does not support a theory, but neither should it be invalidated by such support.

Regarding Rand, it is a non sequitur to suggest that just because academics embrace her it is evidence of her statements being valid. It is hard to imagine that any Objectivist or Randian would say the same thing about Marxists, Feminists, Libertarians or Anarchists in academia. Besides, even if all of academia embraced her does not necessarily mean that her statements are valid - that would be an argumentum ad numerum. Tejano 14:13, 25 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Here is a debate over Rand's status as a pop- or pseudo-philosopher from the old entry on "pop-philosophy" that now redirects here.

Pro-Rand:

Ayn Rand was not a "pop" philosopher. Her work has been discussed by academic scholars, and although she was not well-received by professional philosophers, she is a philosopher in her own right.

Against Rand:

On the contrary, Ayn Rand is the foremost example of someone who has been accused of being a pop philosopher. The coverage over the question of Ayn Rand's status as a philosopher is admirably covered in the entry on her and in the entry on pseduo-philosophy. It is not that academic scholars did not receive her philosophy well, most professional philosophers dismissed her as a "pop philosopher." Personally, I was introduced to philosophy by the works of Ayn Rand. As many people are. She is a great gateway into serious philosophy. However, I also knew when to drop her. She did not live up to the standard of philosophy for the time in which she lived, and she is not given a place in contemporary philosophic discussion. When she is discussed, it normally doesn't happen without the those discussing her status as a "pop philosopher." -Atfyfe 06:43, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

Pro-Rand:

But there are academics who seriously debate her work. If you're interested in a scholarly book on Objectivism published by professional philosophers, I would recommend The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, edited by Douglas J. Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen. Some contributors include philosophers Erik Mack, Anthony Flew, Wallace Matson, J. Charles King, and Tibor Machan. In the introduction, the editors state the each of the contributors agrees that "Rand was a philosopher, not a mere popularizer." While some articles in it are somewhat favorable or completely neutral, a few are very critical. So the charge that academia has completely ignored Ayn Rand and dismissed Objectivism is not only POV, but also totally fallacious. Ayn Rand should not be included in this "article" on "pop philosophy." --24.220.246.20

Dismissing Objectivism as a "pseudophilosophy" is blatantly biased and intolerable. Rand's work has been studied and commented on by professional philosophers; books on the subject of Objectivism have been published by academics; sources such as Britannica and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy refer to Rand as a philosopher; academics who write critically of Objectivism frequently refer to it as a philosophy, e.g. Michael Huemer. By the way, my previous edit was not "in bad faith." -24.220.246.20

Against Rand:

I still have to say that Rand is the key example of pseudo- or pop-philosophy that philosophers cite. Regardless if it is a correct description, it is widespread. That, at the very least, should be mentioned in this article. Secondly, I think it is a correct description. Rand may make an occasional showing in academic philosophy, but (1) they are rare, and (2) she is still thought of as an outsider. You forgot to mention Nozick, who is a major contemporary philosopher who thinks Rand deserves more credit than she is given. However, these rare pro-Rand philosophers are not just discussing her philosophy, but fighting for us to recognize Rand as a true philosopher (implying that people don't consider her one). Just because Rand is a pop-philosopher, doesn't mean she wouldn't have professional philosophers who think that is a mis-labeling of Rand. I did not say that Rand was completely ignored. So your straw-man accusation is "totally fallacious." As I said: "When she is discussed, it normally doesn't happen without the those discussing her status as a 'pop philosopher.'" That normally isn't done for Quine, or Kripke, or McDowell, etc. However, it is done for Voltaire, Emerson, etc. Which is the category in which I think Rand may belong.
To sum up my little rant here: it would be incorrect to leave out in an entry on "pop-philosophy" that Rand is a famous and common target of such a label. However, to remain NPOV the entry should not take sides on if Rand actually is one or not. -Atfyfe 02:30, 11 October 2006 (UTC)

Could whomever said that "Professional Scholars" consider Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance a Pseudophilosophy please cite sources. I could find any Philosopher or "Professional Scholar" who is against anything, so unless we want to make this article infinitely long, someone should justify why this is included. --Butter 10:27, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Content Dispute: Definition of Pseudophilosophy

Okay, I'm new to this page, so that means (1) I'm energetic and ready to edit, (2) I'm unfamiliar with the history of edits and reverts the page has already undergone, and (3) I'm both willing and able to bring up for discussion again any topics that don't seem to have been fully addressed.

Let me begin by saying I was horrified upon first seeing this page on Wikipedia. Pseudophilosophy, while certainly a term bandied about by nonphilosophers, is not something that I've ever heard a serious philosopher use in a sentence. To be sure, I am certain that there is such a thing as pseudophilosophy, but how it is currently defined on this page is outrageous.

Consider pseudoscience. Science is not knowledge, but a way of arriving at knowledge, and pseudoscience is stuff that isn't really science yet pretends to be. I understand why phrenology and the like is termed as pseudoscience; that makes sense to me, and I'm perfectly okay with the term.

But pseudophilosophy? Have I missed something here?

For example, Pirsig's Zen Motorcycle Maintenance stuff is listed in this article as an example of pseudophilosophy. The previous edit to this talk page even asks for information on why it is here. But what gives? I agree that Pirsig's stuff is incorrect; the arguments just aren't sound. But that doesn't mean that it's deliberately misleading. And isn't that what pseudophilosophy really is? I mean, lots of philosophers have been wrong on one thing or another. Plato, for example, often made the Humean fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. (Though Leo Strauss would say that that was his point in the first place.) But who among us is ready to call Plato a pseudophilosopher?

Clearly, pseudophilosophy is not determined by whether or not a philosophy is right. So what is the quality that determines whether or not a philosophy should be deemed a pseudophilosophy? From the way examples are bandied about on this page, it looks to me as though pseudophilosophy is determined by opinion, and nothing more.

Look, I've read Rand, and Pirsig, and even Hegel. Rand and Pirsig are wrong -- their logic is flawed -- but that doesn't mean that it is a pseudophilosophy. As for Hegel, I really can't say anything at all, as his stuff is totally incomprehensible to me. But then again, so was Aristotle the first time I read him.

In order for a philosophy to be pseduophilosophy, it would need to pass the same intrinsic test that pseudoscience is made to do. And I'm not talking about falsifiability; that's particular to pseudoscience, and not to pseudophilosophy. What I'm talking about is the basic, easy definition that (I hope) everyone here will agree on: that pseudophilosophy is something presented which is not philosophy as if it were philosophy. Then, once we've agreed on this definition, we can ask what philosophy is.

Surely (I would hope), philosophy is nothing but love of wisdom. So as long as the speaker is really trying to get at wisdom, even if he fails, what he speaks of is philosophy. The only true examples of pseudophilosophy would be those who know one thing to be true, and yet preach another. But even then, certain philosophies praise that sort of thing -- look at Machiavelli, or even Leo Strauss! Now there's a character who emphasizes the idea of lauding what you don't believe in -- yet no one accuses him of being a pseudophilosopher.

Nothing against the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, but that added info by Rescher saying that the term is particularly appropriate when "those who use the resources of reason to substantiate the claim that rationality is unachievable in matters of inquiry" is pure hogwash. Callicles in Plato's Gorgias attempts just that -- and even though he ultimately gave bad arguments, it doesn't make it pseudophilosophy.

This issue really needs to be discussed. I am not going to edit the main article yet, as I want to see what kind of responses I get here first.

If I don't get any good responses within a week, then I'm going to rewrite this article appropriately. I'd do it now, but I don't want someone to revert my work; so let me know ahead of time what everyone else thinks on this.

Eric Herboso 21:28, 1 Feb 2005 (UTC)

You may have a point that, if "pseudophilosophy" is supposed to be analogous to "pseudoscience", then there must be a principle distinguishing it from simply bad philosophy. But Wikipedia is supposed to be descriptive, not prescriptive. The article should report how the term is commonly used and to what theories it is commonly applied. It may be that the usage fails an analogy test with pseudoscience, but surely an encyclopedia shouldn't create a novel definition for a term in common usage and ignore that usage.
Actually, I'm not convinced that "pseudophilosophy" fails the analogy test. Someone may plausibly argue that academic philosophers are the only appropriate judges of what counts as academic philosophy and that "pseudophilosophy" applies to those apparently philosophical works which fail as academic philosophy. This isn't so different from a view of science in certain philosophical circles: science just is what scientists do.
But whether we agree with this view or not, I think that the article must present common usage rather than a novel definition that we think is more principled. I'm strongly opposed to your proposed re-write at present. Phiwum 08:56, 7 November 2005 (UTC)
I think you're mostly right. But while "pseudophilosophy" surely isn't characterized just by being wrong, I doubt it has to be deliberately misleading either. Wildly incompetent is probably sufficient. By analogy, consider a paradigmatic pseudoscience: many (I won't say all) advocates of "Intelligent Design" aren't lying--they really believe the stuff, and believe that it's good science, and simply are too ignorant or dumb to know any better. It's misleading, but not (necessarily) deliberately so; but it's surely pseudoscience.
(Incidentally, the term is used in a sentence by a serious philosopher: in the quoted sentence by Nicholas Rescher; but, true, isn't used very often.)
Followup: A non-trivial number of philosophers do deny that Strauss should be called a philosopher. Myles Burnyeat wrote a noted essay in (I think) the TLS to that effect some years back, and more recently Brian Leiter (archived on leiterreport.typepad.com) remarks:
The ... New York Times ... continues the mainstream media's long-standing fraudulent portrayal of Leo Strauss, and his acolytes like Allan Bloom, Francis Fukuyama, and Harry Jaffa, as serious political philosophers and scholars. The Times calls Strauss a "classicist and political philosopher," not noting that he could not have been appointed in any serious classics or philosophy department because of the poor quality of both his scholarship and philosophical argumentation.
So, whether it's true or false, the accusation is made, on exactly the grounds of Strauss's incompetence.


I'm also new here, so I hope I'll be excused for throwing in a complaint that might seem too obvious to even discuss, which is this; to define pseudophilosophy, we surely need a definition of philosophy? And those are hard to come by. We could tentatively, as suggested, go with "love of wisdom", but this is just postponing the question. What's 'wisdom'? Or 'love', for that matter. A precise definition of philosophy is generally agreed upon as being "notoriously difficult", and this diffculty leaks onto the pseudophilosophy discussion. But untill such a definition is in place it seems a bit useless to discuss definitions of pseudophilosophy.

A more reasonable approach, it seems to me, is along the lines of the "Wikipedia is supposed to be descriptive, not prescriptive" argument. And when describing common usages of the term 'pseudophilosophy' special emphasis should be put on who most frequently apply the term, and perhaps for what reasons. I suspect this would mostly be academic - especially analytic - philosophers, eager to protect their territory. Any philosopher particularly eager to label some text as pseudophilosophy should be viewed with a healthy dose of sceptisism - as in Quine et al. protesting Derrida's honorary degree at Cambridge.

Ayn Rand section

The entire section on Ayn Rand was recently deleted wholesale by an anonymous editor. While I might agree that too much attention is focused on Rand in the article, and that too much effort seems to have gone into trying to rehabilitate Rand, I'm not sure that entirely deleting the section is the answer. -- Smerdis of Tlön 00:01, 15 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Ayn Rand III

It is not "without discussion" that Ayn Rand got her own subsection in this article: see above. I've been somewhat unhappy with her prominence in this article, and if you will look through the versions of the history, there used to be a whole lot more about Rand; that section had in fact been pared down rather sharply, and parts of it forked to the cited article about academic reactions to Rand.

Still, I do not see how the answer is to delete the discussion of Rand wholesale, especially since her name pops up frequently whenever discussion of "pseudophilosophy" is made. Smerdis of Tlön 19:08, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Neurality disputed

Where is the critism in this article? What intellectual standard? Who's standards? Yours... mine? Come on. Pseudophilosophy is just another "straw man" argument mechanism to attack the individual not the ideas. Look at practically every significant western philosopher and you will see their ideas were attacked as Pseudophilosophy... When did this term come into being... byy whom? I could go on but I think I have made my point. H0riz0n 14:05, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

"intellectual standards"

A portion of the article right now reads "while significantly failing to meet some suitable intellectual standards". To make the article more objective (and thus less readily attacked by ignorant relativists), it should be made clear precisely which intellectual standards are violated (and, if necessary, mention criticism of these intellectual standards). Some hints of standards that most people would agree on: vague, non-defined or ill-defined concepts, mixing together two different concepts that share the same term (in fact, a frequent error), heavy use of concepts with strong connotations, lack of locical consistency, texts being more emotional than factual (too much pathos compared to logos, see modes of persuasion - an example may be philosophy presented as a novel or a poem), etc. [In fact, I think that these are different formulations of more or less the same problem]. These very intellectual standards should perhaps be collected on a page of its own as well. See also the article on pseudoscience, which I find very factual and informative, of course in part because the scientific method is so easy to define. -More on this may be found here: Logical positivism and Plato, for example in the dialogue Gorgias (Plato).

Followup: The use of rhetorical tricks or terms that sound very sophisticated, elegant or complex but still are vague or ill-defined are sometimes a hallmark of pseudophilosophy. Also, I would like to emphasis that the importance of logical consistency, precise definition and correct use of concepts often is seen disputed by relativists and semi-relativists, but still it's an essential part of philosophy and the philosophical tradition. It seems some people want to define philosophy as a discipline where "anything goes", but this isn't and has never been true. If necessary, this very dispute should be mentioned in the article.

I dont get it, logical positivism is not the font of philosophical wisdom, it is a single school of philosophy who produced mixed success in a modest philosophical project over a hundred years ago. The logical criteria they created are treated with deep skepticism by numerous contemporary philosophers, and not only continental wankers or whatever. Similarly, the falsifiability critierion has long since ceased to be used as a shibboleth even for scientific theories, much less for philosophical theories. If there needs to be a pseudophilosophy article (and I think, by the way, that nearly all accusations of pseudophilosophy generally end up reading: philosophy I don't like) it ought to include a wide variety of these accusations throughout the history of philosophy, and show that it is used in nearly every case where incommensurable philosophies clash. I think english speaking philosophers tend to underestimate how frequently the same accusations that get lobbed at (mostly French) "poststructuralists" here in the states are made against analytics elsewhere. Badiou refers to analytic philosophy as "anglo-american sophistry", Derrida claims (in reference to Searle) that "those who raise a hue and cry about obscurity because they do not realize the unclarity of their good old aufklarung are in my eyes dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists.", Zizek has accused Chalmers, Dennett, Pinker and Damasio of more or less complete philosophical ignorance. Attempting to show the analytic-contiental split as an extended chase scene where analytics try to 'bust' continentals and continentals try to wriggle out using their magic tricks and poetry is completely inaccurate and some of the worst pseudo-history and pseudo-sociology that I've ever encountered.

Jimmyq2305 21:37, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Do you have any external links or references that discuss this? I'd like to read more about it, and it would be relevant for the article. When it comes to Zizek, I don't really regard him as an authority from what I've read by him, but that's me. And people quoted on Critiques of Slavoj Žižek, but as long as there isn't broad agreement on any standards for philosophical work, and people without knowledge of any such standards apparently are free to participate in philosophical discussions, this discussion is bound to dissolve. Long live relativism. Narssarssuaq 21:13, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Zizkek's authority is not what im aiming at. My contention is simply that philosophers, regardless of their affiliations, will frequently call philosophers of rival affiliations pseudophilosophers. It is, by the way, easily possible to develop an argument against purely objective standards that does not rely on any purportedly objective standards. For example, you could claim that while no actually objective standards exist, it is still useful to develop an argument based on a rigorous and verifiable reading of the texts you critique so as to "play the game correctly". The best (and frequently used) analogy is to games. While you would never say that the rules of chess are objective (ie: coded in nature or derivable from first-order logic), you would also have major problems if the person across the board from you violated them. Similarly, while no one would deny that the laws of traffic are social constructs, flouting them would bring you into contact with numerous fear-inducing probabilities. As far as Zizek's critiques of cog-psych, The Parallax View contains a systematic (for Zizek, anyway) presentation of them. What I find mostly annoying about the onesidedness of the english-language wiki with regards to 'analytic' versus 'all other' philosophy (Continental Philosophy, by the by, is not an existing philosophical entity, unless it refers very specifically to American thinkers working in a philosophical tradition inherited from continental europe. On the continent itself, there is no continental philosophy, only phenomenology, psychoanalysis, etc...) is that it loses sight of the fact that the critiques of analytic philosophy are often NOT based on 'policing the boundaries' or 'phallogocentrism' or 'excess of rationalism', frequently they are simply based on lack of rigor and failure to adhere to accepted philosophical standards (viz Derrida's critique of Searle, Badiou's response to Sokal, Fink's response to Sokal). In at least one case, i think it is quite obvious that this has been borne out by fact. Sokal's claim that Badiou's use of mathematics is (paraphrasing from memory, sorry) 'gibberish here and elsewhere in his work', is at least cast into strong doubt by Being and Event, especially given that Badiou translated Cantor into French, and his extensive citation (usually of the accepted standard editions used by working mathematicians and scientists - precisely the opposite of the sloppiness Sokal claims to describe) and reproduction of the theorems he uses.Jimmyq2305 15:53, 4 September 2006 (UTC)
"frequently they are simply based on lack of rigor and failure to adhere to accepted philosophical standards" -- I'm interested in these precise "accepted philosophical standards". What are they? How do they differ from field to field in philosophy? Are some philosophical directions in direct opposition to each other? I think I somehow know what the "accepted standards" are, but my views of this are frequently bashed, so I can't really be sure. Narssarssuaq 12:38, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
there are standards, but they are not objective. for instance, for many analytic philosophers, derrida was not a philosopher until he engaged them in ways they understood. for many, philosophers people who do semantic analysis of philosophy texts in the analytic tradition are not philosophers either, likewise methodologists and logicians may not be philosophers in one tradition or another. however, they are not pseudophilosophy. pseudophilosophy is when something appears to be philosophy, but is not, and it is not philosophy because some universal, but subjective standards... iow, the judgement of many philosophers. this is why, the small community of philosophers interested in rand and doing rand work, do not and will likely never move rand out of pseudophilosophy. what has moved work out of pseudophilosophy is when many noted philosophers use the work as philosophy. zizek has a point about the ignorance of most philosophers, as most philosophers are ignorant of lacan, that though is evidence of the difference between the contextualist tradition and the non-contextualist tradition, which maps weakly into continental/analytic splits, but.. there are contextualists in the analytic tradition too, and a critique of the new philosophers of france, bernard henri-levy, et.al. is that they are not philosophers precisely because they ignore the philosophical contexts to 'engage with the world'... --Buridan 11:26, 1 September 2006 (UTC)
This probably means that the subject of philosophy is divided into segments with no real contact with one another. Still, remember that students of philosophy and their philosophical papers are given grades. Are they simply a reflection of the professors' subjective opinions, or is there actually some intersubjectivity present as well? Narssarssuaq 13:10, 1 September 2006 (UTC)
Having graded my share of philosophy papers, I taught political philosophy for 8 years..... I can say that what you are graded on is usually not subjective in the way that you seem to suggest above. If you turned in a paper on Rand in my class, you would likely not fail for dealing with pseudophilosophy, but... if all you did was reiterate her ideological positions and pseudophilosophy, then yes, you would likely fail. The goal of philosophy papers is usually to develop an argument and to demonstrate understanding, arguments need foundations, foundations are found in the literature of the field, and understanding is built in really thinking and reflecting on the topic at hand. Randians, in my experience, tend to have all the answers, few arguments, and little understanding of the rest of the debates and issues. That is a gross generalization of course, but many young people come to political philosophy either armed with Rand or Marx, both learned more as ideology than the philosophical merits they might have, and it is my goal to get them to go beyond that. The basis of the grade then, is rarely based in the content, but it is based in the understanding and analysis of the content. That is not subjective beyond different professors have different standards and understandings, but in my experience, rarely is there much variance once the professors discuss the paper. --Buridan 18:01, 3 September 2006 (UTC)
This invariably means that you have used a number of objective standards, doesn't it? For example that you should, I quote, "develop an argument and to demonstrate understanding, arguments need foundations, foundations are found in the literature of the field, and understanding is built in really thinking and reflecting on the topic at hand". Thus, the claim that "there are standards, but they are not objective" written above seems false. Narssarssuaq 11:39, 4 September 2006 (UTC)
Standards and their implementations vary across practices. Teaching and scholarship are related, but not the same in practice. That one has more objective standards in grading and assessment of student work does not mean they are appropriate or accepted as a practice for colleague's work.--Buridan 13:43, 4 September 2006 (UTC)
This would mean that there's little or no basis for discussion in "colleague's work" - so that there is a lot more "monologue" than dialogue compared to other academic fields? Narssarssuaq 12:00, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
I think that there was a study, or series of studies that show just this,i remember seeing it on politicaltheory.info. --Buridan 19:32, 5 September 2006 (UTC)

Walter Kaufmann

Maybe Schopenhauer's assessment of Hegel says a great deal about Hegel. There is one way to find out, read Hegel for yourself. "The in-itself into which something is reflected into itself out of its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself … etc., etc., etc." Walter Kaufmann's comment about Schopenhauer's comment about Hegel reveals more about Walter Kaufmann than it does about Schopenhauer. Kaufmann has been dead for many years, so I guess that we will never know exactly what he meant. At present, it is just a criticism of Schopenhauer and an approval of Hegel, but we don't really know why. Should we just accept his authority?Lestrade 01:18, 26 September 2006 (UTC)Lestrade


Where, in Walter Kaufmann's writings, does he say that Schopenhauer's attacks on Hegel actually illuminate more about Schopenhauer than about Hegel? What, specifically, do the attacks illuminate about Schopenhauer?Lestrade 18:06, 1 October 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

(sic!) in "Accusations of pseudophilosophy in academia"?

In this paragraph it's written "...occupy margins ; where where we would...". It's obviously not correct. First of all there should be no space after "margins". Second the word "where" should not be stated twice. The problem is that it's in a quotation. Therefore, I don't know how it was originally written. In short either it should be corrected or should "(sic!)" be added. Smallchanges 12:23, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Voltaire a real philosopher?

There is no question that Voltaire has had a great influence on European history and culture. However, did he really come up with any new ideas and concepts, which have been seriously considered by academic philosophers? Wouldn't it be possible to classify him as an early, perhaps the first, example of "Pseudophilosophy in popular culture"? Smallchanges 13:40, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Please help me with quotation for Mr. Soros

Yesterday I wrote a few lines about Mr. G. Soros. Today it's indicated that a quotation is needed and basically I agree to that. However, Right now I don't have access to my books about Soros so I cannot fill in the quotation. Please help me with this, someone. Thanks! Smallchanges 12:51, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

ideology is not philosophy

they are two different things and rand has both. one is not the other though. that paragraph is talking about her ideology. if you want to create a paragraph about her philosophy, feel free. however, the going through and changing everything that someone doesn't like about rand is not an option. that is why i reverted, it was because 24, goes around and has a history of making changing to rand articles without any justification and many of those changes are quite dubitable.--Buridan 16:44, 13 October 2006 (UTC)

The paragraph in question is more than a little confused as it is and I believe the word "philosophical" makes better sense. For instance, why comment that her ideological views are not presented in peer-reviewed journals? Since when is ideology peer-reviewed? It seems to me that it is much more natural to read these claims as about her philosophical views (such as they are). The use of the term "ideological" is more obfuscatory than exact here. Phiwum 17:15, 13 October 2006 (UTC)
Is there any concensus here on "ideological" vs. "philosophical"? I see that Buridan is quite taken with the former term and that LGagnon first made the change. And I can see the motive: the article is casting doubt on her ideas as philosophical ideas. Nonetheless, this hairsplitting has made the paragraph less readable. Phiwum 17:32, 13 October 2006 (UTC)
i don't think it is less readable. i repaired the journal issue. ideologicaly isn't obfuscatory either, it is not meant to obfuscate, or otherwise make confusing, it is to determine a relationship to ideas that in this case is not philosophical. as i said, rand has both a philosophy and and ideology, here we are talking about her ideological elements that are oft confused for philosophy.--Buridan 13:00, 14 October 2006 (UTC)


I agreed with the recent changes you reverted. Drop "ideological views" in favor of "views" and "ideological system" in favor of "system of thought". This is far more neutral and makes a hell of a lot more sense in context. Once more: it makes no sense to say that here ideological views haven't been peer-reviewed. Ideological views are not normally reviewed. Philosophical views are reviewed, but of course I understand why you don't want to call Rand's views philosophical. Hence, just call them "views".

I am making the change, since I've seen no consensus in favor of "ideological". Just the opinion of one editor. Phiwum 21:02, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

Rand Again

I deleted this "Finally, she and some of her followers are often perceived as being dogmatic, frequently ignoring published criticism of the system instead of responding to it. This is in part because many of them were young people excited by her novels and unlearned in philosophy; such people are not often aware of the complexities of their subject and prone to construe disagreement as ignorance."

This part "immediately ignoring published criticism..." is directly contradicted by the next paragraph, which reads "There have been few published reactions to Objectivism in academic journals." So how are criticisms being ignored by Rand's supporters if those criticisms haven't been published? Popular criticism, such as those written by Gore Vidal and in the New York Times during the 1960s, WERE responded to publicly by Rand devotes Leonard Peikoff and Alan Greenspan, for example.

"Many of them were young people... unlearned in philosophy" Many of them when? In the 1950 and 1960s? Not so, as most of the people in her circle were philosophy grad students (three of them students of Sidney Hook). This passage is (A) incredibly POV and (B) outright insulting. The fact that (C) it is entirely uncited makes it all the worse.

It's unbecoming of an encyclopedia.

(I also deleted a transition word (I think it was "Furthermore") from the paragraph following the Rand section. The word made it sound like the following paragraph would contain more on Rand, when in fact it begins a new topic.) Endlessmike 888 01:29, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

it is unbecoming until there is a citation, i agree. but yes, that can go, though it did speak to the nature of pseudophilosophy and who it appeals to.--Buridan 03:17, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

All it did was perpetuate (unsubstantiated) stereotypes and bigoted views of Objectivists. Endlessmike 888 03:21, 25 January 2007 (UTC)
i think you might want to rethink that. it might be a stereotype, but why is it one? that is what it hits on. who ends up reading pseudo-philosophy and accepting it. --Buridan 03:27, 25 January 2007 (UTC)
One Feb19th an anonymous editor put the part I removed back into the article. No one noticed until now, so I removed it again. Endlessmike 888 05:38, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
I cleaned it up and cited it. I used google books which shows more citable material, but i figured one was enough. --Buridan 12:08, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
The Kelley cite does not support the claim that Rand supporters ignore criticism. That claim is factually innacurate, as a simply search on JSTOR will show. You can also look to past issues of Commentary, or the history of the Ayn Rand Society, or if you really dig you could find letters to the editor by Peikoff and Greenspan defending Atlas Shrugged agains Gore Vidal. Second, can you quote a passage from Feminist Interpretations that says what you cite it as saying? The book says some very harsh things about Rand, but I don't recall it as dismissing her supporters as young and ignorant. It's been a few years since I read it though. Endlessmike 888 19:52, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
The excerpts of Feminist Interpretations available on Google books do not support what you cite it for. So I'm puzzled as to what in the book you think is a citation for "This is in part because many of them were young people excited by her novels and unlearned in philosophy; such people are not often aware of the complexities of their subject and prone to ignore the larger debates, conflating their ignorance with Objectivist dogmatism." Endlessmike 888 20:02, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
Oops, my fault. I confused Gladstein Ayn Rand Companion with Feminist Interpretations, also edited by Gladstein. Ignore what I said, and I'll get back to you when I check out the Companion. Endlessmike 888 20:04, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

I read what is available on google books. None of it supports what you cited it for, Buridan. What passage did you have in mind? Endlessmike 888 18:47, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

the author was discussing another authors opinion of young rand people in regards to dogmatism. i think it was around page 111 or in the 20's, but i'd have to search again one of two books. would you like more citations of people believing young rand readers are dogmatic and uninformed? ignorant? the citation that needs to be established is only that people hold this opinion of rand readers. i don't think there is much to debate about that and there are innumerable possible citations, i suspect. --Buridan 02:23, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
The first excerpted page is 25, the excerpt stops at 29. Nothing about Rands followers or even a mention of critics in the 20s. Page 111 is not excerpted. I would like a citation that supports this claim: "This is in part because many of them were young people excited by her novels and unlearned in philosophy; such people are not often aware of the complexities of their subject and prone to ignore the larger debates, conflating their ignorance with Objectivist dogmatism."
Notice that the claim is not that some people describe Objectivists as "young people... unlearned in philosophy." Rather the claim is factual, that if you collected every person who claims influence from Rand, enough of them would be young people ignorant of philosophy to say that "many" of them are.
I'm changing the sentence to reflect that this is the claim of critics, and asking for a citation. The Gladstein book does not provide evidence for it. If you think it does, the onus is on you to provide us with a quote. Endlessmike 888 03:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
no, the book provides the insight to make this. it is a true claim, but then any time you say young people are unlearned in philosophy it is true, the difference is the way they are unlearned, which was that the unlearnedness is what allows them to accept objectivism, and other pseudo philosophy. that was supported by the book. --Buridan 10:59, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
What page are those quotes from? Endlessmike 888 20:05, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
those are from around 111.--Buridan 21:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
Buridan, with due respect and despite my personal beliefs about Objectivism, I agree with Endlessmike. The page can say that certain authors refer to Objectivists as young people unlearned in philosophy, but it should not say that Objectivists are mostly young people unlearned in philosophy unless there is real statistical evidence regarding this claim. We shouldn't be agreeing with these criticisms without factual data. Phiwum 20:49, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Buridan, I'm confused. Earlier you said that you found the book on Google Books. Do you have your own copy? Because page 111 is not excerpted on google books. Take a look, it says "Page 97-152 are not part of this book preview." Endlessmike 888 22:22, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

if you log in to google with an acct, you get to see more pages. i can see 109-122 amongst many others. in any case, I'm ok with the current 'some' wording.--Buridan 23:03, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

I logged in with an account, and I still can't see those pages. Is there a specific type of google account one needs to see more in the preview? Endlessmike 888 01:37, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
i don't know... i can give you a screenshot if you want. i have quite an extensive google acct.
No need, we've reached common ground I think. Endlessmike 888 02:58, 3 May 2007 (UTC)

Ayn Rand's Objectivism is often cited as a pseudophilosophy, for several reasons.

The citation given for this statement ( Nicholas Rescher (1997). Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason. University of Notre Dame Press. ISBN 0268037019.) does not seem to justify or explain the statement. The book itself seems to only to be a critique and defense of objectivity, not Ayn Rand's Objectivism. One would have to read the majority book to understand why the editor believes it is evidence of Objectivism being a pseudophilosophy. Does anyone know a particular page and/or can give us a quote that explains why this book is a valid citation for Objectivism's pseudophilosophy?

I suggest the citation is removed until it can be validated or replaced.

Kukyona 21:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Your suggestion is perfectly reasonable. Phiwum 01:23, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

I hadn't noticed this. If you go to the book's page on Amazon.com, you can look in its index. Ayn Rand is not listed. Is she discussed at all? Perhaps only in passing and thus not worthy of mention in the index? Perhaps whomever added the citation could explain. Endlessmike 888 23:56, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

The book does not discuss Ayn Rand, so I removed the citation. Endlessmike 888 05:30, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

One must recall that philosophy has taken various institutional forms over the centuries, starting from the Epicurian' gardens and other Schools.

The sentence "One must recall that philosophy has taken various institutional forms over the centuries, starting from the Epicurian' gardens and other Schools. " Seems to be false as the Epicureans came after the Academy which was a school of philosophy if I'm not mistaken.

KurtFF8 02:09, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

actually they were contemporaries. the academy existed for many centuries. was the academy first, is that your argument? I don't think we can make that argument really. socrates talks about the naked wise philosophers in the east at least once as i recall. and athen's saven sages seems to be a bit greaco-centric or great-traditon history... possibly fictitious in many ways. thus i'd tend to ascribe this line to literary allusion more than statement of fact. --Buridan 12:23, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

POV

There is a strong POV in this article. Particularly the parts which imply that academic philosophy is like some sort of secret society which used the term "pseudophilosophy" to exclude people they disagree with. Perhaps it would be reasonable to mention that people have made this accusation (if indeed they have and a source can be provided), but the article shouldn't assert it as fact. I am going to delete some of these insinuations. Misodoctakleidist 18:41, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Pseudophilosophy/Archive_1&oldid=1137102587"