United States v. Virginia
|United States v. Virginia|
|Argued January 17, 1996|
Decided June 26, 1996
|Full case name||United States v. Virginia et al.|
|Citations||518 U.S. 515 (more)|
|Prior history||Judgment for defendants, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), certiorari denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993, on remand, judgment for defendants, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), motion for rehearing en banc denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), certiorari granted 516 U.S. 910 (1995).|
|Commonwealth of Virginia's exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute violated Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.|
|Majority||Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer|
|Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.|
|U.S. Const. amend. XIV|
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), is a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the long-standing male-only admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in a 7–1 decision. (Justice Clarence Thomas, whose son was enrolled at VMI at the time, recused himself.)
Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that because VMI failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its sex-based admissions policy, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In an attempt to satisfy equal protection requirements, the state of Virginia had proposed a parallel program for women, called the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts women's college.
However, Justice Ginsburg held that the VWIL would not provide women with the same type of rigorous military training, facilities, courses, faculty, financial opportunities, and/or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords male cadets, a decision evocative of Sweatt v. Painter, when the Court ruled in 1950 that segregated law schools in Texas were unconstitutional, since a newly formed black law school clearly did not provide the same benefits to its students as the state's prestigious and long-maintained white law school. In her opinion, she stated that "The VWIL program is a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote a concurrence agreeing to strike down the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. However, he declined to join the majority opinion's basis for using the Fourteenth Amendment, writing: "Had Virginia made a genuine effort to devote comparable public resources to a facility for women, and followed through on such a plan, it might well have avoided an equal protection violation." This rationale supported separate but equal facilities separated on the basis of sex: "it is not the 'exclusion of women' that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but the maintenance of an all-men school without providing any—much less a comparable—institution for women ... It would be a sufficient remedy, I think, if the two institutions offered the same quality of education and were of the same overall caliber."
Justice Scalia's lone dissent argued that the standard applied by the majority was closer to a strict scrutiny standard than the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to previous cases involving equal protection based on sex. Notably, however, the opinion for the Court eschewed either standard; its language did not comport with the "important governmental interest" formula used in prior intermediate scrutiny cases. Scalia argued that "if the question of the applicable standard of review for sex-based classifications were to be regarded as an appropriate subject for reconsideration, the stronger argument would be not for elevating the standard to strict scrutiny, but for reducing it to rational-basis review."
With the VMI decision, the high court effectively struck down any law which, as Justice Ginsburg wrote, "denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature — equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society."
Following the ruling, VMI contemplated going private to exempt itself from the 14th Amendment, and thus this ruling. The Department of Defense warned the school that it would withdraw all ROTC programs from the school if this privatization took place. As a result of the DOD action, Congress amended 10 U.S.C. § 2111a, to prohibit the military from withdrawing or diminishing any ROTC program at one of the six senior military colleges, including VMI. However, VMI's Board of Visitors had already voted 8-7 to admit women and did not revisit the issue after the law was amended.
VMI was the last all-male public university in the United States.
- Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 518
- List of United States Supreme Court cases
- Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume
- Philippa Strum (2002). Women in the Barracks: The Vmi Case and Equal Rights. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1164-9.
- "United States v. Virginia :: 518 U.S. 515 (1996) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center". Justia Law.
- "United States Code § 2111a. Support for senior military colleges". Retrieved 13 August 2011.
- Bowsher, David K. (November 1998). "Cracking the Code of United States v. Virginia". Duke Law Journal. Duke University School of Law. 48 (2): 305–339. doi:10.2307/1373108. JSTOR 1373108.
- Stobaugh, Heather L. (Fall 2002). "The Aftermath of United States v. Virginia: Why Five Justices are Pulling in the Reins on the 'Exceedingly Persuasive Justification'". SMU Law Review. 55 (4): 1755–1779. ISSN 1066-1271. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
- Strum, Philippa (2002). Women in the Barracks: The VMI Case and Equal Rights. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1164-9. OCLC 47849408.
- Stockel, Eric J. (1996). "Note, United States v. Virginia: Does Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?" 13 TOURO L. REV. 229 (1996)