User:Woodcut-like/Sick Staff at Wuhan Institute of Virology
The article on Sick Staff at Wuhan Institute of Virology in The Wall Street Journal by Michael R. Gordon, Warren P. Strobel [A 1] and Drew Hinshaw [A 2]on May 23, 2021 Fueled the debate on the Investigations into the origin of COVID-19.
Intelligence on Sick Staff at Wuhan Lab Fuels Debate on Covid-19 Origin Report says researchers went to hospital in November 2019, shortly before confirmed outbreak; adds to calls for probe of whether virus escaped lab A World Health Organization-led team investigating the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology on Feb. 3. 2021.
Three researchers from China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology became sick enough in November 2019 that they sought hospital care, according to a previously undisclosed U.S. intelligence report that could add weight to growing calls for a fuller probe of whether the Covid-19 virus may have escaped from the laboratory.
The details of the reporting go beyond a Sate Department fact sheet, issued during the final days of the Trump administration, which said that several researchers at the lab, a center for the study of coronaviruses and other pathogens, became sick in autumn 2019 “with symptoms consistent with both Covid-19 and common seasonal illness.”[A 3]
The disclosure of the number of researchers, the timing of their illnesses and their hospital visits come on the eve of a meeting of the World Health Organization’s decision-making body, which is expected to discuss the next phase of an investigation into Covid-19’s origins.
Current and former officials familiar with the intelligence about the lab researchers expressed differing views about the strength of the supporting evidence for the assessment. One person said that it was provided by an international partner and was potentially significant but still in need of further investigation and additional corroboration.
Another person described the intelligence as stronger. “The information that we had coming from the various sources was of exquisite quality. It was very precise. What it didn’t tell you was exactly why they got sick,” he said, referring to the researchers.
November 2019 is roughly when many epidemiologists and virologists believe SARS-CoV-2, the virus behind the pandemic, first began circulating around the central Chinese city of Wuhan, where Beijing says that the first confirmed case was a man who fell ill on Dec. 8, 2019.
The Wuhan Institute hasn’t shared raw data, safety logs and lab records on its extensive work with coronaviruses in bats, which many consider the most likely source of the virus. Shi Zhengli, the top bat coronavirus expert at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, has said Covid-19 didn’t leak from her laboratories. Dr. Shi shown in 2017.
China has repeatedly denied that the virus escaped from one of its labs. On Sunday, 23rd of may 2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China cited a WHO-led team’s conclusion, after a visit to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or WIV, in February 2021, that a lab leak was extremely unlikely. “The U.S. continues to hype the lab leak theory,” the foreign ministry said in response to a request for comment by The Wall Street Journal. “Is it actually concerned about tracing the source or trying to divert attention?”
The Biden administration declined to comment on the intelligence but said that all technically credible theories on the origin of the pandemic should be investigated by the WHO and international experts.
“We continue to have serious questions about the earliest days of the Covid-19 pandemic, including its origins within the People’s Republic of China,” said a spokeswoman for the National Security Council.
Covid-19’s Origins
[edit]“We’re not going to make pronouncements that prejudge an ongoing WHO study into the source of SARS-CoV-2,” the spokeswoman said. “As a matter of policy we never comment on intelligence issues.”
Beijing has also asserted that the virus could have originated outside China, including at a lab at the Fort Detrick military base in Maryland, and called for the WHO to investigate early Covid outbreaks in other countries.
Most scientists say they have seen nothing to corroborate the idea that the virus came from a U.S. military lab, and the White House has said there are no credible reasons to investigate it.
China’s National Health Commission and the WIV didn’t respond to requests for comment. Shi Zhengli, the top bat coronavirus expert at WIV, has said the virus didn’t leak from her laboratories. She told the WHO-led team that traveled to Wuhan earlier this year to investigate the origins of the virus that all staff had tested negative for Covid-19 antibodies and there had been no turnover of staff on the coronavirus team.
Marion Koopmans, a Dutch virologist on that team told NBC News in March that some WIV staff did fall sick in the autumn of 2019, but she attributed that to regular, seasonal sickness.
“There were occasional illnesses because that’s normal. There was nothing that stood out,” she said. “Maybe one or two. It’s certainly not a big, big thing.”
The World Health Organization’s mission to Wuhan said the coronavirus most likely spread naturally to humans through an animal.
WSJ’s Jeremy Page [A 4] reports on what scientists learned during their weekslong investigation.
It isn’t unusual for people in China to go straight to the hospital when they fall sick, either because they get better care there or lack access to a general practitioner. Covid-19 and the flu, while very different illnesses, share some of the same symptoms, such as fever, aches and a cough. Still, it could be significant if members of the same team working with coronaviruses went to hospital with similar symptoms shortly before the pandemic was first identified.
David Asher, a former U.S. official who led a State Department task force on the origins of the virus for then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, told a Hudson Institute seminar in March 2021 that he doubted that the lab researchers became sick because of the ordinary flu.[A 5]
“I’m very doubtful that three people in highly protected circumstances in a level three laboratory working on coronaviruses would all get sick with influenza that put them in the hospital or in severe conditions all in the same week, and it didn’t have anything to do with the coronavirus,” he said, adding that the researchers’ illness may represent “the first known cluster” of Covid-19 cases.
Long characterized by skeptics as a conspiracy theory, the hypothesis that the pandemic could have begun with a lab accident has attracted more interest from scientists who have complained about the lack of transparency by Chinese authorities or conclusive proof for the alternate hypothesis: that the virus was contracted by humans from a bat or other infected animal outside a lab.
Many proponents of the lab hypothesis say that a virus that was carried by an infected bat might have been brought to the lab so that researchers could work on potential vaccines—only to escape.
While the lab hypothesis is being taken more seriously, including by Biden administration officials, the debate is still colored by political tensions, including over how much evidence is needed to sustain the hypothesis.
The State Department fact sheet issued during the Trump administration, which drew on classified intelligence, said that the “U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both Covid-19 and seasonal illnesses.”
The January 15, 2021 fact sheet added that this fact “raises questions about the credibility” of Dr. Shi and criticized Beijing for its “deceit and disinformation” while acknowledging that the U.S. government hasn’t determined exactly how the pandemic began.
The Biden administration hasn’t disputed any of the assertions in the fact sheet, which current and former officials say was vetted by U.S. intelligence agencies. The fact sheet also covered research activities at the WIV, its alleged cooperation on some projects with the Chinese military and accidents at other Chinese labs.
But one Biden administration official said that by highlighting data that pointed to the lab leak hypothesis, Trump administration officials had sought “to put spin on the ball.” Several U.S. officials described the intelligence as “circumstantial,” worthy of further exploration but not conclusive on its own.
Asked about the January 15, 2021, statement, State Department spokesman Ned Price said: “A fact sheet issued by the previous administration on January 15 2021, did not draw any conclusions regarding the origins of the coronavirus. Rather, it focused on the lack of transparency surrounding the origins.”
One year after Covid-19 first emerged in Wuhan, a WHO team traveled to the Chinese city to investigate the origins of the virus.
WSJ explains what the scientists are looking for—and what they may find during their politically sensitive mission.
Though the first known case was Dec. 8, several analyses of the virus’s rate of mutation concluded that it likely began spreading several weeks earlier.
The WHO-led team that visited Wuhan concluded in a joint report with Chinese experts in March that the virus most likely spread from bats to humans via another animal, and that a laboratory leak was “extremely unlikely.”
However, team members said they didn’t view raw data or original lab, safety and other records. On the same day the report came out, WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the team hadn’t adequately examined the lab leak hypothesis, and called for a fuller probe of the idea.
The U.S., European Union and several other governments have also called for a more transparent investigation of Covid-19’s origins, without explicitly demanding a lab probe. They have called in particular for better access to data and samples from potential early Covid-19 cases.
Members of the WHO-led team said Chinese counterparts had identified 92 potential Covid-19 cases among some 76,000 people who fell sick between October and early December 2019, but turned down requests to share raw data on the larger group. That data would help the WHO-led team understand why China sought to only test those 92 people for antibodies.
Team members also said they asked for access to a Wuhan blood bank to test samples from before December 2019 for antibodies. Chinese authorities declined at first, citing privacy concerns, then agreed, but have yet to provide that access, team members say. Investigating the Origin of Covid-19 How It All Started: China’s Early Coronavirus Missteps, March 6, 2020, How It All Started: China’s Early Coronavirus Missteps On the Ground in Wuhan, Signs of China Stalling Probe of Coronavirus Origins May 12, 2020On the Ground in Wuhan, Signs of China Stalling Probe of Coronavirus Origins China Refuses to Give WHO Raw Data on Early Covid-19 Cases, Feb. 12, 2021 China Refuses to Give WHO Raw Data on Early Covid-19 Cases In Hunt for Covid-19 Origin, WHO Team Focuses on Two Animal Types in China. Feb. 18, 2021 In Hunt for Covid-19 Origin, WHO Team Focuses on Two Animal Types in China Patient Zero Points to Second Wuhan Market, Feb. 26, 2021, Patient Zero Points to Second Wuhan Market Covid-19 Virus Studies Yield New Clues on Pandemic’s Origin. March 1, 2021, Covid-19 Virus Studies Yield New Clues on Pandemic’s Origin How the WHO’s Hunt for Covid’s Origins Stumbled in China, March 17, 2021, How the WHO’s Hunt for Covid’s Origins Stumbled in China.
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Warren P. Strobel covers intelligence and security in the Journal's Washington bureau. He has traveled with seven U.S. secretaries of state and two presidents. He and his colleagues' work at Knight Ridder Newspapers challenging the Bush administration's case for invading Iraq was featured in the 2018 Rob Reiner movie, “Shock and Awe.” He was White House correspondent and State Department correspondent for the Washington Times and is the author of articles in American Journalism Review and the Christian Science Monitor. He was a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1994-95.
- ^ Drew Hinshaw is a former Fulbright scholar who studied media and political journalism and has worked extensively with the West African press.
- ^ ARCHIVED CONTENT released online from January 20, 2017 to January 20, 2021.
Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)
[edit]Office of the Spokesperson for the United States Department of State January 15, 2021
- For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic’s origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.
The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.
The CCP’s deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19’s origin that deserve greater scrutiny:
1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):
- The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
- Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.
- The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.
2. Research at the WIV:
- Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.
- The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including “RaTG13,” which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
- WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV’s work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.
3. Secret military activity at the WIV:
- Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military.
The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
- The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.
Today’s revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19’s origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.
As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus’s origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.
- ^ Jeremy Page, is China Political & Diplomatic Editor in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, leading coverage of domestic politics, international relations and security. He joined the Journal in Beijing in 2010, prior to which he worked for The Times of London for eight years, first in Russia, then in India. He started out as a reporter for Reuters in China in 1997. Jeremy Page is the China political and diplomatic editor for The Wall Street Journal, based in Beijing. He joined the Journal in Beijing in 2010 and previously worked for The Times of London as South Asia correspondent, focusing on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and as Moscow correspondent, also covering Central Asia. He first visited China as a student in 1992 and began his career with Reuters in Beijing in 1997.
- ^ David Asher is a former Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he specialized in Economics and Security as well as Asia strategy. His current research is focused on artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Asher is well known as one of the most experienced subject matter experts to the U.S. Government on countering money laundering, terrorism financing and sanctions evasion schemes. Over the last 25 years he has played a senior role in numerous economic and financial pressure campaigns involving defiant states, terrorist organizations, drug cartels, and weapons proliferation networks. From 2001 to 2005, Asher was the special coordinator of the State Department’s North Korea Working Group (under the Secretary of State), co-chair of the North Korea Activities Group policy coordinating committee for the National Security Council, and U.S. delegation adviser to the Six Party Talks. During the Bush administration, Asher developed and oversaw the global targeting and disruption of the Kim Jong Il regime’s financial, illicit trading and WMD networks. Asher was the strategic architect of the September 2005 designation of Banco Delta Asia in Macao and the February 2011 designation of the Lebanese Canadian Bank, both under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. From 2008-2010 he advised the Deputy Commander, US CENTCOM, General John R. Allen, on Iran and the Levant as well counter-proliferation and counter terrorism. From 2011-2014, he served as a senior advisor to the US Special Operations Command for counter threat finance and counter network operations. From October 2014-August 2015 Asher returned to the Department of State where he led the development of the USG and coalition economic Warfare Campaign Strategy against the Islamic State under the Presidential Special Envoy, General (ret.) John R. Allen. Asher is the principal author of the CNAS report, Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. National Security and co-author of Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network (written with Scott Modell). Asher has a Ph.D in International Relations from Oxford University and was a College Scholar at Cornell University as an Undergraduate. He has over two decades of experience working in the international financial community and currently advises two of the largest global hedge funds. He also a Senior Corporate Advisor at Spark-Cognition and Chairman of Sayari Analytics. He is fluent in Japanese
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