European Banking Supervision: Difference between revisions

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{{Main|Banking union}}
{{Main|Banking union}}
The question of supervising the European banking system arose long before the [[Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2007-2008]]. Shortly after the creation of the [[European Monetary Union|monetary union]] in 1999, a number of observers and policy-makers warned that the new monetary architecture would be incomplete, and therefore fragile, without at least some coordination of supervisory policies among euro members.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Smaghi|first=Lorenzo|title=Open issues in European central banking.|last2=Gros|first2=Daniel|publisher=Palgrave|year=2000|location=New York}}</ref>
The Single Supervisory Mechanism was decided as part of the eurozone shift towards a banking union at the summit of eurozone heads of state and government, in [[Brussels]] on 28–29 June 2012. In compliance with the decisions made then, the [[European Commission]] developed its proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the SSM in the summer of 2012, and published it on 12 September 2012.<ref name=eu>{{cite press release |url=http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/953 |title=Commission proposes new ECB powers for banking supervision as part of a banking union |publisher=Communication department of the European Commission |date=12 September 2012 |accessdate=22 July 2013}}</ref>


The first supervisory measure put in place at the EU level was the creation of the [[Lamfalussy process|Lamfalussy Process]] in March 2001.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Regulatory process in financial services|url=https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/regulatory-process-financial-services/regulatory-process-financial-services_en|access-date=2021-03-29|website=European Commission - European Commission|language=en}}</ref> It involved the creation of a number of committees in charge of overseeing regulations in the financial sector. The primary goal of these committees was to accelerate the integration of the EU securities market.<ref name=":11">{{Cite journal|last=Alford|first=Duncan|date=2006|title=The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Bank Regulation?|url=http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1341325|journal=Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L.|volume=25|doi=|issn=}}</ref>
The ECB "welcomed" the proposal,<ref name=ecb>[http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120912.en.html "ECB welcomes Commission's proposal for a single supervisory mechanism"], ECB press release, 12 September 2012</ref> but [[Chancellor of Germany]] [[Angela Merkel]] questioned "the capacity of ECB to monitor 6,000 banks". The [[Vice-President of the European Commission]], [[Olli Rehn]], responded that the majority of European banks would still be monitored by national supervisory bodies, while the ECB "would assume ultimate responsibility over the supervision, in order to prevent banking crises from escalating".<ref name=hel>[http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/3588-rehn-schedule-for-single-supervisory-mechanism-feasible.html "Rehn: Schedule for Single Supervisory Mechanism Feasible"], ''[[Helsinki Times]]'', 13 September 2012</ref>


This approach was not binding for the European banking sector and had therefore little influence on the supervision of European banks. This can be explained by the fact that the [[Treaties of the European Union|European treaties]] did not allow the EU, at the time, to have real decision-making power on these matters. The idea of having to modify the treaties and of engaging in a vast debate on the Member States’ loss of sovereignty cooled down the ambitions of the Lamfalussy process. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences in the [[European Union]] incentivized European leaders to adopt a [[Supranational union|supranational]] mechanism of banking supervision.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Kermarec|first=Rodéric|date=2013|title=  Le Projet d’Union bancaire européenne : état des lieux et analyse critique.|url=https://assasrecherche.u-paris2.fr/ori-oai-search/notice/view/univ-pantheon-assas-ori-2732|access-date=2021-03-29|website=Université Paris II}}</ref>
Some economists remained skeptical, pointing to the composition of the SSM board as an issue.<ref name=eco>Ivo Arnold, [http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/09/first-the-governance-then-the-guarantees "First the Governance, Then the Guarantees"],''[[Nouriel Roubini|EconoMonitor]]'', 19 September 2012</ref> The Commission proposes a board consisting of a total of 23 members, with 17 representatives of bank supervisors of member-states plus one chairman, one vice-chairman, and four other members. Thus, the large majority of the SSM board would consist of national supervisors who "do not appreciate ECB interference in their daily national supervisory activities".<ref name=eco/>


The main objective of the new supervisory mechanism was to restore confidence in financial markets. The idea was also to avoid having to bail out banks with public money in case of future economic crises.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Wymeersch|first=Eddy|date=2014|title=The Single Supervisory Mechanism or 'Ssm', Part One of the Banking Union.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427577|journal=National Bank of Belgium Working Paper|volume=225|doi=|issn=}}</ref>
The [[European Parliament]] and [[European Council|Council]] agreed on the specifics of ECB oversight of eurozone banks on 19 March 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-251_en.htm?locale=en|title=An important step towards a real banking union in Europe: Statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier following the trilogue agreement on the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the eurozone|date=2013-03-19|accessdate=2014-05-29|publisher=[[European Commission]]}}</ref> The Parliament voted in favour of the SSM Regulations on 12 September 2013,<ref name=SSMEP/> and the [[Council of the European Union]] gave its approval on 15 October 2013.<ref name=CSSM>{{cite web|url=http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014044%202013%20INIT|title=Council approves single supervisory mechanism for banking|date=2013-10-15|accessdate=2014-05-29|publisher=[[Council of the European Union]]}}</ref>


To implement this new system of supervision, the President of the [[European Commission]] in 2008, [[José Manuel Barroso]], asked a working group of the think tank [[Eurofi]] to look at how the EU could best regulate the European banking market. This group was led by [[Jacques de Larosière]], a French senior officer who held, until 1978, the position of Director General of the Treasury in France. He was also President of the [[International Monetary Fund]] from 1978 to 1987, President of the “[[Bank of France|Banque de France]]” from 1987 to 1993 and President of the [[European Bank for Reconstruction and Development]] from 1993.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jacques de Larosière|url=https://www.babelio.com/auteur/Jacques-de-Larosiere/262581|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-29|website=Babelio}}</ref> On a more controversial stance, [[Jacques de Larosière]] has also been a close advisor of [[BNP Paribas]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Haar|first=Kenneth|last2=Rowell|first2=Andy|last3=Vassalos|first3=Yiorgos|date=2009|title=Would you bank on them?|url=https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/files/resource/wouldyoubankonthem.pdf|url-status=live|website=Corporate Europe Observatory}}</ref>
The SSM Regulation set 4 November 2014 as the date when the ECB would begin its supervisory role. Within the eurozone, the regulation gives the ECB responsibility for roughly 130 financial institutions with holdings of 85% of the banking assets.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-eu-bonus-cap-crd-iv-emir-aifmd.pdf |title= EU regulatory outlook |website= PwC |accessdate= February 19, 2014}}</ref>


This group led by de Larosière delivered a report highlighting the major failure of European banking supervision pre-2008.<ref name=":0" /> Based on this report, the European institutions have set up in 2011 “The European System of Financial Supervision” (ESFS). Its primary objective was: <blockquote>"''to ensure that the rules applicable to the financial sector are adequately implemented, to preserve financial stability and ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole''”.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2010-10-24|title=RÈGLEMENT (UE) No 1093/2010 DU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN ET DU CONSEIL du 24 novembre 2010 instituant une Autorité européenne de surveillance (Autorité bancaire européenne), modifiant la décision no 716/2009/CE et abrogeant la décision 2009/78/CE de la Commission|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010R1093&from=en|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-29}}</ref> </blockquote>The ESFC brought together, in an unconventional manner, the European and the national supervisory authorities.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nagy|first=Agnes|last2=Stefan|first2=Pete|last3=Dézsi-Benyovszki|first3=Annamaria|last4=Szabó Tunde|first4=Petra|date=2010|title=The de Larosière Report Regarding the new Structure of European System of Financial Supervision|url=https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication14527_en.pdf|journal=Theoretical and Applied Economics|volume=11(552)}}</ref>
==Functioning==


Despite the creation of this new mechanism, the European Commission considered that, having a single currency, the EU needed to go further in the integration of its banking supervision practices. The idea was that the mere collaboration of national and European supervisory authorities was not enough and that the EU needed a single supervisory authority. The European Commission therefore suggested the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.<ref name=":0" />
The SSM operates as a system of common bank supervision in the EU that involves national supervisors and the European Central Bank. The ECB is endowed with final supervisory authority while national supervisors are in a supporting role.


This proposal was debated at the [[Euro summit|Eurozone summit]] that took place in [[Brussels]] on the 28th and 29th of June 2012. [[Herman Van Rompuy]], who was President of the European Council at the time, had worked upstream with the President of the Commission, the President of the Central Bank and of the Eurogroup on a preliminary report used as a basis for discussions at the summit.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Press corner|url=https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en|access-date=2021-04-10|website=European Commission - European Commission|language=en}}</ref> In compliance with the decisions made then, the [[European Commission]] published a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the SSM in September 2012.<ref name="eu">{{cite press release |url=http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/953 |title=Commission proposes new ECB powers for banking supervision as part of a banking union |publisher=Communication department of the European Commission |date=12 September 2012 |accessdate=22 July 2013}}</ref>
===Division of labour===
A division of labour has been established between the ECB and national supervisors. Banks deemed "significant" will be supervised directly by the ECB. Smaller banks will continue to be directly monitored by their national authorities, though the ECB has the authority to take over direct supervision of any bank.<ref name=SSMEP/> A bank is deemed significant if it meets any of the following five conditions:<ref name=SSMEP/>
# The value of its assets exceeds €30 billion.
# The value of its assets exceeds both €5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the member state in which it is located.
# The bank is among the three most significant banks of the country in which it is located.
# The bank has large cross-border activities.
# The bank receives, or has applied for, assistance from eurozone bailout funds (the [[European Stability Mechanism]] or [[European Financial Stability Facility]]).


The European Central Bank welcomed the proposal.<ref name="ecb">[http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120912.en.html "ECB welcomes Commission's proposal for a single supervisory mechanism"], ECB press release, 12 September 2012</ref> [[Chancellor of Germany]] [[Angela Merkel]] questioned "''the capacity of the ECB to monitor 6,000 banks''". The [[Vice-President of the European Commission]] at the time, [[Olli Rehn]], responded to that concern that the majority of European banks would still be monitored by national supervisory bodies, while the ECB "''would assume ultimate responsibility for the supervision, in order to prevent banking crises from escalating''".<ref name="hel">[http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/3588-rehn-schedule-for-single-supervisory-mechanism-feasible.html "Rehn: Schedule for Single Supervisory Mechanism Feasible"], ''[[Helsinki Times]]'', 13 September 2012</ref>
A total of 122 banks are being supervised directly by the ECB, representing approximately 82% of bank assets. All other banks in the SSM (more than 6,000 in the eurozone alone) will be supervised by the national supervisor, although the ECB will keep final supervisory authority over these banks.

===Organisational structure in the ECB===
A Supervisory Board will draft supervisory decisions. The Supervisory Board will consist of the national supervisors participating in the SSM, in addition to a chair, vice-chair and four ECB representatives.

After the draft decision, the formal decision is to be made by the ECB's ultimate decision-making body, the [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]], which consists of the national central banks of the eurozone and the ECB's Executive Board.

A strict administrative separation is foreseen between the ECB's monetary and supervisory tasks. Final decision-making on both matters, however, takes place in the same body (the [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]]).

===Membership===
The 19 eurozone member states participate automatically in the SSM.<ref name=eurozone>{{cite web|title=Euro area 1999 – 2015| url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/map.en.html|publisher=[[European Central Bank]]|accessdate=3 December 2015}}</ref> The last country to join was [[Lithuania]], when it joined the eurozone on 1 January 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140723.en.html|title= Lithuania to join euro area and single supervisory mechanism (SSM) on 1 January 2015|publisher=European Central Bank|date=23 July 2014}}</ref>


The [[European Parliament]] voted in favour of the SSM proposal on the 12th of September 2013.<ref name="SSMEP">{{cite web|date=2013-09-12|title=Legislative package for banking supervision in the Eurozone – frequently asked questions|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-780_en.htm?locale=en|work=[[European Commission]]|accessdate=2014-05-29}}</ref> The [[Council of the European Union]] gave its own approval on the 15th of October 2013.<ref name="CSSM">{{cite web|url=http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014044%202013%20INIT|title=Council approves single supervisory mechanism for banking|date=2013-10-15|accessdate=2014-05-29|publisher=[[Council of the European Union]]}}</ref> The SSM Regulation entered into force on the 4th of November 2014.
Since the EU treaties only give the ECB jurisdiction over eurozone states, legally it cannot enforce measures in non-eurozone states. This would prevent the ECB from effectively carrying out its supervisory role in these states. Under the [[Treaties of the European Union|European Treaties]], non-eurozone countries do not have the right to vote in the ECB's Governing Council and in return are not bound by the ECB's decisions. Non-eurozone countries cannot become full members of the SSM in the sense of having the same rights and obligations as eurozone SSM members.


The fact that the SSM is formulated as a [[Regulation (European Union)|regulation]] and not a [[Directive (European Union)|directive]] is important. Indeed, a regulation is legally binding and Member States do not have the choice, unlike for directives, of how to transpose it under national law.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Difference between a Regulation, Directive and Decision|url=https://www.usda-eu.org/eu-basics-questions/difference-between-a-regulation-directive-and-decision/|access-date=2021-04-10|website=United States Mission to the European Union|language=en-US}}</ref>
However, non-eurozone EU member states can enter into a "close cooperation agreement" with the ECB. The banks in that country are then supervised by the ECB and the country gains a seat in the ECB's Supervisory Board. It would allow banks in that country to be supervised by the ECB provided that they have mechanisms in place to make ECB measures binding upon national authorities. A "close cooperation" agreement can be ended by the ECB or by the participating non-eurozone member state.<ref name=SSMEP>{{cite web|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-780_en.htm?locale=en|title=Legislative package for banking supervision in the Eurozone – frequently asked questions|date=2013-09-12|accessdate=2014-05-29| work=[[European Commission]]}}</ref> Participating non-eurozone states will also gain a seat on the ECB's Supervisory Board.<ref name=CSSM/>


==Organization==
The procedure for non-eurozone states to join SSM through "close cooperation", regulating the timing and content of applications and how the ECB shall assess such applications and the practicalities of admitting new members, was outlined by Decision ECB/2014/510. The decision entered into force on 27 February 2014.<ref name="Procedure to apply for SSM Membership through close cooperation">{{cite web |url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/en_dec_2014_05_fen.pdf|title=Decision of the European Central Bank of 31 January 2014: On the close cooperation with the national competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the euro (ECB/2014/5)| format=PDF |publisher = European Central Bank|date=31 January 2014}}</ref> The ECB governing council decided on 24 June 2020 to establish a close cooperation agreement with the Bulgarian and Croatian central banks. The close cooperation agreements enter into force on 1 October 2020, at which point they will participate in the SSM.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1015]</ref><ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1016]</ref>


===Mechanisms===
===SSM at the ECB===
The [[European Central Bank]] (ECB) has the leadership in European banking supervision. <ref>{{Cite web|title=Decision-making|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/decision-making/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref> A strict administrative separation is foreseen between the ECB's monetary and supervisory tasks. However, final decision-making on both matters takes place in the same body: the [[Governing Council]].
The ECB's monitoring regime includes conducting [[Stress test (financial)|stress tests]] on financial institutions.<ref name=SSMEP/> If problems are found, the ECB will have the ability to conduct early intervention in the bank to rectify the situation, such as by setting capital or risk limits or by requiring changes in management.


The [[Governing Council]] is the main decision-making entity of the ECB. It comprises the members of the [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank]] and the governors of all national central banks of the [[Eurozone]]'s member states. The Governing council is in charge, based on the opinion drafted by the Supervisory Board, of taking formal decisions with regards to its supervisory mandate.
However, if a bank is found to be in danger of failing, the responsibility for resolving it will rest with the [[Single Resolution Mechanism]].<ref name=SSMEP/>


The Supervisory board is organised by article 26 of the SSM regulation (Council regulation (EU) No 1024/2013).<ref name=":9" /> It is composed of all national supervisors participating in the SSM, a chair, vice-chair and four ECB representatives. These members meet every three weeks in order to draft supervisory decisions then submitted to the [[Governing Council]].<ref name=":13">{{Cite web|title=Supervisory Board|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/whoiswho/supervisoryboard/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref> The composition of the Supervisory Board has been, over time, the following one:
===Limits to supervision===
A first limit to the SSM's scope is geographical because it only covers a part of the EU member states. It will hence contribute to what is known as [[multi-speed Europe]]. A second limit is the fact that the SSM only deals with bank supervision. Supervision of the rest of the financial sector (for example insurance firms) remains a national competence. In addition, some aspects of bank supervision (for example consumer protection or anti-money laundering monitoring<ref>{{cite news|last=Jones|first=Claire|title= ECB lacks power to uncover money laundering — Nouy|url= https://www.ft.com/content/e3c4a87e-17bb-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44 |newspaper=Financial Times| accessdate=5 July 2018}}</ref>) remain a task for national supervisors.<ref>{{cite web|last=Verhelst|first=Stijn|title= Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Passing the point of no return for Europe's Banking Union|url= http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep58.pdf |publisher=Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations| accessdate=12 June 2013}}</ref>

===Leadership===


Chair:
Chair:
Line 100: Line 81:
* [[Elizabeth McCaul]] (2019-)
* [[Elizabeth McCaul]] (2019-)


The Supervisory Board is assisted in the preparation of its meetings by a Steering Committee. This committee gathers the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, an ECB representative (Edouard Fernandez-Bollo since 2019) as well as five deputies of national supervisors.<ref name=":13" />
==2014 Comprehensive Assessment==

ECB published its first comprehensive supervision review on 26 October 2014, covering the 130 most significant credit institutions in the 19 eurozone states (representing assets worth €22 trillion - equal to 82% of total banking assets in the eurozone), of which the 3 credit institutions from Lithuania were included only for informational purpose as they will first join SSM on 1 January 2015. The selection of the significant credit institutions being subject for the supervision and stress test, is '''''not''''' identical to each states selection of its domestic [[List of systemically important banks|Systemically Important Financial Institution]]s.
Finally, several Joint Supervisory Teams (JST), composed of members of the ECB's staff, national competent supervisors and experts in the banking field, make the link between the national and supranational levels. There is a JST for each significant banking institution. They act as supporting bodies, responsible mainly for the coordination, control and evaluation of supervisory missions.<ref name=":12">{{Cite web|title=Joint Supervisory Teams|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/approach/jst/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref>

===Division of labour===
A division of labour has been established between the ECB and national supervisors. Banks deemed significant will be supervised directly by the ECB. Even though the ECB has the authority to take over the direct supervision of any bank, smaller banks will usually continue to be monitored directly by their national authorities.<ref name=SSMEP/> A total of 115 banks are currently being supervised by the ECB <ref name=":14">{{Cite web|title=List of supervised banks|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref>; all other banks are supervised by their national supervisor.

A bank is considered significant when it meets any of the following criteria:<ref name="SSMEP" />

* The value of its assets exceeds €30 billion;
* The value of its assets exceeds both €5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the member state in which it is located;
* The bank is among the three most significant banks of the country in which it is located;
* The bank has large cross-border activities;
* The bank receives, or has applied for, assistance from eurozone bailout funds (i.e., the [[European Stability Mechanism]] or [[European Financial Stability Facility]]).

This significance status is subject to change due to, for example, mergers and acquisitions. In 2020, two additional banks (LP Group B.V. in the [[Netherlands]] and Agri Europe Cyprus in [[Slovenia]]) have joined the list of banks supervised by the ECB <ref>{{Cite web|title=What makes a bank significant?|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/criteria/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref><ref name=":14" />.

===Membership===
[[Eurozone]] member states automatically participate in the SSM.<ref name=eurozone>{{cite web|title=Euro area 1999 – 2015| url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/map.en.html|publisher=[[European Central Bank]]|accessdate=3 December 2015}}</ref> [[Lithuania]], being the latest country to join the Eurozone on the 1st of January 2015,<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140723.en.html|title= Lithuania to join euro area and single supervisory mechanism (SSM) on 1 January 2015|publisher=European Central Bank|date=23 July 2014}}</ref> was accordingly added to the scope of application of the SSM. [[Croatia]] and [[Bulgaria]], both in the process of adopting the Euro currency will be joining the SSM as "full" members when officially part of the Eurozone. In the meantime, both countries have signed a close cooperation agreement with the ECB.<ref>{{Cite news|last=European Commission|date=2020|title=La Commission se félicite de l'entrée de la Bulgarie et de la Croatie dans le mécanisme de taux de change II|url=https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_20_1321|access-date=2021-04-09}}</ref>

Under the [[Treaties of the European Union|European Treaties]], non-Eurozone countries do not have the right to vote in the ECB's Governing Council and, in return, are not bound by its decisions. As a result, non-Eurozone countries cannot become full members of the SSM (i.e., they cannot have the same rights and obligations as Eurozone SSM members). However, non-Eurozone EU member states can enter into a "close cooperation agreement" with the ECB. This procedure is organised by article 7 of the SSM regulation (Council regulation (EU) No 1024/2013) and the ECB decision 2014/510.<ref name="Procedure to apply for SSM Membership through close cooperation">{{cite web|date=31 January 2014|title=Decision of the European Central Bank of 31 January 2014: On the close cooperation with the national competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the euro (ECB/2014/5)|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/en_dec_2014_05_fen.pdf|publisher=European Central Bank|format=PDF}}</ref> In effect, these agreements imply the supervision of banks in these signatory countries by the ECB <ref>{{Cite news|last=Council of the European Union|date=2013|title=Council approves single supervisory mechanism for banking|url=https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2014044%202013%20INIT/EN/pdf}}</ref>. A close cooperation agreement can be ended either by the ECB or by the participating non-Eurozone member state. <ref name="SSMEP" />

== Monitoring Mechanism ==
As part of the SSM, the ECB is, according to Regulation 1024/2013, Art. 4, in charge of:<ref name=":9" />

* Conducting supervisory reviews ('''Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process)'''
* Assessing banks’ acquisition of qualifying holdings ('''Mergers and Acquisitions''')

===Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process===
The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process, also known as ‘SREP’, is '''a periodic assessment''' '''of the [[Risk|risks]]''' taken by European [[Bank|banks]]. This process, undertaken annually by supervisors from the ECB and Joint Supervisory Teams, is an essential element of the implementation of the ''Single Supervisory Mechanism''. The aim of the SREP is to make sure that banks remain safe and reliable; that any factors that could affect their [[Capital (economics)|capital]] and [[liquidity]] are under control. <ref name=":15">{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2021|title=The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/2021/html/ssm.srep202101_supervisorymethodology2021.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-09|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref> Today, the capital and liquidity levels of banks are then directly subject to an [[European Central Bank|ECB]] monitoring system while beforehand it was heterogeneously done at a national level.<ref>{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|first=|date=2019|title=The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process in 2015|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/2015/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref>

This evaluation is based on the monitoring of four different areas:<ref name=":15" />

* [[Business model|Business Model]] - assessment of the bank’s [[strategy]] and its main activities;
* Internal [[Governance]] - examination of the [[organizational structure]] and the [[management]];
* Risks to capital - close analysis of risks linked to [[credits]], [[Market (economics)|markets]], [[Interest rate|interest rates]], and operations;
* Risks to liquidity - zoom on whether the banks have sufficient [[cash]] to cover their short-term needs.

In addition, each year, the European Central Bank is, under [[European Union law]],<ref>{{Cite web|last=The European Parliament and the Council|date=|title=DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj/eng|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-01|website=eur-lex.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> obliged to perform at least one [[Stress test (financial)|stress test]] on all supervised banks. This test will be part of the annual SREP cycle.<ref name=":16">{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|first=|date=2021|title=Stress tests|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/tasks/stresstests/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref> Stress tests are computer-simulated techniques which evaluate the capacity of banks to cope with potential financial and [[Shock (economics)|economic shocks]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kenton|first=Will|title=Stress Testing|url=https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stresstesting.asp|access-date=2021-03-28|website=Investopedia|language=en}}</ref> Annual SREP cycles are based on data from the previous year and  after each cycle, there is an individual evaluation.<ref name=":15" />
[[File:The overall SREP process.png|thumb|335x335px|The overall SREP process <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bank|first=European Central|date=2021-01-28|title=Supervisory methodology|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/2021/html/ssm.srep202101_supervisorymethodology2021.en.html|language=en}}</ref>]]
Based on these assessments and simulations, supervisors write a report on the vulnerability of European banks, with a score ranging from 1 (low risk) to 4 (high risks), and list concrete measures for these banks to take. These measures can be quantitative - related to capital or liquidity, or qualitative (e.g., a change in the management structure or the need of holding more capital especially in times of [[financial crisis]]).<ref name=":15" /> These actions shall normally be fulfilled by the following year. In case of non-compliance with these requirements, the ECB can charge a fine up to the double of the profits (or losses) which have been generated (or caused) by the breach and that can amount up to 10% of these banks’ annual [[Sales turnover|turnover]].<ref name=":9" /> The ECB can also request national authorities to open proceedings against these banks.<ref name=":9" />  In the worst case scenario, when a bank is likely to fail, the second pillar of the [[European Banking union|European Banking Union]], '''[[Single Resolution Mechanism|the Single Resolution Mechanism]]''', enters into play. Eventually, even though the methodology and the timeframe are identical for banks, the actions to take can significantly differ among them<ref>{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|first=|date=2020|title=What is the SREP?|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/srep.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref> as well as the sanctions.<ref>{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|first=|date=2021|title=Supervisory sanctions|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/html/index.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision}}</ref>

==== Capital requirements ====
As banks can take considerable [[Risk|risks]], holding [[Capital (economics)|capital]] is essential to absorb potential losses, avoid [[Bankruptcy|bankruptcies]] and secure people’s [[deposits]]. The amount of capital banks should hold is proportional to the risks they take.<ref>{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|first=|date=2020|title=Why do banks need to hold capital?|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/hold_capital.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision|language=en}}</ref> This is closely monitored by the supervisory authorities.

Since 2016, if the results of the SREP for a bank do not reflect a proper coverage of the risks, the ECB may impose additional [[Capital requirement|capital requirements]] to those required by the Basel agreement. This agreement provides a minimum capital requirement (called Pillar 1 requirement) of 8% of banks’ [[Risk-weighted asset|risk-weighted assets]].{{Citation needed}} Since [[Basel II]], extra requirements (called Pillar 2 requirements) can be set in order to cover additional risks.<ref name=":17" /> This second category of requirements is divided in two:

* Pillar 2 Requirement (P2R): requirements in terms of risk sensitivity and flexibility that must be fulfilled at all times;
* Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G): identification of the levels of capital to be maintained by banks in the longer run.

Finally, [[Basel III]] provides additional capital buffers covering more specific risks.

==== Non-performing loans ====
The SSM has been actively involved in the making of [[Non-performing loan|Non-Performing Loans]] action plans. In the ECB guidance recommendations, the SSM, along with the [[European Banking Authority]] (EBA), have introduced a new definition of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) that relates to the optimisation of the disposal of the NPLs by the banks. The main purpose is to integrate the multidimensional framework that the banks use in their evaluation process in the comprehensive assessment by the Supervisory Authority.<ref name=":19">{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=March 2017|title=Guidance to banks on non-performing loans|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/guidance_on_npl.en.pdf?b2b48eefa9972f0ca983c8b164b859ac|url-status=live|access-date=1 March 2021}}</ref>

A bank loan is non-performing when the 90-day period is exceeded without the borrower paying the due amount or the agreed interest.<ref name=":19" /> If customers do not follow the agreed upon repayment terms for 90 days or more, the bank must further protect itself by increasing its equity reserve in the event the loan is not paid. The purpose of this procedure is to increase the bank's resilience to shocks by sharing the risk with the private sector. In other words, addressing the problems associated with PNPs in the future is paramount to consolidating the banking union, while developing lending activity.

The new provisions put in place a "prudential backstop," or minimum common loss guarantee for the reserve funds that banks set up to deal with losses from future non-performing loans. If a bank fails to meet this agreed minimum level, deductions are made directly from its capital.<ref> Conseil de l’UE, « Prêts non performants: le Conseil approuve sa position sur les exigences de fonds propres pour les créances douteuses des banques », 31/10/2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2018/10/31/non-performing-loans-council-approves-position-on-capital-requirements-for-banks-bad-loans/ Retrieved 2021-04-11.</ref>

=== SSM in banking consolidation ===
Before the [[Financial crisis of 2007–2008|financial crisis of 2008]], an increasing number of banks were merging across Europe.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Heukmes|first=Joachim|last2=Guionnet|first2=Baptiste|date=2018|title=M&A benefits for the banking sector consolidation|url=https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/Banking/lu-mergers-acquisition-benefits-banking-sector.pdf|journal=Inside magazine|publisher=Deloitte|volume=18|issue=3}}</ref> This trend stopped as a result of the crisis: between 2008 and 2017, while we saw a decline in the number of cross-border [[Mergers and acquisitions|M&A]]<nowiki/>s,<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Jackson|first=Olly|date=2018|title=Consolidation and the EU banking sector|url=https://search.proquest.com/openview/0cc062577850cad6fc9eb084d1521f62/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=36341|journal=International Financial Law Review|via=ProQuest}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> domestic consolidations (i.e., between two national institutions) rose.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Gardella|first=Anna|last2=Rimarchi|first2=Massimiliano|last3=Stroppa|first3=Davide|date=2020|title=Potential Regulatory Obstacles to Crossborder Mergers and Acquisitions in the EU Banking Sector.|url=https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/844126/Potential%20obstacles%20M%26A.pdf|journal=EBA Staff Paper Series|publisher=European Banking Authority|volume=7}}</ref> In 2016, there were about 6 000 banks in the [[Eurozone]], most of which with a clear focus on their domestic market.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Schoenmaker|first=Dirk|date=2015|title=The New Banking Union Landscape in Europe: Consolidation Ahead?|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3083603|journal=Journal of Financial Perspectives|volume=3}}</ref> Today, the European banking landscape is composed of banks with a smaller market share at the EU level than what can be observed in the United States.<ref name=":4" /> As a result, the European market is said to be more fragmented and therefore less competitive than in the US or Asia.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":5">{{Cite web|last=Kruizinga|first=Anthony|last2=de Haan|first2=Martijn|date=2020|title=Paving the way for European banking consolidation|url=https://www.pwc.nl/en/insights-and-publications/services-and-industries/financial-sector/paving-the-way-for-european-banking-consolidation.html|url-status=live|website=PwC Netherlands}}</ref>

Cross-border mergers in banking would help banks to diversify their portfolio and, therefore, better recover from localized shocks in the economy.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":6">{{Cite book|last=Boer|first=Martin|title=Consolidation of the European banking industry: obstacles and policies|last2=Portilla|first2=Andrés|publisher=Fundación de Estudios Financieros and Fundación ICO|year=2020|isbn=978-84-09-19649-4|pages=263-282}}</ref> On the other hand, spreading risks across different geographies could also be a threat to the stability of financial markets: one might, indeed, worry of a potential effect of contagion between regions.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Wagner|first=Wolf|date=2010|title=Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957309000345|journal=Journal of Financial Intermediation|volume=19|issue=3|pages=373-386}}</ref> Such transactions could also lead to the creation of groups regarded as “[[Too big to fail|''too big to fail'']]”, which, in case of systemic crises, would require significant support from the public purse.<ref name=":6" /> Following the terrible consequences of the [[Lehman Brothers]]’ fall in 2008, public authorities seem committed to avoid the collapse of other systemic banks.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal|last=Kalaitzake|first=Manolis|date=2019|title=Central banking and financial political power: An investigation into the European Central Bank.|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1024529418812690|journal=Competition & Change|volume=23|issue=3|pages=221-244}}</ref> One of the side effects of these public guarantees is to encourage [[moral hazard]]: protected by a public net, these financial institutions are incentivized to adopt riskier behaviors.<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last=Weiß|first=Gregor|last2=Neumann|first2=Sascha|last3=Bostandzic|first3=Denefa|date=2014|title=Systemic risk and bank consolidation: International evidence.|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426613004536|journal=Journal of Banking & Finance|volume=40|pages=165-181}}</ref> As this opposition of opinions illustrates, if cross-border mergers might have the potential of reducing the exposure of individual firms to localized shocks, studies<ref name=":8" /> show that they also increase [[Systemic risk|systemic risks]] on financial markets.

In the attempt to mitigate those risks, the [[European Central Bank|ECB]] is, since 2013, responsible (as part of the Single Monitoring Mechanism), with the [[European Commission]], for assessing the soundness of banking mergers (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 4).<ref name=":9">{{Cite web|last=The Council of the European Union|title=Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1024|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-01|website=eur-lex.europa.eu}}</ref> While the [[European Union competition law|European Commission]] is in charge of checking the impacts such transactions will have on competition and, therefore, on consumers, the ECB is tasked to monitor the risks entailed by the suggested consolidations. If a transaction includes the acquisition of more than 10% of a bank’s shares or voting rights (i.e., a qualifying holding – Regulation 575/2013, Art. 4(1)36),<ref>{{Cite web|last=The European Parliament and the Council|title=Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 Text with EEA relevance|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0575|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-01|website=eur-lex.europa.eu}}</ref> it must be reported to the national competent authority of the Member State in which the bank is established. This national authority must then conduct an assessment of the deal and forward its conclusions to the ECB, which is the final decision-maker, validating (with or without conditions) or refusing the transaction (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 15).<ref name=":9" />

In 2020, the ECB published a document aiming to clarify the way they were assessing such transactions, with the objective of being more transparent and predictable.<ref name=":17">{{Cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2020|title=Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in the banking sector|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.guideconsolidation2101~fb6f871dc2.en.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Even though transactions are assessed on a case-to-case basis, the supervision process of these deals follow the same three stages:

# The preliminary stage: the ECB advises companies to contact them early in order to get feedback on their transaction project;
# The formal application stage: the project is officially sent for approval to the ECB;
# The implementation phase: if approved, the project and its developments are closely monitored by the ECB.

In phase two, the ECB pays particular attention to the sustainability of the suggested [[business model]] (e.g., under which assumptions it has been built, what has been planned in terms of IT integration, etc.) and to the governance mechanism at stake (e.g. what the skills and experiences of the leadership are). With this communication, the ECB also took the initiative to clarify how it was computing the [[Capital requirement|capital requirements]] of the new entity and how it would assess the [[Asset quality|quality of this new body's assets]].

According to two [[PricewaterhouseCoopers|PwC]] analysts, the publication of this document by the ECB seems to indicate that it wishes to encourage banking consolidation.<ref name=":5" /> This position from the ECB is not new. In November 2016, the ECB wrote in its Financial Stability Review the following sentence with regards to the banking sector: <blockquote>“''Consolidation could bring some profitability benefits at the sector level by increasing cost and revenue synergies without worsening the so-called “too-big-to-fail” problem''” (ECB Financial Stability Review, Nov. 2016, p. 75)<ref>{{Cite journal|last=European Central Bank|date=2016|title=Financial Stability Review - Nov. 2016|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/fsr/financialstabilityreview201611.en.pdf|journal=Financial Stability Review}}</ref> </blockquote>This positioning of the ECB, in favor of bigger and more competitive banks in Europe, translates a certain bias of this institution towards the financial industry.<ref name=":10" /> This bias can be explained by different power mechanisms at stake:

* Instrumental power: central bankers have, through their interactions with expert groups and their [[Revolving door (politics)|past professional experiences]], close relationships with professionals from the financial industry, framing their preferences in support of these firms.<ref name=":7" />
* Structural power: banks have today such a large influence on the European economy, employing many people and financing many organizations, that the ECB actually have incentives to protect this industry.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" />
* Infrastructural power: [[Central bank|central bankers]] rely on the banking industry to transmit their policy’s objectives to the [[real economy]]. When setting its short-term [[interest rate]], the central bank hopes to get an indirect influence, through private banks’ lending operations, on different macroeconomic variables (e.g., [[inflation]]).<ref>{{Cite book|last=Braun|first=Benjamin|title=The Financial Consequences of Mr Draghi? Infrastructural Power and the Rise of Market-Based (Central) Banking.|publisher=Foundation for European Progressive Studies|year=2016|location=Brussels}}</ref><ref name=":10" />

Because of these mechanisms, it is argued that the interests of central bankers can often be found aligned with the ones of the banking industry.<ref name=":7" /> With regards to banking consolidation, the position of the ECB, in support of large competitive banks operating across Europe, tends to favor a situation of financial stability at short-term, at the expense of longer term consequences resulting from an increase in the European systemic risk.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book|last=Peter|first=Dietsch|title=Do central banks serve the people?|last2=Claveau|first2=François|last3=Fontan|first3=Clément|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|year=2018}}</ref>

The centralization of banking supervision at the EU level and the harmonization of banking regulations in the EU has already been a way to foster consolidation in the financial industry.<ref name=":2" /> Nevertheless, many obstacles to consolidation – economic (e.g., poor economic conditions in Europe), regulatory (e.g., national discrepancies in corporate law) and cultural (e.g., linguistic barriers) – remain.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":6" /> Zooming on obstacles linked to regulatory and monitoring practices, despite efforts of harmonization, the fact that there remain some national inconsistencies in those practices has been identified as a barrier to consolidation (e.g., some countries assess subsidiaries as separate entities, others as part of a single group).<ref name=":6" /> Another issue is the tendency of some EU member states, since the [[European debt crisis|EU sovereign debt crisis]], to impose minimum capital requirements to their national banks, hindering the free movement of capital across EU’s subsidiaries.<ref name=":6" /> This reaction could be explained by the current incompleteness of the [[European Banking union|Banking Union]]: lacking a third – risk-sharing – pillar, national authorities would not be ready to drop their prerogatives.<ref name=":3" /> To sum up, despite a willingness from the sector and authorities to boost the competitiveness of the European banking industry, obstacles remain in the way of a further integration of the European banking market.

==Monitoring outcomes==
The ECB published its first comprehensive assessment on 26 October 2014. This financial health check covered the 130 most significant credit institutions in the 19 Eurozone states representing assets worth €22 trillion (equal to 82% of total banking assets of the eurozone).


The supervision report included:
The supervision report included:
# The results of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) - assessing capital shortfalls of each significant credit institution on 31 December 2013.
# The results of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) - assessing capital shortfalls (i.e., a failure to meet the minimum [[capital requirement]]) of each significant credit institution on 31 December 2013.
# Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on the baseline scenario - being the latest economic forecast published by the Commission for the eurozone in 2014-16.
# Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on the baseline scenario - being the latest economic forecast published by the Commission for the eurozone in 2014-16.
# Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on an adverse scenario - which was developed by the [[European Systemic Risk Board]] in cooperation with the National Competent Authorities, the [[European Banking Authority|EBA]] and the ECB.
# Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on an adverse scenario - which was developed by the [[European Systemic Risk Board]] in cooperation with the National Competent Authorities, the [[European Banking Authority|EBA]] and the ECB.
The EBA designed the utilized stress test methodology, where banks were required to maintain a minimum [[Tier 1 capital|CET1 ratio]] of 8% under the baseline scenario (equal to the requirement for the AQR), and a minimum CET1 ratio of 5.5% under the adverse scenario. The review found, that despite identification of a need for asset value adjustments equal to €62 billion, a total of 105 out of the 130 assessed banks still met each of the 3 calculated minimum capital requirements on 31 December 2013. So only a total of 25 banks were found to suffer from capital shortfalls on 31 December 2013, of which 12 had already managed to cover these capital shortfalls through raising extra CET1-capital from the markets during 2014.<ref>{{cite web| url= https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141026.en.html|title= ECB’s in-depth review shows banks need to take further action| publisher=European Central Bank|date=26 October 2014}}</ref> The remaining 13 banks still suffering from a capital shortfall, were granted 2 weeks to submit a plan for how they plan to cover it, with a final deadline for raising additional CET1-capital no later than: 30 April 2015 (if the shortfall stemmed from the AQR assessment or the baseline scenario stress test) or 31 July 2015 (if the shortfall stemmed from the adverse scenario stress test).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/assessment/html/index.en.html#t1|title=Banking Supervision > Comprehensive assessment: What happens after the disclosure of the results?|publisher=European Central Bank|date=26 October 2014}}</ref>


Based on these three criteria, the review found that a total of 105 out of the 130 assessed banks met all minimum capital requirements on 31 December 2013. A total of 25 banks were found to suffer from capital shortfalls on 31 December 2013, of which 12 managed to cover these capital shortfalls through raising extra capital in 2014. The remaining 13 banks were asked to submit a recapitalization plan for 2015.<ref>{{cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2014|title=ECB’s in-depth review shows banks need to take further action|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141026.en.html#t1|url-status=live|publisher=}}</ref>
The table below summarizes the review results for all of the 25 banks, that were found to suffer from a capital shortfall on 31 December 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/aggregatereportonthecomprehensiveassessment201410.en.pdf|title=Aggregate report on the comprehensive assessment, October 2014|format=PDF|publisher=European Central Bank|date=26 October 2014}}</ref> Those 12 with a green background already raised sufficient amount of additional [[Basel III#Capital requirements|CET1-capital]] in 2014, while those 5 with a yellow background were found to have bridged their shortfall through other measures than raising additional capital (internal restructuring ensuring dynamic budget sheet gains, governmental guarantees, or retained earnings), and only the remaining 8 with a red background were required to raise additional [[Basel III#Capital requirements|CET1-capital]].

{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size:90%; clear:both; line-height:1.25; border:2px solid; text-align:center"
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size:90%; clear:both; line-height:1.25; border:2px solid; text-align:center"
|-
|-
Line 183: Line 247:
{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}<sup>3</sup> The impact on 2014 of the restructuring measures already taken to improve structural profitability and the maintenance of retained earnings in banks will cover the shortfalls identified.</small>
{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}{{0}}<sup>3</sup> The impact on 2014 of the restructuring measures already taken to improve structural profitability and the maintenance of retained earnings in banks will cover the shortfalls identified.</small>
|}
|}
Beside of the 25 banks found to suffer from capital shortfalls on 31 December 2013, it was expected [[Portugal]]'s second-biggest bank, [[Banco Espírito Santo]], would also have shown a capital shortfall if being analyzed. However, ECB decided to postpone the AQR and stress test for this bank, after it went into an orderly resolution and ceased to exist in August 2014 - with all its assets transferred to the Portuguese resolution fund. The resolution plan now being implemented by the resolution fund, will cause a split of the bank into a "bad bank" (holding all bad assets, to be liquidated as soon as possible) and a new continuing recapitalized bank [[Novo Banco]] (only holding the healthy assets).<ref name="BESrestructure">{{cite news|title=Portugal in 4.9 billion euro rescue of Banco Espirito Santo|url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/04/uk-portugal-bes-cenbank-idUKKBN0G30TA20140804|accessdate=3 August 2014|work=Reuters}}</ref> At the time of the published stress test, the work of splitting up the assets between the two entities had not yet been completed, and for this reason ECB decided to postpone its stress test of the continuing Novo Banco.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/669262/FAQs+on+EU-wide+stress+test.pdf/2ab790e8-ca25-43ce-9041-8fa86277e7ba|title=2014 EU-wide stress test: Frequently Asked Questions|publisher=European Banking Authority|date=26 October 2014}}</ref> One month later, it was announced Novo Banco had a sufficient CET1-ratio of 9.2% as of 4 August 2014 (after secretion of the toxic assets into the "bad bank"), and the resolution fund expected it would be sold as a viable bank to a new private owner during the second quarter of 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-04/novo-banco-says-common-equity-tier-1-ratio-exceeded-ecb-minimum.html|title=Novo Banco Says Common Equity Ratio Exceeded ECB Minimum|publisher=Bloomberg|date=4 December 2014}}</ref>


This is the only time where a comprehensive assessment has been done for the 130 banks supervised by the ECB. Since 2014, only a few numbers of banks have been comprehensively assessed by the ECB: 13 in 2015, 4 in 2016 and 7 in 2019.<ref>{{cite web|last=European Central Bank|title=Comprehensive assessments|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/tasks/comprehensive_assessment/html/index.en.html#t1|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision|publisher=}}</ref> These comprehensive assessments are conducted either when a bank is recognized as significant or when deemed necessary (i.e., in case of exceptional circumstances or when a non-Eurozone country joins the mechanism). Comprehensive assessments require too much resources for them to be conducted annually.
In addition to ECB's AQR and stress test for the 130 most significant banks in the [[eurozone]] member states, an identical AQR and stress test was conducted and published simultaneously by the [[European Banking Authority|EBA]], covering the 123 most significant banks across the entire [[European Union]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2014/results|title=2014 EU-wide stress test results|publisher=European Banking Authority|date=26 October 2014}}</ref> National supervision authorities might also choose to publish additional stress tests. For example, the [[Bank of England]] regularly publishes its own stress tests, covering all of its [[List of systemically important banks#D-SIBs within each of the EEA member states (both domestic and global)|8 selected domestic SIFIs]].<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/stress-testing |title= Bank of England stress test home |website= Bank of England|date=15 December 2017}}</ref>

Other supervision tools are therefore used on a more regular basis in order to assess how banks would cope with potential economic shocks. As required by EU law and as part of the SREP, the ECB carries out annual [[Stress test (financial)|stress tests]] on supervised banks.<ref name=":16" /> In 2016, a stress test was performed on 51 banks, covering 70% of EU banking assets. These banks entered the process with an average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1, i.e., percentage of Tier 1 capital held by banks)<ref>{{cite web|last=Grant|first=Michel|date=2020|title=Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)|url=https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/common-equity-tier-1-cet1.asp#t1|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-28|website=Investopedia|publisher=}}</ref> ratio of 13%, higher than the 11.2% of 2014. The test showed that, with one exception, all the assessed banks exceeded the benchmark used in 2014 in terms of CET1 capital level (5.5%). The results of this stress test show that, in 2016, EU banks had a better potential of resilience and shock absorption than in 2014.<ref>{{cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2016|title=Stress test shows improved resilience of euro area banking system|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/sr160729.en.html#t1|url-status=live|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision|publisher=}}</ref> In 2018, two types of stress tests were performed: an EBA stress test for 33 banks and a SSM SREP stress test for 54 banks. The aggregate results of those tests show that, in 2018, both sets of banks had again strengthened their capital base compared to 2016, increasing their potential of resistance to financial shocks.<ref>{{cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2019|title=ECB 2018 stress test analysis shows improved capital basis of significant euro area banks|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ssm.pr190201~6114ab7593.en.html#t1|url-status=live|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision|publisher=}}</ref> Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the 2020 stress test has been postponed to 2021. The results of this test should be published by the end of June 2021.<ref>{{cite web|last=European Central Bank|date=2021|title=ECB to stress test 38 euro area banks as part of the 2021 EU-wide stress test led by EBA|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ssm.pr210129~69d2d006ec.en.html#t1|url-status=live|website=European Central Bank - Banking Supervision|publisher=}}</ref>

== Limitations and critics ==
The SSM has been, over time, criticised regarding its methodology and scope. This institutional scheme has also suffered from some controversies.

===== Methodological limits =====
[[Stress test (financial)|Stress tests]] are an integral part of the supervisory activities of the ECB.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bank|first=European Central|date=2021-01-28|title=2020 SREP aggregate results|url=https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/2021/html/ssm.srepaggregateresults2021.en.html/|language=en}}</ref> Methodological flaws related to these stress tests have been identified and corrected throughout the years in order for these assessments to properly reflect the actual risk status of the banks.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2016-10-01|title=Is the European banking system robust? An evaluation through the lens of the ECB׳s Comprehensive Assessment|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2110701716300105|journal=International Economics|language=en|volume=147|pages=126–144|doi=10.1016/j.inteco.2016.04.002|issn=2110-7017}}</ref> In the 2014 stress tests, the capital strength of banks was assessed according to the [[Basel III]] approach that uses Common Equity Tier 1 as the only capital buffer. This methodology has been the subject of criticism by many scholars and organisations for its failure to provide good estimates of the actual solvency of banks. This method was deemed to favour investment banks that were less exposed to credit risk as opposed to commercial banks.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Steffen|first=Sascha|title=Robustness, Validity and Significance of the ECB's AQR and Stress Test Exercise|url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/528761/IPOL_STU(2014)528761_EN.pdf|url-status=live|access-date=29 March 2021}}</ref> Today, stress tests remain flawed: e.g., they do not take into account potential externalities and spillovers while these risks have been shown to have significant impacts in a time of crisis. [[Andrea Enria]], the head of the [[European Banking Authority]] (EBA), also pointed out the fact that these tests do not take into account possible adjustments that a bank could make in reaction to an economic shock (i.e., stress tests assume that the bank will not react to the shock). Finally, he also emphasised that, while the methodology of stress tests is transparent, decisions taken by the supervisor as a result of these tests (e.g., increase its capital or decrease its [[dividend]] payments) are the result of a mutual agreement closed with the bank in a rather non-transparent manner.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Lederer|first=Edouard|date=2018|title=Le régulateur des banques européennes critique les récents stress tests|url=https://www.lesechos.fr/finance-marches/banque-assurances/le-regulateur-des-banques-europeennes-critique-les-recents-stress-tests-147880|url-status=live|access-date=2021-04-11|website=Les Echos}}</ref>

In their 2018 report, the [[European Court of Auditors]] (ECA) pointed out flaws in the Comprehensive Assessment process of the SSM. The main identified flaws by the ECA were the limited resources of the ECB to gather the necessary information to assess the assets' quality of banks and a lack of effective guidance on risk assessment.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Guarascio|first=Francesco|date=2018-01-16|title=Flaws in ECB supervision of failing banks, EU auditors warn|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-banks-ecb-auditors-idUSL8N1PA3RZ|access-date=2021-03-01}}</ref>

==== Institutional limits ====
A first limit to the SSM's scope of application is geographical: it does not cover all EU member states. This system hence contributes to what is known as the [[multi-speed Europe]].{{Citation needed}} Another limitation to the scope of application of the SSM is the fact that it only deals with the supervision of banks. Supervision of the rest of the financial sector (e.g., insurance firms) remains a national competence. The supervisory role of the ECB is restricted to individual banking institutions as they are defined in the [[Basel III|Capital Requirements Directive IV]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Schoenmaker|first=Dirk|last2=Wierts|first2=Peter|date=February 2016|title=Macroprudential Supervision: From Theory to Policy|url=https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/wp/esrbwp2.en.pdf?aeef658c5b4815a4508115020bbad035|url-status=live}}</ref> This means that the ECB cannot conduct supervision on over-the-counter [[Derivatives market|derivatives markets]], wholesale debt securities markets and on the [[Shadow banking system|shadow banking]] industry. In addition, some aspects of bank supervision (e.g., consumer protection or money laundering monitoring<ref>{{cite news|last=Jones|first=Claire|title=ECB lacks power to uncover money laundering — Nouy|newspaper=Financial Times|url=https://www.ft.com/content/e3c4a87e-17bb-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44|accessdate=5 July 2018}}</ref>) continue to be dealt with at the national level.<ref>{{cite web|last=Verhelst|first=Stijn|title=Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Passing the point of no return for Europe's Banking Union|url=http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep58.pdf|publisher=Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations|accessdate=12 June 2013}}</ref> Furthermore, while the ECB directly supervises the most significant banks of the [[Eurozone]], the supervision of smaller banks remains under national realm. National authorities are also in charge of defining their own macro prudential policy, limiting the ability of the ECB to take a proactive stance on [[Systemic risk|systemic]] and [[Liquidity risk|liquidity risks]].<ref name=":18" /> Finally, when the SSM was first launched, some economists were sceptical with regards to the composition of its Supervisory Board: they criticized the fact that a large majority of this board would be composed of national supervisors who "''do not appreciate ECB interference in their daily national supervisory activities''".<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ivo|first=Arnold|date=2012|title=First the Governance, Then the Guarantees|journal=EconoMonitor}}</ref>

The quality of the ECB’s banking supervision is dependent on the effectiveness of the [[Single Resolution Mechanism]] as well as on the creation of a [[Deposit insurance|deposit insurance scheme]]. In 2018, 17 economists published a paper calling for a reform of the banking union. These economists emphasised the necessity to consolidate the [[Single Resolution Mechanism]], enabling the establishment of real risk-sharing mechanisms.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform {{!}} Bruegel|url=https://www.bruegel.org/2018/01/reconciling-risk-sharing-with-market-discipline-a-constructive-approach-to-euro-area-reform/|access-date=2021-03-29|language=en-US}}</ref> With regards to the deposit insurance scheme, it has been subject to a first proposal by the Commission in November 2015 but no tangible progress has been made since then to achieve its implementation.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Valero|first=Jorge|date=2020-12-07|title=Commission eyes new proposal to unblock deposit insurance scheme|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/banking-union/news/commission-eyes-new-proposal-to-unblock-deposit-insurance-scheme/|access-date=2021-03-01|website=www.euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref>

Thirdly, as laid down in articles [[wikisource:Consolidated_version_of_the_Treaty_on_the_Functioning_of_the_European_Union/Title_VIII:_Economic_and_Monetary_Policy#Article_130|130]] and [[wikisource:Consolidated_version_of_the_Treaty_on_the_Functioning_of_the_European_Union/Chapter_1:_The_Institutions#Article_282|282]] of the TFEU, the independence of the ECB from political actors should be guaranteed. However, the ECB has to rely on the European [[European Parliament|Parliament]] and the [[European Council|Council]] to take decisions regarding the reporting of its supervisory activities and the appointment of its members.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Fraccaroli|first=Nicolò|last2=Giovannini|first2=Alessandro|last3=Jamet|first3=Jean‑François|date=2018|title=The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the crisis|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201805_01.en.html|url-status=live|access-date=20 March 2021|website=[[European Central Bank]]}}</ref> The perceived need of democratic legitimacy that is at the basis of these procedures can be thought to create a shift of accountability from the ECB to the institutions – or member states – of the Union.

A final important question arises when prudential supervision and monetary policy are at stake, as it is the case at the ECB: as these two areas are intertwined, how to avoid potential conflicts of interest?<ref name=":18">{{Cite web|last=Kern|first=Alexander|date=2016|title=The European Central Bank and Banking Supervision: The Regulatory Limits of the Single Supervisory Mechanism|url=https://www.rwi.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:21a63bce-fbb5-4bd7-a673-2e3172282c50/ECFR_Vol.13_Issue_3.3-30.pdf|url-status=live|access-date=29 March 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Amorello|first=Luca|title=Macroprudential Banking Supervision & Monetary Policy|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2018|isbn=978-3-319-94155-4|location=London, UK|pages=338-339|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-94156-1}}</ref> The Supervisory Board is theoretically in charge of preventing these issues from happening. In practice, the ECB has already interfered with the solvency assessments of its supervised banks by, for example, [[Quantitative easing|purchasing asset-backed securities]] issued by these same banks.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Hale|first=Thomas|date=8 February 2017|title=How the ECB’s purchases have changed European bond markets|work=[[The Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/c5568324-ec8f-11e6-930f-061b01e23655|url-status=live|access-date=31 March 2021}}</ref>

==== Controversies ====
In 2019, the [[European Commission]] concluded a contract with the American asset management company [[BlackRock]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Riding|first=Siobhan|date=2021-01-04|title=EU lobbying by fund groups fuels fears over vested interest|url=https://www.ft.com/content/298e8544-5b53-44fd-925c-89b64ce0da37|access-date=2021-03-29|website=www.ft.com|language=en-GB}}</ref> The company has been mandated to advise the Commission on prudential risk matters to implement sustainability in the banking regulation [[European Banking union|ecosystem]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=BlackRock to advise ECB on bond-buying plan|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/blackrock-to-advise-ecb-on-bond-buying-plan-1.1910060|access-date=2021-04-09|website=The Irish Times|language=en}}</ref> This is not the first time that the ECB has been working with BlackRock: in the aftermath of the [[European debt crisis|Eurozone debt crisis]], in 2014, the private firm already helped the ECB conduct its comprehensive assessment of the European banking market.<ref>"Ces financiers qui dirigent le monde - BlackRock". ARTE. 2019.</ref> Concerns over potential conflicts of interests have been raised regarding the choice of a private company because of the potential influence on the rulemaking of the ECB, as well as on the credibility of BlackRock to perform such a task. The Commission and BlackRock rejected any wrongdoings and respectively invoked independence and transparency.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Temple-West|first=Patrick|last2=Khan|first2=Mehreen|date=13 April 2020|title=BlackRock to advise EU on green regulation for bank|work=[[The Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/da821c64-b2f8-4119-afa1-fdafa9a57918|url-status=live|access-date=29 March 2021}}</ref>

==== The health crisis and its impacts on banking supervision ====
The [[COVID-19 recession|COVID-19 crisis]] has highlighted new limitations concerning the methodology of [[Stress test (financial)|stress tests]]. During the first half of 2020, financial markets underwent unprecedented fluctuations far from what had been considered in the most severe forecasts (e.g., in the most adverse scenarios of the EBA, oil would lose 15% of its value whereas oil price actually fell by 60% at the peak of the crisis in 2020). This [[COVID-19 pandemic|Covid-19 crisis]] could actually be considered as a real-life stress test whose macroeconomic factors could later be used to readjust the EBA-ECB most severe scenario in their subsequent evaluations. This health crisis has also illustrated the dual role of the ECB: its actions during the crisis reflected a mix between its mandate as banking supervisor and its [[European_Union_response_to_the_COVID-19_pandemic#Assistance_to_member_states|initiatives]] in support of the stability of financial markets.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020|title=Marchés financiers : le stress test EBA mis à l’épreuve de la crise du « COVID-19 », ou pourquoi le stress test EBA 2020 est rapidement devenu obsolète.|url=http://www.mpg-partners.com/2020/04/20/marches-financiers-stress-test-eba-mis-a-lepreuve-de-crise-covid-19-stress-test-eba-2020-rapidement-devenu-obsolete/|url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-29|website=MPG Partners}}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==

Revision as of 15:47, 11 April 2021

Regulation 1024/2013
European Union regulation
TitleConferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
ApplicabilityAll EU member states. However, only eurozone states and EU member states with "close cooperation agreements" (collectively referred to as participating SSM members), will become subject to the supervision tasks conferred to ECB.
Made byCouncil of the European Union                  
Made underArticle 127(6) of the TFEU.
Journal referenceOJ L287, 29.10.2013, p.63–89
History
Date made15 October 2013
Came into force3 November 2013
Implementation date4 November 2014.
Current legislation
Initial home of the SSM, the Japan Center in Frankfurt
Current home of the SSM (since March 2016), the Eurotower in Frankfurt

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first pillar of the European banking union and is the legislative and institutional framework that grants the European Central Bank (ECB) a leading supervisory role over banks in the EU. The ECB directly supervises the larger banks while it does it indirectly for the smaller ones. Eurozone countries are required to participate, while participation is voluntary for non-eurozone EU member states. In October 2020, two non-Eurozone countries joined the European banking supervision mechanism through a process known as close cooperation: Bulgaria and Croatia. As of early 2021, the SSM directly supervises 115 banks across the Union, representing almost 82% of banking assets of these countries. The SSM, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism are the two central components of the European banking union.

Genesis

The question of supervising the European banking system arose long before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Shortly after the creation of the monetary union in 1999, a number of observers and policy-makers warned that the new monetary architecture would be incomplete, and therefore fragile, without at least some coordination of supervisory policies among euro members.[1]

The first supervisory measure put in place at the EU level was the creation of the Lamfalussy Process in March 2001.[2] It involved the creation of a number of committees in charge of overseeing regulations in the financial sector. The primary goal of these committees was to accelerate the integration of the EU securities market.[3]

This approach was not binding for the European banking sector and had therefore little influence on the supervision of European banks. This can be explained by the fact that the European treaties did not allow the EU, at the time, to have real decision-making power on these matters. The idea of having to modify the treaties and of engaging in a vast debate on the Member States’ loss of sovereignty cooled down the ambitions of the Lamfalussy process. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences in the European Union incentivized European leaders to adopt a supranational mechanism of banking supervision.[4]

The main objective of the new supervisory mechanism was to restore confidence in financial markets. The idea was also to avoid having to bail out banks with public money in case of future economic crises.[5]

To implement this new system of supervision, the President of the European Commission in 2008, José Manuel Barroso, asked a working group of the think tank Eurofi to look at how the EU could best regulate the European banking market. This group was led by Jacques de Larosière, a French senior officer who held, until 1978, the position of Director General of the Treasury in France. He was also President of the International Monetary Fund from 1978 to 1987, President of the “Banque de France” from 1987 to 1993 and President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development from 1993.[6] On a more controversial stance, Jacques de Larosière has also been a close advisor of BNP Paribas.[7]

This group led by de Larosière delivered a report highlighting the major failure of European banking supervision pre-2008.[4] Based on this report, the European institutions have set up in 2011 “The European System of Financial Supervision” (ESFS). Its primary objective was:

"to ensure that the rules applicable to the financial sector are adequately implemented, to preserve financial stability and ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole”.[8]

The ESFC brought together, in an unconventional manner, the European and the national supervisory authorities.[9]

Despite the creation of this new mechanism, the European Commission considered that, having a single currency, the EU needed to go further in the integration of its banking supervision practices. The idea was that the mere collaboration of national and European supervisory authorities was not enough and that the EU needed a single supervisory authority. The European Commission therefore suggested the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.[4]

This proposal was debated at the Eurozone summit that took place in Brussels on the 28th and 29th of June 2012. Herman Van Rompuy, who was President of the European Council at the time, had worked upstream with the President of the Commission, the President of the Central Bank and of the Eurogroup on a preliminary report used as a basis for discussions at the summit.[10] In compliance with the decisions made then, the European Commission published a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the SSM in September 2012.[11]

The European Central Bank welcomed the proposal.[12] Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel questioned "the capacity of the ECB to monitor 6,000 banks". The Vice-President of the European Commission at the time, Olli Rehn, responded to that concern that the majority of European banks would still be monitored by national supervisory bodies, while the ECB "would assume ultimate responsibility for the supervision, in order to prevent banking crises from escalating".[13]

The European Parliament voted in favour of the SSM proposal on the 12th of September 2013.[14] The Council of the European Union gave its own approval on the 15th of October 2013.[15] The SSM Regulation entered into force on the 4th of November 2014.

The fact that the SSM is formulated as a regulation and not a directive is important. Indeed, a regulation is legally binding and Member States do not have the choice, unlike for directives, of how to transpose it under national law.[16]

Organization

SSM at the ECB

The European Central Bank (ECB) has the leadership in European banking supervision. [17] A strict administrative separation is foreseen between the ECB's monetary and supervisory tasks. However, final decision-making on both matters takes place in the same body: the Governing Council.

The Governing Council is the main decision-making entity of the ECB. It comprises the members of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and the governors of all national central banks of the Eurozone's member states. The Governing council is in charge, based on the opinion drafted by the Supervisory Board, of taking formal decisions with regards to its supervisory mandate.

The Supervisory board is organised by article 26 of the SSM regulation (Council regulation (EU) No 1024/2013).[18] It is composed of all national supervisors participating in the SSM, a chair, vice-chair and four ECB representatives. These members meet every three weeks in order to draft supervisory decisions then submitted to the Governing Council.[19] The composition of the Supervisory Board has been, over time, the following one:

Chair:

Vice Chair:

ECB appointees:

The Supervisory Board is assisted in the preparation of its meetings by a Steering Committee. This committee gathers the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, an ECB representative (Edouard Fernandez-Bollo since 2019) as well as five deputies of national supervisors.[19]

Finally, several Joint Supervisory Teams (JST), composed of members of the ECB's staff, national competent supervisors and experts in the banking field, make the link between the national and supranational levels. There is a JST for each significant banking institution. They act as supporting bodies, responsible mainly for the coordination, control and evaluation of supervisory missions.[20]

Division of labour

A division of labour has been established between the ECB and national supervisors. Banks deemed significant will be supervised directly by the ECB. Even though the ECB has the authority to take over the direct supervision of any bank, smaller banks will usually continue to be monitored directly by their national authorities.[14] A total of 115 banks are currently being supervised by the ECB [21]; all other banks are supervised by their national supervisor.

A bank is considered significant when it meets any of the following criteria:[14]

  • The value of its assets exceeds €30 billion;
  • The value of its assets exceeds both €5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the member state in which it is located;
  • The bank is among the three most significant banks of the country in which it is located;
  • The bank has large cross-border activities;
  • The bank receives, or has applied for, assistance from eurozone bailout funds (i.e., the European Stability Mechanism or European Financial Stability Facility).

This significance status is subject to change due to, for example, mergers and acquisitions. In 2020, two additional banks (LP Group B.V. in the Netherlands and Agri Europe Cyprus in Slovenia) have joined the list of banks supervised by the ECB [22][21].

Membership

Eurozone member states automatically participate in the SSM.[23] Lithuania, being the latest country to join the Eurozone on the 1st of January 2015,[24] was accordingly added to the scope of application of the SSM. Croatia and Bulgaria, both in the process of adopting the Euro currency will be joining the SSM as "full" members when officially part of the Eurozone. In the meantime, both countries have signed a close cooperation agreement with the ECB.[25]

Under the European Treaties, non-Eurozone countries do not have the right to vote in the ECB's Governing Council and, in return, are not bound by its decisions. As a result, non-Eurozone countries cannot become full members of the SSM (i.e., they cannot have the same rights and obligations as Eurozone SSM members). However, non-Eurozone EU member states can enter into a "close cooperation agreement" with the ECB. This procedure is organised by article 7 of the SSM regulation (Council regulation (EU) No 1024/2013) and the ECB decision 2014/510.[26] In effect, these agreements imply the supervision of banks in these signatory countries by the ECB [27]. A close cooperation agreement can be ended either by the ECB or by the participating non-Eurozone member state. [14]

Monitoring Mechanism

As part of the SSM, the ECB is, according to Regulation 1024/2013, Art. 4, in charge of:[18]

  • Conducting supervisory reviews (Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process)
  • Assessing banks’ acquisition of qualifying holdings (Mergers and Acquisitions)

Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process

The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process, also known as ‘SREP’, is a periodic assessment of the risks taken by European banks. This process, undertaken annually by supervisors from the ECB and Joint Supervisory Teams, is an essential element of the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The aim of the SREP is to make sure that banks remain safe and reliable; that any factors that could affect their capital and liquidity are under control. [28] Today, the capital and liquidity levels of banks are then directly subject to an ECB monitoring system while beforehand it was heterogeneously done at a national level.[29]

This evaluation is based on the monitoring of four different areas:[28]

In addition, each year, the European Central Bank is, under European Union law,[30] obliged to perform at least one stress test on all supervised banks. This test will be part of the annual SREP cycle.[31] Stress tests are computer-simulated techniques which evaluate the capacity of banks to cope with potential financial and economic shocks.[32] Annual SREP cycles are based on data from the previous year and  after each cycle, there is an individual evaluation.[28]

File:The overall SREP process.png
The overall SREP process [33]

Based on these assessments and simulations, supervisors write a report on the vulnerability of European banks, with a score ranging from 1 (low risk) to 4 (high risks), and list concrete measures for these banks to take. These measures can be quantitative - related to capital or liquidity, or qualitative (e.g., a change in the management structure or the need of holding more capital especially in times of financial crisis).[28] These actions shall normally be fulfilled by the following year. In case of non-compliance with these requirements, the ECB can charge a fine up to the double of the profits (or losses) which have been generated (or caused) by the breach and that can amount up to 10% of these banks’ annual turnover.[18] The ECB can also request national authorities to open proceedings against these banks.[18]  In the worst case scenario, when a bank is likely to fail, the second pillar of the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Mechanism, enters into play. Eventually, even though the methodology and the timeframe are identical for banks, the actions to take can significantly differ among them[34] as well as the sanctions.[35]

Capital requirements

As banks can take considerable risks, holding capital is essential to absorb potential losses, avoid bankruptcies and secure people’s deposits. The amount of capital banks should hold is proportional to the risks they take.[36] This is closely monitored by the supervisory authorities.

Since 2016, if the results of the SREP for a bank do not reflect a proper coverage of the risks, the ECB may impose additional capital requirements to those required by the Basel agreement. This agreement provides a minimum capital requirement (called Pillar 1 requirement) of 8% of banks’ risk-weighted assets.[citation needed] Since Basel II, extra requirements (called Pillar 2 requirements) can be set in order to cover additional risks.[37] This second category of requirements is divided in two:

  • Pillar 2 Requirement (P2R): requirements in terms of risk sensitivity and flexibility that must be fulfilled at all times;
  • Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G): identification of the levels of capital to be maintained by banks in the longer run.

Finally, Basel III provides additional capital buffers covering more specific risks.

Non-performing loans

The SSM has been actively involved in the making of Non-Performing Loans action plans. In the ECB guidance recommendations, the SSM, along with the European Banking Authority (EBA), have introduced a new definition of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) that relates to the optimisation of the disposal of the NPLs by the banks. The main purpose is to integrate the multidimensional framework that the banks use in their evaluation process in the comprehensive assessment by the Supervisory Authority.[38]

A bank loan is non-performing when the 90-day period is exceeded without the borrower paying the due amount or the agreed interest.[38] If customers do not follow the agreed upon repayment terms for 90 days or more, the bank must further protect itself by increasing its equity reserve in the event the loan is not paid. The purpose of this procedure is to increase the bank's resilience to shocks by sharing the risk with the private sector. In other words, addressing the problems associated with PNPs in the future is paramount to consolidating the banking union, while developing lending activity.

The new provisions put in place a "prudential backstop," or minimum common loss guarantee for the reserve funds that banks set up to deal with losses from future non-performing loans. If a bank fails to meet this agreed minimum level, deductions are made directly from its capital.[39]

SSM in banking consolidation

Before the financial crisis of 2008, an increasing number of banks were merging across Europe.[40] This trend stopped as a result of the crisis: between 2008 and 2017, while we saw a decline in the number of cross-border M&As,[41][40] domestic consolidations (i.e., between two national institutions) rose.[42] In 2016, there were about 6 000 banks in the Eurozone, most of which with a clear focus on their domestic market.[43] Today, the European banking landscape is composed of banks with a smaller market share at the EU level than what can be observed in the United States.[43] As a result, the European market is said to be more fragmented and therefore less competitive than in the US or Asia.[40][44]

Cross-border mergers in banking would help banks to diversify their portfolio and, therefore, better recover from localized shocks in the economy.[43][45] On the other hand, spreading risks across different geographies could also be a threat to the stability of financial markets: one might, indeed, worry of a potential effect of contagion between regions.[42][46] Such transactions could also lead to the creation of groups regarded as “too big to fail”, which, in case of systemic crises, would require significant support from the public purse.[45] Following the terrible consequences of the Lehman Brothers’ fall in 2008, public authorities seem committed to avoid the collapse of other systemic banks.[47] One of the side effects of these public guarantees is to encourage moral hazard: protected by a public net, these financial institutions are incentivized to adopt riskier behaviors.[48] As this opposition of opinions illustrates, if cross-border mergers might have the potential of reducing the exposure of individual firms to localized shocks, studies[48] show that they also increase systemic risks on financial markets.

In the attempt to mitigate those risks, the ECB is, since 2013, responsible (as part of the Single Monitoring Mechanism), with the European Commission, for assessing the soundness of banking mergers (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 4).[18] While the European Commission is in charge of checking the impacts such transactions will have on competition and, therefore, on consumers, the ECB is tasked to monitor the risks entailed by the suggested consolidations. If a transaction includes the acquisition of more than 10% of a bank’s shares or voting rights (i.e., a qualifying holding – Regulation 575/2013, Art. 4(1)36),[49] it must be reported to the national competent authority of the Member State in which the bank is established. This national authority must then conduct an assessment of the deal and forward its conclusions to the ECB, which is the final decision-maker, validating (with or without conditions) or refusing the transaction (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 15).[18]

In 2020, the ECB published a document aiming to clarify the way they were assessing such transactions, with the objective of being more transparent and predictable.[37] Even though transactions are assessed on a case-to-case basis, the supervision process of these deals follow the same three stages:

  1. The preliminary stage: the ECB advises companies to contact them early in order to get feedback on their transaction project;
  2. The formal application stage: the project is officially sent for approval to the ECB;
  3. The implementation phase: if approved, the project and its developments are closely monitored by the ECB.

In phase two, the ECB pays particular attention to the sustainability of the suggested business model (e.g., under which assumptions it has been built, what has been planned in terms of IT integration, etc.) and to the governance mechanism at stake (e.g. what the skills and experiences of the leadership are). With this communication, the ECB also took the initiative to clarify how it was computing the capital requirements of the new entity and how it would assess the quality of this new body's assets.

According to two PwC analysts, the publication of this document by the ECB seems to indicate that it wishes to encourage banking consolidation.[44] This position from the ECB is not new. In November 2016, the ECB wrote in its Financial Stability Review the following sentence with regards to the banking sector:

Consolidation could bring some profitability benefits at the sector level by increasing cost and revenue synergies without worsening the so-called “too-big-to-fail” problem” (ECB Financial Stability Review, Nov. 2016, p. 75)[50]

This positioning of the ECB, in favor of bigger and more competitive banks in Europe, translates a certain bias of this institution towards the financial industry.[51] This bias can be explained by different power mechanisms at stake:

  • Instrumental power: central bankers have, through their interactions with expert groups and their past professional experiences, close relationships with professionals from the financial industry, framing their preferences in support of these firms.[47]
  • Structural power: banks have today such a large influence on the European economy, employing many people and financing many organizations, that the ECB actually have incentives to protect this industry.[47][51]
  • Infrastructural power: central bankers rely on the banking industry to transmit their policy’s objectives to the real economy. When setting its short-term interest rate, the central bank hopes to get an indirect influence, through private banks’ lending operations, on different macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation).[52][51]

Because of these mechanisms, it is argued that the interests of central bankers can often be found aligned with the ones of the banking industry.[47] With regards to banking consolidation, the position of the ECB, in support of large competitive banks operating across Europe, tends to favor a situation of financial stability at short-term, at the expense of longer term consequences resulting from an increase in the European systemic risk.[51]

The centralization of banking supervision at the EU level and the harmonization of banking regulations in the EU has already been a way to foster consolidation in the financial industry.[41] Nevertheless, many obstacles to consolidation – economic (e.g., poor economic conditions in Europe), regulatory (e.g., national discrepancies in corporate law) and cultural (e.g., linguistic barriers) – remain.[43][45] Zooming on obstacles linked to regulatory and monitoring practices, despite efforts of harmonization, the fact that there remain some national inconsistencies in those practices has been identified as a barrier to consolidation (e.g., some countries assess subsidiaries as separate entities, others as part of a single group).[45] Another issue is the tendency of some EU member states, since the EU sovereign debt crisis, to impose minimum capital requirements to their national banks, hindering the free movement of capital across EU’s subsidiaries.[45] This reaction could be explained by the current incompleteness of the Banking Union: lacking a third – risk-sharing – pillar, national authorities would not be ready to drop their prerogatives.[42] To sum up, despite a willingness from the sector and authorities to boost the competitiveness of the European banking industry, obstacles remain in the way of a further integration of the European banking market.

Monitoring outcomes

The ECB published its first comprehensive assessment on 26 October 2014. This financial health check covered the 130 most significant credit institutions in the 19 Eurozone states representing assets worth €22 trillion (equal to 82% of total banking assets of the eurozone).

The supervision report included:

  1. The results of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) - assessing capital shortfalls (i.e., a failure to meet the minimum capital requirement) of each significant credit institution on 31 December 2013.
  2. Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on the baseline scenario - being the latest economic forecast published by the Commission for the eurozone in 2014-16.
  3. Assessment of potential capital shortfalls when subject to a stress test based on an adverse scenario - which was developed by the European Systemic Risk Board in cooperation with the National Competent Authorities, the EBA and the ECB.

Based on these three criteria, the review found that a total of 105 out of the 130 assessed banks met all minimum capital requirements on 31 December 2013. A total of 25 banks were found to suffer from capital shortfalls on 31 December 2013, of which 12 managed to cover these capital shortfalls through raising extra capital in 2014. The remaining 13 banks were asked to submit a recapitalization plan for 2015.[53]

SSM participating banks with a CET1 capital shortfall, as of the status of its assets on 31 December 2013
Bank Name State CET1 ratio
starting
point
CET1 ratio
post
AQR
CET1 ratio
baseline
scenario
CET1 ratio
adverse
scenario
Capital shortfall
on 31 Dec 2013
(€ billion)
Net eligible
capital raised
during 2014
(€ billion)
Capital shortfall
post net
capital raised
(€ billion)
Eurobank¹ Greece 10.6% 7.8% 2.0% -6.4% 4.63 2.86 1.76
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 10.2% 7.0% 6.0% -0.1% 4.25 2.14 2.11
National Bank of Greece¹ Greece 10.7% 7.5% 5.7% -0.4% 3.43 2.50 0.93
Banca Carige Italy 5.2% 3.9% 2.3% -2.4% 1.83 1.02 0.81
Cooperative Central Bank Ltd Cyprus -3.7% -3.7% -3.2% -8.0% 1.17 1.50 0.00
Portuguese Commercial Bank Portugal 12.2% 10.3% 8.8% 3.0% 1.14 -0.01 1.15
Bank of Cyprus Cyprus 10.4% 7.3% 7.7% 1.5% 0.92 1.00 0.00
Oesterreichischer Volksbanken-Verbund Austria 11.5% 10.3% 7.2% 2.1% 0.86 0.00 0.86
Permanent tsb Ireland 13.1% 12.8% 8.8% 1.0% 0.85 0.00 0.85
Veneto Banca Italy 7.3% 5.7% 5.8% 2.7% 0.71 0.74 0.00
Banco Popolare Italy 10.1% 7.9% 6.7% 4.7% 0.69 1.76 0.00
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy 7.3% 6.9% 6.5% 4.0% 0.68 0.52 0.17
Banca Popolare di Vicenza Italy 9.4% 7.6% 7.5% 3.2% 0.68 0.46 0.22
Piraeus Bank Greece 13.7% 10.0% 9.0% 4.4% 0.66 1.00 0.00
Credito Valtellinese Italy 8.8% 7.5% 6.9% 3.5% 0.38 0.42 0.00
Dexia² Belgium 16.4% 15.8% 10.8% 5.0% 0.34 0.00 0.34
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy 8.2% 7.4% 7.2% 4.2% 0.32 0.34 0.00
Hellenic Bank Cyprus 7.6% 5.2% 6.2% -0.5% 0.28 0.10 0.18
Münchener Hypothekenbank Germany 6.9% 6.9% 5.8% 2.9% 0.23 0.41 0.00
AXA Bank Europe Belgium 15.2% 14.7% 12.7% 3.4% 0.20 0.20 0.00
C.R.H. - Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat France 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.5% 0.13 0.25 0.00
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Italy 9.2% 8.4% 8.3% 5.2% 0.13 0.76 0.00
Nova Ljubljanska banka3 Slovenia 16.1% 14.6% 12.8% 5.0% 0.03 0.00 0.03
Liberbank Spain 8.7% 7.8% 8.5% 5.6% 0.03 0.64 0.00
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor3 Slovenia 19.6% 15.7% 12.8% 4.4% 0.03 0.00 0.03
Total - 10.0% 8.4% 7.2% 2.1% 24.62 18.59 9.47
Notes:

00000¹ These banks have a shortfall on a static balance sheet projection, but will have dynamic balance sheet projections taken into account in determining their final capital requirements.
000000Under the dynamic balance sheet assumption, these banks have no or practically no shortfall taking into account net capital already raised.
00000² Taking into account the orderly resolution plan of this institution, which benefits from a State guarantee, there is no need to proceed with additional capital raising.
000003 The impact on 2014 of the restructuring measures already taken to improve structural profitability and the maintenance of retained earnings in banks will cover the shortfalls identified.

This is the only time where a comprehensive assessment has been done for the 130 banks supervised by the ECB. Since 2014, only a few numbers of banks have been comprehensively assessed by the ECB: 13 in 2015, 4 in 2016 and 7 in 2019.[54] These comprehensive assessments are conducted either when a bank is recognized as significant or when deemed necessary (i.e., in case of exceptional circumstances or when a non-Eurozone country joins the mechanism). Comprehensive assessments require too much resources for them to be conducted annually.

Other supervision tools are therefore used on a more regular basis in order to assess how banks would cope with potential economic shocks. As required by EU law and as part of the SREP, the ECB carries out annual stress tests on supervised banks.[31] In 2016, a stress test was performed on 51 banks, covering 70% of EU banking assets. These banks entered the process with an average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1, i.e., percentage of Tier 1 capital held by banks)[55] ratio of 13%, higher than the 11.2% of 2014. The test showed that, with one exception, all the assessed banks exceeded the benchmark used in 2014 in terms of CET1 capital level (5.5%). The results of this stress test show that, in 2016, EU banks had a better potential of resilience and shock absorption than in 2014.[56] In 2018, two types of stress tests were performed: an EBA stress test for 33 banks and a SSM SREP stress test for 54 banks. The aggregate results of those tests show that, in 2018, both sets of banks had again strengthened their capital base compared to 2016, increasing their potential of resistance to financial shocks.[57] Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the 2020 stress test has been postponed to 2021. The results of this test should be published by the end of June 2021.[58]

Limitations and critics

The SSM has been, over time, criticised regarding its methodology and scope. This institutional scheme has also suffered from some controversies.

Methodological limits

Stress tests are an integral part of the supervisory activities of the ECB.[59] Methodological flaws related to these stress tests have been identified and corrected throughout the years in order for these assessments to properly reflect the actual risk status of the banks.[60] In the 2014 stress tests, the capital strength of banks was assessed according to the Basel III approach that uses Common Equity Tier 1 as the only capital buffer. This methodology has been the subject of criticism by many scholars and organisations for its failure to provide good estimates of the actual solvency of banks. This method was deemed to favour investment banks that were less exposed to credit risk as opposed to commercial banks.[61] Today, stress tests remain flawed: e.g., they do not take into account potential externalities and spillovers while these risks have been shown to have significant impacts in a time of crisis. Andrea Enria, the head of the European Banking Authority (EBA), also pointed out the fact that these tests do not take into account possible adjustments that a bank could make in reaction to an economic shock (i.e., stress tests assume that the bank will not react to the shock). Finally, he also emphasised that, while the methodology of stress tests is transparent, decisions taken by the supervisor as a result of these tests (e.g., increase its capital or decrease its dividend payments) are the result of a mutual agreement closed with the bank in a rather non-transparent manner.[62]

In their 2018 report, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) pointed out flaws in the Comprehensive Assessment process of the SSM. The main identified flaws by the ECA were the limited resources of the ECB to gather the necessary information to assess the assets' quality of banks and a lack of effective guidance on risk assessment.[63]

Institutional limits

A first limit to the SSM's scope of application is geographical: it does not cover all EU member states. This system hence contributes to what is known as the multi-speed Europe.[citation needed] Another limitation to the scope of application of the SSM is the fact that it only deals with the supervision of banks. Supervision of the rest of the financial sector (e.g., insurance firms) remains a national competence. The supervisory role of the ECB is restricted to individual banking institutions as they are defined in the Capital Requirements Directive IV.[64] This means that the ECB cannot conduct supervision on over-the-counter derivatives markets, wholesale debt securities markets and on the shadow banking industry. In addition, some aspects of bank supervision (e.g., consumer protection or money laundering monitoring[65]) continue to be dealt with at the national level.[66] Furthermore, while the ECB directly supervises the most significant banks of the Eurozone, the supervision of smaller banks remains under national realm. National authorities are also in charge of defining their own macro prudential policy, limiting the ability of the ECB to take a proactive stance on systemic and liquidity risks.[67] Finally, when the SSM was first launched, some economists were sceptical with regards to the composition of its Supervisory Board: they criticized the fact that a large majority of this board would be composed of national supervisors who "do not appreciate ECB interference in their daily national supervisory activities".[68]

The quality of the ECB’s banking supervision is dependent on the effectiveness of the Single Resolution Mechanism as well as on the creation of a deposit insurance scheme. In 2018, 17 economists published a paper calling for a reform of the banking union. These economists emphasised the necessity to consolidate the Single Resolution Mechanism, enabling the establishment of real risk-sharing mechanisms.[69] With regards to the deposit insurance scheme, it has been subject to a first proposal by the Commission in November 2015 but no tangible progress has been made since then to achieve its implementation.[70]

Thirdly, as laid down in articles 130 and 282 of the TFEU, the independence of the ECB from political actors should be guaranteed. However, the ECB has to rely on the European Parliament and the Council to take decisions regarding the reporting of its supervisory activities and the appointment of its members.[71] The perceived need of democratic legitimacy that is at the basis of these procedures can be thought to create a shift of accountability from the ECB to the institutions – or member states – of the Union.

A final important question arises when prudential supervision and monetary policy are at stake, as it is the case at the ECB: as these two areas are intertwined, how to avoid potential conflicts of interest?[67][72] The Supervisory Board is theoretically in charge of preventing these issues from happening. In practice, the ECB has already interfered with the solvency assessments of its supervised banks by, for example, purchasing asset-backed securities issued by these same banks.[73]

Controversies

In 2019, the European Commission concluded a contract with the American asset management company BlackRock.[74] The company has been mandated to advise the Commission on prudential risk matters to implement sustainability in the banking regulation ecosystem.[75] This is not the first time that the ECB has been working with BlackRock: in the aftermath of the Eurozone debt crisis, in 2014, the private firm already helped the ECB conduct its comprehensive assessment of the European banking market.[76] Concerns over potential conflicts of interests have been raised regarding the choice of a private company because of the potential influence on the rulemaking of the ECB, as well as on the credibility of BlackRock to perform such a task. The Commission and BlackRock rejected any wrongdoings and respectively invoked independence and transparency.[77]

The health crisis and its impacts on banking supervision

The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted new limitations concerning the methodology of stress tests. During the first half of 2020, financial markets underwent unprecedented fluctuations far from what had been considered in the most severe forecasts (e.g., in the most adverse scenarios of the EBA, oil would lose 15% of its value whereas oil price actually fell by 60% at the peak of the crisis in 2020). This Covid-19 crisis could actually be considered as a real-life stress test whose macroeconomic factors could later be used to readjust the EBA-ECB most severe scenario in their subsequent evaluations. This health crisis has also illustrated the dual role of the ECB: its actions during the crisis reflected a mix between its mandate as banking supervisor and its initiatives in support of the stability of financial markets.[78]

See also

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