Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
|Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission|
|Argued April 2–3, 1969
Decided June 9, 1969
|Full case name||Red Lion Broadcasting Company, Incorporated, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.|
|Citations||395 U.S. 367 (more)
89 S. Ct. 1794; 23 L. Ed. 2d 371; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 88; 1 Media L. Rep. 2053
|Prior history||Motion to dismiss denied, 306 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1969); judgment for plaintiff, N.D. Ill.; judgment set aside, judgment for defendant, 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970); affirmed, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972); rehearing denied, 7th Circuit, 9-7-72; cert. granted, 410 U.S. 925 (1973)|
|Subsequent history||Retrial on remand, judgment for plaintiff, N.D. Ill.; affirmed, 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982); certiorari denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983)|
|The First Amendment permits a federal agency to formulate rules to allow persons defamed or potentially defamed access to equal time to respond and a fairness standard for editorial speech by broadcast radio stations. Seventh Circuit reversed.|
|Majority||White, joined by Warren, Black, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall|
|Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.|
|U.S. Const. amend. I|
|Wikisource has original text related to this article:|
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), while strongly suggesting that broadcast radio stations (and by logical extension, television stations) are First Amendment speakers whose editorial speech is protected, upheld the equal time provisions of the Fairness Doctrine ruling that it was "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." 395 U.S. at 390. In upholding the Fairness Doctrine, the Court based its rationale partly on a scarce radio spectrum.
The FCC by administrative rulemaking had required that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. 395 U.S. 367, 369. As a result the FCC added an "equal time rule" and a "response to personal attack" rule. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. challenged these rules as unconstitutionally infringing on the speech of the station's editorial judgment. Justice Byron White, writing for the majority explained, the FCC has included among the conditions of the Red Lion license itself the requirement that operation of the station be carried out in the public interest. Id. at 380.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has for many years imposed on broadcasters a "fairness doctrine," requiring that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side of those issues be given fair coverage. In No. 2, the FCC declared that petitioner Red Lion Broadcasting Co. had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine when it carried a program which constituted a personal attack on one Cook (journalist Fred J. Cook), and ordered it to send a transcript of the broadcast to Cook and provide reply time, whether or not Cook would pay for it. The Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's position. After the commencement of the Red Lion litigation the FCC began a rule-making proceeding to make the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable, and to specify its rules relating to political editorials. The rules, as adopted and amended, were held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA (No. 717), as abridging the freedoms of speech and press.
Held: 1. The history of the fairness doctrine and of related legislation shows that the FCC's action in the Red Lion case did not exceed its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the FCC was implementing congressional policy. pp. 375–386.
(a) The fairness doctrine began shortly after the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among competing applicant in the public interest, and insofar as there is an affirmative obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not differ from the fairness doctrine. pp. 375–379.
(b) The FCC's statutory mandate to see that broadcasters operate in the public interest and Congress' reaffirmation, in the 1959 amendment to 315 of the Communications Act, of the FCC's view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard, support the conclusion that the doctrine and its component personal attack and political editorializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. pp. 379–386.
2. The fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political editorial rules do not violate the First Amendment. pp. 386–401.
(a) The First Amendment is relevant to public broadcasting, but it is the right of the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. pp. 386–390.
(b) The First Amendment does not protect private censorship by broadcasters who are licensed by the Government to use a scarce resource which is denied to others. pp. 390–392.
(c) The danger that licensees will eliminate coverage of controversial issues as a result of the personal attack and political editorial rules is at best speculative, and, in any event, the FCC has authority to guard against this danger. pp. 392–395.
(d) There was nothing vague about the FCC's specific ruling in the Red Lion case and the regulations at issue in No. 717 could be employed in precisely the same way as the fairness doctrine in Red Lion. It is not necessary to decide every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide these cases. Problems involving more extreme applications or more difficult constitutional questions will be dealt with if and when they arise. pp. 395–396.
(e) It has not been shown that the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, which impelled governmental regulation, is entirely a thing of the past, as new uses for the frequency spectrum have kept pace with improved technology and more efficient utilization of that spectrum. pp. 396–400.
No. 2, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 381 F.2d 908, affirmed; No. 717, 400 F.2d 1002, reversed and remanded