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Cambodia–China relations

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Cambodian–Chinese relations
Map indicating locations of Cambodia and China

Cambodia
China

The bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the People's Republic of China have strengthened considerably after the end of the Cambodian–Vietnamese War, during which China had supported the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam.[1]

History

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Present from Cambodia to Qing court
Then-Prince Norodom Sihanouk with CCP chairman Mao Zedong (far left) and Chinese president Liu Shaoqi (far right) in Beijing, 1965.

Although the countries share no common border, China has had a historic cultural and commercial relationship with Cambodia. The 950,000 Chinese in Cambodia constitute 3-5% of Cambodia's population, and although they were discriminated against by the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese, they have re-emerged as a prominent business community.[2]

The first contacts between China and the Khmer Empire of Cambodia occurred in the Tang period, and for centuries onward the two countries shared a strong trading relationship. A Chola-Song-Khmer trade axis dominated trade in the east for much of the 11th and 12th centuries. Yuan Chinese accounts of the Cambodian kingdom proved to be crucial to uncovering the history of the region. Cambodia maintained relations with Ming China as early as 1421 AD during the final years of the Khmer Empire when Ponhea Yat dispatched a minister to establish formal diplomatic ties.[3]

China has used Cambodia as a counterweight to Vietnam. In the mid-20th century, the People's Republic of China supported the Maoist Khmer Rouge against Lon Nol's regime, who Nationalist China had ties with, during the Cambodian Civil War and then its takeover of Cambodia in 1975. Also, Mao Zedong had fostered good relations with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who also fought against Lon Nol and backed the Khmer Rouge. When the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia in 1978, China provided extensive political and military support for the Khmer Rouge.[1] In 1979, China waged a brief border war against Vietnam, partly to threaten it into pulling out of Cambodia.[4] The Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, from July 1989 to October 1991, resolved Cambodia–China relations.[citation needed]

Modern depiction of a visit of Zheng He's fleet to Cambodia. A relief in Nanjing's Treasure Boat Shipyard Park

Since 1997, China began developing closer relations with the regime of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, once a pro-Vietnamese leader and a defector from the Khmer Rouge during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.[1] Although initially backing Hun Sen's political opponent Prince Norodom Ranariddh and his FUNCINPEC, China was disenchanted with Ranariddh's efforts to build a closer relationship with Taiwan, which is claimed by China.[1] Facing international isolation after the 1997 coup that brought him to power, Hun Sen cultivated close ties with China, which opposed efforts by Western countries to impose economic sanctions on Cambodia.[1] China filled the gap in grants, aids, and investments formerly filled by Western countries.[5]: 28  China's close ties with Cambodia have also served to gain leverage against Vietnamese influence in the region.[6]

In 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese Head of State to visit Cambodia.[5]: 28 

In July 2019, Cambodia was among 37 countries which signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang region.[7] In June 2020, Cambodia was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations.[8]

In November 2022, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Cambodia for the ASEAN Summit and stated that China would continue to support and provide aid for infrastructure projects and industrialization efforts in Cambodia.[5]: 31 

Cooperation

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Generally, Cambodia and China have had significant strategic cooperation since Cambodia's 1958 independence.[5]: 27  From the Cambodian perspective, strong relations with China help Cambodia to pushback against Cambodia's larger neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand.[5]: 27 

During the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao between April 7-April 8, 2006 both nations signed several bilateral agreements and a treaty of "Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation."[1] China diversified its aid and investments in Cambodia and promised to provide US$600 million in loans and grants.[1][6] China has canceled much of Cambodia's debt and granted a fresh loan of US$12.4 million for the construction of the building housing the Cambodian government's council of ministers and the restoration of the Angkor Wat temple and heritage site.[9][6] About $200 million has been earmarked as a low-interest loan for the construction of bridges spanning the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers. China has cultivated strong ties with Cambodia, gaining access to its sea ports that can allow China to exploit oil reserves in the Gulf of Tonkin.[6] During the visit, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen described China as Cambodia's "most trustworthy friend."[1][6]

China has also funded Chinese language schools in Cambodia.[9] Immigration of Chinese workers to Cambodia has also stepped up in recent years[vague] and is estimated between 50,000 and 300,000.[9][needs update]

From 2000 to 2014, Cambodia received 132 projects financed by Chinese aid, a greater number of projects than any other recipient of Chinese aid.[10]: 103  In 2014, Prime Minister Hun Sen requested that China help construct a stadium for Cambodia in advance of the 2023 Southeast Asian Games.[11]: 50  China began building Morodok Techo National Stadium in 2017 at a cost of US$169 million and completed it for Cambodia in December 2021.[11]: 50 

Within ASEAN, Cambodia is often supportive of China.[12]: 211  In 2016, Cambodia took a China-favorable position at an ASEAN meeting which addressed sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.[13]: 185  Observers generally expected the meeting to produce a statement critical of China's positions, but through Cambodia's objection the meeting resulted in a more general statement not referencing China and speaking generally of concern over on-going developments in the South China Sea.[13]: 185  Chinese leaders expressed their appreciation for Cambodia and China's foreign minister stated, "History will prove that the Cambodian side's maintained position is correct."[14]: 52 

Defense

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Further information: Ream Naval Base

In the aftermath of the 1997 coup, China provided US$2.8 million in military aid and has since supplied wide range of military equipment,[15] training of military and police cadre and naval vessels to combat drug trafficking and piracy.[1] In May 2014, Cambodia and China entered into an agreement to increase their defense ties.[14]: 164  As part of the agreement, China increased the number of scholarships it offered to Cambodian military personnel to study in China.[14]: 164  In 2018, China provided $100 million to Cambodia for defense spending.[10]: 103  In 2022, Cambodia and China signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation.[10]: 103 

Health

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, China provided major assistance to the Hun Sen government's vaccination campaign.[16] As of early November 2021, China had sent more than 35 million vaccines to Cambodia. China provided many of them free of charge.[16] Vaccines provided by China accounted for more than 90% of total vaccines provided to Cambodia from other countries.[16] China also provided other health care supplies as well as medical professionals to Cambodia during the pandemic.[17] In part thanks to Chinese contributions, Cambodia had the second-highest vaccination rate in Southeast Asia, despite having the second lowest per capita GDP in the region.[17]

Commerce

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Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has a major role in infrastructure development in Cambodia.[16] In 2017, China financed approximately 70% of Cambodia's road and bridge development.[16] China built a major expressway between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, which began operating in 2023.[16]

Trade between Cambodia and China totaled US$4.8 billion in 2016,[18] compared to $732 million in 2006 and has increased by an average of 26% for the last 10 years.[9] However, Cambodia has a significant trade deficit with China, importing over $3.9 billion (raw fabrics being the largest constituent) compared to its exports of $830 million.[18] It was estimated that 60% of products in Cambodian markets were Chinese-made on 2006,[9] and 24% of Cambodian imports were from China in 2015.[19] There are multiple large-scale Chinese investment projects in Cambodia such as the 400 MW Lower Se San 2 Dam worth $781 million[20] and a US$3.8 billion deep-water port project on a 90-km stretch of Cambodian coastline.[21] According to the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, the Cambodian government gave over 4.6 million hectares in concessions to 107 Chinese-owned firms between 1994 and 2012.[22]

In 2010, Cambodia and China signed cooperation agreements on bridge and road infrastructure.[14]: 159  Cambodia and China signed a free trade agreement in 2020.[23]: 269 

Effective 1 December 2024, China eliminated tariffs for goods imported from all of the countries that the United Nations categorizes as least developed and with which China has diplomatic relations, including Cambodia.[24]

Concerns

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Embassy of Cambodia in China
Portraits of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping and King Norodom Sihamoni being displayed during Xi's state visit to Cambodia, October 2016.

The Cambodian government's suppression of the Falun Gong, a new religious movement (considered by China and other critics to be a cult) banned by China, and extradition of two Falun Gong activists to China was criticized by human rights activities and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.[1] Suspected preferential treatment for Cambodia-based Chinese firms and the National Assembly's guarantee of profits for the Chinese investors in the Kamchay power plant has also provoked criticism from opposition politicians of China's growing political clout in Cambodia.[9]

From 1994 to 2012 China invested a total of US$9.17 billion in Cambodia.[25] However, illegal logging and shady deals involving members of Cambodia's government and Chinese firms were reported to be increasing. Mining projects and government land concessions to foreign and local firms, resulted in people being displaced from their land. According to The Cambodia Daily in 2006, Phong hill tribes in Mondulkiri province "claim that the Chinese company has colluded with the Cambodian government to illegally force them from their ancestral homeland".[26] The Boeung Kak and Borei Keila evictions in Phnom Penh were seen by many observers as the Cambodian Government's increasing drift away from the adherence to human rights. The Chinese funded Sesan Dam project in the northeastern part of Cambodia, threaten to lower the fish stocks, and affect the livelihood of many Khmer. "By one estimate, the project will result in a 9 percent drop in fish stocks in the entire Mekong Basin".[27]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Storey, Ian (April 2006). "China's tightening relationship with Cambodia". China Brief. 6 (9). Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on June 16, 2007. Retrieved 2008-06-17.
  2. ^ Thomas Lum. "Cambodia: Background and U.S. relations" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. pp. 14–16. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2008-06-05. Retrieved 2008-06-17.
  3. ^ Chun, Chanboth (29 July 2014). "ប្រវត្តិព្រះបាទព្ញាយ៉ាតរំដោះក្រុងអង្គរពីសៀម". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 26 August 2022. Retrieved 3 June 2020.
  4. ^ "Vietnam - China". U.S. Library of Congress. Archived from the original on 2004-10-29. Retrieved 2008-06-03.
  5. ^ a b c d e Han, Enze (2024). The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-769659-0.
  6. ^ a b c d e "China gives Cambodia $600m in aid". BBC News. 2006-04-08. Archived from the original on 2022-12-12. Retrieved 2008-06-17.
  7. ^ "Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?". The Diplomat. 15 July 2019. Archived from the original on 3 February 2020. Retrieved 19 July 2019.
  8. ^ Lawler, Dave (2 July 2020). "The 53 countries supporting China's crackdown on Hong Kong". Axios. Archived from the original on 4 July 2020. Retrieved 3 July 2020.
  9. ^ a b c d e f David Fullbrook (2006-10-06). "China's growing influence in Cambodia". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 2008-12-02. Retrieved 2008-06-17.
  10. ^ a b c Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-25231-8.
  11. ^ a b Strange, Austin (2023-12-21). Chinese Global Infrastructure (EPUB). Elements in Global China. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009090902. ISBN 978-1-009-09090-2.
  12. ^ Gerstl, Alfred (2023). "China in its Immediate Neighborhood". In Kironska, Kristina; Turscanyi, Richard Q. (eds.). Contemporary China: a New Superpower?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-03-239508-1.
  13. ^ a b Tsang, Steve; Cheung, Olivia (2024). The Political Thought of Xi Jinping. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197689363.
  14. ^ a b c d Loh, Dylan M.H. (2024). China's Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9781503638204.
  15. ^ Hoa Kỳ ngưng viện trợ, Trung Quốc tặng ngay Phnom Penh 257 quân xa Archived 2010-06-27 at the Wayback Machine (in Vietnamese)
  16. ^ a b c d e f Han, Enze (2024). The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia (illustrated ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-19-769658-3. Archived from the original on 13 July 2024.
  17. ^ a b Han, Enze (2024). The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia (illustrated ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-19-769658-3. Archived from the original on 13 July 2024.
  18. ^ a b Dongmiao, Zhang (11 April 2017). "Cambodia-China trade volume reaches 4.8 bln USD last year: PM". XinhuaNet. Archived from the original on 20 June 2017. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
  19. ^ "OEC - Cambodia (KHM) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners". Observatory of Economic Complexity. Archived from the original on 28 October 2023. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
  20. ^ "Agreement signed for construction of Lower Sesan 2 Dam". Cambodia Daily. 27 November 2012. Archived from the original on 21 February 2018. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
  21. ^ Peel, Michael (1 September 2016). "China draws Cambodia closer in diplomatic embrace". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 18 August 2017. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
  22. ^ Palatino, Mong (26 June 2012). "Is China a Bad Investor?". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 18 August 2017. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
  23. ^ Cheng, Wenting (2023). China in Global Governance of Intellectual Property: Implications for Global Distributive Justice. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies series. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-031-24369-1.
  24. ^ "China sharpens edge in global trade with zero-tariff deal for developing world". South China Morning Post. 2024-10-29. Retrieved 2024-12-03.
  25. ^ Pheakday, Heng (2013-07-16). "Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia a controversial affair". East Asia Forum. Amsterdam. Archived from the original on 2014-11-24. Retrieved Nov 13, 2014.
  26. ^ Plaut, Ethan; Prak, Chan Thul (2006-04-08). "Chinese Business and Politics: A Growing Influence in Cambodia". The Cambodia Daily. Archived from the original on November 29, 2014. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  27. ^ Stragio, Sebastian (2014). Hun Sen's Cambodia. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300190724.
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