|Jiang in 2002|
|General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China|
24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
|Preceded by||Zhao Ziyang|
|Succeeded by||Hu Jintao|
|Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission|
9 November 1989 – 19 September 2004
|Preceded by||Deng Xiaoping|
|Succeeded by||Hu Jintao|
|5th President of the People's Republic of China|
27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003
|Vice President||Rong Yiren
|Preceded by||Yang Shangkun|
|Succeeded by||Hu Jintao|
|Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission|
19 March 1990 – 8 March 2005
|Preceded by||Deng Xiaoping|
|Succeeded by||Hu Jintao|
|Member of the 13,14,15 th CPC Politburo Standing Committee|
24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
|Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee|
November 1987 – June 1989
|Deputy||Zhu Rongji (Mayor)|
|Preceded by||Rui Xingwen|
|Succeeded by||Zhu Rongji|
|Member of the
National People's Congress
25 March 1988 – 5 March 2008
17 August 1926 |
|Political party||Communist Party of China|
|Alma mater||Xi'an Jiao Tong University|
Jiang Zemin (born 17 August 1926) is a retired Chinese politician who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2004, and as President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003. Jiang has been described as the "core of the third generation" of Communist Party leaders since 1989. Also, his long career and political prominence have led to him being "paramount leader" of China.
Jiang Zemin came to power following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, replacing Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary, the highest office within the Communist Party of China. With the waning influence of Deng Xiaoping and the other members of Eight Elders due to old age — and with the help of old and powerful party and state leaders, elder Chen Yun and former President Li Xiannian — Jiang effectively became the "paramount leader" in the 1990s.
Under his leadership, China experienced substantial developmental growth with reforms, saw the peaceful return of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom and Macau from Portugal, and improved its relations with the outside world while the Communist Party maintained its tight control over the government. Jiang has been criticized for being too concerned about his personal image at home, and too conciliatory towards Russia and the United States abroad.
Background and ascendancy
Jiang was born in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu. His ancestral home was the Jiang Village (江村), Jingde County, Anhui. This was also the hometown of a number of prominent figures in Chinese academic and intellectual establishments. Jiang grew up during the years of Japanese occupation. His uncle, Jiang Shangqing, died fighting the Japanese in World War II and is considered to be a national hero. Since Shangqing had no heirs, Jiang became the adopted son of Shangqing's wife, or his aunt, Wang Zhelan, to whom he referred to as "Niang"(Chinese: 娘) or "Mom." Jiang attended the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National Central University in Japanese-occupied Nanjing before being transferred to [Xi'an Jiao Tong University]]. He graduated there in 1947 with a Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering.
He claims that he joined the Communist Party of China when he was in college. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang received his training at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the 1950s. He also worked for Changchun's First Automobile Works. He eventually got transferred to government services, where he began to rise in prominence and rank, eventually becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Electronic Industries in 1983.
In 1985 he became Mayor of Shanghai, and subsequently the Party Secretary of Shanghai. Jiang received mixed reviews as mayor. Many of his critics dismissed him as a "flower pot", a Chinese term for someone who only seems useful, but actually gets nothing done. Many credited Shanghai's growth during the period to Zhu Rongji. Jiang was an ardent believer, during this period, in Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. In an attempt to curb student discontent in 1986, Jiang recited the Gettysburg Address in English in front of a group of student protesters.
Jiang was described as having a passable command of several foreign languages, including Romanian, Russian, and English. One of his favorite activities was to engage foreign visitors in small talk on arts and literature in their native language, in addition to singing foreign songs in the original language. He became friends with Allen Broussard, the African-American judge who visited Shanghai in 1987 and Brazilian actress Lucélia Santos.
Jiang was elevated to national politics in 1987, automatically becoming a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee because it is customarily dictated that the Party Secretary of Shanghai would also have a seat in the Politburo. In 1989, China was in crisis over the Tiananmen Square protest, and the central government was in conflict on how to handle the protesters. In June, Deng Xiaoping dismissed liberal Zhao Ziyang, who was considered to be too conciliatory toward the student protestors. At the time, Jiang was the Shanghai Party secretary, the top figure in China's new economic center. In an incident with the World Economic Herald, Jiang closed down the newspaper, deeming it to be harmful. The handling of the crisis in Shanghai was noticed by Beijing, and then by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. As the protests escalated and then Party general secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed from office, Jiang was selected by the Party leaders as a compromise candidate over Tianjin's Li Ruihuan, Premier Li Peng, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and the retired elders to become the new General Secretary. Before that, he had been considered to be an unlikely candidate. Within three years, Deng had transferred most power in the state, party and military to Jiang.
Jiang was elevated to the country's top job in 1989 with a fairly small power base inside the party, and thus, very little actual power. His most reliable allies were the powerful party elders – Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. He was believed as simply a transitional figure until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Other prominent Party and military figures like Yang Shangkun and brother Yang Baibing were believed to be planning a coup. Jiang used Deng Xiaoping as a back-up to his leadership in the first few years. Jiang, who was believed to have a neo-conservative slant, warned against "bourgeois liberalization". Deng's belief, however, stipulated that the only solution to keeping the legitimacy of Communist rule over China was to continue the drive for modernization and economic reform, and therefore placed himself at odds with Jiang.
At the first meeting of the new Politburo Standing Committee, after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Jiang criticized the previous period as "hard on the economy, soft on politics" and advocated increasing political thought work. Anne-Marie Brady writes that "Jiang Zemin was a long time political cadre with a nose for ideological work and its importance. This meeting marked the beginning of a new era in propaganda and political thought work in China." Soon after, the Central Propaganda Department was given more resources and power, "including the power to go in to the propaganda-related work units and cleanse the ranks of those who had been supportive of the democracy movement."
Deng grew critical of Jiang's leadership in 1992. During Deng's southern tours, he subtly suggested that the pace of reform was not fast enough, and the "central leadership" (i.e. Jiang) had most responsibility. Jiang grew ever more cautious, and rallied behind Deng's reforms completely. In 1993, Jiang coined the new term "socialist market economy" to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into essentially a government-regulated capitalist market economy. It was a huge step to take in the realization of Deng's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". At the same time, Jiang elevated many of his supporters from Shanghai to high government positions, after regaining Deng's confidence. He abolished the outdated Central Advisory Committee, an advisory body composed of revolutionary party elders. He became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, followed by his election to the Presidency in March 1993.
In the early 1990s, post-Tiananmen economic reforms had stabilized and the country was on a consistent growth trajectory. At the same time, China faced a myriad of economic and social problems. At Deng's state funeral in 1997, Jiang delivered the elder statesman's eulogy. Jiang had inherited a China rampant with political corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's policy that "some areas can get rich before others" led to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the interior provinces. The unprecedented economic growth and the deregulation in a number of heavy industries led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOE's), breaking the iron rice bowl. As a result, unemployment rates skyrocketed, rising as high as 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%. A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth ending up in foreign countries. The re-emergence of organized crime and a surge in crime rates began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals. Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the on-going problems. Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions.
Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since the Mao era in the late 1970s. The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm Xinwen Lianbo each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. Jiang appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always comprehensible. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang scolded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English. The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night, an event regarded to be in poor taste outside China.
Tong asserts that among the main features of Jiang’s domestic policy was his campaign against the Falun Gong, which once had tens of millions of followers in China. On 25 April 1999 upwards of 10,000 Falun Gong adherents protested outside the Zhongnanhai government compound to request official recognition, in response to which Jiang declared the Falun Gong threat must be defeated. According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown. In June 1999, Jiang established an extralegal department, the 6-10 Office, to oversee the suppression of Falun Gong. On 20 July, hundreds of Falun Gong adherents were allegedly abducted and detained. The suppression that followed was characterized a nationwide campaign of propaganda, as well as the large-scale arbitrarily imprisonment and coercive reeducation of Falun Gong practitioners, sometimes resulting in death. Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. The scope and intensity of the campaign has been described as "unrivaled" in recent history, and as being reminiscent of the extremes of the Cultural Revolution. Falun Gong practitioners outside China have filed dozens of largely symbolic lawsuits against Jiang Zemin and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity. Although courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity in many instances, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang and other officials on the charge of torture and genocide and asked for their arrest in late 2009.
Jiang went on a groundbreaking state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to supporters of the Chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in passable English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as Jiang and Clinton sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action. Jiang's foreign policy was for the most part passive and non-confrontational. A personal friend of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere. Despite this, there were at least three serious flare-ups between China and the US during Jiang's tenure. The first was in 1996 when President Clinton dispatched warships to the Taiwan area during a period when the PLA appeared to be making threatening gestures. The second was the above-mentioned NATO bombing of Serbia and the third was the shootdown of a US spyplane over Hainan in April 2001.
Jiang did not specialize in economics, and in 1997 handed most of the economic governance of the country to Zhu Rongji, who became Premier, and remained in office through the Asian financial crisis. Under their joint leadership, Mainland China has sustained an average of 8% GDP growth annually, achieving the highest rate of per capita economic growth in major world economies, raising eyebrows around the world with its astonishing speed. This was mostly achieved by continuing the process of a transition to a market economy. Strong party control over China was cemented by the PRC's successful bid to join the World Trade Organization and Beijing winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.
Entrenching Three Represents
Before he transferred power to a younger generation of leaders, Jiang had his theory of Three Represents written into the Party's constitution, alongside Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Critics believe this is just another piece added to Jiang's cult of personality, others have seen practical applications of the theory as a guiding ideology in the future direction of the CPC. Largely speculated to step down from all positions by international media, rival Li Ruihuan's resignation in 2002 prompted analysts to rethink the man. The theory of Three Represents was believed by many political analysts to be Jiang's effort at extending his vision to Marxist–Leninist principles, and therefore elevating himself alongside previous Chinese Marxist philosophers Mao and Deng.
In 2002, Jiang stepped down from the powerful CPC Politburo Standing Committee and CPC General Secretary to make way for a "fourth generation" of leadership headed by Hu Jintao, marking the beginning of a transition of power that would last several years. Hu assumed Jiang's title as party head, becoming the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Six out of the nine new members of Standing Committee at the time were considered part of Jiang's so-called "Shanghai Clique", the most prominent being Vice President Zeng Qinghong and First Vice Premier Huang Ju.
Although Jiang retained the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission, most members of the commission are professional military men. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, "Having one center is called 'loyalty', while having two centers will result in 'problems.'" This was widely interpreted as a criticism of Jiang's attempt to exercise dual leadership with Hu on the model of Deng Xiaoping.
Hu succeeded Jiang as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China on 15 November 2002. To the surprise of many observers, evidence of Jiang's continuing influence on public policy abruptly disappeared from the official media. Jiang was conspicuously silent during the SARS crisis, especially when compared to the very public profile of Hu and Wen Jiabao. It has been argued that the institutional arrangements created by the 16th Congress have left Jiang in a position where he cannot exercise much influence. Although many of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee are associated with him, the Standing Committee does not have command authority over the civilian bureaucracy.
On 19 September 2004, after a four-day meeting of the 198-member Central Committee, Jiang resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, his last party post. Six months later he resigned his last significant post, chairman of the State CMC. This followed weeks of speculation that Hu Jintao's supporters in the Communist Party leadership were pressing Jiang to step aside. Jiang's term was supposed to have lasted until 2007. Hu also succeeded Jiang as the CMC chairman, but, in an apparent political defeat for Jiang, General Xu Caihou, and not Zeng Qinghong was appointed to succeed Hu as vice chairman. This power transition officially marks the end of Jiang's era in China, which roughly lasted from 1993 to 2004.
Although Jiang has been seldom seen in public since giving up his last official title in 2004, he was with Hu Jintao on stage at a ceremony celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, and toured the Military Museum of the Chinese Peoples Revolution with Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and other former senior officials. On 8 August 2008, Jiang appeared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics Games. He also stood beside Hu Jintao during 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China mass parade in October 2009.
In 2011, Jiang was subject to internet rumors of his death as he was absent from public events such as the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. As a response, Chinese censors blocked searches for the words "Jiang Zemin", or even simply "Jiang". On 6 July, Hong Kong media carried headlines that Jiang was "critically ill", while the TV station ATV reported that Jiang had died in Beijing. State news agency Xinhua, quoting "authoritative sources", declared that overseas media reports of Jiang's death were "pure rumor".
Jiang reappeared again at the 18th party congress in October 2012.
Jiang's legacy is subject to the debate of historians and biographers. Formally, Jiang's theory of "Three Represents" was enshrined in both Party and State constitutions as an "important thought," alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. However, apart from official pronouncements by the media and party publications, the theory has had limited influence. It has receded in importance over the years, as his successors' ideologies such as the "Scientific Development Concept" and "Chinese Dream" became more dominant. Jiang has come under quiet criticism from within the Communist Party of China for focusing on economic growth at all costs while ignoring the resulting environmental damage of the growth, the widening gap between rich and poor in China and the social costs absorbed by those whom economic reform has left behind. By contrast, the policies of his successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have widely been seen as efforts to address these imbalances and move away from a sole focus on economic growth toward a broader view of development which incorporates non-economic factors such as health and the environment.
Domestically, Jiang's legacy and reputation is mixed. While some people attributed the period of relative stability and growth in the 1990s to Jiang's term, others argue that Jiang did little to correct mistakes resulting from Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, leaving the next administration facing innumerable problems, some of which it is too late to solve. The fact he arose to power as the direct beneficiary of the political aftermath of Tiananmen has shaped the perception of Jiang in the eyes of many. Indeed, his support for elder Chen Yun's conservative economic policies following the 1989 protests and his subsequent shift in loyalty to Deng Xiaoping's reform-oriented agenda following the latter's "Southern Tour" was seen as the exercise of a political opportunist. Some have also associated Jiang with the widespread corruption and cronyism that had become a notable feature of the Communist power apparatus since Jiang's years in power. His interference with high profile corruption investigations since stepping down from power, such as those involving Shanghai tycoon Zhou Zhengyi, has only served to reinforce this perception.
Jiang's obsession with image has also spurred a myriad of "face projects" around the country, where expensive public works projects are carried out for the purpose of bolstering the image of the local leadership. While his showy nature has often been considered charming and even charismatic by the west, in the relatively more conservative Chinese society it was often perceived as frivolous, pompous and lacking in character and substance. Jiang's Theory of Three Represents justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party, and changed the founding ideology of the CPC from protection of the peasantry and workers to that of the "overwhelming majority of the people", a euphemism aimed at including the growing entrepreneurial class. Conservative critics within the party have quietly denounced this as betrayal of the communist ideology, while reformers have praised Jiang as a visionary. Such a move, however, increasingly justified a newly found collusion between the business and ruling elites, thus significantly linking bureaucracy and financial gain, which critics argued fosters more corruption. Some have suggested this is the part of Jiang's legacy that will last, at least in name, as long as the communists remain in power.
Many biographers of Jiang have noted his government resembled an oligarchy as opposed to an autocratic dictatorship. Many of his policies have been attributed to others in government, notably Premier Zhu Rongji, whose tense relationship with Jiang caused widespread speculation, especially following Jiang's decision to suppress the Falun Gong movement. Jiang is often credited with the improvement in foreign relations during his term, but at the same time many Chinese have criticized him for being too conciliatory towards the United States and Russia. The issue of Chinese reunification between the mainland and Taiwan gained ground during Jiang's term, as Cross-Strait talks led to the eventual Three Links after Jiang stepped down as Party general secretary. The construction of the Qinghai–Tibet Railway and the Three Gorges Dam began under Jiang.
- History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)
- Politics of the People's Republic of China
- Shanghai clique
- The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Jiang's controversial biography by Robert Lawrence Kuhn
- Tomoyuki Kojima. China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy: Cooperation with all, Emphasis on Major Powers. Asia-Pacific Review, 1469–2937, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2001
- The-Cambridge Handbook Contemporary China. Cambridge University Press. 2001. p. 326. ISBN 978-0521786744.
- "Jiang Zemin – General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee". People's Daily. Retrieved 4 December 2010.
- Structure and Choice
- "BBC: Profile: Jiang Zemin". BBC News. 19 September 2004. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
- Los Angeles Times: China Leans Heavily on Trouble-Shooter : Politics: Vice Premier Zhu Rongji's assignment is to cope with economic troubles, corruption, rural anger.
- Kuhn, Robert Lawrence: The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin
- "Book: Real Story of Jiang Zemin: Introduction(4)". Chinaview.wordpress.com. 25 August 2006. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
- Kissinger, Henry (2001). "Chapter 17". On China. Penguin Press HC. ISBN 978-1-59420-271-1.
- China completes military power transfer
- Comparative Politics: Structure and Choice
- Lyman Miller: Overlapping Transitions in China's Leadership
- Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- TMichael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990), 546.
- BBC: Profile: Jiang Zemin
- "Hong Kong Journalists Association: FOE Annual Report, 2001". Hong Kong Journalists Association. 2001-08-09. Archived from the original on 11 October, 2014 9:51:32 AM UTC. Retrieved 2014-10-11. Check date values in:
- James Tong. “Revenge of the Forbidden City: The suppression of the Falungong in China, 1999–2005.” Oxford University Press, 2009
- Ethan Gutmann, ‘An Occurrence on Fuyou Street’, National Review, 13 July 2009.
- Jiang Zemin, Letter to Party cadres on the evening of 25 April 1999. Published in Beijing Zhichun no. 97 (June 2001)
- Human Right Watch; M Spiegel (2001). Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong. New York.
- Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, ‘The 610 Office:Policing the Chinese Spirit’, China Brief , Volume 11 Issue 17 (9 November 2011).
- Amnesty International "China: The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called 'heretical organization'" 23 March 2000
- Johnson, Ian "Death Trap – How One Chinese City Resorted to Atrocities To Control Falun Dafa," Wall Street Journal, 26 December 2000. Third party archive at Pulitzer.org
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2009, 10 October 2009.
- David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, 2008
- David Ownby, 'Qigong, Falun Gong, and the Body Politic in Contemporary China,' in China's transformations: the stories beyond the headlines, Lionel M. Jensen, Timothy B. Weston ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2007.
- Human Rights Law Foundation, Direct Litigation. Retrieved 19 March 2011
- La Audiencia pide interrogar al ex presidente chino Jiang por genocidio, 14 November 2009
- Luis Andres Henao, Argentine judge asks China arrests over Falun Gong, 22 December 2009
- Xinhua:China's Jiang Zemin, Canada's Jean Chrétien discuss relations 21 October 2001.
- Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS
- Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (China aktuell)
- China's leadership makes show of unity ahead of key Communist Party congress International Herald Tribune
- Former Chinese President tours Military Museum CCTV International
- "Where is Jiang Zemin?". Financial Times. 1 July 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2011.
- "Jiang's Rumours of Death Spread". Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 6 July 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2011.
- Krishnan, Ananth (7 July 2011). "Reports of former president's death "pure rumour", says China, The Hindu
- "Is China's Ex-Leader Jiang Zemin Dead? Local Censors Don't Want Any Speculation". Time. 6 July 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2011.
- 2:03 pm ET (9 October 2011). "Jiang Zemin Appears in Public Three Months After Media Reports of Death". Bloomberg.
- Anything for Power: The Real Story of China's Jiang Zemin - Chapter 22
- Lam, Willy. Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao era. pp. 44–46
- Profile: Jiang Zemin
- Chinese Citizens Find Court Guilty
- Miles, James A. R. (1997). The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray. p. 59. ISBN 978-0472084517.
- How Jiang Zemin and Son Profited from Corruption
- "Washington Post: Jiang Zemin's Puzzlement". Highbeam.com. 25 March 2001. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
- Communist Party Intensifies Political and Ideological Study Among Young Teachers
- Editorial: The Chinese Communist Party Has No Way Forward
- Kuhn, 2004; Lam, 1997
- Anything for Power: The Real Story of China's Jiang Zemin Chapter 13
- "China under Jiang Zemin". Facts and Details. 1 October 1928. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
- Smoke clears over China's U.S. strategy
- Gilley, Bruce. "Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 395pp. This was the first biography of Jiang to appear in the West. A comprehensive and highly readable journalistic account of Jiang's early years, his ascendancy within the Party bureaucracy, and his ultimate rise to power as Deng Xiaoping's successor in the wake of Tiananmen.
- Kuhn, Robert Lawrence = The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Random House (English edition) 2005. Century Publishing Group, Shanghai (Chinese edition) 2005. The book is a general biography of Jiang with a more favorable stance towards him.
- China Daily = English language review of biography by Dr. Kuhn.
- Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "The Era of Jiang Zemin"; Prentice Hall, Singapore: 1999. General Jiang-era background information and analysis, not comprehensive biography.
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