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==Famines, democracy and economics==
==Famines, democracy and economics==
India's historical experience has been a central case for social science studies of famine. Economist Amartya Sen, who received the 1998 Nobel prize for his contributions to welfare economics,{{sfn|1998|Nobelprize.org}} advances the theory that lack of democracy and famines are inter-related. Sen cites the example of the 1943 Bengal famine, stating that it was made viable only because of the lack of democracy in India under British rule. The silencing of the Indian press by the British government to prevent any criticism of governmental policies exacerbated the famine. The situation was aggravated further by the British government's suspension of trade in rice and grains between various Indian provinces. This restricted the movement of food through private trade even though the price of food was much higher in Bengal. No relief was made available to the Indian citizenry for many months during which thousands perished every week.{{#tag:ref|"The Bengal famine of 1943, was made viable not only by the lack of democracy in c olonial India, but also by severe restrictions on reporting and criticism imposed on the Indian press, and the voluntary practice of 'silence' on the famine that the British-owned media chose to follow (as a part of alleged 'war effort', for fear of aiding the Japanese military forces that were at the door of India, in Burma)...There was of course no parliament in India under the British colonial administration. In fact, governmental policy , far from being helpful, actually exacerbated the famine."{{sfn|Sen|2009|pp=338-343}}|group=fn}} According to Sen such famines are easily preventable if they are given the serious attention they deserve. Famines cannot be ignored by a free country under a democratic government facing elections, opposition parties and an independent media. Such famines continued in the India under British occupation up to the very end of British rule. They disappeared quickly after Indian independence with the establishment of a multi-party democracy and a free press.{{#tag:ref|"Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to prevent them, and a government of a democratic country-facing elections, criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers-cannot but make a serious effort to prevent famines. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly, after independence, with the establishment of a multi-part democracy with a free press.{{sfn|Sen|2001|pp=12-14}}|group=fn}} Olivier Rubin's review of the evidence disagrees with Sen; after examining the cases of post-Independence India, [[Niger]], and [[Malawi]], he finds that "democracy is no panacea against famine." Rubin's analysis questions whether democracy and a free press were sufficient to truly avert famine in 1967 and 1973 (the Maharashtra "near miss" involved some 130,000 deaths), and notes that some dynamics of electoral democracy complicate rather than bring about famine relief efforts. Rubin does not address colonial period famines.{{sfn|Rubin|2009}} On the other hand, Andrew Banik's study ''Starvation and India's democracy'' affirms Sen's thesis, but indicates that while democracy has been able to prevent famines in India, it has not been sufficient to avoid [[Malnutrition in India|severe under-nutrition]] and starvation deaths, which Banik calls a "silent emergency" in the country.{{sfn|Banik|2007}}
India's historical experience has been a central case for social science studies of famine. Economist Amartya Sen, who received the 1998 Nobel prize for his contributions to welfare economics,{{sfn|1998|Nobelprize.org}} advances the theory that lack of democracy and famines are inter-related. Sen cites the example of the 1943 Bengal famine, stating that it was made viable only because of the lack of democracy in India under British rule. The silencing of the Indian press by the British government to prevent any criticism of governmental policies exacerbated the famine. The situation was aggravated further by the British government's suspension of trade in rice and grains between various Indian provinces. This restricted the movement of food through private trade even though the price of food was much higher in Bengal. No relief was made available to the Indian citizenry for many months during which thousands perished every week.{{#tag:ref|"The Bengal famine of 1943, was made viable not only by the lack of democracy in c olonial India, but also by severe restrictions on reporting and criticism imposed on the Indian press, and the voluntary practice of 'silence' on the famine that the British-owned media chose to follow (as a part of alleged 'war effort', for fear of aiding the Japanese military forces that were at the door of India, in Burma)...There was of course no parliament in India under the British colonial administration. In fact, governmental policy , far from being helpful, actually exacerbated the famine."{{sfn|Sen|2009|pp=338-343}}|group=fn}} According to Sen such famines are easily preventable if they are given the serious attention they deserve. Famines cannot be ignored by a free country under a democratic government facing elections, opposition parties and an independent media. Such famines continued in the India under British occupation up to the very end of British rule. They disappeared quickly after Indian independence with the establishment of a multi-party democracy and a free press.{{#tag:ref|"Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to prevent them, and a government of a democratic country-facing elections, criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers-cannot but make a serious effort to prevent famines. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly, after independence, with the establishment of a multi-part democracy with a free press.{{sfn|Sen|2001|pp=12-14}}|group=fn}}
Olivier Rubin's review of the evidence disagrees with Sen; after examining the cases of post-Independence India, [[Niger]], and [[Malawi]], he finds that "democracy is no panacea against famine." Rubin's analysis questions whether democracy and a free press were sufficient to truly avert famine in 1967 and 1973 (the Maharashtra "near miss" involved some 130,000 deaths), and notes that some dynamics of electoral democracy complicate rather than bring about famine relief efforts. Rubin does not address colonial period famines.{{sfn|Rubin|2009}} On the other hand, Andrew Banik's study ''Starvation and India's democracy'' affirms Sen's thesis, but indicates that while democracy has been able to prevent famines in India, it has not been sufficient to avoid [[Malnutrition in India|severe under-nutrition]] and starvation deaths, which Banik calls a "silent emergency" in the country.{{sfn|Banik|2007}}


==Chronology==
==Chronology==

Revision as of 23:47, 26 September 2010

A child suffering Marasmus, extreme starvation, in 1972.

Famine has been a recurrent feature of life in South Asia, reaching its deadliest peak in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historical and legendary evidence names some 90 famines in 2,500 years of history, two-thirds of those since 1700.[1] There were 14 famines in India between 11th and 17th century. Famines in India resulted in more than 37 million deaths over the course of the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. Historians, social scientists, contemporary critics, and participants have identified British government inaction and adherence to utilitarian, mercantilist, and Malthusian policies as contributing factors to the severity of famine; the post-1880 British Famine Codes, some transportation improvements, and democratic rule after independence have been identified as furthering famine relief. The last famines were the Bihar starvation in December 1966 and a drought in Maharashtra in 1970-1973.

Indian agriculture is heavily dependent on the climate of India: a favorable southwest summer monsoon is critical in securing water for irrigating Indian crops. In the past, droughts have periodically led to major Indian famines, including the Bengal famine of 1770, the Chalisa famine, the Doji bara famine, the Great Famine of 1876–78; and the Bengal famine of 1943.[2][3]

Famines in pre-colonial South Asia

During the 1022-1033, great famines made all the provinces in India depopulated.[citation needed] Famine in the Deccan and Gujarat killed at least 2 million people in 1630-32.

Famines under British rule

From the earliest endeavors of the British East India Company on the Subcontinent but especially since 1857—the year of the first major Indian rebellion against British rule—the British Raj, as the British governing body was known after 1857, had instituted a widespread series of mercantilist economic rules intended to foster a favorable balance of trade for Britain relative to the Subcontinent as well as other colonies, which had a dramatic impact on the economic milieu within India. Because of these effects and the Raj's role as the supreme governing body within India, contemporary scholars such as Romesh Dutt in 1900—who had himself witnessed the famines first-hand—and present-day scholars such as Amartya Sen agree, that the famines were a product both of uneven rainfall and British economic and administrative policies. These policies had, since 1857, led to the seizure and conversion of local farmland to foreign-owned plantations, restrictions on internal trade, heavy taxation of Indians to support British expeditions in Afghanistan like the Second Anglo-Afghan War, inflationary measures that increased the price of food, and substantial exports of staple crops from India to Britain. (Dutt, 1900 and 1902; Srivastava, 1968; Sen, 1982; Bhatia, 1985.)

During the period of East India Company rule, which at first only extended over part of the subcontinent, there were a number of major famines. The 1901 Famine Commission found that twelve famines and four "severe scarcities" took place between 1765 and 1858. The first, the Bengal famine of 1770, is estimated to have taken nearly one-third of the population.[4]

The Famine Commission of 1880 observed that each province in British India, including Burma, had a surplus of food grains, and the annual surplus amounted to 5.16 million tons (Bhatia, 1970). At that time, annual export of rice and other grains from India was approximately one million tons. At about the same time the British devised the first ever famine scales and engaged themselves in a series of canal building and irrigation improvements. Development economist Jean Drèze evaluates the conditions before and after Famine Commission policy changes: "a contrast between the earlier period of frequently recurring catastrophes, and the latter period when long stretches of tranquility were disturbed by a few large scale famines" in 1896-97, 1899–1900, and 1943-44.[5] There was the threat of famine but after 1902 there was no major famine in India until the Bengal famine of 1943-44 which was the most devastating, killing 6-7 million during World War II. [6] Drèze explains these "intermittent failures" by four factors—failure to declare a famine (particularly in 1943), the "excessively punitive character" of famine restrictions such as wages for public works, the "policy of strict non-interference with private trade," and the natural severity of the food crises.[5]

In 1907 and in 1874[citation needed] the response from the British was better: in both cases rice was imported abroad and famine was averted.

Famines before British rule (duration 700 years)[7][8][9]
Century Number of famines Location
Eleventh
2
Both local
Thirteenth
1
Around Delhi
Fourteenth
3
All local
Fifteenth
2
Both local
Sixteenth
3
All local
Seventeenth
3
General; area not defined
Eighteenth (to 1745)
4
Northwestern provinces, Delhi, Sindh (twice), all local
Total
18
-
Famines under the British rule in the 19th century (duration 100 years)[7][8][9]
Years Number of famines Deaths
1800 to 1825
5
perhaps 1,000,000 deaths
1835 to 1850
2
500,000
1850 to 1875
6
5,000,000
1875 to 1900
18
estimate 26,000,000
Total estimate
31
37 million

British response

The first major famine that took place under British rule was the Bengal Famine of 1770. About a quarter to a third of the population of Bengal starved to death in about a ten month period. East India Company's raising of taxes disastrously coincided with this famine[10] and exacerbated it even if the famine was not caused by the British regime.[11] Following this famine "Successive British governments were anxious not to add to the burden of taxation."{sfn|Johnson|2003|p=30}} In 1866 the rains failed again in Bengal and Orissa. Food was rushed into the famine stricken zones. The result of which was that the famine was alleviated in Bengal although a Monsoon in Orissa forced the closure of the harbor. As a result food could not be imported into Orissa as easily as Bengal.[12] In 1865-66, severe drought struck Orissa and was met by British official inaction. The British Secretary of State for India Lord Salisbury did nothing for two months by which time a million people had died. The lack of taking any precautions whatsoever caused Salisbury to never feel free from the blame.[fn 1]

Some British citizens such as William Digby agitated for policy reforms and famine relief, but Lord Lytton, the governing British viceroy in India, opposed such changes in the belief that they would stimulate shirking by Indian workers. Reacting against calls for relief during the 1877-79 famine, Lytton replied, "Let the British public foot the bill for its 'cheap sentiment,' if it wished to save life at a cost that would bankrupt India," substantively ordering "there is to be no interference of any kind on the part of Government with the object of reducing the price of food," and instructing district officers to "discourage relief works in every possible way.... Mere distress is not a sufficient reason for opening a relief work." (quoted in Davis 2001:31, 52)

In 1874 the response from the British authorities was better. Famine was completely averted. Then in 1876 a huge famine broke out in Madras. Lord Lytton's administration believed that 'market forces alone would suffice to feed the starving Indians.'[10] Beatty Balfour wrote in her book, Lord Lytton's Indian Administration that:

In the despatch addressed to the Duke of Buckingham, in which the Viceroy announced his intention of visiting the famine districts of Madras and Mysores, the general principles for the management of famine affairs were once more laid down. After stating that the Government of India, with approval of Her Majesty’s Government, were resolved to avert death by starvation by the employment of all means available, the Viceroy first expressed his conviction that ‘absolute non-interference with the operations of private commercial enterprise must be the foundation of their present famine policy.’ This on the ground that ‘free and abundant trade cannot co-exist with Government importation’ and that more food will reach the famine stricken districts if private enterprise is left to itself (beyond receiving every possible facility and information from the government) than if it were paralysed by Government competition.[14]

The results of such thinking proved fatal (some 5.5 million starved[15] and so such a policy was abandoned. Lord Lytton established the Famine Insurance Grant, a system in which, in times of financial surplus, Rs. 1,500,000 would be applied to famine relief works. The results of this were that the British prematurely assumed that the problem of famine had been solved forever which made future British viceroys complacent (which proved disastrous in 1896).[16] Lord Curzon tried to alleviate the famine, he spent Rs. 68,000,000 (about £10,000,000) to try and reduce the effects of the famine[17] and, at its peak, 4.5 million people were on famine relief. However, Curzon did state that:

Any government which imperiled the financial position of India in the interests of prodigal philanthropy would be open to serious criticism; but any government which by indiscriminate alms-giving weakened the fiber and demoralized the self-reliance of the population, would be guilty of a public crime.[18]

He also cut back rations that he characterized as "dangerously high" and stiffened relief eligibility by reinstating the Temple tests.[19] In total, between 1.25 to 10 million people were killed in the famine.[20][21] The Famine during World War II lead to the development of the Bengal Famine Mixture this would later save tens of thousands of lives at the liberated concentration camps such as Belsen[22] just as experiments in Belsen later saved hundreds of thousands of eyes in India.

Famines after Independence

India's success in preventing droughts and other natural disasters from developing in to large sacle famines since independence can attributed of several factors, two historical milestones being the defining of Famine Codes at the end of the nineteenth century and the achievement of independence in 1947.[23] However, the fundamental changes that have contributed to the success of famine prevention are in the political sphere. Prior to independence, the commitment of the British administration in preventing starvation deaths could not be depended upon whereas after independence, this evolved in to a political compulsion.[24] After Indian gained Independence in 1947, the threat of famines did not go away, damage to crops and lack of rain continued to be problem. The loss of life did not meet the scale of the 1943 Bengal or earlier famines but continued to be a problem. Jean Drèze finds that the post-Independence Indian government "largely remedied" the three major failures of 1880-1948 British famine policy, "an event which must count as marking the second great turning-point in the history of famine relief in India over the past two centuries".[25] On a number of occasions the Indian-government sought food and grain from the United States to provide replacement for damaged crops. In 1966 a large scale famine in Bihar was adverted with the import of foreign food, although livestock and crops were destroyed. In 1972 the United States stopped supplying food aid and shortages of fertilizer due to a lack of foreign currency did not help. After several years of good monsoons and a good crop in the early 1970s India considered exporting food and being self-sufficient. But they did not foresee the drought in 1972 and in January 1973 it was reported that hundreds of thousands of people had died and some 25 million needed help, the worst hit area being Maharashtra. This help was provided in the form of large scale employment to the deprived sections of Maharashtrian society. This, in effect, helped attract considerable amounts of food to Maharashtra.[26] The relief measures were effective and they limited the impact of the devastating drought causing relatively little damage in terms of excess mortality, nutritional deficits and asset depletion. Although large scale famines have disappeared from India after independence, mass poverty and hunger are persistent problems. Like the famines, these problems need public action as a key ingredient in confronting what is colossal failure.[26]

Famines, democracy and economics

India's historical experience has been a central case for social science studies of famine. Economist Amartya Sen, who received the 1998 Nobel prize for his contributions to welfare economics,[27] advances the theory that lack of democracy and famines are inter-related. Sen cites the example of the 1943 Bengal famine, stating that it was made viable only because of the lack of democracy in India under British rule. The silencing of the Indian press by the British government to prevent any criticism of governmental policies exacerbated the famine. The situation was aggravated further by the British government's suspension of trade in rice and grains between various Indian provinces. This restricted the movement of food through private trade even though the price of food was much higher in Bengal. No relief was made available to the Indian citizenry for many months during which thousands perished every week.[fn 2] According to Sen such famines are easily preventable if they are given the serious attention they deserve. Famines cannot be ignored by a free country under a democratic government facing elections, opposition parties and an independent media. Such famines continued in the India under British occupation up to the very end of British rule. They disappeared quickly after Indian independence with the establishment of a multi-party democracy and a free press.[fn 3]

Olivier Rubin's review of the evidence disagrees with Sen; after examining the cases of post-Independence India, Niger, and Malawi, he finds that "democracy is no panacea against famine." Rubin's analysis questions whether democracy and a free press were sufficient to truly avert famine in 1967 and 1973 (the Maharashtra "near miss" involved some 130,000 deaths), and notes that some dynamics of electoral democracy complicate rather than bring about famine relief efforts. Rubin does not address colonial period famines.[30] On the other hand, Andrew Banik's study Starvation and India's democracy affirms Sen's thesis, but indicates that while democracy has been able to prevent famines in India, it has not been sufficient to avoid severe under-nutrition and starvation deaths, which Banik calls a "silent emergency" in the country.[31]

Chronology

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ "I did nothing for two months. Before that time the monsoon had closed the ports of Orissa—help was impossible—and—it is said—a million people died. The Governments of India and Bengal had taken in effect no precautions whatever.… I never could feel that I was free from all blame for the result." --The British Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury.[13]
  2. ^ "The Bengal famine of 1943, was made viable not only by the lack of democracy in c olonial India, but also by severe restrictions on reporting and criticism imposed on the Indian press, and the voluntary practice of 'silence' on the famine that the British-owned media chose to follow (as a part of alleged 'war effort', for fear of aiding the Japanese military forces that were at the door of India, in Burma)...There was of course no parliament in India under the British colonial administration. In fact, governmental policy , far from being helpful, actually exacerbated the famine."[28]
  3. ^ "Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to prevent them, and a government of a democratic country-facing elections, criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers-cannot but make a serious effort to prevent famines. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly, after independence, with the establishment of a multi-part democracy with a free press.[29]

Citations

  1. ^ Murton 2000, p. 1412.
  2. ^ Nash 2003, pp. 22–23.
  3. ^ Collier & Webb 2002, p. 67.
  4. ^ Visaria & Visaria 1983, p. 477.
  5. ^ a b Dréze 1991, pp. 32–33.
  6. ^ Portillo 2008.
  7. ^ a b Bose 1918, pp. 79–81.
  8. ^ a b Rai 2008, pp. 263–281.
  9. ^ a b Koomar 2009, pp. 13–14.
  10. ^ a b Ferguson 2004.
  11. ^ Schama 2003.
  12. ^ Fiske 1869.
  13. ^ Davis 2001, p. 32.
  14. ^ Balfour 1899, p. 204.
  15. ^ Keay 2001, p. 454.
  16. ^ Gilmour 2007, p. 116.
  17. ^ James 2000.
  18. ^ Davis 2000, p. 162.
  19. ^ Davis 2000, p. 164.
  20. ^ Davis 2000, p. 173.
  21. ^ Nash 2003.
  22. ^ Channel 4 Television 2007.
  23. ^ Drèze 1991, pp. 97–98.
  24. ^ Drèze 1991, p. 98.
  25. ^ Dréze 1991, p. 35.
  26. ^ a b Dréze 1991, p. 99.
  27. ^ 1998 & Nobelprize.org.
  28. ^ Sen 2009, pp. 338–343.
  29. ^ Sen 2001, pp. 12–14.
  30. ^ Rubin 2009.
  31. ^ Banik 2007.
  32. ^ CBC News 2010.

References

Further reading

  • Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (2001), ISBN 1-85984-739-0
  • Romesh C Dutt, Economic History of India (1900), is available on www.economics.mcmaster.ca
  • Sanjay Sharma, "Famine,Philanthropy and the Colonial State: North India in the early Nineteenth Century"(2001), Delhi: Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-565386-6.