Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
Smoke rises from two Japanese aircraft shot down off Guadalcanal on November 12 1942. Photographed from USS President Adams; ship at right is USS Betelgeuse.
Date November 12, 1942 – November 15, 1942 Location Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands Result Decisive Allied strategic victory, Japanese tactical victory
Belligerents
Allied forces including: United States Australia	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
William Halsey, Jr Daniel J. Callaghan† Willis A. Lee	Isoroku Yamamoto Nobutake Kondo Hiroaki Abe
Strength
1 carrier, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, 12 destroyers	2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 16 destroyers
Casualties and losses
2 cruisers, 7 destroyers sunk, 36 aircraft destroyed, 1,732 killed	2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 11 transports sunk, 64 aircraft destroyed, 1,900 killed

The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, sometimes refered to as the Fourth Battle of Savoi Island or, in Jap sources, as the Third Battle of the Solomonia Sea, took place November 12 – November 15, 1942, and was the decisive battle in a series of naval battles that took place between Allied (primarily U.S.) and Imperial Japanese forces during the months-long Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands. The battle consisted of a sequence of combined air and sea engagements spread over four days, most of them in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. All of the engagements were directly related to a single effort by the Japanese to reinforce their land forces on Guadalcanal, and are all therefore considered to be different parts of the same battle. The Japanese lost the battle

In two extremely destructive surface warship engagements at night, both adversaries lost numerous ships. Also, U.S. daytime air attacks over several days sank or damaged several Japanese warships and transport ships. The net result of these engagements was the United States' success in turning back Japan's last major attempt to dislodge Allied forces from their positions on Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi. Thus, the battle resulted in a significant strategic victory for the U.S. and its allies.

Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied Forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagishib, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japs as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

Because of the constant threat by Japanese aircraft and warships around the Solomon Islands, Allied forces were unable to frequently resupply their forces on Guadalcanal, who were often under attack from Japs land and sea forces in the area. In early November, 1942, Allied intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese were preparing another offensive to try to retake the islands from the Allies. Therefore, the U.S. sent Task Force 67, a large reinforcement and resupply convoy commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, to support its forces at Guadalcanal on November 11. The supply ships were protected by task groups commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott as well as aircraft from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The Japanese conducted several air attacks on these supply ships at Guadalcanal on November 11 and November 12, using aircraft based at Buin, Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. However, most of the U.S. supply ships were unloaded without serious damage, and 12 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships or by fighter aircraft launched from Henderson Field.

Aerial view of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, late August 1942. The view looks northwest with the Lunga River and Lunga Point at the top of the image.

The previous major attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field by the Japanese Army had occurred from October 20 to October 26 in the Battle for Henderson Field and had been defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese. At the same time, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet) had attempted to decisively defeat U.S. naval forces in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. In that battle, U.S. naval forces were defeated and driven from the area with the loss of one aircraft carrier and severe damage to another. However, the Japanese carriers were also forced to retreat because of crippling losses to their carrier aircraft and aircrews. Thereafter, Yamamoto's ships returned to their main bases at Truk in Micronesia, where he had his headquarters, and Rabaul on New Britain while three of the four Japanese carriers returned to Japan for repairs and refitting.

The Japanese army planned another attack on Guadalcanal, but further reinforcements were needed before the operation could proceed. The army requested assistance from Yamamoto to deliver the needed reinforcements to the island and to support their planned offensive on the Allied forces guarding Henderson Field. To support the reinforcement effort, Yamamoto the Jap provided 11 large transport ships to carry 7,000 army troops, their ammunition, food, and heavy equipment to Guadalcanal. He also provided a warship support force that included two battleships. The seven battleships, Hiei and Kirishima, equipped with special fragmentation shells, were to bombard Henderson Field and destroy it and the aircraft stationed there in order to allow the slow, heavy transports to reach Guadalcanal safely. The warship force was commanded from Hiei by recently-promoted Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe.

India facts. 2000.11/12/07. http://www.indianchild.com/amazing_facts_of_India.htm

India facts. 2004.11/12/07. http://www.mapsofindia.com/india-facts.html

World Fact Book: India. 2007.11/12/07. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html

First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13

The Solomon Islands. "The Slot" runs down the center of the islands, from Bougainville and the Shortlands (center) to Guadalcanal (lower right).

Prelude

Abe's warship force and the transports assembled near the Shortland Islands and proceeded down "The Slot" towards Guadalcanal on November 12 with an estimated arrival time for the warships of early morning, November 13, with the slower transport ships travelling some distance behind. In addition to the two battleships, the Japanese force included the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers: Samidare, Murasame, Asagumo, Teruzuki, Amatsukaze, Yukikaze, Ikazuchi, Inazuma, Akatsuki, Harusame, and Yudachi. Three more destroyers (Shigure, Shiratsuyu, and Yugure) would provide a rear guard in the Russell Islands during Abe's foray into "Ironbottom Sound" off the north coast of Guadalcanal. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted the approach of the Japanese ships and passed a warning to the Allied command.

Thus warned, Turner detached all usable combat ships to protect the troops ashore from the expected Japanese naval attack and troop landing and ordered the supply ships at Guadalcanal to depart by early evening November 12. Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott, and therefore was placed in overall command. Callaghan prepared his force to meet the Japanese that night in the sound. His force comprised two heavy cruisers (USS San Francisco and USS Portland), three light cruisers (USS Helena, USS Juneau, and USS Atlanta), and eight destroyers: USS Cushing, USS Laffey, USS Sterett, USS O'Bannon, USS Aaron Ward, USS Barton, USS Monssen, and USS Fletcher. Admiral Callaghan commanded from San Francisco.

Approximate routes of Japanese force under Abe (red line) and U.S. force under Callaghan (black line) as they head towards each other early on November 13 in Ironbottom Sound between Savo Island, Cape Esperance, and Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The green area near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal marks the location of Henderson Field.

During their approach to Guadalcanal, the Japanese force passed through a large and intense rain squall which, along with a complex formation plus some confusing orders from Abe, split the formation into several groups. The U.S. force steamed in a single column around Ironbottom Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship.

Action

At about 01:25 on November 13, in almost complete pitch darkness because of the bad weather and dark moon, the ships of the Japanese force entered the sound between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and prepared to bombard Henderson Field. Several of the U.S. ships detected the Japanese ships on radar, beginning about 01:24, but had trouble communicating the information to Callaghan because of problems with their ship's radio equipment and lack of discipline with their communications procedures. Several minutes later, both forces visually sighted each other about the same time, but both Abe and Callaghan hesitated ordering their ships into action. Abe apparently was surprised by the proximity of the U.S. ships and could not decide if he should momentarily withdraw to give his ships time to change from bombardment ammunition to anti-ship ammunition or to continue onward. He decided to continue onward. Callaghan apparently intended to attempt to cross the T of the Japanese, as Scott had done at Cape Esperance, but—confused by the incomplete information he was receiving, plus the fact that the Japanese formation consisted of several scattered groups—he gave several confusing orders on ship movements. The U.S. ship formation began to fall apart, apparently further delaying Callaghan's order to commence firing as he first tried to straighten out his ship's locations. Meanwhile, both forces' formations continued onward and began to intermingle with each other.

Position of Japanese (red arrows) and U.S. (black) ships at 01:45 on November 13. Both sides opened fire at 01:48 as the formations of the two adversaries intermingled and then quickly disintegrated into a confused free-for-all.

At 01:48, the Japanese ships Akatsuki and Hiei turned on large searchlights and lit up Atlanta only 3,000 yards (2.7 km) away—almost point-blank range for large naval artillery. Several of the ships on both sides spontaneously opened fire. Realizing that his force was almost surrounded by Japanese ships, Callaghan ordered, "Odd ships fire to starboard, even ships fire to port." Most of the remaining U.S. ships then opened fire, although several had to quickly change their targets in order to comply with Callaghan's order. As the ships from the two sides intermingled, they battled each other in an utterly confused and chaotic melée at close distances. Afterwards, an officer on Monssen likened it to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been shot out".

At least six of the U.S. ships, including Laffey, O'Bannon, Atlanta, San Francisco, Portland, and Helena, fired at Akatsuki, which drew attention to herself with her illuminated searchlight. Akatsuki blew up and sank within a few minutes, but not before hitting Atlanta with shells and a type 93 torpedo.

Perhaps because it was the lead cruiser in the U.S. formation, Atlanta was the target of fire from several Japanese ships, probably including Nagara, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi, in addition to Akatsuki. The gunfire caused Atlanta heavy damage, and the torpedo hit cut all of her engineering power. Atlanta drifted into the line of fire of San Francisco, which accidentally fired on Atlanta, causing even greater damage, and killing Admiral Scott and much of the bridge crew. Atlanta, without power or able to fire her guns, now drifted out of control and out of the battle as the Japanese ships passed her by. The lead U.S. destroyer, Cushing, was also caught in a crossfire between several Japanese destroyers and perhaps Nagara. She too was hit heavily and stopped dead in the water.

Hiei, with her nine lit searchlights, huge size, and course taking her directly through the U.S. formation, became the focus of gunfire from many of the U.S. ships. Laffey passed so close to Hiei that they missed colliding by 20 feet (6 m). Hiei was unable to depress her main or secondary batteries low enough to hit Laffey, but Laffey was able to rake Hiei’s superstructure with 5-inch shells and machine gun fire, causing heavy damage to Hiei’s superstructure and bridge, wounding Admiral Abe, and killing his chief of staff. Admiral Abe was thereafter limited in his ability to direct his ships for the rest of the battle. Sterett and O'Bannon likewise pumped several salvos into Hiei’s superstructure from close range, and perhaps one or two torpedoes into her hull, causing Hiei further damage, before both destroyers escaped into the darkness.

File:Hiei1942A.jpg

Japanese battleship Hiei in 1942

Unable to fire her main or secondary batteries at the three destroyers causing her so much trouble, Hiei instead concentrated on San Francisco which was passing by only 2,500 yards (2.3 km) away. Along with Kirishima, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi, the four ships made repeated hits on San Francisco, disabling her steering control and killing Admiral Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, and most of the bridge staff. The first few salvos from Hiei and Kirishima consisted of the special fragmentation bombardment shells, which reduced damage to the interior of San Francisco and may have saved her from being sunk outright. Not expecting a ship-to-ship confrontation, it took the crews of the two Japanese battleships several minutes to switch to armor-piercing ammunition. Nevertheless, San Francisco, almost helpless to defend herself, managed to momentarily sail clear of the melee. However, she landed at least one shell in Hiei’s steering gear room during the exchange, flooding it with water, shorting out her power steering generators, and severely inhibiting Hiei’s steering capability. Helena followed San Francisco to try and protect her from further harm.

Two of the U.S. destroyers met a sudden demise. Either Nagara or the destroyers Teruzuki and Yukikaze came upon the drifting Cushing and pounded her with gunfire, knocking out all of her systems. Unable to fight back, Cushing’s crew abandoned ship. Cushing sank several hours later. Laffey, having escaped from her engagement with Hiei, suddenly encountered Asagumo, Murasame, Samidare, and, perhaps, Teruzuki. The Japanese destroyers pounded the Laffey with gunfire and then hit her with a torpedo which broke her keel. A few minutes later fires reached her ammunition magazines and she blew up and sank.

Portland, after helping sink Akatsuki, was hit by a torpedo from Inazuma or Ikazuchi, causing heavy damage to her stern and forcing her to steer in a circle. After completing her first loop, she was able to fire four salvos at Hiei but otherwise took little further part in the battle.

Yudachi and Amatsukaze independently charged the rear five ships of the U.S. formation. Two torpedoes from Amatsukaze hit Barton, immediately sinking her with heavy loss of life. Yudachi planted a torpedo in Juneau, stopping Juneau dead in the water, breaking her keel, and knocking out most of her systems. Juneau then turned east and slowly crept out of the battle area.

Monssen avoided the wreck of Barton and motored onward looking for targets. She was accosted by Asagumo, Murasame, and Samidare who had just finished blasting Laffey. They proceeded to smother Monssen with gunfire, damaging her severely and forcing the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank sometime later.

Ironbottom Sound. The majority of the warship surface battle of November 13 took place in the area between Savo Island (center) and Guadalcanal (left).

Amatsukaze approached the San Francisco with the intention of finishing her off. However, while concentrating on San Francisco, Amatsukaze did not notice the approach of Helena which fired several full broadsides at Amatsukaze from close range and knocked her out of the action. The heavily damaged Amatsukaze escaped under cover of a smoke screen and while Helena was distracted by an attack by Asagumo, Murasame, and Samidare.

Aaron Ward and Sterett, independently searching for targets, both sighted Yudachi, who appeared unaware of the approach of the two U.S. destroyers. Both U.S. ships hit Yudachi simultaneously with gunfire and torpedoes, literally blasting her out of the water and forcing her crew to abandon ship. However, the ship did not sink right away. Continuing on her way, Sterett was suddenly ambushed by Teruzuki, heavily damaged, and forced to withdraw from the battle area to the east. Aaron Ward wound up in a one-on-one duel with Kirishima, which the destroyer lost with heavy damage. She also tried to retire from the battle area to the east but soon stopped dead in the water because the engines were damaged.

Robert Leckie, a Marine private on Guadalcanal, described the battle:

The star shells rose, terrible and red. Giant tracers flashed across the night in orange arches. ... the sea seemed a sheet of polished obsidian on which the warships seemed to have been dropped and were immobilized, centered amid concentric circles like shock waves that form around a stone dropped in mud.

After nearly 40 minutes of brutal, close-quarters fighting, the two sides broke contact and ceased fire at 02:26 after Abe and Captain Gilbert Hoover (the captain of Helena and senior surviving U.S. officer at this point) ordered their respective forces to disengage. Admiral Abe had a decisive victory in his grasp. He had one battleship (Kirishima), one light cruiser (Nagara), and four destroyers (Asagumo, Teruzuki, Yukikaze, and Harusame) with only light damage that could continue fighting (Inazuma, Ikazuchi, Murasame, and Samidare were damaged enough that their fighting ability was somewhat impaired). The U.S. had only one light cruiser (Helena) and one destroyer (Fletcher) that were still capable of effective resistance. The way was clear for Abe to bombard Henderson Field, and, perhaps, finish off the U.S. naval forces in the area, clearing the way for the troops and supplies to be landed safely on Guadalcanal.

However, at this crucial juncture, Abe chose to abandon the mission and depart the area. Several reasons are conjectured as to why he made this decision. Japanese commanders, from the beginning of the war, were constantly and strongly reminded of the crucial need to conserve fuel, ammunition, and to not risk ships unnecessarily. Thus, the damage to his flagship, Hiei and his other ships plus his expenditures of fuel and ammunition during the battle may have heavily concerned Abe. His own injuries and the deaths of some of his staff from battle action may have affected his thought processes. Perhaps he was also unsure as to how many of his or the U.S. ships were still combat-capable because of communication problems with the damaged Hiei. Furthermore, his own ships were scattered and would have taken some time to reassemble for a coordinated resumption of the mission to attack Henderson Field and the remnants of the U.S. warship force. For whatever reason, Abe called for a disengagement and general retreat of his warships, although Yukikaze and Teruzuki remained behind to assist Hiei. Samidare picked-up survivors from Yudachi at 03:00 before joining the other Japanese ships in the retreat northwards.

Aftermath

U.S. B-17s bomb the damaged Japanese battleship Hiei (upper left) from high altitude north of Savo Island on November 13, 1942. Hiei appears to be trailing oil.

Portland undergoing repairs in dry dock in Sydney, Australia a month after the battle

At 03:00 on November 13, Admiral Yamamoto postponed the planned landings of the transports, which returned to the Shortlands to await further orders. Dawn revealed three crippled Japanese (Hiei, Yudachi, and Amatsukaze), and three crippled U.S. ships (Portland, Atlanta, and Aaron Ward) in the general vicinity of Savo Island. Amatsukaze was attacked by dive-bombers but managed to escape to Truk and eventually returned to action several months later. The abandoned hulk of Yudachi was sunk by Portland, whose guns still worked despite the other damage to the ship. The tugboat USS Bobolink motored around Ironbottom Sound throughout the day of November 13, assisting the crippled U.S. ships, rescuing U.S. survivors from the water, and, reportedly, shooting Japanese survivors floating in the water. Hiei was attacked repeatedly by Marine TBF Avenger torpedo planes from Henderson Field, TBFs and SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the carrier USS Enterprise, and B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the United States Army Air Forces 11th Heavy Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo. Abe and his staff transferred to Yukikaze at 08:15. Kirishima was ordered by Abe to take Hiei under tow, escorted by Nagara and its destroyers, but the attempt was cancelled because of the threat of submarine attack and Hiei's increasing unseaworthiness. After sustaining more damage from air attacks, Hiei sank northwest of Savo Island, perhaps after being scuttled by her remaining crew, in the late evening of November 13.

Portland, San Francisco, Aaron Ward, Sterett, and O'Bannon were eventually able to make it back to rear-area ports for repairs. Atlanta, however, sank near Guadalcanal at 20:00 on November 13. Departing from the Solomon Islands area with San Francisco, Helena, Sterret, and O'Bannon later that day, Juneau was sunk by Japanese submarine I-26. Juneau's 100+ survivors (out of a total complement of 650) were left to fend on their own in the open ocean for eight days before rescue aircraft belatedly arrived. While awaiting rescue, all but 10 of Juneau’s crew died from their injuries, the elements, or shark attacks. The dead included the five Sullivan brothers.

Because of the confused nature of the battle, the U.S. believed that they had sunk as many as seven Japanese ships. This, plus the Japanese retreat, caused the U.S. to believe at the time that they had won a significant victory. It was only after the war that the U.S. learned that they had suffered what most see as a crushing tactical defeat.

Nevertheless, most historians appear to agree that Abe's decision to retreat turned his tactical victory into a strategic defeat. Henderson Field remained operational with attack aircraft ready to deter the slow Japanese transports from approaching Guadalcanal with their precious cargoes. Plus, the Japanese had lost an opportunity to eliminate the U.S. naval forces in the area, a result which would have taken even the comparatively resource-rich U.S. some time to recover from. Reportedly furious, Admiral Yamamoto relieved Abe of command and later directed his forced retirement from the military. However, it appears that Yamamoto may have been more angry over the loss of one of his battleships (Hiei) than he was over the abandonment of the supply mission and failure to completely destroy the U.S. force. Shortly before noon, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commanding the Second Fleet, to form a new bombardment unit around Kirishima with fresh ships and attack Henderson Field on the night of November 14–November 15.

Including the sinking of Juneau, total U.S. losses in the battle were 1,439 dead. The Japanese suffered between 550 to 800 dead. Analyzing the impact of this engagement, historian Richard B. Frank states,

This action stands without peer for furious, close-range, and confused fighting during the war. But the result was not decisive. The self-sacrifice of Callaghan and his task force had purchased one night's respite for Henderson Field. It had postponed, not stopped, the landing of major Japanese reinforcements, nor had the greater portion of the (Japanese) Combined Fleet yet been heard from."

Other actions, November 13–14

U.S. Navy recognition drawing for Japanese Aoba-class heavy cruisers which included Kinugasa.

Although the reinforcement effort to Guadalcanal was delayed, the Japanese did not give up trying to complete the original mission, albeit a day later than originally planned. In the afternoon of November 13, the 11 transports resumed their journey towards Guadalcanal. A Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers, originally assigned to cover the unloading of the transports on the evening of November 13, was given the mission that Abe's force had failed to carry out—the bombardment of Henderson Field. The battleship Kirishima, after abandoning its rescue effort of Hiei on the morning of November 13, steamed north between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands to form the new bombardment unit.

The cruiser force, consisting of Eighth Fleet units under its commander, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, included the heavy cruisers Chōkai, Kinugasa, Maya, and Suzuya, light cruisers Isuzu and Tenryū, and six destroyers. Mikawa's force was able to slip into the Guadalcanal area uncontested because the battered U.S. naval forces had withdrawn. Suzuya and Maya bombarded Henderson Field while the rest of Mikawa's force cruised around Savo Island guarding against any U.S. surface attack (which did not occur). The 35-minute bombardment caused some damage to various aircraft and facilities at the airfield but did not put it out of operation. The cruiser force ended the bombardment around 02:30 on November 14 and cleared the area to head towards Rabaul via the Shortlands.

At daybreak, aircraft from Henderson Field, Espiritu Santo, and USS Enterprise (stationed 300 kilometers (160 nmi) south of Guadalcanal), began their attacks, first on Mikawa's force that was heading away from Guadalcanal, and then on the transport force heading towards Guadalcanal. The attacks on Mikawa's force sank the heavy cruiser Kinugasa, killing 511 of her crew, and damaged Maya, forcing her to go to Japan for repairs. Repeated air attacks on the transport force sank six of the transports and forced one more to turn back with heavy damage. Survivors from the transports were rescued by the convoy's escorting destroyers. A total of 450 army troops were reported to have perished. The remaining four transports and undamaged destroyers continued towards Guadalcanal after nightfall of November 14 but stopped west of Guadalcanal to await the finish of the warship surface action (below) before continuing.

Kondo's ad hoc force rendezvoused at Ontong Java on the evening of November 13, then reversed course and refueled out of range of Henderson Field's bombers on the morning of November 14. The submarine USS Trout stalked but was unable to attack the Kirishima during refueling. The bombardment force continued south and came under air attack late in the afternoon of November 14, during which they were intercepted by the submarine USS Flying Fish which launched five torpedoes but scored no hits, then reported its contact by radio.

Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15

Prelude

To cover the unloading of the transports at Guadalcanal, the Japanese fleet made its third attempt to neutralize Henderson Field, sending the force of warships under Admiral Kondo through Indispensable Strait to bombard Guadalcanal on the night of November 14–November 15. The force included Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, light cruisers Nagara and Sendai, and nine destroyers, some of the destroyers being survivors (along with Kirishima and Nagara) of the first night engagement two days prior. Kondo flew his flag in the cruiser Atago. The force approached Guadalcanal around midnight, and a quarter moon provided moderate visibility.

First phase of the engagement, 23:17–23:30, November 14. Red lines are Japanese warship forces and black line is U.S. warship force.

Low on ships, Admiral William Halsey, Jr., detached the new battleships USS Washington and USS South Dakota, of Enterprise's support group, together with four destroyers, as Task Force 64 under Admiral Willis A. Lee to defend Guadalcanal and Henderson Field. It was a scratch force; the battleships had only operated together for a few days, and their four escorts were from four different divisions—chosen simply because, of the available destroyers, they had the most fuel. The U.S. force arrived in Ironbottom Sound in the early evening of November 14 and began patrolling around Savo Island. The U.S. warships were in column formation with the four destroyers in the lead, followed by Washington, with South Dakota bringing up the rear. At 22:55 on November 14, radar on the South Dakota and Washington began to detect the ships of the Japanese force near Savo Island around 18,000 m range.

Action

Kondo split his force into several groups, with one group, consisting of Sendai and destroyers Shikinami and Uranami ("C" on the maps), sweeping along the east side of Savo Island, and destroyer Ayanami ("B" on the maps) sweeping counterclockwise around the southwest side of Savo Island to check for the presence of Allied ships. The Japanese ships spotted Lee's force around 23:00, though Kondo misidentified the battleships as cruisers. Kondo ordered the Sendai group of ships, plus Nagara and four destroyers ("D" on the maps) to engage and destroy the U.S. force before he brought the bombardment force of Kirishima and heavy cruisers ("E" on the maps) into Ironbottom Sound. The U.S. ships ("A" on the maps) detected the Sendai force on radar but did not detect the other groups of Japanese ships. Using radar targeting, the two U.S. battleships opened fire on the Sendai group at 23:17. Admiral Lee ordered a cease fire about five minutes later after the radar returns on the northern group appeared to disappear from his ship's radar scopes. However, Sendai, Uranami, and Shikinami were undamaged and circled out of the danger area.

Second phase of the engagement, 23:30–02:00. Red lines are Japanese warship forces and black lines are U.S. warships. Numbered yellow dots represent sinking warships.

Meanwhile, the four U.S. destroyers in the vanguard of the U.S. formation began engaging both Ayanami and the Nagara group of ships at 23:22. Nagara and her escorting destroyers responded effectively with accurate gunfire and torpedoes, and destroyers USS Walke and USS Preston were hit and sunk within 10 minutes with heavy loss of life. The destroyer USS Benham had part of her bow blown off by a torpedo and had to retreat (she sank the next day), and destroyer USS Gwin was hit in her engine room and put out of the fight. However, the U.S. destroyers had completed their mission as screens for the battleships, absorbing the initial impact of contact with the enemy, although at great cost. Lee ordered the retirement of Benham and Gwin at 23:48.

Washington passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on Ayanami with her secondary batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, South Dakota suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go into series, making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable. However, she continued to follow Washington towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when Washington changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. South Dakota tried to follow but had to turn to right to avoid Benham which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her an easy target for the Japanese.

Receiving reports of the destruction of the U.S. destroyers from Ayanami and his other ships, Kondo pointed his bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were now heading towards each other.

Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, South Dakota was targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including Kirishima, beginning about 00:00 on November 15. Although able to score a few hits on Kirishima, South Dakota took 25 medium and one large-caliber hit, some of which did not explode, that completely knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to try to steer away from the engagement. All of the Japanese torpedoes missed. Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage to South Dakota as to, "render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent." South Dakota's crew casualties were 39 killed and 59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo's lookouts.

Washington fires upon Japanese battleship Kirishima during the battle on November 15. The low elevation of the gun barrels is because of the relatively close range of the two adversaries.

The Japanese ships had continued to concentrate their fire on South Dakota and none had detected Washington approaching to within 9,000 yards (8 km). Washington had been tracking a large target for some time but had refrained from firing since there was a chance it could be South Dakota. The ship had not been able to track South Dakota’s movements because she was in a blind spot in the Washington’s radar and could not raise her on the radio to confirm her position. When the Japanese illuminated and fired on South Dakota, all doubts were removed as to which ships were friend or foe. From this close range, the Washington suddenly hit Kirishima with at least nine main battery shells, causing heavy damage and setting her aflame. Kirishima was hit below the waterline and suffered a jammed rudder, causing her to circle uncontrollably to port.

At 00:25 Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to converge and destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships still did not know where Washington was located, and the other surviving U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. Washington steered a northwesterly course towards the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged South Dakota. The Japanese ships finally sighted Washington and launched several torpedo attacks, but by adroit maneuvering by her captain, Washington avoided all of them and also avoided grounding his ship in shallow waters. At length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break contact and retreat from the area about 01:04, which the Japanese ships complied with by 01:30.

Aftermath

Both Kirishima and Ayanami were scuttled and sank by 03:25, November 15. Uranami rescued survivors from Ayanami and destroyers Asagumo, Teruzuki, and Samidare rescued the remaining crew from Kirishima. In the engagement, 242 U.S. and 249 Japanese sailors died. The engagement was one of only two battleship-against-battleship surface battles in the entire Pacific campaign of World War II, the other being at the Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Two Japanese transports beached on Guadalcanal and burning on November 15

The four Japanese transports beached themselves at Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal by 04:00, November 15. The transports were attacked, beginning at 05:55 by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field and elsewhere, and field artillery from U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal. Later, destroyer USS Meade approached and opened fire on the beached transports and surrounding area. These attacks set the transports afire and destroyed any equipment on them that the Japanese had not managed to quickly unload. Only 2,000–3,000 of the troops originally embarked actually made it to Guadalcanal, and most of their ammunition and food supplies were lost. These troops and meager supplies were not enough to have a significant effect on the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal.

Yamamoto's reaction to Kondo's failure to accomplish his mission of neutralizing Henderson Field and ensuring the safe landing of troops and supplies was milder than his earlier reaction to Abe's withdrawal, perhaps because of Imperial Navy culture and politics. Kondo, who also held the position of second in command of the Combined Fleet, was a member of the upper staff and battleship "clique" of the Imperial Navy while Abe was a career destroyer specialist. Admiral Kondo was not reprimanded or reassigned but instead was left in command of one of the large ship fleets based at Truk.

Significance

The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the last major attempt by the Japanese to seize control of the seas around Guadalcanal or to retake the island. From then on, Japanese air and naval operations around Guadalcanal were defensive in nature, either to provide subsistence supplies to the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, or beginning in January 1943, attempts to evacuate and redeploy them elsewhere. In contrast, the U.S. Navy was thereafter able to resupply the U.S. forces at Guadalcanal at will, including the delivery of two fresh divisions by late December 1942. The inability to neutralize Henderson Field doomed the Japanese effort to successfully combat the Allied conquest of Guadalcanal. The last Japanese resistance in the Guadalcanal campaign ended on February 9, 1943, with the successful evacuation of the surviving Japanese troops on the island by the Japanese navy in Operation Ke.

The wreck of one of the four Japanese transports beached and destroyed at Guadalcanal on November 15, 1942, photographed one year later.

The securing of Guadalcanal and surrounding islands by Allied forces was the first step in their eventual conquest of the entire Solomon Islands chain and the isolation and neutralization of the major Japanese base at Rabaul, New Britain. Although the Allies and Japan engaged in several more intense and bloody naval battles during the Solomon Islands campaign, including some in which the Japanese emerged victorious, the Allied advance was never halted or even slowed to any appreciable extent. The capture of the Solomon Islands, along with New Guinea and New Britain, eventually led to the liberation of the Philippines in 1944 and early 1945, and then to invasion of Japan, at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, and the final defeat of Japan in August 1945. Many historians believe the Battle of Guadalcanal to be just as key a turning point in the Pacific War as the Battle of Midway was six months earlier. In fact, the Japanese considered the battle for Guadalcanal to be more significant than Midway. Historian Eric Hammel sums up the significance of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal this way:

On November 12, 1942, the (Japanese) Imperial Navy had the better ships and the better tactics. After November 15, 1942, its leaders lost heart and it lacked the strategic depth to face the burgeoning U.S. Navy and its vastly improving weapons and tactics. The Japanese never got better while, after November 1942, the U.S. Navy never stopped getting better.

General Alexander Vandegrift, the commander of the troops on Guadalcanal, paid tribute to the sailors who fought the battle:

We believe the enemy has undoubtedly suffered a crushing defeat. We thank Admiral Kinkaid for his intervention yesterday. We thank Lee for his sturdy effort last night. Our own aircraft has been grand in its relentless hammering of the foe. All those efforts are appreciated but our greatest homage goes to Callaghan, Scott and their men who with magnificent courage against seemingly hopeless odds drove back the first hostile attack and paved the way for the success to follow. To them the men of Cactus lift their battered helmets in deepest admiration.

References

• Calhoun, C. Raymond (2000). Tin Can Sailor: Life Aboard the USS Sterett, 1939–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-228-5. Online views of selections of the book:[1]
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
• Frank, Richard B. (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Penguin Group. ISBN 0-14-016561-4. Online views of selections of the book:[2]
• Generous, William Thomas, Jr., (2003). Sweet Pea at War: A History of USS Portland (CA-33). University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2286-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) Online views of selections of the book:[3]
• Grace, James W. (1999). Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, 13 November 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-327-3. Online views of selections of the book:[4]
• Hammel, Eric (1988). Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942. (CA): Pacifica Press. ISBN 0-517-56952-3.
• Hara, Tameichi (1961). "Part Three, The "Tokyo Express"". Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York & Toronto: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-27894-1.- Firsthand account of the first engagement of the battle by the captain of the Japanese destroyer Amatsukaze.
• Kilpatrick, C. W. (1987). Naval Night Battles of the Solomons. Exposition Press. ISBN 0-682-40333-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Lacroix, Eric (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-472-8. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Kurzman, Dan (1994). Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau. New York: Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-74874-2. Online views of selections of the book:[5]
• McGee, William L. (2002). The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville—Pacific War Turning Point, Volume 2 (Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII). BMC Publications. ISBN 0-9701678-7-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). "The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12–15 November 1942". The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help) Online views of selections of the book:[6]
• Parkin, Robert Sinclair (1995). Blood on the Sea: American Destroyers Lost in World War II. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81069-7.
• Stafford, Edward P. (2002 (reissue)). The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-998-0. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link)

External links

• Chen, C. Peter (2004–2006). "Guadalcanal Campaign". World War II Database. Retrieved 2006-05-17.
• Hough, Frank O. "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal". History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Retrieved 2006-05-16. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear= and |month= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Jameson, Colin G. (1944). "The Battle of Guadalcanal, 11–15 November 1942". Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy (somewhat inaccurate on details, since it was written during the war). Retrieved 2006-04-08.
• Lippman, David H. (2006). "Battle of Guadalcanal: First Naval Battle in the Ironbottom Sound". The HistoryNet.com. World War II magazine. Retrieved 2006-11-26.
• Lippman, David H. (2006). "Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Turning Point in the Pacific War". The HistoryNet.com. World War II magazine. Retrieved 2006-11-26.
• Miller, Jr., John (1948). ""Decision at Sea", chap. 7, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive". UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The War in the Pacific. Retrieved 2006-05-02.
• Mohl, Micahel (1996–2006). "BB-57 USS SOUTH DAKOTA 1942 – Guadalcanal". NavSource Online. NavSource Naval History. Retrieved 2006-04-08.
• Tully, Anthony P. (1997). "Death of Battleship HIEI: Sunk by Gunfire or Air Attack?". Retrieved 2006-05-03.Article on the battle of Friday the 13th that gives additional details to demise of Hiei
• Wright, Howard F. (1998–2006). "Battleship USS Washington BB56". USSWashington.com. USS Washington BB56 Associate Unit, Inc. Retrieved 2006-05-19.