13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian)

13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar 13. Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS „Handschar“ (kroatische Nr. 1) 13. oružana brdska divizija SS-a Handžar, također i hrvatska br. 1
Unit insignia of 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar
Active	1943 - 1944
Country	Nazi Germany
Allegiance	Nazi Germany Independent State of Croatia
Branch	Waffen-SS
Type	Mountain Infantry
Role	Anti-Partisan operations
Size	Division
Nickname(s)	Handschar
Motto(s)	Handžaru udaraj! (Handschar - Strike!)
Engagements	Operation Wegweiser Operation Save Operation Osterei Operation Maibaum Operation Maiglöckchen Operation Vollmond Operation Heiderose
Commanders
Notable commanders	Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig Desiderius Hampel

The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian) was a Waffen-SS mountain infantry formation used to conduct operations against Yugoslav Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) from March to December 1944. Named Handschar, after a local fighting knife or sword carried by Turkish policemen during the Ottoman period, it was one of the thirty-eight divisions fielded by the Waffen SS during World War II.

There is differing information about its exact composition, but the majority of the division was composed of Bosnian Muslims and some Catholic Croat soldiers and mostly German and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche officers. The division took an oath of allegiance to both Adolf Hitler and the leader of the NDH, Ante Pavelić.

The division operated mainly within a designated 'security zone' in north-eastern Bosnia within the NDH between the Sava, Bosna, Drina and Spreča rivers, administratively part of the Posavina and Usora-Soli counties. The division also fought briefly in the Syrmia region north of the Sava prior to crossing into north-eastern Bosnia, and in adjacent areas of Bosnia. In late 1944, the division was transferred briefly to the Zagreb area. In the next few months, the remnants of the division fought against the Red Army and Bulgarians in southern Hungary, falling back via a series of defensive lines until they were inside the Reich (Austrian) frontier. Most of the few Bosnian Muslims remaining with the division left at this point, and attempted to return to Bosnia. The rest of the division retreated further west, hoping to surrender to the Western Allies. Most of the division became prisoners of the British Army, however 38 officers were extradited by the Yugoslavian authorities to face criminal charges, of whom ten were executed.

History

After the fall of Sarajevo on 16 April 1941 to Nazi Germany, the extreme Croat nationalist and fascist Ante Pavelić, who had been in exile in Benito Mussolini's Italy, was appointed Poglavnik or leader of a new Ustaše state - the Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH). The Yugoslav provinces of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Serbia were reconstituted as an 'Italian-German quasi-protectorate'. The NDH authorities, led by the Ustaše, almost immediately launched a vicious campaign of violence directed at the Serb population.

The Mestrovic Pavilion was an art museum that was converted into a mosque by the addition of minarets.

Pavelić ordered a property in Zagreb be converted into a mosque that he named the 'Poglavnik's Mosque' in an effort to secure the loyalty of the Bosnian Muslims. Despite Pavelić's assurances of equality with the Croats, it wasn't long before many Muslims became dissatisfied with Croatian rule. An Islamic leader reported that not one Muslim occupied an influential post in the (local) administration. Fierce fighting broke out between the Ustaše, Chetniks and Partisans in the territory of the NDH. A number of Ustaše units believed that the Muslims were communist sympathizers and burned their villages and murdered civilians. The Chetniks accused the Muslims taking part in the Ustaše violence against Serbs and perpetrated similar atrocities against the Muslim population. The Muslim population received little protection from the Croatian Home Guard, who the Germans described as 'of minimal combat value'. Some local militias were raised, but these were of limited value, and only one, the Tuzla-based Home Guard 'Hadžiefendić Legion' led by Muhamed Hadžiefendić was of any significance.

Bosnian Muslim elite and notables issued resolutions or memorandums in various cities that publicly denounced Croat-Nazi collaborationist measures, laws and violence against Serbs: Prijedor (23 September 1941), Resolution of Sarajevo Muslims (12 October), Mostar (21 October), Banja Luka (12 November), Bijeljina (2 December) and Tuzla (11 December). The resolutions condemned the Ustaše in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both for their mistreatment of Muslims and for their attempts to turn Muslims and Serbs against one another. One memorandum declared that since the beginning of the Ustaše regime, the Muslims dreaded the lawless activities that some Ustaše, some Croatian government authorities, and various illegal groups perpetrated against the Serbs.

This dissatisfaction with Ustaše rule and need for protection of the Bosnian Muslim population was combined with nostalgia for the period of Habsburg rule in Bosnia and a generally friendly attitude towards Germany among some prominent Bosnian Muslims. These factors led to a movement towards autonomy for the Bosnian Muslim community which was strongly opposed by Pavelić as counter to the integrity of the NDH. By November 1942, the Muslim autonomists led by Uzeiraga Hadžihasanović were desperate to protect their people, and wrote to Adolf Hitler asking that he annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Reich.

On 6 December 1942, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler and key Waffen SS recruiting officer SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger approached Hitler with the proposal to raise a Bosnian Muslim SS division. Both the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS were concerned about the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the NDH that tied down German military personnel that could be better employed elsewhere. A German source noted that by 1943 over 100,000 Bosnian Muslims had been killed and 250,000 became refugees. In addition, starvation threatened the region due to a serious food shortage. "The Muslims" remarked SS Obergruppenführer and General of Waffen-SS Artur Phleps, "bear the special status of being persecuted by all others".

Himmler was personally fascinated by the Islamic faith, and believed that Islam created fearless soldiers. He thought that Muslim men would make perfect SS soldiers as Islam "promises them Heaven if they fight and are killed in action." As for their ethnic background and SS requirements, it appears that Himmler accepted the theories advanced by both Croatian and German nationalists that the Croatian people, including the Muslims were not ethnic Slavs but pure Aryans of either Gothic or Iranian descent.

Himmler was also inspired by the noted successes of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry in World War I. George Lepre wrote, "Himmler endeavored to restore what he called "an old Austrian" tradition by reviving the Bosnian regiments of the former Austro-Hungarian army in the form of a Bosnian Muslim SS Division. Once raised, this division was to engage and destroy Tito's Partisan forces operating in north-eastern Bosnia, thus restoring local 'order'. Himmler's primary concern in the region was not the security of the local Muslim population, but the welfare of ethnic German settlers to the north in Syrmia. "Srem (Syrmia) is the breadbasket of Croatia, and hopefully it and our beloved German settlements will be secured. I hope that the area south of Srem will be liberated by [...] the Bosnian division [...] so that we can at least restore partial order in this ridiculous (Croatian) state."'"

Hitler formally approved the project in mid-February 1943, and Himmler put then SS Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant of Waffen-SS Artur Phleps, commander of the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen, in charge of raising the first SS division composed of non-Germanic people.

Recruitment

Soldiers of the SS Handschar with a brochure about "Islam and Judaism", 1943

Phleps travelled to Zagreb to begin formal negotiations with the NDH government on 18 February 1943, and met with German foreign ministry envoy Siegfried Kasche and NDH Foreign Minister Dr. Mladen Lorković representing Pavelić. Even though Pavelić had already agreed to the raising of the division, it was clear from the start that the Waffen SS and NDH governments had very different ideas of how the division would be recruited and controlled. Lorković suggested that the division be named "SS Ustasa Division", not an SS Division but a Croatian unit raised with SS assistance, and that its regiments be given regional names such as Bosna, Krajina, Una etc. Pavelić, with the support of Kasche, objected to the recruitment of an exclusively Muslim division due to concerns about a Muslim bid for independence, as Muslim areas were considered an integral part of the NDH. As a compromise, the word "Croatian" was included in its official title, and some Croatian Catholic officers were included in the division. Despite the fact that Himmler and Phleps prevailed and largely recruited the division as they saw fit, the NDH government was very unhappy with the outcome, particularly regarding the ethnic composition of the division.

SS Standartenführer Karl von Krempler, a specialist in Islam, was charged by Himmler and Phleps with organising the recruitment of Muslims from Bosnia into the Waffen-SS.

"On 3 March [1942], Phleps met with fellow SS officer Karl von Krempler, who, together with NDH government official Dr. Alija Šuljak, was to conduct the recruiting effort. The campaign began on the twentieth, when the multi-lingual von Krempler and Dr. Šuljak, accompanied by several other dignitaries began an eighteen-day recruiting tour through eleven Bosnian districts." In the meantime the Germans began raising the divisional headquarters staff in Berlin, including SS Standartenführer of the Reserve Herbert von Oberwurzer who was transferred from the SS Mountain Division Nord to command the division.

Dr. Šuljak and von Krempler soon fell out over the aims and purposes of the proposed division. Šuljak, an entirely political appointee, criticized von Krempler's Serbian dialect and his use of traditional Islamic colours and emblems (green flags and crescent moons) rather than the new Ustaše symbols during recruitment. When he reached Tuzla in central Bosnia, von Krempler met the Muslim militia leader Major Muhamed Hadžiefendić, who was then officially serving in an under-equipped NDH army unit. On 28 March, Hadžiefendić escorted von Krempler to Sarajevo, where he introduced him to the leader of the Islamic clergy in all Bosnia, the Reis-ul-Ulema, Hafiz Muhamed Pandža, and other leading Muslim politicians not involved with the Ustaše. The NDH government and Kasche were furious, demanding von Krempler be removed immediately. However the SS ignored this and von Krempler continued to sign men up, including both Muslim and Catholic deserters from the NDH armed forces.

In April 1943, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, was invited by key Waffen SS recruiter SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger to assist in the organizing and recruiting Muslims into the Waffen SS and other units in Yugoslavia. He was escorted by von Krempler, who also spoke fluent Turkish. The Mufti successfully convinced the Muslims to ignore the declarations of the Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka Ulama (Islamic clerics), who in 1941 forbade them from collaborating with the Ustaše.

Grand Mufti Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, alongside SS Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of Waffen SS Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig, greeting Bosnian SS volunteers together with Nazi officers in November 1943.

The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust states that "The Germans made a point of publicizing the fact that Husseini had flown from Berlin to Sarajevo for the sole purpose of giving his blessing to the Muslim army and inspecting its arms and training exercises". According to Aleksa Djilas in The Nation That Wasn't, al-Husayni: "accepted, visited Bosnia, and convinced some important Muslim leaders that a Muslim SS division would be in the interest of Islam."

The Mufti insisted that, "The most important task of this division must be to protect the homeland and families (of the Bosnian volunteers); the division must not be permitted to leave Bosnia", but this request was ignored by the Germans.

Despite the support of al-Husayni, recruitment for the division fell well short of the numbers needed, and to the dismay of Himmler, 2,800 Croat Catholics were inducted into the division.

Hussein Biscevic (Husejin Biščević or Biščević-beg; born 28 July 1884) was the highest ranking (and perhaps the oldest) Bosnian military officer to volunteer. Biscevic had served in the Austro–Hungarian Army and he was appointed SS Obersturmbannführer assigning him to Flak Abteilung 13 in August 1943. However, he was determined to be unsuitable and replaced with a German just prior to the division first going into combat.

Composition

Sources differ regarding the initial composition of the division. Pavlowitch states that sixty percent of its recruits were composed of Muslims and the rest were Yugoslav Volksdeutsche who made up the majority of its officers and NCOs, but Tomasevich states that it was formed with 23,200 Muslims and 2,800 Croats, with mostly German officers. Whilst Tomasevich states it was the largest of the Muslim SS Divisions with 26,000 men, Lepre indicates that the prescribed strength of the division was reduced from 26,000 to 21,000, and Cohen states that the division achieved a maximum strength of 17,000 in April 1944. The number of Christians was higher than directed by Himmler, who had allowed a 10% Christian component only after the recruitment of sufficient Muslims proved difficult. The division had a Muslim Imam for each battalion other than the all-German signal battalion. For about six months the division included about 1,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and the Sandžak region who were formed into the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, which later became the 1st Battalion of the 28th Regiment.

By the time the division had completed its training, its officer corps was almost entirely German but it was about one third short of its establishment in both officers and NCOs.

Formation and Training

The division was initially sent to southern France for the purposes of formation and training, where it was accommodated mainly in towns and villages in the Aveyron and Lozère départements. The decision by the Waffen SS to form and train the division outside Bosnia was contrary to advice given by the German plenipotentiary general in the NDH, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau. This advice soon proved prophetic.

Villefranche-de-Rouergue Mutiny (September 1943)

Tomb of the "Yugoslavian combatants" in Villefranche.

On the night of 16/17 September 1943, whilst SS Handschar was training in Villefranche-de-Rouergue in France, a group of pro-Partisan soldiers led by Muslim and Catholic junior officers staged a mutiny within the division's Pioneer battalion. Led by Ferid Džanić, Božo Jelinek (aka Eduard Matutinović), Nikola Vukelić and Lutfija Dizdarevič, they captured most of the German personnel and executed five German officers, including Obersturmbannführer Oskar Kirchbaum, the pioneer battalion commander. Apparently the mutineers believed that many of the enlisted men would join them and they could reach the western Allies. The revolt was put down with the assistance of the unit Imam, Halim Malkoć and unit physician Dr. Willfried Schweiger. Malkoć told the Bosnian enlisted men of 1st Company that they were being deceived, released the German NCOs and rallied the company to hunt down the ringleaders. Schweiger did the same with 2nd Company. Dizdarevič and Džanić were shot and killed during the fighting, Vukelić were captured, and Jelinek/Matutinović escaped. Sources vary on the number of mutineers killed during the mutiny and executed after the revolt was put down. Tomasevich states that 78 of the worst offenders were executed, but Lepre lists only 14 executions and four more deserters that were located and shot in late September. Cohen states that about 150 mutineers were killed immediately. As Tito had once suggested that his Partisan followers enlist for police duty in Croatia where they could receive weapons, uniforms and superior training, the Germans believed that this was why the mutineers had infiltrated the division. Afterward there was a purge of members of the division who were deemed "unsuitable for service" or "politically unreliable". Some 825 Bosnians were eventually removed from the division and sent to Nazi Germany for "labor service" with Organisation Todt. Of these, 265 refused and were sent to Neuengamme concentration camp where dozens of them died.

Himmler later on said of the mutiny: "I knew there was a chance that a few traitors might be smuggled into the division, but I haven’t the slightest doubt concerning the loyalty of the Bosnians. These troops were loyal to their supreme commander twenty years ago so why shouldn’t they be so today." Himmler was referring to the Bosnian Muslim troops who had served in the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg army. Himmler awarded both Malkoč and Schweiger the Iron Cross Second Class for their roles in thwarting the mutiny. Five soldiers, including Ejub Jašarević and Adem Okanadžić were also decorated.

When the city was liberated in 1944, the population decided to pay tribute to the troops by naming one of its streets Avenue des Croates (Bosnian Muslims being identified by the local population as Croats of Islamic faith) and commemorating "the revolt of the Croats" every 17 September. Cohen states that after the war, the Yugoslav government requested it be changed "the revolt of the Yugoslavs" in order to obscure the ethnicity of the mutineers, which was refused by the French for the sake of "historical truth". The Villefranche-de-Rouergue mutiny is commemorated in the city with a monument designed by the Croatian sculptor Vanja Radauš.

As a result of the mutiny, the division was moved to the Neuhammer training grounds in the Silesian region of Germany (current day Poland) to complete its training. During the training phase, the German officers of the division, pleased with the progress being made, coined the term Mujo for the Bosnian Muslims of the division.

Commanders

• SS-Gruppenführer Artur Phleps (in charge of raising the division, from 13 February 1943)
• SS-Standartenführer of the Reserve Herbert Von Obwurzer (9 March 1943–1 August 1943)
• SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of the Waffen-SS Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig (1 August 1943–1 June 1944)
• SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of the Waffen-SS Desiderius Hampel (1 June 1944–8 May 1945)

Order of battle

• 27th Waffen Mountain Infantry Regiment of the SS (1st Croatian)
• 28th Waffen Mountain Infantry Regiment of the SS (2nd Croatian)
• 13th SS Mountain Artillery Regiment
• 13th SS Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion
• 13th SS Panzerjäger Battalion
• 13th SS Mountain Pioneer Battalion
• 13th SS Flak Battalion
• 13th SS Mountain Signals Battalion
• 13th SS Division Supply Battalion
• 13th SS Logistics Battalion
• 13th SS Medical Battalion
• 13th SS Replacement Battalion

From 24 September 1944, the supply and logistics battalions were combined to form the 13th SS Service Support/Supply Regiment

Anti-Partisan operations March to May 1944

The division was formed for the primary role of securing around 6000 square kilometres of territory (the designated 'security zone') in north-eastern Bosnia within the NDH. The 'security zone' encompassed the Posavina, Semberija and Majevica regions between the Sava, Bosna, Drina and Spreča rivers. Himmler saw this task as critical to the safeguarding of important agricultural areas and Volksdeutsche settlements in the Syrmia region to the north.

Security zone of the division corresponding to local district subdivisions highlighted in green

The division participated in what may have been the largest anti-Partisan sweep of World War II: Operation Maibaum, in which the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen (SS Prinz Eugen) was also involved. The division also participated in a number of other divisional and corps-sized anti-Partisan operations between March and September 1944.

Operation Wegweiser

The division first saw action during Operation Wegweiser (Signpost) from 9 to 12 March 1944. The aim of Operation Wegweiser was to clear a part of the Syrmia region which was occupied by Partisans who were constantly threatening the Zagreb-Belgrade railway. The Partisans were operating from particular forests around Bosut and villages along the Sava river. The Partisans avoided decisive engagement with the division and withdrew to the south-east. Sauberzweig claimed the Partisans suffered 573 killed and 82 captured. The operation was a success in clearing the Bosut forests, but the Partisans returned to the area soon after the operation concluded.

Operation Save

Begun on 15 March 1944 shortly after the completion of Operation Wegweiser, the objective of Operation Save (Sava) was the clearing of Partisans from the Semberija region of the 'security zone', in northeastern Bosnia, across the Sava River. Before the crossing, Sauberzweig wrote an open letter to the division: "We have now reached the Bosnian frontier and will (soon) begin the march into the homeland. [...] The Führer has provided you with his best weapons. Not only do you (have these) in your hands, but above all you have an idea in your hearts - to liberate the homeland. [...] Before long, each of you shall be standing in the place that you call home, as a soldier and a gentleman; standing firm as a defender of the idea of saving the culture of Europe - the idea of Adolf Hitler."

Sauberzweig also ordered that as the units of the division crossed the Sava River, each commander was to read a prepared message, which emphasized that the "liberation of Bosnia" and ultimately the liberation of "Muslim Albania" was their goal, appealing directly to the Albanian troops in the division. The 27th Regiment of the division crossed the Sava at dawn at Bosanska Rača near the confluence with the Drina. The rest of the division crossed at Brĉko covered by an intense artillery bombardment. Contact was immediately made with Partisan forces, who quickly withdrew into the forests. The service support units remained in Vinkovci, which became their permanent garrison area. 27th Regiment advanced easily across the Pannonian Plain through Velino Selo to Brodac and then on to Bijeljina which was taken against light Partisan resistance late on 16 March.

The 27th Regiment then consolidated its position in Bijeljina whilst the 28th Regiment and divisional reconnaissance battalion bore the brunt of the fighting as it advanced through Pukis, Celic and Koraj at the foot of the Majevica mountains. Sauberzweig later recorded that the 2nd battalion of the 28th Regiment "at Celic stormed the Partisan defenses with (new) battalion commander Hans Hanke at the point" and that the enemy forces withdrew after a hard battle with heavy losses, and running low on ammunition.

Once the area was secured, defensive positions were established along the Celic-Lopare road and units sent out company strength reconnaissance. On the night of 17–18 March, elements of the Partisan 16th and 36th Vojvodina Divisions mounted unsuccessful attacks against the 28th Regiment's positions at Koraj and Zabrde, losing over 200 dead.

Operation Osterei

After Operation Save, the division remained relatively static for more than three weeks, conducting mopping up operations and beating off local Partisan attacks. The Muslim men of the division were impatient to push further into Bosnia. However, the divisional reconnaissance battalion was heavily engaged on the western flank of the divisional area, attacking positions held by the Partisan 3rd Vojvodina Brigade at Gornji Rahić on 26 March, killing 124 Partisans and capturing fourteen. The battalion went on to capture several more Partisan positions in the next week.

Operation Osterei (Easter Egg) began on 12 April 1944 with the goal of clearing the Majevica mountain, which was held by elements of the Partisan 3rd Corps led by General Vladimir Popović. The 27th Regiment of the division quickly captured Janja and drove through Donja Trnova to reach an important economic objective for the German war machine, the Ugljevik coal mines. Following fighting which continued into the evening of 13 April, the 27th Regiment reported Partisan casualties of 106 dead, 45 captured and 2 deserters along with large amounts of weapons and ammunition. The regiment also seized a huge amount of medical supplies from aid stations in the area of Donja Trnova.

The 28th Regiment of the division drove south through Mačkovac and during fighting around Priboj its 1st battalion, made up of Albanians, incurred heavy casualties. The Partisan 3rd Corps then withdrew the 16th and 36th (Vojvodina) divisions south across the Tuzla-Zvornik road. The divisional reconnaissance battalion continued the advance, driving into the western Majevicas and capturing Srebrnik and Gradačac then establishing contact with the NDH Home Guard 1st Mountain Brigade. The Germans considered Operation Osterei a major success, with all objectives achieved with minimal losses.

During the final phase of Operation Osterei, the 1st Battalion of the 28th Regiment (made up of Albanian soldiers) was withdrawn from the fighting and transferred to Pristina in Kosovo to form part of the 21st Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Skanderbeg (1st Albanian) being raised by order of Himmler. A new 1st Battalion was raised from other divisional units and new recruits.

In the latter part of Operation Osterei, Jadgkommandos, lightly armed and mobile 'hunter teams' of battalion or company strength were used to break up and harass Partisans still operating on the flanks of the division. These teams killed over 380 Partisans and captured over 200 between 21–23 April. By mid-April, half of the division 'security zone' had been cleared of Partisans.

Operation Maibaum

The ambitious goal of Operation Maibaum (Maypole) was to destroy the Partisan Third Bosnian Corps. Army Group F ordered V SS Mountain Corps to form a blockade along the line of the Drina to prevent the Partisan force from crossing into Serbia. Operation Maibaum was one of the largest counter-insurgency operations of the Second World War, and included SS Prinz Eugen and NDH forces. Under the command of V SS Mountain Corps, the primary tasks of the division were to capture Tuzla and Zvornik then drive south parallel with the Drina to meet the other elements of V SS Mountain Corps. The original plan included the parachute insertion of 500th SS Parachute Battalion into the Vlasenica area, but this was cancelled due to unsuitable weather. Flank security was to be provided by the divisional reconnaissance battalion in the Srebrnik area. The deployment of parts of the division south of the Spreča and therefore outside the 'security zone' during Operation Maibaum was ordered by Artur Phleps, the commander of the V SS Mountain Corps, against the opposition of the divisional commander, Sauberzweig. This caused some friction between the two which eventually required intervention by Himmler.

On 23 April, the 28th Regiment pushed south along mountain roads through Tuzla then as far as Stupari the following day. On 25 April, the 27th Regiment advanced south to capture Zvornik. At the same time, the 28th Regiment sent I/28 east towards Vlasenica and II/28 continuing south towards Kladanj, capturing the town on 27 April. Due to the level of the Drinjača at Klandanj, instead of fording the river and pushing east towards Vlasenica, II/28 continued south-east towards Han Pijesak, where they met elements of SS Prinz Eugen advancing north.

I/28 captured Vlasenica on 28 April, but was almost immediately attacked from the east by two Partisan divisions. A third Partisan division surrounded the headquarters of 28th Regiment at Šekovići, some 30 kilometres north-west of Vlasenica. Both II/28 and the divisional reconnaissance battalion were rushed to Vlasenica, where II/28 relieved the battered I/28 then advanced on and surrounded Šekovići. After a 48 hour battle, during which II/28 was decimated, the town was taken.

While the battle of Šekovići raged, the 27th Regiment extended the Drina blockade further south, ambushing a Partisan column and reaching Nova Kasaba on 30 April. After the situation at Šekovići improved on 1 May, the 27th Regiment returned to patrolling the Tuzla-Zvornik road. The 28th Regiment moved to the Simin Han-Lopare area on 5 May, while SS Prinz Eugen pursued the Partisans withdrawing south.

Operation Maibaum had not only stopped the Partisan 3rd Corps from crossing the Drina into Serbia, it had scattered the Partisan formation and killed nearly a thousand of its troops. On 6 May, V SS Mountain Corps ordered SS Handschar to return to the security zone north of the Spreča.

Operation Maiglöckchen

On 17–18 May 1944, the division, along with the local Majevica-Tuzla Chetnik unit commanded by Radivoj Kerovic, commenced Operation Maiglöckchen (May Bell) to destroy several Partisan brigades in the Majevicas. The Partisans were encircled in the Stolice heights. An attempt by the Partisan 16th Vojvodina Division to relieve the surrounded force was defeated by the divisional reconnaissance battalion and elements of the 28th Regiment and the relieving column was driven back across the Spreća. After heavy bombardment by the divisional artillery regiment, the trapped Partisan force was able to escape south out of the pocket under cover of darkness on the night of 18 May. The Partisans suffered considerable casualties, the 17th Majevica Brigade alone losing 16 killed and 60 missing. At the conclusion of Operation Maiglöckchen, the 27th Regiment remained near Zvornik and the 28th Regiment deployed near Srebrnik.

Cooperation with local forces in the 'security zone'

After Operation Maiglöckchen, the division shifted to a largely defensive posture aimed at denying Partisans access to the 'security zone'. Since its arrival in the 'security zone' the division had been assisted in this task by local forces of varying reliability. These included four groups of Chetniks numbering 13,000 in total, Nešad Topčić's Zeleni Kader (or Green Cadres, a Muslim nationalist militia) most of which eventually joined the Partisans, and both Ustaša militia and Home Guard of the NDH, neither of which was of much help to the division. These same groups, along with the Partisans, had simultaneously been trying to encourage Bosnian and Croat members of the division to desert to their forces. Between March and June 1944, these attempts were largely fruitless, with less than 200 members of the division deserting.

Anti-Partisan operations June to August 1944

Operation Vollmond

Following Operation Rösselsprung (Knight's Move), the German attempt to kill or capture Josip Broz Tito at Drvar in western Bosnia on 25 May 1944 (known in post-war Yugoslav historiography as the Seventh Enemy Offensive), Tito ordered a general uprising by Partisan forces. The Partisan 3rd Bosnia Corps, which had been pushed out of the 'security zone' by Operations Save and Osterei, planned an offensive that involved three parallel columns of divisional strength thrusting north into the 'security zone' to engage and destroy German and local allied forces.

Operation Vollmond (Full Moon) was devised quickly after the divisional reconnaissance battalion observed Partisan forces crossing the Tuzla-Zvornik road on the evening of 6 June 1944. Sauberzweig's aim was to assault from the east and north, pushing the advancing Partisan forces against the Drina. However, the German plan underestimated the strength of the Partisan 'Western Column' which consisted of the 16th Vojvodina Division, and placed only the 1st battalion of the 28th Regiment (I/28) on some heights in their path. I/28 included a large number of new recruits that had only recently joined the division. I/28 was protecting two batteries of the divisional artillery regiment, one of which (7/AR13) was deployed just east of Lopare.

Late on 7 June, the Partisans scattered I/28 and although II/28 was sent from Srebrenik to assist, the 16th Division surged forward against the positions of 7/AR13, which consisted of 80 men with four 150mm guns and only one machine gun. After four hours fighting, and with half the battery's personnel dead, the artillerymen ran out of small arms ammunition and they scattered into the forest. II/28 counterattacked on the afternoon of 9 June and throughout 10 June, the Partisan 16th Vojvodina Division withdrew that afternoon and II/28 pursued both the Partisan 'Western Column' and 'Centre Column' south. The guns and vehicles of 7/AR13 had been destroyed by the Partisans before they withdrew, and there were reports that the German dead at Lopare had been mutilated. The 'Eastern Column' was stopped by the 27th Regiment, and the last of the Partisan 3rd Bosnia Corps was pushed back across the Spreča on 12 June.

Operation Vollmond cost SS Handschar 205 dead, 528 wounded and 89 missing. I/28 had been decimated, with only 180 men remaining. However, the Germans had killed over 1500 Partisans and captured large amounts of arms and ammunition.

At the conclusion of Operation Vollmond, the commander of the 27th Regiment, Desiderius Hampel was appointed as division commander, and Sauberzweig was tasked with forming a new corps headquarters, the IX SS Mountain Corps. The commander of the 28th Regiment, Hellmuth Raithel was tasked to raise the new 23rd Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Kama (2nd Croatian). Both the new corps headquarters and new division were to be formed in southern Hungary, and three NCOs from every company of SS Handschar along with other personnel, were transferred to form the cadre of SS Kama. New commanders were appointed to the two mountain infantry regiments of the division, notably Hans Hanke as the commander of the 28th Regiment.

Soon after Hampel's assumption of command, he became aware that local Chetniks were scavenging on the Operation Vollmond battlefields for divisional equipment. He met with the Chetnik leader Kerović, and arranged for the return of the equipment in exchange for small arms ammunition and boxes of hand grenades.

Throughout the remainder of June 1944 and into the first week of July, the division was engaged in fighting off attempted Partisan incursions into the 'security zone' and reinforcing local NDH and Chetnik forces that were under attack from the Partisans.

Operation Fliegenfänger

Launched on 14 July 1944, the objective of Operation Fliegenfänger (Flypaper) was to destroy a Partisan makeshift runway in the Osmaci area near Šekovići about 26 km southeast of Tuzla, and destroy the Partisan forces guarding it. The airstrip was being used by Allied aircraft to bring in supplies and evacuate wounded Partisans to Italy. The airfield was defended by elements of the 19th (Birac) Partisan Brigade of the 27th (Eastern Bosnia) Division. Two battalions of the 27th Regiment of SS Hanschar, along with a battalion of Chetniks captured the towns of Osmaci and Memići and destroyed the airfield despite stiff resistance. Forty two Partisans were killed and the division's losses were four dead and seven wounded. The Partisan force withdrew to the Vlasenica-Rajici area. The cooperation with the Chetnik battalion was described in the IX SS Mountain Corps war diary as 'effective'.

Operation Heiderose

While SS Handschar was conducting Operation Fliegenfänger, Second Panzer Army were developing a plan to block a large Partisan force from moving from central Bosnia into western Serbia to reinforce Partisan forces operating there. Due to issues with the availability of various units of V SS Mountain Corps, the planned 'Operation Rose' did not go ahead.

However, in the interim, as most of the division was deployed in the southern part of the 'security zone', Hampel decided to develop a divisional-level operation, named Operation Heiderose (Wild Rose) targeting the Partisan positions north-west of Šekovići. The 27th Regiment, reinforced by the same Chetnik battalion that cooperated in Operation Fliegenfänger, would attack east towards Šekovići, and the 28th Regiment would push south. A detached battalion of SS Prinz Eugen would act as a blocking force driving north. Hampel was apparently unhappy with the performance of the new commander of the 27th Regiment (Obersturmbannführer Hermann Peter), and put the divisional chief of staff, Sturmbannführer Erich Braun in charge of the 27th Regiment for the operation.

On 17 July 1944, SS Handschar began Operation Heiderose. Fierce resistance was immediately encountered by the 28th Regiment, whilst the 27th Regiment climbed the heights to Udrč before dusk without serious opposition.

Early on 18 July, the Chetniks assaulted from Matkovac towards Šekovići, and the 27th Regiment reached Bačkovac and seized the high ground south of Šekovići on 19 July 1944. The 28th Regiment forced the Partisan 36th Vojvodina Division back. The battalion from SS Prinz Eugen struck serious resistance around Vlasenica but pushed through. On 19 July, the 28th Regiment drove north towards Gornje Petrovice to attack the Partisan 12th Corps at Živinice. The divisional reconnaissance battalion of SS Prinz Eugen was pushed in from Vareš as a blocking force to stop the Partisans from withdrawing via Kladanj.

At this stage, the Partisans committed the 16th Vojvodina Division to assist the 36th Vojvodina Division that had borne the brunt of Operation Heiderose to this point. Both divisions attacked the 27th Regiment on 20 July, which counterattacked the following day after the Partisans were rebuffed with heavy casualties. On 23 July, the Partisans began to withdraw south out of the area, and the division began to search for the hidden Partisan bases that German intelligence had indicated were located in the area. After a further day of searching, the division located more than ten separate Partisan bases, which the cooperating Chetniks began to clear themselves, despite the fact that they had shown little interest in actually fighting the Partisans over the previous days.

Operation Heiderose was a significant success for the division, causing serious losses to the Partisan formations engaged. More than 900 Partisans were killed, and a large amount of equipment was captured; 1 anti-tank gun, 2 mortars, 22 machine guns, over 800 rifles, and nearly 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The division suffered 24 killed, and over 150 wounded. Erich Braun was recommended for the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross but the recommendation was not supported, apparently due to disagreements between the divisional staff and the corps commander (Phleps) that had occurred during the formation of the division.

Operation Hackfleisch/Rübezahl

In the first week of August 1944, Second Panzer Army was finally ready to move to thwart the Partisan advance from Bosnia into Serbia, originally planned as Operation Rose. Renamed Operation Rübezahl (Mountain Spirit) the revamped plan required the SS Handschar and SS Prinz Eugen divisions to form the Bosnian phase of the operation, named Operation Hackfleisch (Minced Meat). Operation Hackfleisch aimed to drive out the Partisans occupying the area between the towns of Kladanj, Vlasenica, Sokolac and Olovo. The overall plan involved columns that were to force the Partisan eastwards into the pincers of the other units, thereby destroying them.

The columns were allocated tasks and composed as follows:

• the divisional reconnaissance battalion of SS Prinz Eugen was to drive west from Vareš and attack the Partisans around the town of Olovo, pushing them east
• I/28 from SS Handschar was to attack south and south-east from Ribnica towards Olovo
• III/28 from SS Handschar was to thrust south and south-east from Klandanj towards the village of Petrović
• The 27th Regiment of SS Handschar was to drive southwards from Šekovići
• Parts of the 14th Regiment of SS Prinz Eugen were to push north-west between Olovo and Sokolac
• Parts of the 13th Regiment of SS Prinz Eugen were to attack northwards through Sokolac

The 27th Regiment of the division became locked in fierce fighting with the Partisan 27th and 38th East Bosnian Divisions, which had launched an offensive near Vlasenica. The inability of the 27th Regiment to push forward meant that the plan to encircle the Partisan force was not achieved, and the Partisans escaped by crossing the Vlasenica-Han Pijesak road to the east. Other Partisan forces withdrew in the direction of Goražde.

From the German perspective, Operation Hackfleisch was a moderate success, with 227 Partisans killed and over 50 prisoners taken. However, whilst Operation Hackfleisch delayed the move of Partisan forces into Serbia, it did not prevent it. To enable SS Prinz Eugen to pursue Partisan forces witthdrawing towards central Bosnia, both I/28 and III/28 were placed under command of that division for the period 8–17 August 1944. During the remainder of August 1944, the rest of the division fought hard to keep the Partisans out of the 'security zone'. The Partisan 11th Border and 38th East Bosnia divisions quickly infiltrated into the southern part of the 'security zone' and the 27th East Bosnia Division crossed into the area north-west of Srebrenica and drove towards Bratunaci. After a series of rapid redeployments and battalion and regimental attacks, the division managed to scatter the 11th Border Division and maul the 27th East Bosnia Division.

The division had by now been fighting almost continuously throughout the summer, and according to the divisional commander Hampel, had been exhausted before Operation Hackfleisch began. The cumulative effect of this exhaustion, the deteriorating situation the Germans faced on all fronts, and rumors probably spread among members of the division by the Partisans and/or Ustaša, was that the division began to disintegrate from early September 1944.

Disintegration

On 17 August 1944 Josip Broz Tito offered a general amnesty to all opponents and many men in the division chose this point to defect. A week later in August Romania changed sides and the Red Army advanced deep into the Balkans, getting very close to Bosnia. Over 1–7 September the Allies undertook Operation "Ratweek". In a combined assault British and American air forces based in Italy attacked important railways and bridges in conjunction with heightened Partisan activity in the same areas. This undermined German supply and morale, necessitating specialised military and repair operations to secure transportation lines. On 17 September, the Partisans seized the important (largely Muslim) town of Tuzla in northeast Bosnia following a mass defection by the "12th Ustaše Brigade" garrison to the Partisan cause. Between 1–20 September over 2000 men of the division deserted. Especially heavy desertions from the division in September 1944 were the main reason for the move of the division from north-east Bosnia to northern Croatia.

At 05:00, 3 October 1944, 28th Slavonia Division assaulted a company sized base from SS Handschar at Janja. Soon Aufklarungs Abt. 13 and III/27 with a battery from AR 13 were rushing to relieve the pressure off the battered garrison. At the dawn of the following day, an additional four partisan brigades attacked the garrison in Janja. The attacks were eventually repulsed by the outnumbered force from SS Handschar. Jagdkommandos were sent after the fleeing enemy but were not able to inflict significant losses on them as they had already crossed the Drina.

On 20 October the Red Army liberated Belgrade and the following day the divisional staff Imam, Abdullah Muhasilović, incited a mutiny and led 100 men back to Bosnia. By November 1944 the division, which had been 95% non-German in January, was now 50% German. On 10 November the division was committed to action against the Soviets at Darda, Croatia.

It was at this time that first units from the division were sent to fight the Red Army under the command of other units. Two batteries from IV/AR13, the 1st Company of the Panzer Jager Abt. and five anti aircraft guns were sent to fight against the advancing Russians. They were returned to SS Handschar after hard fighting in late November. A 105mm battery from the Division also saw service with the Sturmbrigade von Rudno.

The end of the division

The division fought on until 19 April 1945, being slowly pushed back across Hungary. On 5 May the remaining men, both German and Bosnian began to retreat eastwards towards Austria. On 8 May an order was sent to retreat to Wolfsberg, Carinthia.

On 12 May 1945 Brigadeführer and Generalmajor of the Waffen-SS Desiderius Hampel carried out surrender negoitations with the British Army and on 15 May most of the men were transported to Rimini in Italy, where they were incarcerated with other prisoners of war from the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen and 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Reichsführer-SS.

On learning of their retreat several "imams approached their commander, Hans Hanke, and requested that they and their men be discharged and be allowed to attempt to return to their homeland.... Soon, all of the Bosnians remaining in the division were asked if they wished to remain." Many of these men are alleged to have been murdered by Communist Partisans after the war.

Aftermath

Between 22–30 August 1947, trials by the Communist regime for members of the division took place at a military court in Sarajevo. "Although the indictment accused the division of murdering some five thousand people, only seven of the thirty-eight defendants were charged with specific offenses." The accused were defended by three Yugoslav lawyers: two civilian and one military officer. All 38 men were found guilty and either sentenced to death (10) or prison terms of between five years and life (28). Some committed suicide rather be extradited, including Generalleutnant Sauberzweig who committed suicide on 20 October 1946, and SS Obersturmführer Hans König who also committed suicide. SS Obersturmführer Imam Halim Malkoč was executed at Bihać on 7 March 1947.

Those executed on 17 July 1948 included:

• SS Obersturmführer (der Reserve) Rolf Baumeister
• SS Hauptsturmführer (der Reserve) Walter Eipel
• SS Oberscharführer Kurt Lütkemüller
• SS Hauptscharführer Bruno Lütjens
• SS Obersturmführer (der Reserve) Heinz Masannek
• SS Oberscharführer Josef Pälmke
• SS Oberscharführer Wilhelm Schmidt
• SS Obersturmführer (der Reserve) Willi Schreer
• SS Oberscharführer Erich Schwerin
• SS Obersturmführer (der Reserve) Kurt Weber

Almost all the prisoners were released early, and by 1952 the prisoners had been freed, except SS Sturmmann Wilhelm Mahn who died during captivity. SS-Brigadeführer Desiderius Hampel never faced a trial and survived the war. He died on the 11 January 1981 in Graz, Austria.

Uniform

The uniform worn by the division was regular SS M43 field-jacket issue, with a divisional collar patch showing an arm holding a scimitar, over a swastika. On the left arm was a Croatian armshield (red-white chessboard) and on the right an Edelweiss flower patch. There was controversy over the chessboard armshield, especially with the Imams, who, after crossing the Sava river, took them off. Former SS personnel who were serving in the division were entitled to wear a Sig Rune badge that was attached to the left breast pocket of the tunic.

Headgear was either the SS M43 fez which was to be worn by all ranks, while German officers had the option to wear the mountain cap (Bergmütze). The fez was chosen for the Division by Heinrich Himmler due to it having been worn by the Bosnia-Herzegovinian infantry regiments of the Austro-Hungarian Army from 1894 to 1918, as well as by the Austro-Hungarian Albanian Legion from 1916-18. There were two versions of the fez made: a field gray model to be worn in combat and while on duty, and a red colored model that was worn during parades, marching exercises, and while off duty. Both the fez and mountain cap bore the death's head and eagle of the SS, the mountain cap was also adorned with an Edelweiss flower patch, worn on the left side of the cap.

Division Hymn

Set to the melody of "Wir fahren gegen Engelland" (Bombs on England) by Herms Niel

Sa Pjesmom u Boj	Into Battle With a Song
Pjesma jeci, sva se zemlja trese,	A song is in the air, the entire earth is shaking,
SS-vojska stupa roj u roj,	Columns of SS men march in step,
SS-vojska sveti barjak vije.	SS men wave the sacred banners.
SS-vojska sve za narod svoj.	SS men do everything for the people.
Daj mi ruku ti, draga Ivana,	Give me your hand, dear Ivana,
oj s Bogom sad, oj s Bogom sad, oj s Bogom sad	Follow God now, Follow God now, Follow God now
idem branit, idem branit, idem branit mili,	I shall defend, I shall defend, I shall defend my beloved
rodni kraj, rodni kraj.	Homeland, Homeland
U boj smjelo vi SS-junaci	SS men are heroes in battle
pokazite domovini put!	Show our homeland the way
Podjite putem slavnih pradjedova	Follow the road of our glorious grandfathers
dok ne padne tiran klet i ljut.	Until tyranny falls, cursed and bitter
Ljubav nasa nek u srdcu plamti,	Let love burn in our hearts
i sa pjesmom podjimo u boj.	And with a song let's enter battle
Za slobodu mile domovine	To liberate our beloved homeland
svaki rado datce zivot svoj.	For which anyone would gladly sacrifice his life.

See also

• List of Knight's Cross recipients 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian)
• Mountain Infantry
• Waffen-SS
• 21st Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Skanderbeg (1st Albanian)
• 23rd Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Kama (2nd Croatian)

References

• Cohen, Philip J. (1996). Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 0890967601.
• Lepre, George (1997). Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division 1943-1945. Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 0-7643-0134-9.
• Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (2007). Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 1850658951.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804708576.
• Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Vol. 2. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804736154.
• Military Intelligence Division, United States War Department, Washington D.C. (29 February 1944), Special Series No.21, German Mountain Warfare{{citation}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Further reading

• Munoz, Antonio J., editor.The East Came West: Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist Volunteers in the German Armed Forces. (chapters 2 and 13) Bayside, NY: Axis Europa, 2001 ISBN 1-891227-39-4
• Stein, George H. (1984). The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-45 Cornell UP. ISBN 0-8014-9275-0
• Mousavizadeh, Nader (1996). The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-09835-5
• Bishop, Michael (2003). SS: Hell on the Western Front. Zenith Imprint. ISBN 0-7603-1402-0
• "13.SS 'Handžar' divizija i njen slom u Istočna Bosni" (Istočna Bosna, vol. 2, 587)
• Redzic, Enver, Muslimansko Autonomastvo I 13. SS Divizija (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1987).
• K.W. Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Jugoslawien 1941-1949, vol.I of Die Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. by Dr Erich Maschke (Munich: Verlag Ernst and Werner Giesking, 1962, I/1:107-109
• Herf, Jeffrey. Nazi propaganda for the Arab world. Yale UP, New Haven 2009. ISBN 0-300-14579-9. p. 204ff.
• Mallmann, Klaus-Michael & Cüppers, Martin. Halbmond und Hakenkreuz. Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft WBG. 2006, p. 211 – 236 Muslime für das Dritte Reich. Der islamische Sektor von Wehrmacht, Sicherheitspolizei und Waffen-SS. Template:De

External links

• 13.Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS "Handschar" (kroat.Nr.1) at Feldgrau.com.
• 13. Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS Handschar (kroatische Nr. 1) at Axis History Factbook.
• 13th SS Freiwilligsten Gebirgsjägerdivision Handschar at Vojska.net.