Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah
Detained at	Guantanamo
Other name(s)	Abu Zubaydah زين العابدين محمد حسين
ISN	10016
Charge(s)	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Abu Zubaydah (Arabic: ابو زبيدة; born 12 March 1971 as Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn) is currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a detainee in the war on Terror. Zubaydah's name is often transliterated as Abu Zubaidah, Abu Zubeida, or Abu Zoubeida. Born Zein al-Abideen Mohamed Hussein (Arabic: زين العابدين محمد حسين), he is also known by over thirty-five aliases.

Biography and His Early Years in Afghanistan

Born in Saudi Arabia, Abu Zubaydah moved to Afghanistan in 1991 to assist the mujahideen in their fight against the Afghan and Soviet Communists. In 1992, while fighting for the mujahideen Abu Zubaydah was injured from a mortar shell blast which left shrapnel in his head and caused severe memory loss, as well as the loss of his ability to speak for over one year. Abu Zubaydah eventually became involved in the jihad training camp known as the Khalden Camp.

The Khalden Camp has been described by the U.S. Government as an al-Qaeda training facility -- an assertion that has been utilized as evidence of Abu Zubaydah's, and over 50 other Guatanamo detainees' alleged connection to al-Qaeda. This allegation has been contested, however, by multiple detainees, the 9/11 Commission Report, and Brynjar Lia, head of the international terrorism and global jihadism at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. Abu Zubaydah testified in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal that the Khalden Camp was at such odds with al-Qaeda and Bin Laden that is was closed by the Taliban in 2001, at the request of al-Qaeda. This account was corroborated by two other detainees, Noor Uthman Muhammed, who was alleged by the U.S. Government to have been the emir, or leader, of the Khalden Camp, and a close friend of Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi. Brynjar Lia also states in his book that there was an ideological conflict between the leaders of the Khalden Camp on one side, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the other. Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi, and Noor Uthman Muhammed confirmed this divide in their CSRT testimony. Of the 57 detainees the U.S. Government has associated with the Khalden Camp, 27 have been released, including Abu Zubaydah's good friend Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi.

Pre-9/11 Terrorism Allegations

By 1999, the U.S. Government was attempting to run surveillance on Abu Zubaydah. By March of 2000, United States officials were reporting that Abu Zubaydah was a "senior bin Laden official", the "former head of Egypt-based Islamic Jihad", a "trusted aide" to bin Laden with "growing power", who had "played a key role in the East Africa embassy attacks."

Internationally Abu Zubaydah was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court for his alleged role in plots to bomb U.S. and Israeli targets in Jordan. A senior Middle East security official stated Abu Zubaydah had directed the Jordanian cell and was part of “bin Laden’s inner circle." In August, 2001 a classified FBI report entitled “Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S.”, which would not become public until much later, stated that the foiled millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, had confessed that Abu Zubaydah had not only encouraged him to blow up the Los Angeles airport, but had facilitated his mission. The report also claims Abu Zubaydah was planning his own attack on the U.S. An unclassified FBI report also stated that Ahmed Ressam attempted to buy a laptop for Abu Zubaydah. Despite all of these supposed connections, when Ahmed Ressam went to trial in December 2001 federal prosecutors did not attempt to link him to Abu Zubaydah.

Capture and Detention

On March 28, 2002, CIA and FBI agents, in conjunction with Pakistani intelligence services, raided several safe houses in Pakistan looking for terrorists and members of al-Qaeda. Abu Zubaydah was apprehended from one of the targeted safe houses in Faisalabad, Pakistan. During his apprehension he was shot in the thigh, the groin, and the stomach with rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle. He was taken by the CIA to a Pakistani hospital nearby and treated for his wounds where the doctor who attended him admitted to John Kiriakou, the co-leader of the CIA group that apprehended Abu Zubaydah, that he had never before seen a patient survive such severe wounds.

It is unclear how the Government found Abu Zubaydah. U.S. officials claimed he was tracked down after making a phone call to al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen. However, this has been questioned by a C.I.A. official who stated that the U.S. paid $10 million to the Pakistani government in order to find Abu Zubaydah. Also, Saudi Arabian officials claimed Abu Zubaydah was captured after intelligence gleaned during an interrogation by their GSS. However, it would be reported in 2008 that Deuce Martinez, a C.I.A. analyst had played an integral role in narrowing down Abu Zubaydah’s supposed hideouts to the 14 targeted by the joint raids. Abu Zubaydah was turned over to the CIA which flew in a doctor from John Hopkins University to ensure he would not succumb to his wounds during transit out of Pakistan.

While in CIA custody he was transferred to CIA operated prisons in Pakistan, Thailand, Afghanistan, Poland, and Northern Africa. In September 2006, President George W. Bush gave a speech in which he stated that Abu Zubaydah and eleven other high value detainees had been transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and would be tried by military commissions.

U.S. Government Media Accounts of Abu Zubaydah Following His Capture

After Abu Zubaydah's capture, officials from the U.S. Government spoke out publicly about Abu Zubaydah's value as a source of intelligence and his supposed role in al-Qaeda. However, as would later be reported in 2009, the U.S. Government's depiction of Abu Zubaydah was overly inflated and he was, as Justice Department Officials stated, "[t]he above ground support... To make him the mastermind of anything is ridiculous", a "personnel clerk", a "logistics chief", and a travel agent."

In 2002, following his capture, a former State Department director of counter-terrorism, Michael Sheehan, said he saw Abu Zubzaydah as being “sinister” and that “[t]here is evidence that he is a planner and a manager as well. I think he’s a major player.” John B. Bellinger III declared Abu Zubaydah “extremely dangerous” and a planner of 9/11 in a June 2007 briefing on Guantanamo Bay. A former station chief for the CIA, Bob Grenier, claimed he “spent two and a half years of [his] life casing Abu Zubaydah” and claims Abu Zubaydah was a trainer, a recruiter, understood bomb-making, was a forger, a logistician, and some who made things happen, and made “al-Qaeda function.”

On April 2, 2002 then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated in a Department of Defense press briefing “I don’t think there’s any doubt but a man named Abu Zubaydah is a close associate of UBL’s, and if not the number two, very close to the number two person in the organization. I think that’s well established.” Mr. Rumsfeld also stated Abu Zubadaydah was “a very senior al Qaeda official who has been intimately involved in a range of activities for the al Qaeda.” On April 3, 2002 in another press conference, Mr. Rumsfeld stated the United States was responsible for Abu Zubaydah’s detention. Mr. Rumsfeld declared Abu Zubaydah was a “very senior al Qaeda operative.” During this same two week period in April 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer described Abu Zubaydah as a “key terrorist recruiter and operational planner and member of Osama bin Laden’s inner circle.” He further claimed the capture of AZ was a “very serious blow” to al-Qaeda and that one of al-Qaeda's “many tentacles" was "cut off.” Finally, on April 9, 2002 President George W. Bush declared in a speech at the Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon that Abu Zubaydah was “one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States.” He also stated in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, on April 17, 2002 that Abu Zubaydah was “one of al-Qaeda’s top leaders” who was “spending a lot of time as one of the top operating officials of al Qaeda, plotting and planning murder.” In June 6, 2002 during his address to the nation, President Bush stated Abu Zubaydah was “al Qaeda’s chief of operations.” Come October 2002 George W. Bush stated in a speech at a dinner for Thaddeus McCotter that “Abu Zubaydah was one of the top three leaders” in al-Qaeda.

Numerous anonymous U.S. officials have also made allegations against Abu Zubaydah in the press, including:

He was a “senior bin Laden official” and the “former head of Egypt-based Islamic Jihad.”
He “played a key role in the East Africa embassy attacks.”
He was listed as a “trusted aide” to bin Laden with “growing power.”
Western officials believed al-Qaeda may have been under the control of Abu Zubaydah.
Abu Zubaydah was an aide of bin Laden who ran training camps in Afghanistan and “coordinated terror cells in Europe and North America.”
Abu Zubaydah was a “key terrorist recruiter, operational planner, and member of Osama Bin Laden’s inner cicrcle.”
Abu Zubaydah was “bin Laden’s CEO”, “a central figure in Al Qaeda”, and a “bin Laden lieutenant.”
Abu Zubaydah is Bin Laden’s “travel planner.”
Abu Zubaydah is one of bin Laden’s “confidants.”
Abu Zubaydah is “one of a handful of men entrusted with running the terrorism network in the event of Osama bin Laden’s death or capture.”
Abu Zubaydah was a senior bin Laden lieutenant who was believed “to be organizing al Qaida resources to carry out attacks on American targets.”
Abu Zubaydah was the fourth ranking member of al Qaida behind Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Muhamed Atef.
Abu Zubaydah was the “successor as chief of operations for al Qaida” after Muhamed Atef’s death.
Abu Zubaydah knows the identities of “thousands” of terrorists that passed through al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan.
Abu Zubaydah briefed Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber.
Abu Zubaydah was one of bin Laden’s top planners of terrorist operations who knew of al Qaida plots and cells.
Abu Zubaydah was captured after he made a cell phone call to al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen.
Abu Zubaydah stated al-Qaeda knew how to smuggle a dirty-bomb into the United States. Abu Zubaydah’s information was further proof al-Qaeda was attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Abu Zubaydah is the “connection between bin Laden and many of al-Qaida’s operational cells.”
Abu Zubaydah is linked to plots to detonate apartment buildings.
Abu Zubaydah confirmed the fourth September 11 flight, UA 93, was intended to hit the White House. (His claim is contradicted by Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi Bin al Shibh though, who stated UA 93 was on its way to the capitol, not the White House.)
Osama bin Laden wrote a handwritten note to Abu Zubaydah in December, 2001. The letter allegedly tells Abu Zubaydah to continue fighting the United States if bin Laden passes away.
Abu Zubaydah told U.S. officials that Iraq and al-Qaeda were linked in the training of people on chemical weapons. (The officials noted there was no independent verification of this claim.)

Despite all of these allegations the U.S. Government has not officially charged Abu Zubaydah with any crimes.

Abu Zubaydah's Value as a Source of Intelligence

When Abu Zubaydah was captured, the Bush Administration believed he was an unparalleled source of intelligence on al-Qaeda and terrorism plots. Abu Zubaydah was touted as the biggest catch of the War on Terror until the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Immediately after Abu Zubaydah’s capture the director of the FBI stated Abu Zubzaydah’s capture would help deter future attacks. Also, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated Abu Zubaydah could provide a treasure-trove of information about al-Qaeda. Donald Rumsfeld echoed these sentiments claiming Abu Zubaydah was “a man who knows of additional attacks”, who has “trained people to do this”, and was a big fish who had a fountain of knowledge.

An anonymous U.S. official claimed Abu Zubaydah was an incredible source of information claiming “One Abu Zubaydah is worth a ton of guys at Gitmo.” In February 2008, C.I.A. director Michael Hayden admitted that he believed information gleaned from Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation “led to reliable information”, that Abu Zubaydah was a “prolific producer” of information, and that roughly 25 percent of the information on al Qaeda that came from human sources originated from Abu Zubaydah. Hayden stated Abu Zubaydah was one of three individuals “best positioned to know about impending terrorist atrocities.”

In April, 2002 after being briefed on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations, Porter J. Goss, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee said “[t]he Abu Zubaydah story is a good one, with more to come.” Richard C. Shelby described Abu Zubaydah as someone who was “carefully trained in techniques of disinformation.” Nancy Pelosi, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee would describe Abu Zubaydah as being “very skilled at avoiding interrogation. He is an agent of disinformation.”

While Abu Zubaydah would provide important intelligence on the War on Terror, his value as an intel source was greatly inflated, much like his role in the global terror network, as noted below.

Exploitation of Abu Zubaydah's Value

President Bush personally used Abu Zubaydah’s perceived “value” as a detainee to justify the use of the CIA's harsher interrogation techniques as well as Abu Zubaydah’s detention in secret C.I.A. prisons around the world, such as Thailand, Poland, and Diego Garcia.

In a speech in 2006, President Bush claimed that Abu Zubaydah initially revealed useful intelligence, including information that allegedly helped foil a terrorist attack on American soil, but that Abu Zubaydah became uncooperative. It was only then, he reported, that an “alternative set of procedures” was used on Abu Zubaydah in order to gain valuable intelligence and were “safe and lawful.” He also stated that Abu Zubaydah had received training in how to resist interrogation, and thus more aggressive techniques were mandated. These claims directly conflict with the reports of the original F.B.I. agents tasked with interrogating Abu Zubaydah who had been receiving crucial pieces of information from him without the use of harsher techniques, as well as other government officials. The President further asserted in his speech that after the harsher interrogation techniques were applied, Abu Zubaydah renewed his cooperation and provided information that helped capture an alleged planner of the September 11th attacks, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind the September 11th attacks. It has been revealed that the information Abu Zubaydah gave on these two terrorists had already been gleaned by U.S. intelligence months before Abu Zubaydah’s capture.

Despite the contentions that Abu Zubaydah’s confessions may not have been accurate, President Bush reiterated the value of Abu Zubaydah’s information when he signed an executive order in July 2007 allowing harsh interrogation tactics “limited in public only by a vaguely worded ban on cruel and inhuman treatment.” President Bush would also later veto an intelligence funding bill which included a provision to restrict harsher interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.

The Iraq War

The U.S. Government used questionable intel from Abu Zubaydah in order to justify the invasion of Iraq. U.S. officials stated that the allegations that Iraq and al-Qaeda were linked in the training of people on chemical weapons came from Abu Zubaydah. The officials noted there was no independent verification of his claims. The U.S. Government included statements made by Abu Zubaydah in regards to al Qaeda’s ability to obtain a dirty bomb in its attempts to show a link between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to a Senate Intelligence Committee report Abu Zubaydah also “indicated that he had heard that an important al Qaeda associate, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and others had good relationships with Iraqi intelligence.” However, in June, 2003 Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were reported as stating there was no link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.

The Military Commissions Act

President Bush also asked Congress in a speech in September 2006 to formulate special rules in order to try Abu Zubaydah via military commission in Guantanamo Bay. In fact, in late April 2002 less than one month after Abu Zubaydah’s capture, Justice Department officials stated Abu Zubaydah “is a near-ideal candidate for a tribunal trial.” However, only several months later US Officials acknowledged there was “no rush” to try Abu Zubaydah via military commission. In September 2006, President Bush stated in an interview that if Congress could pass a “good bill” out of the Senate in regards to setting up a military commission system, then Abu Zubaydah “is going to go on trial.” The U.S. Government has yet to try Abu Zubaydah by military commission, article 3 court, or in any other capacity.

The Bush Administration's Domestic Spying Program

In addition to justifying the use of presently illegal torture techniques, the Bush administration used Abu Zubaydah’s capture as justification to accelerate its domestic spying program to allow quick action on the phone numbers and addresses seized during Abu Zubaydah’s capture. Inexplicably the NSA expanded its surveillance beyond the numbers seized during Abu Zubaydah’s capture. The spying program would later be revamped in order to make it legal.

The FBI Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah: Pre-CIA

Following Abu Zubaydah’s capture he was interrogated by FBI agents Ali Soufan and Steve Gaudin. The interrogation followed standard FBI protocol and involved cleaning and dressing Abu Zubaydah’s wounds. Ali Soufan stated in a Newsweek article in April, 2009 "We kept him alive... It wasn't easy, he couldn't drink, he had a fever. I was holding ice to his lips." The agents attempted to convince Abu Zubaydah that they knew of his activities in languages he understood; English and Arabic. Both agents believed they were making good progress in gathering intelligence from Abu Zubayda: He disclosed Khalid Sheihkh Muhamed’s alias, “Mukhtar,” as well as other details of the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. Abu Aubzaydah also revealed the identity of Jose Padilla to the FBI agents.

FBI and CIA Clash Over Interrogation Tactics

Within a matter of days a CIA interrogation team began participating in Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. The CIA team included CIA contractor and former Air Force psychologist James Mitchell. Within days James Mitchell took over the interrogations from Soufan and Gaudin. Mitchell ignored Soufan's previously successful strategy and ordered that Abu Zubaydah answer questions or face a gradual increase in aggressive techniques. Soufan asked Mitchell whether he had ever interrogated anyone, to which Mitchell replied that he hadn't, but "Science is science. This is a behavioral issue" and suggested Soufan was the inexperienced one at the facility.

Mitchell strongly believed in his interrogation methods and applied them to Abu Zubaydah. Mitchell believed that Abu Zubaydah must be treated “like a dog in a cage.” He stated the interrogation “was like an experiment, when you apply electric shocks to a caged dog, after a while, he’s so diminished, he can’t resist.” Soufan was so engraged at the tactics being contemplated by the CIA that he challenged a CIA agent's authority to go through with them, shouting "We're the United States of America, and we don't do that kind of thing." The CIA agent told him in April 2002 that the tactics were approved by the "highest levels" in Washington, and even stated that the approvals "are coming from [Alberto] Gonzales." FBI agents Ali Soufan and Steve Gaudin were replaced, but were allowed to stay on and observe the CIA’s interrogation. Ali Soufan was alarmed by the CIA’s interrogation tactics. He reported to his FBI superiors that the CIA’s interrogation constituted “borderline torture.” He was particularly concerned about a coffin-like box he discovered that had been built by the CIA interrogation team. He was so angry he called the FBI Assistant Director for counterterrorism, Pasquale D'Amaro and shouted "I swear to God, I'm going to arrest these guys!" After Soufan’s complaints to the FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director Pasquale D’Amuro were communicated to the CIA, both FBI agents were ordered to leave the facility immediately by FBI Director Robert Mueller. Ali Soufan left, but Steve Gaudin stayed an additional few weeks and continued to participate in the interrogation.

Shortly thereafter Pasquale D'Amaro met with officials from the Department of Justice as well as the Attorney General Office’s Criminal Division concerning the FBI’s participation in CIA interrogations of terrorism suspects. During this meeting D’Amuro learned that the CIA had requested an opinion from the Department of Justice regarding the proposed use of certain types of interrogation techniques. D’Amuro met with FBI director Robert Mueller III and told him the FBI should not participate in interrogations using harsh techniques because FBI protocol prohibited agents from being involved. Robert Mueller III agreed with D’Amuro and ordered all FBI agents to stop participating in any interrogations where the CIA used harsh interrogation techniques. In 2008, a report by the Justice Department’s Inspector General alleged the FBI complained repeatedly beginning in 2002 about harsh CIA tactics. Top FBI officials apparently debated for six months after Abu Zubaydah’s capture as to what to do, before formally severing ties with any CIA interrogations where harsh tactics were used.

The CIA Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

The CIA interrogation strategies were based off work done by James Elmer Mitchell and Bruce Jessen in the Air Force's Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) program. The CIA contracted with the two psychologists to develop alternative, harsh interrogation techniques. However, neither of the two psychologists had any experience in conducting interrogations. Air Force Reserve Colonel Steve Kleinman stated that the CIA "chose two clinical psychologists who had no intelligence background whatsoever, who had never conducted an interrogation... to do something that had never been proven in the real world." Associates of Mitchell and Jessen were skeptical of their methods and believed they did not possess any data about the impact of SERE training on the human psyche. The CIA came to learn that Mitchell and Jessen's expertise in waterboarding was probably "misrepresented" and thus, there was no reason to believe it was medically safe or effective. Despite these shortcomings of experience and know-how, the two psychologists boasted of being paid $1000 a day plus expenses, tax-free by the CIA for their work.

The SERE program, which Mitchell and Jessen would reverse engineer, was originally designed to be defensive in nature and was used to train pilots and other soldiers on how to resist harsh interrogation techniques and torture were they to fall into enemy hands. The program subjected trainees to torture techniques such as “waterboarding . . . sleep deprivation, isolation, exposure to extreme temperatures, enclosure in tiny spaces, bombardment with agonizing sounds at extremely damaging decibel levels, and religious and sexual humiliation.” Under CIA supervision, Miller and Jessen adapted SERE into an offensive program designed to train CIA agents on how to use the harsh interrogation techniques to gather information from terrorist detainees. In fact, all of the tactics listed above would later be reported in the International Committee of the Red Cross Report on Fourteen High Value Detainees in CIA Custody as having been used on Abu Zubaydah.

The psychologists relied heavily on experiments done by American psychologist Martin Seligman in the 1970s known as “learned helplessness.” In these experiments caged dogs were electrocuted in a random way in order to completely break their will to resist. Mitchell and Jessen applied this idea to Abu Zubaydah during his interrogation. Many of the interrogation techniques used in the SERE program, including waterboarding, cold cell, long-time standing, and sleep deprivation were previously considered illegal under U.S. and international law and treaties at the time of Abu Zubaydah’s capture. In fact, the United States had prosecuted Japanese military officials after World War II and American soldiers after the Vietnam War for waterboarding and as recently as 1983. Since 1930, the United States had defined sleep deprivation as an illegal form of torture. Many other techniques developed by the CIA constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and torture under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Top U.S. Officials Approve Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

In the Spring of 2002, immediately following Abu Zubaydah’s capture, top US Government officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, George Tenet, Condoleeza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Ashcroft discussed at length whether or not the CIA could legally use harsh techniques against Abu Zubaydah. Condoleeza Rice specifically mentioned the SERE program during the meeting stating “I recall being told that U.S. military personnel were subjected to training to certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques…” In addition, in 2002, several Democratic congressional leaders were briefed on the proposed “enhanced interrogation techniques.” These congressional leaders included Nancy Pelosi, the future Speaker of the House, and Representative Jane Harman. Congressional officials have stated that the attitude in the briefings ranged from “quiet acquiescence, if not downright support.” Harman was the only congressional leader to object to the tactics being proposed. It is of note that in a 2007 report by investigator Dick Marty on secret CIA prisons, the phrase “enhanced interrogations” was stated to be a euphemism for “torture.” The documents show that top U.S. Officials were intimately involved in the discussion and approval of the harsher interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah. Condoleeza Rice ultimately told the CIA the harsher interrogation tactics were acceptable, and Dick Cheney stated "I signed off on it; so did others." During the discussions John Ashcroft is reported as saying “Why are we talking about this in the White House? History will not judge this kindly.”

At least one advisor to Condoleeza Rice, Philip Zelikow, opposed the new, harsher interrogation techniques. Upon reading the August 1, 2002 memo which justified the torture, Zelikow authored his own memo contesting the Justice Department's conclusions, since he believed they were legally incorrect. The Bush Administration attempted to collect all of the copies of Zelikow's memo and destroy them, although it is still unclear why.

The Torture Memos

In 2009, President Obama released four Justice Department memos which outlined the procedures CIA operatives wished to use on Abu Zubaydah.

August 1, 2002 Memo

In August 2002, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, Jay Bybee and John Yoo drafted the first Torture Memo. The purpose of the memo was to gain approval for harsh interrogation tactics to be used on Abu Zubaydah. Although some believe the harsh tactics were already in effect before the memo granting authority to use them was written. Alberto Gonzales would later testify before Congress that the opinion was sought after the detention of Abu Zubaydah. Questions by C.I.A. officers over which tactics could be used on Abu Zubaydah had spurred the torture memo’s existence, which is reflected in the language of the memo; "You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu Zubaydah." The memo's author, John Yoo, acknowledged the memo was the basis for Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. Yoo even told an interviewer “there was an urgency to decide so that valuable intelligence could be acquired from Abu Zubaydah, before further attacks could occur.”

The memo contemplated ten techniques the interrogators wanted to use: "(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.” Many of the techniques were, until then, generally considered illegal. Many other techniques developed by the CIA constituted inhumane and degrading treatment and torture under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The memo was drafted weeks after prohibited techniques had already been used on Abu Zubaydah and was used to provide after-the-fact legal support for harsh interrogation techniques. Regardless, the techniques were only to be used on an "as-needed basis and that not all of these techniques will necessarily be used.” The techniques were to be used in an escalating fashion, but the "repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions" and that substantial repetition was assured not to occur. However, Abu Zubaydah would eventually be waterboarded 83 times in the same month the memo was drafted.

According to a psychological evaluation conducted of Abu Zubaydah upon his capture, the memo alleges that Abu Zubaydah:

Quickly rose from very low level mujahedin to third or fourth man in al Qaeda
Served as Usama Bin Laden’s senior lieutenant
Managed a network of training camps
Was instrumental in the training of operatives for al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan
Acted as the Deputy Camp Commander for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all trainees during 1999-2000
Approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training camps from 1996-1999
No one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan without his knowledge and approval
Acted as al Qaeda’s coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications
Acted as al Qaeda’s counter-intelligence officer and had been trusted to find spies within the organization
Was involved in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda
Was a planner for the Millennium plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets during the Millennium celebrations in Jordan
Served as a planner for the Paris Embassy plot in 2001
Was one of the planners of 9/11
Engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interests
Wrote al Qaeda’s manual on resistance techniques

Due in part to these allegations, the Bush administration approved the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, and subsequently other high-value detainees. The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel drafted a subsequent memo less than a year later authorizing military interrogators to use much of the same techniques the CIA was authorized to use. However, both memoranda were eventually rescinded by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel.

May 10, 2005 Memo

Another subsequent memo addressed the legality of additional interrogation techniques such as nudity, dietary manipulation, abdominal slap, water dousing, and water flicking. It also expanded on the techniques of walling, stress positions, and sleep deprivation, allowing for an additional stress position and extended sleep deprivation up to 180 consecutive hours. The memo also outlined the amount of waterboarding applications a detainee could be subjected to.

The waterboard can only be used with a given detainee during one 30-day period. During that 30-day period the waterboard can be used no more than 5 days. In any given day that waterboarding occurs interrogators may use no more than two “sessions”, with a “session” defined as the time that the detainee is strapped to the board, and that a session can last no more than 2 hours. During any session no more than six applications of water of 10 seconds or more can be used. The total cumulative time of all water applications in a 24 hour period may not exceed 12 minutes.

This meant the detainee could only be subjected to 60 waterboarding sessions of 10 seconds or longer per 30 day period. The memo also reported that the Department of Justice, Inspector General report noted that

[T]he waterboard technique… was different from the technique described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee’s breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and in the DoJ opinion the subject’s airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passage; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator… applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee’s mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency’s use of the technique is different from that used in SERE training because it is ‘for real’ and is ‘more poignant and convincing.’” The Inspector General further reported that “OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogator on the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either efficacious or medically safe.

The Inspector General also noted that the use of waterboarding was discontinued in every armed services branch except the Navy SERE training "because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects." The CIA Office of Medical Services contradicted this conclusion, however, stating that “[w]hile SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain psychological resistance to the waterboard our experience was otherwise. Some subjects unquestionably can withstand a large number of applications, with no immediately discernible cumulative impact beyond their strong aversion to the experience.” The memo also noted that at a Senate Judiciary Committee hear, Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for Victims of Torture, testified that some U.S. military personnel who have undergone waterboard training have apparently stated “that it’s taken them 15 years of therapy to get over it", although his claim has not substantiated. Despite the conflicting information the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel approved all of the tactics listed above.