Operation Torch

Operation Torch was the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa in World War II during the North African Campaign, started November 8 1942.

The Soviet Union had pressed the United States and Britain to start operations in Europe, and open a second front to reduce the pressure of German forces on the Russian troops. While the American commanders favoured Operation Sledgehammer, landing in Occupied Europe as soon as possible, the British commanders believed such a course would end in disaster. An attack on French Northern Africa was proposed instead, which would clear the Axis from North Africa, improve Naval control of the Mediterranean and prepare an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943. American president Roosevelt suspected the African operation would rule out an invasion of Europe in 1943 but agreed to support Churchill.

The Allies planned an Anglo-American invasion of northwestern Africa — Morocco and Algeria, territory nominally in the hands of Vichy French government (see Vichy France). The French had around 60,000 soldiers in Morocco as well as coastal artillery, a handful of tanks and aircraft, with ten or so warships and 11 submarines at Casablanca. The Allies believed that the French forces would not fight, partly because of information supplied by American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. However they harboured suspicions that the French navy would bear a grudge over the British action at Mers-el-Kebir (near Oran) in 1940. An assessment of the sympathies of the French forces in North Africa was essential, and plans were made to secure their cooperation, rather than resistance. The Allies intended to advance rapidly eastwards into Tunisia and attack the German forces in the rear. General Dwight Eisenhower was given command of the operation, and set up his headquarters in Gibraltar.

Preliminary contact

In order to gauge the feeling of the French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might be supportive of an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting a number of French officers, including General Charles Emmanuel Mast, the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies, but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied General in Algeria. General Mark Clark, one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria by submarine, and met with the officers on 21 October.

The Allies also succeeded, with resistance help, in slipping French General Henri Giraud out of Vichy France by submarine, intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud refused to commit to support the Allies before the invasion, possibly because he expected that he would be offered the position of commander in chief of all the invading forces.

The Landings

Map of Operation Torch

The Allies planned a three-pronged amphibious landing to seize the key ports and airports of Morocco and Algeria simultaneously, targeting Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The Western Task Force (aimed at Casablanca) comprised all-American units, with Major-General George Patton in command and Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt heading the naval operations. It consisted of the US 2nd Armored Division, and the US 3rd and US 9th Infantry Divisions - 35,000 troops in all. They were transported directly from the United States. The Central Task Force, aimed at Oran, comprised of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and the US 1st Armored Division - 18,500 troops. It was transshipped from Britain and was commanded by Major-General Lloyd Fredendall, the naval forces being commanded by Commodore Thomas Troubridge. Eastern Task force, aimed at Algiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th and the US 34th Infantry Divisions - 20,000 troops. Naval forces were commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough.

Casablanca

The initial forces landed on November 8, 1942 at three points: Safi (Operation Blackstone), Fedala (Operation Brushwood), and Mehedia-Port Lyautey (Operation Goalpost). Landings commenced before daybreak. Because it was hoped that the French would not resist, there was no preliminary bombardment. During the previous night an Allied-backed coup attempt had been attempted by a General Bethouard, whose forces surrounded the villa of pro-Vichy General Auguste Paul Nogues. Nogues however called for reinforcements, and the coup attempt thus had the effect of putting the Vichy forces on alert.

At Safi the landings were mostly successful. The landings were initially conducted without covering fire, hoping that the French might not resist at all. When the transports were fired on by coastal batteries the supporting ships returned fire. When commanding General Harmon arrived French snipers had pinned the assault troops (most of whom were in combat for the first time) on the beaches. Most of the landings occurred behind schedule; air support from the carriers destroyed a French convoy of trucks intended to reinforce the defenses. Safi surrendered on the afternoon of November 8th. By November 10th the remaining defenders were pinned down and the bulk of Harmon's forces raced to join the siege of Casablanca.

Around Port-Lyautey the landing troops were uncertain of their position, and the second wave was delayed. This gave the defenders time to organise resistance, and the remaining landings were conducted under artillery bombardment. With the assistance of air support from the carriers the troops pushed ahead and the objectives were captured.

Around Fedala (the largest landings with 19,000 men) weather disrupted the landings. The landing beaches again came under fire after daybreak. General Patton landed at 8am and the beachheads were secured by later in the day. The Americans surrounded the port of Casablanca by November 10th, and the city surrendered an hour before the final assault was due to take place. Patton entered the city unopposed.

In general, French resistance in Morocco (apart from the coastal batteries) was sporadic. The French Navy, which was present in strength at Casablanca and only minutes from the landings, stayed in its port and was put out of action by shelling.

Oran

The landing forces were split between three beaches, two west of Oran and one east. Landings at the westernmost beach were delayed because of a French convoy which appeared while the minesweepers were clearing a path. Some delay and confusion, and damage to landing ships, was caused by the unexpected shallowness of water and sandbars; although periscope observations had been carried out, no reconnaissance parties had been landed on the beaches to determine local conditions. This would be in contrast to later amphibious assaults, such as Operation Overlord, in which considerable weight would be given to pre-invasion reconnaissance.

The US 1st Ranger Battalion landed east of Oran, and quickly captured the shore battery at Arzew. An attempt was made to land US infantry at the harbour directly, in order to quickly prevent destruction of the port facilities and scuttling of ships. The attempt failed, however, as the two destroyers were shattered by crossfire from the French vessels there. The French Navy broke from the harbour and attacked the Allied invasion fleet, but were sunk or driven ashore.

French batteries and the invasion fleet exchanged fire throughout the 8th and 9th November, with French troops defending Oran and the surrounding area stubbornly. Heavy fire from the British battleships brought about the surrender on the 9th.

Airborne Landings

Torch saw the first major airborne assault carried out by the United States. The U.S. 509th Parachute Regiment flew all the way from Britain, over Spain, intending to drop near Oran and capture airfields at Tafarquay and Youk-Les-Bains. The drop was marked by navigation and communications problems with French forces on the ground, and the extreme range forced several aircraft to force land in the desert. Nonetheless, and although the 509th was scattered over the area, both airports were captured.

Algiers

Resistance and Coup

At midnight, as the invasion troops were approaching the shore, and as agreed at Cherchell, a group of 400 French resistance, under the command of Henri d'Astier de La Vigerie and José Aboulker, staged a coup, in the early hours of November 8, in the city of Algiers. Key targets were seized, including the telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house and the headquarters of 19th Corps.
Then Robert Murphy drove to the residence of General Alphonse Juin with some resistance fighters. Juin was the senior French Army officer in North Africa, and while the resistance surrounded the house, making Juin effectively a prisoner, Murphy attempted to persuade him to side with the Allies. However he was treated to a surprise. Admiral François Darlan, the commander of all Vichy French forces, was in Algiers on a private visit. Juin insisted on contacting Darlan, and Murphy was unable to persuade either to side with the Allies. In the early morning the Vichy Gendarmerie arrived and released Juin and Darlan.

Then some troops in the region of Algiers attempted all the day long with putting down the coup, but without a complete success, instead of attacking allied landing troops on the beaches. So as the General Ryder forces could encircle Algiers, without any notable resistance, and obtain its complete capitulation around 6'o'clock P.M..

Invasion

The invasion was led by the US 34th Infantry with one brigade of the British 78th, the other acting as reserve. General Ryder, commander of the 34th, was given explicit command of the first wave, since it was believed that the French would react more favourably to an American commander than a British one. The landings were split between three beaches - two west of Algiers and one east. Some landings went to the wrong beaches, but this was immaterial since there was practically no French opposition; coastal batteries had been neutralized by French resistance. One French commander openly welcomed the Allies.

The only fighting took place in the port of Algiers intself, where two British destroyers attempted to land a party of US Rangers directly onto the dock, in order to prevent the French destroying port facilities and scuttling ships. Heavy artillery fire prevented one from landing, and drove the other from the docks after a few hours, leaving 250 of the infantry behind.

The landing troops pushed quickly inland, and by the afternoon a local capitulation was agreed with the North Africa commander, General Juin.

After the battle

Political results

It quickly became clear that Henri Giraud lacked the authority to take command of the French forces, as had been hoped. Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, therefore made agreements with Admiral François Darlan that he would be given control if he joined the Allied side. Charles de Gaulle of the Free French responded with fury. The problem did not vanish when a local French anti-Nazi, Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, murdered Darlan on December 24, 1942: Giraud was then installed in his place.

When Adolf Hitler found out what Admiral Darlan intended to do, he immediately ordered Case Anton put into effect and to reinforce Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps in order to combat the invaders.

The Darlan-Giraud authority, initially resolutely Vichyist, was gradually forced to lead the war effort against Nazi Germany; to democratize; to eliminate its principal head vichyist rulers; and to eventually amalgamate with the French national Committee of London. After which the "Comité Français de la Libération Nationale" (CFLN), born from this fusion, despite Roosevelt opposition, passed in a few months under the authority of General de Gaulle, and became the true and independent government of France in war.

Military consequences

Between November the 8th and 10th French Tunisian forces under the command of general Barré left the whole country open to the Germans, withdrawing to the Algerian border. The general was receiving since November the 14th Juin's orders to resist, but waited until the 18th to begin fighting against the Germans. Then the Tunisian army fought courageously, despite its lack of equipment. The French were quickly helped by British forces.

After consolidating in French territory the Allies struck into Tunisia. Forces in the British 1st Army under Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson almost reached Tunis before a counterattack at Djedeida by German troops under General Walther Nehring thrust them back. In January 1943 German troops under General Erwin Rommel retreating westwards from Libya reached Tunisia.

The British 8th Army in the East, commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, stopped around Tripoli to allow reinforcements to arrive and build up the Allied advantage. In the West the forces of General Anderson came under attack in February at Faid Pass on the 14th and at Kasserine Pass on the 19th. The Allied forces retreated in disarray until heavy Allied reinforcements blunted the German advance on the 22nd.

General Harold Alexander arrived in Tunisia in late February to take command. The Germans attacked again in March, eastwards at Medenine on the 6th but were repulsed. Rommel counselled Hitler to allow a full retreat but was denied and on 9 March Rommel left Tunisia to be replaced by Jürgen von Arnim, who had to spread his forces over 100 miles of northern Tunisia.

These setbacks forced the Allies to consolidate their forces and develop their lines of communication and administration so that they could support a major attack. The 1st Army and the 8th Army then attacked the Germans. Hard fighting followed, but the Allies cut off the Germans from support by naval and air forces between Tunisia and Sicily. On 6 May the British took Tunis, and American forces reached Bizerte, by 13 May the Axis forces in Tunisia had surrendered.

Basic bibliography

War Official reports

• Les Cahiers Français, La part de la Résistance Française dans les évènements d'Afrique du Nord (Official reports of French Resistance Group leaders who seized Algiers on 8 November 1942, to allow allied landing), Commissariat à l'Information of Free French Comité National, London, Aug. 1943.

War correspondent report

• Melvin K. Whiteleather, Main street's new neighbors, J.B. Lippincott Co. Philadelphy, 1945.

Academic works about these events

• George F. Howe, North West Africa: Seizing the initiative in the West, Center of Military History, U.S Army, Library of Congress, 1991.
  
• Arthur L. Funck, The politics of Torch, University Press of Kansas, 1974.
  
• Professeur Yves Maxime Danan, La vie politique à Alger de 1940 à 1944, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1963.
  
• Henri Michel, Darlan, Hachette, Paris, 1993
• Christine Levisse-Touzet, L'Afrique du Nord dans la guerre, 1939-1945, Paris, Albin Michel, 1998.
  
• Professeur José Aboulker et Christine Levisse-Touzet, 8 novembre 1942 : Les armées américaine et anglaise prennent Alger en quinze heures, Paris, Espoir, n° 133, 2002.
  

See also

• Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski.

External links

• The Decision To Invade North Africa (TORCH)
• US Army history of the operation
• A detailed history of 8th November 1942
• Combined Ops
• The accord Franco-Américan of Messelmoun (in French)
• Operation TORCH Planning Exercise by Stephen Sledge (Very detailed)