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Coordinates: 15°09′50″S 19°10′23″E / 15.16389°S 19.17306°E / -15.16389; 19.17306
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|date=December 1987 – March 1988<ref>{{cite book|first= W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead|last=James|title= Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed.|page=14|year=2004|publisher=Scarecrow Press}}</ref>
|date=December 1987 – March 1988<ref>{{cite book|first= W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead|last=James|title= Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed.|page=14|year=2004|publisher=Scarecrow Press}}</ref>
|place={{Coord|15|09|50|S|19|10|23|E|type:city|display=inline,title}}<br>[[Cuito Cuanavale]], [[Angola]]
|place={{Coord|15|09|50|S|19|10|23|E|type:city|display=inline,title}}<br>[[Cuito Cuanavale]], [[Angola]]
|result=Stalemate<ref>{{cite report|date=1988-10-29|url=http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%202.pdf|page=59|publisher=[[Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)]]|volume=2|chapter=2|page=59|title=Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report}}</ref>
|result=Tactical stalemate<br>Angolan and Cuban decisive strategic victory<ref>{{cite report|date=1988-10-29|url=http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%202.pdf|page=59|publisher=[[Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)]]|volume=2|chapter=2|page=59|title=Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report}}</ref>
|combatant1={{flagicon|Angola}} [[Angola]] ([[FAPLA]])<br>{{flag|Cuba}} ([[Military of Cuba|FAR]])<br>[[Image:Flag of South-West Africa People's Organisation.svg|22px]] [[SWAPO]] ([[People's Liberation Army of Namibia|PLAN]])<br>[[Image:ANC UmkhontoweSizwe.gif|22px]] [[Umkhonto we Sizwe]]<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-03-25-cuito-cuanavale-fallen-mk-soldiers-to-be-remembered | title = Cuito Cuanavale: Fallen MK soldiers to be remembered | publisher = Mail and Guardian | location = South Africa}}</ref>
|combatant1={{flagicon|Angola}} [[Angola]] ([[FAPLA]])<br>{{flag|Cuba}} ([[Military of Cuba|FAR]])<br>[[Image:Flag of South-West Africa People's Organisation.svg|22px]] [[SWAPO]] ([[People's Liberation Army of Namibia|PLAN]])<br>[[Image:ANC UmkhontoweSizwe.gif|22px]] [[Umkhonto we Sizwe]]<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-03-25-cuito-cuanavale-fallen-mk-soldiers-to-be-remembered | title = Cuito Cuanavale: Fallen MK soldiers to be remembered | publisher = Mail and Guardian | location = South Africa}}</ref>
|combatant2={{flag|South Africa|1928}} ([[SADF]])<br>[[Image:Flag of Unita.jpg|22px]][[UNITA]]
|combatant2={{flag|South Africa|1928}} ([[SADF]])<br>[[Image:Flag of Unita.jpg|22px]][[UNITA]]

Revision as of 16:51, 10 June 2010

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Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
Part of Angolan Civil War and South African Border War
DateDecember 1987 – March 1988[2]
Location
15°09′50″S 19°10′23″E / 15.16389°S 19.17306°E / -15.16389; 19.17306
Cuito Cuanavale, Angola
Result Tactical stalemate
Angolan and Cuban decisive strategic victory[3]
Belligerents
Angola Angola (FAPLA)
 Cuba (FAR)
SWAPO (PLAN)
Umkhonto we Sizwe[1]		  South Africa (SADF)
File:Flag of Unita.jpgUNITA
Commanders and leaders
Cuba Gen. Leopoldo "Polo" Cintras Frías South Africa Col. Deon Ferreira
Strength
11,500 combined estimate (1,500 Cuba[4][Note 1]; 10,000 FAPLA) 11,000–12,000 combined estimate (3,000–4,000 SADF[5]; 8,000 UNITA[6])
Casualties and losses
- 39 Cuba[7] (Official)
- 4,785 Cuban/Faplan killed[Note 2]		 - 31 SADF(Official)
- 3000 UNITA[8]

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The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was one of the most important episodes of both the civil war in Angola (1975 to 2002) and the South African Border War. The armies of Cuba, Angola and South Africa met at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, and the battle has been called "Africa's largest land battle since World War II".[1] With all sides claiming victory, it was a turning point in the Angolan civil war, leading to the departure of Cuban, South African and other foreign troops from Angola and Namibia, and the independence of Namibia which was also linked to their withdrawal.

Context

Independence from Portugal

Main article: Angolan War of Independence

For 13 years until 1974, three armed groups fought for Angola's independence from Portugal: the Marxist MPLA (with its armed wing FAPLA), led by Agostinho Neto; the conservative FNLA, led by Holden Roberto and supported by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre; and UNITA, led by the charismatic Jonas Savimbi (a Maoist before being sponsored by the CIA and South Africans). There was not any guerrilla group controlling a specific area of Angola because the Portuguese Armed Forces managed to overcome the insurgents[citation needed]. However, each guerrilla movement had its area of influence.

Soon after the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 in Portugal, the new revolutionary government of Portugal began letting go of Portugal's African overseas provinces. Angola also achieved its independence from Portugal on November 11, 1975. After departure of the Portuguese military and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Portuguese, the MPLA controlled the capital, Luanda; UNITA controlled the south of Angola; and the FNLA controlled the north of the newly-independent country.[9]

The Treaty of Alvor comprised a series of agreements between the three rebel factions and Portugal that paved the way to full sovereignty. Under the terms of the treaty, a transitional government was formed, elections were scheduled for the end of the year, and 11 November 1975 was slated as Angola's independence day. Fighting between the three rebel factions started soon after the transitional government took office. The MPLA gained control of the capital. On 9 August the South African Army (SADF) occupied the Ruacana hydro-electric complex on the border with Namibia; on 14 October South Africa launched Operation Savanah in support of UNITA and FNLA advancing on Luanda and coming within 200 km of the city. The FNLA, supported by Zairian units, South Africans and Portuguese mercenaries advanced on Luanda from the east and got as far as Kifangondo. On 7 November Cuba launched Operation Carlota, intervening in favour of the MPLA (see Cuba in Angola). The MPLA managed to hold Luanda and on 11 November Agostinho Neto proclaimed the independence of Angola.

Cold War

Main articles: Cold War and Angolan Civil War

With South African support, UNITA was able to continue the fight against the MPLA, now the Angolan government. The civil war continued more or less unabated until 2002 and cost an estimated half a million lives[10][Note 3] and devastated the country's infrastructure. The tragedy played out against the backdrop of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers realised the strategic importance of southern Africa, a region rich in natural resources (petroleum, natural gas, gold, diamonds) and ringed by shipping routes along its coast. Both sides tried to influence the outcome of the civil war through proxies. Mainly Cuba and the Soviet Union supported Angola and the SWAPO fighting against South African occupation of Namibia, while mainly the United States supported UNITA and South Africa.

Participants

In 1975 the MPLA requested support from Cuba against FPLA, UNITA and South Africa. By March 1976, Cuba had sent around 36,000 troops. After securing power for the MPLA, Cuban troops remained in the country continuing support against UNITA and South Africa. The Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries supplied armament, advisors and specialized technical staff. Soviet generals fulfilled leadership roles, General Konstantin Shaganovitch commanded the Cuban-Angolan forces in the battle.[11].

UNITA received heavy backing from the United States and South Africa. While the U.S. helped UNITA with money and weaponry, South Africa sent around 5,000 troops in aid. South Africa's interests lay in preventing the Angolan government from gaining control of south-eastern Angola and in UNITA keeping hold of the territory as a buffer zone. Angola bordered on South African occupied Namibia (at the time called South West Africa). UNITA and South African control of southern Angola would make it difficult for SWAPO to fight for Namibian independence from bases in Angola.

Battle

class=notpageimage|
Angola

FAPLA advance on Mavinga: Battle of Mavinga II

This battle, also called the Battle of the Lomba River II[12], is essential for understanding the context in which the ensuing Battle of Cuito Cuanavale took place. In 1987, as part of the Angolan government's repeated campaigns for the control of south-eastern Angola, the Angolan army launched a campaign to rout UNITA forces from their stronghold cities of Mavinga, a former Portuguese military base and Jamba in the southeast of the country just above the Caprivi Strip.[13] Under the leadership of Soviet generals[14], it was decided to commence the attack from Cuito Cuanavale. In August the 21st, 25th (both light infantry), 47th (armoured) and the 59th (mechanized) brigades (some sources[who?] also include the 16th brigade) of FAPLA, under Soviet command, departed from the city Cuito Cuanavale in the Cuando Cubango province of south-east Angola. They received air support from the large airbase at Menongue, including MiG 23s deployed in a ground-attack role.[15] Facing them were the UNITA forces composed of the 3rd Regular, 5th Regular, 13th Semi-Regular and 275th Special Forces Battalions[16]

South African reaction

The South African government's strategic concern was to ensure continued UNITA control over regions bordering Namibia, so as to prevent the MPLA-aligned SWAPO guerrillas from gaining a springboard in southern Angola from which to launch attacks into Namibia. In October 1987, after initial sucesses of the Angolan campaign, the South African government intervened on behalf of UNITA by launching a series of military operations in conjunction with UNITA forces, beginning with Operation Modular.

Cuito Cuanavale

South African and UNITA forces, having gained the upper-hand with Operation Modular, then launched Operation Hooper. After a string of defeats, FAPLA forces retreated to the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale, with an air base located at 15°10′00″S 19°10′00″E / 15.1667°S 19.1667°E / -15.1667; 19.1667. If Cuito Cuanavale were lost by FAPLA, the next closest comparable outpost would be Menongue, 300 km from Mavinga and 500 km from UNITA's headquarters at Jamba.[17]

The remnants of three FAPLA brigades were cut off on the east of the Cuito River, across from the town itself and, with no functioning armour or artillery remaining, faced annihilation.[18] On 15 November, the Angolan government fearing a defeat, requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. Fidel Castro responded immediately by sending — in what was called "Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR" — materiel and 15,000 elite troops, retaking the initiative from the Soviets.[19] (This brought the total number of Cuban troops in all of Angola up to 50,000.[20] The first Cuban reinforcements arrived by helicopter in Cuito Cuanavale on 5 December and about 160[21]–200[22] Cuban technicians, advisers, officers, and special forces were helicoptered to the besieged FAPLA troops.

The South African advance was halted 22 km east of Cuito Cuanavale at the Tumpo river (15°10′48″S 18°57′25″E / 15.18°S 18.957°E / -15.18; 18.957) by FAPLA forces, who set up positions fortified by thick minefields. Though stalled, the South Africans secured the tactically important Chambinga Heights.

The quite demoralised 59th FAPLA motorised infantry brigade, 21st and 25th FAPLA light infantry brigades, in positions near Tumpo and east of the Cuito River, were effectively cut off due to SADF artillery control of both the bridge and airstrip and to UNITA guerilla control of the road from Menongue, which they had mined and were prepared to ambush.[23][24]

Castro sent his most experienced pilots and most advanced fighter bombers across the Atlantic to the air base at Menongue. Due to the lack of more sopisticated aircraft and aircraft defence systems (UN-arms embargo) South Africa soon lost the air superiority it had enjoyed in all those years.[25] General Ochoa Sanchez, a veteran of the 1976 Angola campaign and of tank battles in Ethiopia, was made overall commander of the forces on the government side. General Cintras Frias was made commander at Cuito Cuanavale.

The FAPLA was given rapid training in the use of advanced Soviet weapons while the Cuban miners began preparing for the assaults to come.[26] The Angolan army dug in, constructing series of trenches and underground living quarters and underground storage facilities for helicopters.[27][28] The airstrip was kept in repair, but since it was under constant observation by the SADF artillery and air force could not be safely used by fixed wing aircraft.[29][30]

The important bridge across the Cuito river was destroyed by the South Africans on 9 January using a smart bomb.[31][32] The Cubans constructed a wooden footbridge in its place. (They baptised it Patria o Muerte[clarification needed][33]) They partly buried disabled tanks so that their turrets could be used as fixed artillery pieces.[34]

The SADF brought up reinforcements[35] and then carried out, beginning 13 January[36], the first of what would prove to be five indecisive major ground assaults on the entrenched FAPLA positions east of the river.[37] A large Cuban and FAPLA column was on the way from Menongue for the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, but progress in the rainy season was slow due to the need to clear the UNITA minefields and guard against possible ambushes. They did not reach Cuito Cuanavale in time to take part in this first engagement.[38]

Final phase

Rear view of a G-5 howitzer

Major operations continued through 23 March 1988 including several massive ground assaults[39] with infantry (primarily UNITA), armoured cars and tanks on FAPLA positions. Unable to gain any further ground, the SADF withdrew the bulk of their forces.[40] [41] [42] [43] [44][45] They left the artillery, due to the difficulty in transporting it during the rainy season[46][47]. The South Africans continued shelling (using their long-range G-5 artillery[48]) both the air strip and the city, from the high grounds of the Chambinga Heights, for months. Cuban and FAPLA forces retained the city. South African and UNITA forces claimed to have inflicted enormous casualties on Cuban and FAPLA forces, and to have accomplished their objective of repulsing the offensive against UNITA havens in southeast Angola. Cuban and FAPLA forces, however, count the failure of the South Africans to capture the city and the resilience of their troops under bombardment as a triumph. Regardless of which side was the victor, the battle marked a major turning point in the course of events in southern Africa.

By February 1988, it had become clear to all sides that a stalemate had been reached, and that a victory would not be achievable without a considerable escalation in the conflict.[49] Consequently, following a series of peace discussions throughout 1988 mediated by Chester Crocker, a peace accord was finally signed by the parties on 22 December 1988 in New York whereby South Africa and Cuba agreed to the withdrawal of their troops from Angola, and a timetable was set for Namibian independence from South Africa.

Aftermath

On 8 March, General Cintras Frías began opening a second front near Calueque, with 40,000 Cuban troops and a larger number of Angolan forces.[50][Note 4] The SADF side claimed they inflicted severe casualties on the Cubans forcing them to the negotiation table and the Cubans claiming they defeated the SADF to do the same.[51] In fact much of the aftermath has been mired in propaganda. In Black Africa — particularly in southern Africa — the battle has attained legendary status. To that part of the world it is considered the debacle of Apartheid: a rout of the South African armed forces that altered the balance of power in the region and heralded the demise of White minority rule in South Africa. Thus, the battle is often referred to, by Black Africa and Cuba, as the African Stalingrad of Apartheid: the decisive event that defeated Pretoria's objective of establishing regional hegemony — a strategy which was vital to defending and preserving Apartheid — and directly led to the independence of Namibia and accelerated the dismantling of Apartheid. In this point of view Cuba's contribution was crucial as it provided the essential reinforcements, material and planning.

The South African Defense Minister claimed that the taking of Cuito Cuanavale had never been intended.[52] A military analyst associated with the "authoritative"[53] International Institute of Strategic Studies in London pointed out that the use by UNITA of the FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft system reduced the MIG's to using high altitudes techniques ineffective for close air support.[54]

The SADF claims a large number of government casualties of 4,000, 100 armored vehicles, 9 aircraft as well as a heavy loss of armour (94 tanks) due to their use of obsolete T-55 tanks and poorly trained crews against more modern SADF anti-tank weaponry and targeting devices. Cuban and African sources[citation needed] however, claim to have bested South African armored units and point to the abandonment of a number of Olifant tanks, and other vehicles as proof of this.[55]

The South African and American view is expressed by John Turner who claims that following their losses, the Cubans were convinced that further military confrontation with the SADF would not succeed.[56]

Subsequent comments made by a Soviet adviser to the Cubans in Angola suggest a stalemate: "The people's armed forces for the liberation of Angola have not been able either, even with the help of the Cubans, to decisively defeat the enemy and drive him out of the territory or the country. The result, frankly speaking, was an impasse."[57]

Nelson Mandela supported the Cuban version of the battle in a 26 July 1991 speech delivered in Havana: "The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character... We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defence of one of us." [58] However, it should be noted that Mandela is a life long supporter of the ANC and supported the account given by Umkhonto we Sizwe (translated Spear of the Nation, and also abbreviated MK) the then military wing of the ANC, who fought along side the soviet backed Angolan FNLA-Cuban forces, as well as the South African Communist Party and SWAPO.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ On the other hand, Gen. Geldenhuys of the SADF estimated, as quoted in The New York Times, 20 April 1988, that in the period prior to 25 February, Cuban forces numbered about 1,000.
  2. ^ Estimates vary. Renée-Jacques Lique, editor of Afrique Express (Montreuil, France) says "D'un côté 7 000 soldats de l'armée d'Afrique du Sud et 10 000 combattants de l'UNITA, le mouvement rebelle angolais de Jonas Savimbi. De l'autre, 20 000 soldats gouvernementaux angolais des FAPLA (Forces armées populaires de libération de l'Angola) et 5 000 soldats d'élites cubains. …La bataille de Cuito Cuanavale dure huit jours : du 12 au 20 janvier. Les FAPLA et les Cubains en sortent vainqueurs au prix de 4 600 morts. Les troupes sud-africaines sont stoppées, mais plus important encore, dans le même temps, Cubains et Angolais ont avancé sur la Namibie. On the one side, 7,000 soldiers of the South African Army and 10,000 combatants of UNITA, the Angolan rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi. On the other, 20,000 Angolan Government soldiers of FAPLA and 5,000 elite Cuban soldiers… The battle of Cuito Cuanavale lasted eight days: from 12–20 January. The FAPLA and the Cubans were victorious at the cost of 4,600 dead. The South African troops were stopped but, even more importantly, at the same time Cubans and Angolans had advanced on Namibia." http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/AUSTRALE/angola/angolahome.htm On the other hand, Karl Maier, journalist for The Washington Post and The Economist, on a visit to the front on 28 February 1988, repeated an estimate of 10,000 combined FAPLA/Cuban forces defending the town: Angola: Promises and Lies, London, 1996, p. 29.
  3. ^ See also Afrique Express (Montreuil, France), no. 247, 4 February 2002. "La guerre civile angolaise a fait plus de 500.000 morts, plus de 100.000 mutilés et a entraîné le déplacement forcé de plus de 4 millions de personnes sur une population de 12 millions d'Angolais." [The Angolan civil war left more than 500,000 dead, more than 100,000 wounded and forcibly displaced more than 4 million people (out of a population of 12 million)]. http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/AUSTRALE/angola/angolapol/247lapaixenfin.htm
  4. ^ Some estimates say only 10,000-20,000 Cubans: Gleijeses, Piero (2007). "Cuba and the Independence of Namibia", Cold War History, Volume 7, Issue 2. pp. 285–303. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help), and Jaster, op., cit., p. 22.

Footnotes

  1. ^ "Cuito Cuanavale: Fallen MK soldiers to be remembered". South Africa: Mail and Guardian.
  2. ^ James, W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead (2004). Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed. Scarecrow Press. p. 14.
  3. ^ "2". Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (PDF) (Report). Vol. 2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 1988-10-29. p. 59.
  4. ^ Gleijeses, Piero (11 July 2007). Mail and Guardian. South Africa.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  5. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 17. the South Africans assembled [at Mavinga] a considerable force: …totalling some 3,000 men, plus another 1,500–2,000 Namibian troops from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).
  6. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 19. Fighting continued on a large scale, with an estimated 4,000 SADF and SWATF troops, 8,000 UNITA and 10,000 FAPLA forces…
  7. ^ "Cuban Tanks".
  8. ^ Marcum, John (1990). "South Africa and the Angola-Namibia Agreement", in: Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn. New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies. p. 135. ISBN 0887383610. UNITA and the SADF pursued retreating MPLA forces to the advanced air base and provincial capital of Cuito Cuanavale. There they laid siege to what became known as the Stalingrad of Angola, from December 1987 to March 1988. Caught in a conventional action for which it was ill-prepared, UNITA suffered some 3000 battle dead from among the ranks of its best units. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  9. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 8–11.
  10. ^ Maier, Karl (1996). Angola: Promises and Lies. London: Serif. p. 14. ISBN 1 874959 47 1. some observers estimate that 500,000 people have died in the fighting and the famine and disease it has provoked.
  11. ^ http://www.sa-soldier.com/data/06_sadflinks/UsedPDFs/SADF_OPs_analysis.pdf
  12. ^ James, W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead (2004). Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed. Scarecrow Press. p. 16.
  13. ^ John Frederick Walker (2004). A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope. Grove Press. p. 177. ISBN 0802140688.
  14. ^ Crocker, Chester A. (1992). High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. W.W. Norton. ISBN 0393034321. In early October the Soviet-Fapla offensive was smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga. It turned into a headlong retreat over the 120 miles back to the primary launching point at Cuito Cuanavale. In some of the bloodiest battles of the entire civil war, a combined force of some 8,000 UNITA fighters and 4,000 SADF troops destroyed one Fapla brigade and mauled several others out of a total Fapla force of some 18,000 engaged in the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of Fapla losses ranged upward of 4,000 killed and wounded. This offensive had been a Soviet conception from start to finish. Senior Soviet officers played a central role in its execution. ... Huge quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or fell into UNITA and SADF hands when Fapla broke into a disorganized retreat... The 1987 military campaign represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its strategy. ... As of mid-November, the UNITA/SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down thousands of FAPLA's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters. Crocker was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan Administration
  15. ^ Vanemann, Peter. "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980's, in Owen Kahn, op. cit., p. 76.
  16. ^ http://www.fireandfury.com/orbats/modunita.pdf
  17. ^ Michael Radu, Anthony Arnold (1990). The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World. Transaction Publishers. p. 149. ISBN 9780887383076. Retrieved 2008-05-11.
  18. '^ Bole-Richard, Michel (1988-01-23). "Angola : une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA". Le Monde (Paris) (in French). p. 5. {{cite news}}: no-break space character in |title= at position 7 (help), Le Mondes Johannesburg correspondant reported that these units had been without resupply for three weeks. See also Benemelis, Juan. Las Guerras Secretas de Fidel Castro. cap. 18. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |nopp= ignored (|no-pp= suggested) (help)
  19. ^ Vanemann, Peter, op. cit., p. 79.
  20. ^ Treaster, Joseph B. (28 July 1988). "Castro Faults Soviet Tactics in War in Angola. (Foreign Desk).". The New York Times. Mr. After the fighting there, he pressed deep into the south of Angola with a force of 400 tanks — more than all the tanks in the South African armed forces — with support from Soviet-made MIG-23 fighter bombers. With that maneuver, he increased the cost to South Africa of continuing to fight in Angola and placed Cuba in its most aggressive combat position of the war, thus fortifying his present argument that he is preparing to leave Angola with his opponents on the defensive.
  21. ^ Bole Richard, Michel (23 January 1988). "Angola: Une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA". Paris): Le Monde.
  22. ^ Ricardo Luis, Roger. Preparanse a vivir: cronicas de Cuito Cuanavale. p. 6.
  23. ^ "Angola: The siege of Cuito Cuanavale". Africa Confidential vol. 29 No 3. London: 2. 5 February 1988.
  24. ^ Vanneman, Peter. op. cit. p. 79.
  25. ^ Vanneman....
  26. ^ Ricardo Luis, Roger, op. cit., p. 117.
  27. ^ Vanneman, Peter. op. cit. p. 80.
  28. ^ "op. cit". Africa Confidential: 2.
  29. ^ Meier, Karl. op. cit. p. 31.
  30. ^ "loc. cit". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  31. ^ Meier, Karl. op. cit. p. 31.
  32. ^ "loc. cit". Africa Confidential.
  33. ^ Ricardo Luis, Roger (1989). Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale. Havana: Editora Politica.
  34. ^ Holt, C. (2005). At Thy Call we did not falter. Zebra Press. p. 84. ISBN 1770071172.
  35. ^ Nortje, P. (2004). 32 Battalion. Struik. ISBN 1-86872-914-1. says that the "lull" in fighting from 26 November 1987 to 10 December 1987 was "politically motivated". But French, Damian. "SADF 1SAI Ratels in Op Hooper (1987–1988)". Retrieved 2008-01-04. says that his units of the 1st South Africa Infantry arrived, after training, at the front only in Dec. 1988.
  36. ^ Liquer, loc. cit.
  37. ^ George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Routledge. ISBN 0415350158.
  38. ^ "op. cit". Africa Confidential: 2.
  39. ^ For a graphic first hand account of two of these, see url=http://uk.geocities.com/sadf_history1/dfrench.html
  40. ^ Stührenberg, Michael in: Die Zeit 17/1988, Die Schlacht am Ende der Welt, p. 11
  41. ^ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Part Two, p. 59, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%202.pdf
  42. ^ Mail & Guardian Online: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited
  43. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/12/world/south-africa-s-strategy-on-angola-falls-short-enhancing-cubans-role.html?pagewanted=1
  44. ^ Bernard E. Trainor (1988-07-12). "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role". New York Times.
  45. ^ Pazzanita, Anthony (1991). "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 1991). p. 105. The SADF and UNITA had relaxed the siege of the town by May, 1988, although at least several hundred South Africans remained on the outskirts.
  46. ^ Bole-Richard, Michel (1988-06-10). "Les conflits en Afrique australe La progression des troupes cubaines dans le Sud-angolais inquiète Pretoria". Le Monde (Paris) (in French). p. 3..
  47. ^ McFaul, Michael (1990). Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola, International Security vol. 14 no. 3 (Winter 1989-1990). M.I.T. press. some 400-500 South African soldiers...stationed outside Cuito Cuanavale had been waiting out the rainy season to withdraw their heavy G-5 and G-6 artillery guns.By August 1988...[they were] completely surrounded for several months.page=126
  48. ^ G5 155mm 45-calibre, towed gun howitzer
  49. ^ Owen Ellison Kahn (1990). Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0887383610. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  50. ^ Benemelis, Juan, loc. cit.
  51. ^ Scott Thompson (1991). "South Africa and the 1988 Agreements. New Brunswick u.a.: Transaction Publ. p. 125. ISBN 0887383610. Retrieved 2008-05-07., in Owen Ellison Kahn, op. cit.
  52. ^ James Brooke (1988-05-18). "Angolans Besting South Africa in a Remote Battle". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-05-15.
  53. ^ Bernard E. Trainor (1987-11-22). "Angola Drive on the Rebels is Said to Fail"". New York Times. p. 17.
  54. ^ Jaster. op. cit. p. 18. MiG ground-attack fighters… did little damage to SADF and UNITA ground forces.
  55. ^ Ferreira, Colonel Dean (1989). "Lead". Paratus. SADF: 14. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  56. ^ Turner, John W. (1998). Continent Ablaze; The Insurgency Wars in Africa, 1960 to the Present. Cassell Plc. ISBN 1-85409-128-X.
  57. ^ M. Ponomariov, Krasnaya Zvezda Magazine; 20 May 1988.
  58. ^ Castro Ruz, Fidel Alejandro and Mandela, Nelson (1991). How Far We Slaves Have Come. N.Y.: Pathfinder Press. pp. 18–20. ISBN 0873484975.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

References

External links

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