Talk:Battle of Tali–Ihantala

Separate war

You have to make up your mind with regard to the separate war-theory (for the Continuation War). Was the war contemporary with, or a part of, WWII? Wikipedia better stick to one version by default, and expand on arguments for or against in one appropriate article. /M.L.

Comment: From Finland's perspective the war was separate but not from international and Soviet, although internationally the only enemy of Finland was Soviet Union. Even in Finland both the winter war and continuation war were considered (and still are) to be part of WW2 in a larger international scale. Molotov-Ribbentrop pact is one "evidence" of this.

Comment: 1: Finland was driven to fight in the Winter War. Thus, after the pronouncement of the Kuusinen's government no one could trust in any announcements of Stalin's regime. 2: Sweden and other Scandinavian countries were unwilling to have any political or economical contacts with Finland during and after the Winter War fearing the wrath of allied Nazi Germany and Soviet Union. 3. The Ribbentrop treaty was quite well known in Finland, and the results with two totalitarian regimes dividing Europe between them was well forecasted. 4. Soviets actively forced the Finns to Germany's arms by defying the food deliveries that had been agreed in the peace treatments and by sending Finnish renegade communists to Finnish factories and plants to create disorder. However, these agitations were quite unsuccesful, (people who have fought and lost their families, friends and land to an aggressor are not the best of victims for propaganda). Still it showed to the Finnish government that the 'conflict' was far from over. 5. With over 20% percent loss of cultivated land and huge losses of working farmers, the country was in desperate need of food, that realized finally during the winter -41-42. 6. Molotov asked for permission for the'Final Solution for Finland' late 1940 from Hitler. All of this was well known to the Finns. 7. There is no question about Finns being pro Germany in the beginning of Barbarossa, but the Russians had done their utmost to drive Finland against them, there was no choice. 8. Legally, the Russians started their air attacks to Finland some 1h before the minings (by the submarines in Estonian coast) and the Finnish ground forces started their attack to Soviet Union many days later. 9. The myth of the Finns having been part of the active surrounding of Leningrad is totally false. The Finns stopped in the Karelian Isthmus to the old border and left the service route over Lake Ladoga open despite several demand from OKW and even Hitler personally visiting Finnish HQ. Even flying over or near Leningrad was not allowed and as easy as it would have been to the Finns, the Murmansk railroad was not cut. 10. The Germans in the North of Finland, who had any forces to attack Russia were totally useless and kept so (this being more by the inability of Germans to understand Nordic warfare than the will of Hitler.) The Finnish HQ thought and understood them as a defensive force against possible Russian attack. 11. The Germans wanted to have Finnish Jews for their concentration camps. Instead many of the liaison officers to the German army were Jews (knowing the language), they were even awarded with a couple of Iron Crosses (which they declined to receive) to the horror of Germans who just then found out that they were Jews. There was even a front synagogue near the German's headquarters. The Finnish government, when asked said that there is no Jewish problem in Finland, there are only Finns in this country. Six Jews were deported to Germany by the basis that they were German citizens, and that is a shame because at that time it was widely known what would happen to them. Russian POW's were deported to Germany too, many of them Jews, but the basis was their position as political actors and change for Finnish related German held POW's, many of whom were recruited to the Finnish army. 12. All of the German based arms import was paid with hard currency, before 1944 mostly outdated Russian originated war loot. 13. The last comment is about the complicated plan to get weapons from Germany without making any formal agreement with Germany. President Ryti made his position and word as an offer for Finland's independence. All this can be read from contemporary documents. The Russians were beaten and Finland was not invaded and occupied as all of the other countries bordering Soviet Union.

The sources can be found from the books needed to cope with the first and second year courses in Helsinki University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of Political History. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.222.252.205 (talk) 20:35, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Impact

First, a 3:1 troop ratio is not an overwhelming force, when assaulting fortified positions. It is, in fact, a theoretical minimum requirement for the attacker.

Second, It remains unanswered whether or not the Soviet Union would have had enough adequate resources for defeating Finland and if some of its forces were not needed elsewhere.

I don't understand this statement. Does it imply that the strongest land army in the world (at the time) would not be able to defeat the exhausted Finnish one if the former had this goal as a top priority (at the price of letting Berlin fall into the hands of western Allies, that is)?

I removed the sentence from mainspace until someone explains it and provides objective reasons for its inclusion.

It would probably be a good idea to mention the concessions that the Soviet leadership had made to the proposed peace treaty (instead of an unconditional surrender it had demanded before). --Illythr 00:01, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

There was no "unconditional surrender" demand from the Soviets, which makes the whole difference. The Soviets response contained the following (my free transtation): "Since we at several occasions had been fooled by the Finns, we would like to receive an official declaration from the Finnish governement signed by the primeminister or minister of the external affairs that Finland capitulates and asks the Soviet Union for peace. If we receive such a document from the Finnish governement, Moscow is ready to receive a delegation from the Finnish governement". So: "capitulation", "ask for peace" and "receive a delegation" are the key words, no "unconditional" in the text. What would be the meaning of sending a delegation from the Finnish governement to Moscow, if there were no terms to negotiate about? Besides all that, the Soviet side denied Finnish interpretation of their own demand as "unconditional" - in "Pravda" on July 2, 1944. This information was published in several Swedish newspapers on July 3 (3 newspapers as I know, among them "Dagens Nyheter" and "Svenska Dagbladet", two major newspapers). Narangino (talk) 23:47, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

There was no terms to negotiate about. At March 1940 there was no changes in Soviet demands in "negotiations". At February 1944 Mrs Kollontai presented to Paasikivi that the given Soviet terms were negotiable, but when Paasikivi went to Moscow, there was no changes in initial Soviet demands in the "negotiations". At September 1944 the initial Soviet demands were changed before the "negotiations", but after that, it was only to accept or not to accept. No "negotiations".

And of course it wasn't a demand for unconditional surrender: The conditions were very exactly put out. Unfortunately Soviets didn't bother to "negotiate" about the terms with their allies beforehand, despite repeated attempts by ambassador Clark Kerr in May-June 1944 (AVPRF (Arhiv Vnesnei Politiki Rossijskoi Federatsii), fond 135, opis 28, delo 3, p. 10-17). Also, the planned conditions didn't differ practically from unconditional surrender (Dokument o bezogovorotsnoi kapituljatsii Finljandii. Sekretno. Projekt. AVPRF, fond 135, opis 28, delo 8, p. 8-20) --Whiskey (talk) 22:27, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

What do you mean with "Soviets didn't bother to "negotiate" about the terms with their allies"? You know well that the allies met in Teheran in December 1943, where Finland's future faith was discussed. On December 1 1943 "the Big Three" agreed with Stalin's terms about Finland - Soviet Union would let Finland remain independent, they would only take Vyborg, Karelian isthmus and Hangö territory. Stalin was willing to exchange Hangö for Petsamo. Roosvelt replied that it was a "fair exhchange". Read about it in Churchill's memoirs. Narangino (talk) 22:53, 23 January 2010 (UTC)

Stalin's terms were only the framework. If you had bothered to read the part of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning Finland or Moscow Armstice Treaty they contain a lot of more text than that agreed in Tehran. It was that text for what ambassador Kerr sent his inquiries. In a letter, the document found in the Soviet archives fulfills the framework outlined in Tehran, but still contains a lot of issues not discussed at all in Tehran, including Soviet occupation, Soviet general having sovereignity over Finnish leaders, internment and imprisonment of all anti-Soviet elements and all members of the White Guards to the Soviet Union, confiscation of all gold and currency found in the country, cutting of all phone, telegraph and radio transmissions outside from the country etc. etc. All fulfilling the letter of the Tehran, true? --Whiskey (talk) 22:04, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

PS: Since the Soviet Union was the attacker in this battle, shouldn't it be list first in the infobox? --Illythr 00:06, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

What you call "fortified positions" were nothing like what you seem to think. "3:1 troop ratio is not an overwhelming force" I beg to differ. "exhausted Finnish" You apparently have no idea of the Finnish military situation when the peace was signed. Finnish forces were far better equipped when they were at the beginning of the Soviet offensive. I do not see how the Finnish military was "exhausted". --Kurt Leyman 15:44, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

The Finnish situation was growing from hard to desperate at the time, as its chief supporter was now more concerned with its own survival than with aiding its ally. The Soviet Union, on the other hand was at the peak of its military production capability. Without external support, Finland had no hope withstanding the Soviet war machine, had Helsinki been its main target. However, by putting up a competent defense, Finland had indeed managed to "convince" the Soviet military to focus on more important matters instead and being satisfied with the Moscow armistice. So, "difficult" is ok. But "Impossible" needs to go. The sentence above is a rather strange speculation that must go as well. --Illythr 21:37, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Well, Kurt is partly right, as the only fortifications which were available when the Soviet offensive begun were built at front of Vyborg, and the rest of the line was on the map only. Also when the Fourth Strategic Offensive was planned, it was decided that 2.4:1 was necessary ratio, but in reality STAVKA overestimated Finnish numbers so they had higher ratio (Platonov et.al. Bitva za Leningrad). And as Finland called back into the service some age classes which had been demobilized during the war in trenches, the usable manpower was much higher after the battles of June/July than before, and thanks to material deliveries from Germany, they were better equipped, it is hard to claim Finns were exhausted.

BUT, you are right that Finnish strategic situation were becoming more desperate, as German defeats elsewhere made it's continuing support less likely and effective. Also the statement you pointed out is very confusing and missing important qualification: "...with the forces available". And in fact it became clear that Leningrad Front didn't have enough forces and material to defeat Finland at the time, and it would have needed resources from German front to prepare a new offensive and finish the job, which would have weakened Bagration and Lvov-Sandomierz at critical phases. So I agree with your wording. Also, it is evident that T-I didn't "convince" Soviet commanders, as they tried to flank Ihantala in the battles of Bay of Vyborg and Vuosalmi at Karelian Isthmus and at Nietjärvi and Ilomantsi at Ladoga Karelia. It wasn't a single battle which convinced Soviet leaders, but all these battles together, that Finland was still a hard nut to crack. --Whiskey 23:14, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Were the "trenches" of the "War in trenches" dismantled by the time? As for exhaustion - I derived this from the last sentences here. I mean, Finland was suing for peace...

Soviet offensive had passed those trenches already. Finns had concentrated the fortification work to the front line (so called "main line" and to the VT-line, so there wasn't enough material and workforce to do anything on VKT-line. It seems that I have to continue writing...

Well, with "...with the forces available" is still a speculation. Fact is that the Soviet Union decided not to and din't (or, rather, vice versa :) ). Convincing: well, was this the last battle? Then we can write that "...after it the Soviet command became convinced..." etc.--Illythr 23:53, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Not so much. Govorov asked more men and materal from STAVKA, but was not only refused, but had to release his breakthrough forces. Ergo, he didn't have enough forces, and STAVKA didn't consider this section important enough to give more men and material to him, but cancelled it's previous attack order. --Whiskey 12:01, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Not to forget: The landings at Normandy took place during the fighting, initiationg the race to Berlin. --MoRsE 08:01, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Nope. Overlord happened before Valkeasaari. I consider race to Berlin starting with the breakout from Normandy, which happened at July 27 (Operation Cobra), when it became evident that Germans cannot contain the beachhead.--Whiskey 12:06, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

No, 3:1 infantry thats not an overwhelming force, but the Soviet warfare of summer 1944 was not about hugh infantry attack (do they still existed) It was about firepower and mobility, so in the air, the numbers of guns and tanks trully made the Soviet force overwhelming compering to the finnish forces.--Posse72 01:38, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

This battle was a Finnish defensive victory. Please, do not remove the correct result

No Soviet forces were moved from this front before this battle was over. No such source has been provided either, despite request posted at the Continuation War page.

Even if some Soviets or Finns had been moved between different battle stages, the result of this battle still is a Finnish defensive victory. 87.95.85.139 (talk) 04:32, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

I totally agree with that. One editor have recently appeared here to edit this article to look like same as whole Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offense (and same time to edit Vyborg-Petrozavodsk to look complete Soviet victory). Im not sure why, but in my eye it looks pretty much like some kind of russian nationalist or war propaganda (nashi propaganda) which we DO NOT want to wikipedia.62.216.127.93 (talk) 05:40, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Soviet redeployment of troops was planned before Tali-Ihantala

Even if broader operational plans existed for fighting the finnish army, the Soviets decided what to do next already prior to June 20 and capturing of Vyborg. According to A.M Vasilevsky ("Delo moyei zhizni", M., 1976, pp. 450-451) he and general A.I. Antonov discussed the question with Stalin regarding the perspectives for operational development against Finland and that they decided that "after reaching the line Elisenvaara - Imatra - Virojoki and with the assistance from the Baltic Fleet liberating Bolshoy Berezovyi (the biggest Koivisto island) and other islands in Vyborg Bay a strong defence should be created on the Karelian Isthmus and after switching over to the defence there the main attention of the Leningrad Front should be concentrated on participation in the battles for the liberation of Estonia".

This means that the re-deployment of Soviet troops from the Isthmus to the Baltics was planned even before the battle of Tali-Ihantala took place. Creating defensive positions on the Karelian Isthmus was also planned prior to the battle. Koskenkorva (talk) 13:33, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Most of of these arguments are your personal opinions, non of them have anything to do with outcome of Battle of Tali-Ihantala. You can have your own opinions, I fully accept that, but wikipedia is not right place to represent them. Only "research" (if it is one) you are representing is made by Red Army officer in Soviet Union during darkest times of Cold War. I haven't seen ever any research, text or book which doesn't call result of Tali-Ihantala as finnish victory. Not even Russian ones. Tali-Ihantala was delaying battle for finns in front of finnish VKT-line and it was very succesfull one. None of russian forces managed to cross the line, which was situated in Ihantala. Soviet troops suffered almost 20 000 men casualties dead and wounded and 300 tanks (for comparison only 800 tanks were given to troops at the beginning of Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offense). So did Soviet troops even changes to continue offense without reinforcements. Not really. And even if they could, they de facto didn't do it. Does this mean that finns won the battle. Yes it does. There really is no realistic argument to make result look different. If using your method of defining the results of battles, you can say as well that Siege of Leningrad or Normandy Landings or Operation Bagration ended to stalemate, or Operation Barbarossa ended to decisive german victory.62.216.127.93 (talk) 15:23, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Can we start with one thing first? Can you answer the question, what exactly was won at Tali-Ihantala - 1. Finnish independece 2. revert of Russian demand for "unconditional surrender", 3. stopping Finland from leaving the German-Finnish "brotherhood" or 4. preventing the Soviets from taking back the borders of 1940? Also: what was the reason for the Russian re-deployment of troops, Finnish resistance or their own internal decision from June 17 (Vasilevsky, Antonov and Stalin) and their own order from July 11 (July 12 in other sources)? Koskenkorva (talk) 15:29, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

You wrote: "I haven't seen ever any research, text or book which doesn't call result of Tali-Ihantala as finnish victory.". Then you must have seen only the Finnish books. Perhaps it's time you broaden your horizons a little bit. Koskenkorva (talk) 15:33, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Here's the full text from A.M. Vasilevsky's book ("Delo moyei zhizni"):

В ту же ночь в разговоре по телефону И. В. Сталин спросил меня, как он часто это делал, не смогу ли я без особого ущерба для выполняемого задания прибыть на два-три дня в Москву. Я согласился и уже днем был в столице, а вечером 17 июня вместе с А. И. Антоновым встретился с И. В. Сталиным. Как выяснилось, основным вопросом, ради которого меня вызвали в Ставку, явились события на Севере. Войска Ленинградского фронта после ожесточенных боев на Карельском перешейке, нанеся серьезное поражение финским войскам, готовились к штурму последнего оборонительного рубежа. Как стало известно, финское командование уже перебросило часть своих сил из Южной Карелии на Карельский перешеек. Не сомневались мы и в том, что немецкое командование, чтобы спасти Финляндию от поражения и обеспечить ее дальнейшее [412] участие в войне на своей стороне, вынуждено будет, несмотря на все трудности, усилить этот участок фронта. Поэтому фактор времени при решении задач, поставленных перед войсками Ленинградского фронта, играл теперь исключительно важную роль.

Связавшись по телефону с командующим Ленинградским фронтом Л. А. Говоровым, И. В. Сталин заслушал его детальный доклад о ходе событий и подготовке к штурму и дал ему ряд советов и указаний. Удовлетворенный заверениями Говорова в том, что задача ускорить наступление будет решена его войсками в течение ближайшей недели, он пожелал Леониду Александровичу успеха. Тогда же было решено, что после взятия Выборга необходимо будет продолжать наступление и с выходом войск на рубеж Элисенваара — Иматра — Виройоки и освобождением при помощи Балтийского флота Большого Березового и других островов Выборгского залива прочно закрепиться на Карельском перешейке и, перейдя там к обороне, сосредоточить основное внимание Ленинградского фронта на участии в боях по освобождению Эстонии.

You'll find the whole chapter from this book at http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vasilevsky/23.html. Koskenkorva (talk) 15:49, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

That was a great excerpt! And especially it proves the point that Soviets really tried to push through Tali-Ihantala and -as we know in history- failed in doing that. So that excerpt proves that the defender was victorious in this battle, as the attacker failed to reach it's goals.

It is interesting to note, that Vasilevsky's memoirs contradict the orders Govorov received from STAVKA after the capture of Vyborg. In that order Govorov was ordered to continue offensive to Virojoki-Lappeenranta-Imatra-line, with part of the forces to Elisenvaara-Käkisalmi-line, and in the same time prepare continuing offensive to River Kymijoki to Kotka-Kouvola-line. Also the operating boundary between Karelian and Leningrad fronts lies on the line Korovkino-Southern coast of Lake Ladoga-Tervus-Elisenvaara-Taipionkoski-Lappeenranta-Lahti. Central Archive of Ministry of Defence of Russia f. 148a, i. 3763, f. 166, s. 376, 377. The original. [RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), pp. 97,98]--Whiskey (talk) 20:30, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

With your logic, every time a successful offensive reaches it's limit, then it is a defeat. Don't you see how rediculous this sounds? And yet again, the Russians, tried to reach the Finnish border, but chose not to lose too many soldiers on achieving that limited goal (the main goal was alreday achieved - Finland was already under great pressure). The Soviets got intelligence reports, that the Finns had moved in troops from Karelia, so now, 4/5 of all the Finnish army was on the Karelian Isthmus. In that situation, continuing to break through this increased resistance would have been a foolish decision. Interruption of the battle was plannen on June 17, well, perhaps 30-50 kilometres further West, but still - it's far from "Russians beeing defeated" by the Finns. That you must admit. Koskenkorva (talk) 21:22, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

Nope. If the offensive meets the targets given when it was planned, only then it is successful. Sometimes it can reach much more than originally planned. But if it doesn't reach the targets, then it is only partially successful at best, failure at worst. Offensive is a very complex thing, and it can have several battles, some victorious and some defeats, but the outcome of the offensive doesn't affect the outcome of single battles. With your logic, the Battle of Ligny was a French defeat, as they lost the whole Waterloo campaign. In the same way, the outcome of the Soviet offensive doesn't affect the outcome of this single battle.

When Gusev committed his forces to this battle, then it was either reaching their targets, when it would have been a victory, or not reaching the targets and losing the battle. As I have already written above, it doesn't matter how it was achived or not, but only the end situation compared with the targets given before the battle should be checked.

You have asked some questions. May I ask one? If memoirs of a marshall contradicts documents found in the archives of the ministry of defence, which one should we believe? --Whiskey (talk) 23:27, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

You have asked some questions. May I ask one? If memoirs of a marshall contradicts documents found in the archives of the ministry of defence, which one should we believe?. Who says they "contradict" each other? It is fully possible the original fronline could have been modified during the ongoing operation. Vasilevsky's information about the June 17 decision, could hav been modified in a later order to Govorov. But the document you quote still doesn't prove that the Soviets wanted to "occupy" the whole Finland. Operational line doean't mean that Russians wanted to caprure Lahti. It was a border line between the Soviet armies, nothing more. If you present me with an order which esplicitly demands the Soviet army capture Lahtis, then it's another matter. You must carefully read the document you yourself quote.

Also, Tali and Ihantala wasn't "the name of a battle" for the Russians, these were merely villages and towns on their advance route towards the Finnish-Soviet border. When Govorov didn't get a chance to comtinue his attacks, he said to Stalin he could capture Helsinki in two weeks if needed. Stalin didn't approve with that, and ordered re-deployment once again. You know, Govorov actually planned to move 2 rifle divisions of the 45th army across the Vyborg Bay on July 12th, the same day he was order to stop his operations on the Isthmus? Do you know that? If Russians were beaten, why on Earth were they still planning NEW ATTACKS on the Finns???? Koskenkorva (talk) 00:25, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Tali-Ihantala belonged to the Soviet Union in 1941-1944 but were occupied by Finland

I see that my change of the location in the info box has been reversed. Once again, Tali and Ihantala were parts of the territory in 1944, these places became part of the Soviet Union according to the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940 (see the map in the linked article which in red colour shows the areas that Finland lost in that War). Juridically that territories still were Soviet property, even when re-occupied by Finland in 1941. Between 1941 and 1944 this was occupied Soviet areas held by Finnish troops. Accordingly to this, we never speak of Battle of Kiev (1943) as "Kiev, Germany". The info box in that article says "Kiev, USSR", even if the city was held by German troops between 1941 and 1943. I will change the info box in our article accordingly, so please don't change this information. Koskenkorva (talk) 06:30, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

"he area of Tali and Ihantala was Finnish territory before winter war(1939) so it is totally irrelevant to compare it to German occupied Kiev. Finland only tried to invade back the land lost in USSR offensive agreed in Molotov Ribbentrop agreement made by USSR and Germany in the beginning of the WWII in 1939. Here is a link to a map of Finland in the beginning of WWII (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Winterwar-december1939-soviet-attacks.png) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.119.34.83 (talk) 17:54, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

The Soviets broke such agreement, when it attacked Finland, starting on June 22, 1941 - the major Soviet offensive taking place on June 25, 1941. 87.93.76.18 (talk) 09:44, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

I find it unbelievable how someone can call this a "decisive Finnish victory". What exactly did the Finnish win? Certainly not more favourable peace terms. They were in all essentiality the same as the Soviets demanded for over a year before the battle.62.182.6.136 (talk) 15:03, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

The "Finnish defensive victory" means, that the Finns pushed back the war-opening 1941 Soviet attack, then held the Soviets behind the pre-war (1940) border until the final moment of the war, and until the Soviets agreed to give up the demand for Finnish surrender.

At no point of the war - in addition to its war-initiating attack - could the Red Army cross the pre-war Finnish-Soviet border. In the final battle in Ilomantsi the Red Army made its most successful attempt. However, - in the end - two Red army divisions were decimated there, as the Soviets were pushed back. 87.93.76.18 (talk) 09:44, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

What did the Finns achived?, well they stopped an Soviet offensive who had Helsinki as final goal. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 19:46, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Soviet Gen. Platonov: "repeated offensive attempts of the Soviet forces failed ... Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks"

Regarding your editing of the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, user Koskenkorva. In your edit summary you state:

"... it was the Soviets' own order that halted the offensive - troops were order to the Baltics".

However, it is wrong for anyone to try to insinuate that the Soviets lost the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, because troops - or a part of troops - had "already" been moved away. The burden of proof of such troop movements is on the contributor who makes the claim.

In the article, the sources given for this claim appear to have been misused. No support for such pre-battle troop movement can be found from the sources offered. Only Soviet troop movements reported are the ones which took place after the Red Army loss in the battle. Thus:

What proof can you provide us of such troop transfers which would have been executed from this battle arena, before the battle took place. We need your detailed source information please - full with the page number of the book in question, as well as the quote which makes such claim.

Furthermore, even if troop movement had taken place, that would not change the fact that the Soviets lost this battle, as it has been correctly stated in the result segment.

The Soviet specialist on the topic, General S.P. Platonov, makes no false excuses for the Soviet loss. In a Soviet period book 'Bitva za Leningrad, 1941-1944', published in the Soviet Union and edited by the General himself, Platonov states the following:

"The repeated offensive attempts of the Soviet forces failed ... to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and in repulsing all attacks of our troops ... During the offensive operations, lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them in the orders of the Supreme Command, issued on June 21."

Which source in your view describes this battle as a "stalemate" ? If you believe such a source exists, we need to review the source in question. Please make sure to provide us with the exact page number and the related quote in question.

If you cannot provide us with such a quote from an appropriate source, please do not revert the result of this battle.

The result will be now reverted back to Finnish victory - and, the Soviet General Platonov's book will be attached as a source for the information. Other sources can be added. 87.93.76.18 (talk) 09:44, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

Sources

In response to the request for verification of the current source, there appears to be no shortage of reliable English-language sources supporting the statement that this was a Finnish victory:

• http://books.google.com/books?id=Bg8drRyDGhEC&pg=PA184&dq=%22Battle+of+Tali-Ihantala%22&cd=2#v=onepage&q=%22Battle%20of%20Tali-Ihantala%22&f=false
• http://books.google.com/books?id=p58vtOKyVy8C&pg=PA14&dq=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&as_brr=3&cd=2#v=onepage&q=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&f=false
• http://books.google.com/books?id=Dh6jydKXikoC&pg=PA467&dq=Ihantala+battle&as_brr=3&cd=3#v=onepage&q=Ihantala%20battle&f=false

If someone feels these sources are necessary, they can be cited in the article. Kafziel ^{Complaint Department} 17:42, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

• Of course it was a tactical victory... and strategic disaster for the Finns. Mannerheim writes in lengths that he used all available reserves, leaving his left flank in East Karelia naked (where Karelian front captured Petroskoi and crossed 1939 borders, advancing up until 9 august). So Finnish army exhausted it's ability to hold off the Russians, and that is why Finns signed the armistice. --Tbma (talk) 16:20, 17 June 2010 (UTC)
• Article also creates a false image, that because of that battle Soviet forces were moved to another fronts. Those transitions were in fact planned, because the Finnish theater was of secondary importance (Mannerheim), and much more important advances were planned in Belorussia and Baltics. Russians just pushed Finns off the way, and continued to the main direction (the same way they did in Kurlandia with the remnants of Army Group North). --Tbma (talk) 16:20, 17 June 2010 (UTC)

Given that Leningrad Front's offensive which was supposed to continue a fair bit further failed to do so and that Karelian Fronts 7th Army's offensive was stopped short of reaching its goals as well and the forward divisions of 32nd Army were soundly beaten it doesn't seem like Finnish army had exhausted its ability to hold off the Soviets. More like Soviets had exhausted themselves trying to break Finnish defenses after their initial successes despite of moving additional troops into the Isthmus after June 20 (the 59th Army). Leningrad Front was ordered to keep attacking toward much further targets (orders #120 and #121 - Ставка ВГК. 1944-1945 гг. Том 16 (5-4) doc). Battle of Tali-Ihantala started on the June 25th. It ended (nominally, small scale actions continued) on July 9th. Soviet troops assault troops (what was left of them - some PoW (not exactly reliable source, i know) accounts tell regiments (probably just some of them) of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps in Isthmus were down to roughly 100 men from the original 2200) were pulled back and moved south starting on mid July ie. only after it had become clearly obvious that Soviet strength in Isthmus was not enough to force another breakthrough. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:47, 29 June 2010 (UTC)

I do agree that Leningrad front did not reach it's stated objectives, which where 50-60km behind Ihantala (not Helskinki of course). But Karelian front did continue after that: Karhumäki was taken on 23 june, Olonets on 25, Vitele on 27 june, Pertozavodsk (Pertoskoi) on 28 june etc. - already after "Tali-Ihantala". The numbers are also greatly overinflated; "USSR and Russian wars in XX century" [1] gives 200 000 men total on Karelian isthmus, which actually a close match to Soviet 1944 TO&E for two armies (you can look at them for example here [2]). The same goes for losses, which are a close match for total loses of two armies on the whole Karelian isthmus for the whole operation. In no way that would happen on the 7km wide front. That gives of course gross over-inflation of Tali-Ihantala importance. So if the Finns won, why did they continue to lose Finnish territory in Eastern Karelia, and why they did not counter attack? Why did they sign the armistice? --Tbma (talk) 15:50, 29 June 2010 (UTC)

Yes they did manage to capture Karhumäki later on but Karelian front was also stopped short of reaching its goals on the Finnish 'U'-line (battle of nietjärvi) and at battle of ilomantsi. But i fail to understand what does Finnish victory over units of Leningrad Front has to do with advances of Karelian front?

Also are you aware that for one reason or another that link you provided (to Krivocheyev's data) is missing the losses Leningrad front suffered after the June 20 (STAVKA order confirms that LF did continue ops after that) - it also omits the 59th Army from its listing (as that was shipped to Isthmus after June 20). So the data does not cover the whole operation. Why Krivocheyev did cut the casualties and strength listing at June 20 is in a way understandable (first phase of the LF op was completed), but why he did not include the data (strength and casualties) from the rest of the offensive (2nd and planned 3rd stage of LF) is not. Please do note that Tali-Ihantala events happened after the Krivocheyev's data 'cuts out'. They are not included in Krivocheyev's listing - neither are casualties from the battle of Tienhaara, or the crossing attempt of Vyborg Bay or the battle of Äyräpää/Vuosalmi - which all happened after June 20 and were fought by units and formations of Leningrad Front.

Finns had tried to sign armistice or peace with Soviets since 1943. What happened in the battles of 1944 or in failed soviet bombings of Helsinki had no real effect on that intent. They probably did (quite likely) have an effect on the timing of the events as well as on the terms of the treaty. But they did not suddenly push Finns into ceasefire - they had tried to achieve that for nearly a year at that point. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:19, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

Not sure where did you get the "goal was finnish U-line" from. I did not find any russian sources about that, and if anyone would say the 7th army goals, it would be russian sources first, right?

Finnish left flank was weakened by the troops transfer to the Karelian isthmus. Immediately after front stabilized there on 20-21st june - Karelian front started it's offensive. Not sure what 59th army has to do with any of this, because it was in reserve, and did not play any part of those battles. It's operated on islands only. As I understand Krivosheev based his data on name-by-name hospital lists, if 59th was in reserve probably it was not using front line hospitals. In any case losses on islands were minor afaik, and cannot change resulting numbers much.

Also not sure from which sources you get 20th june losses cut-off date.

Any cease fire or armistice needs just two things, general will to sign it and mutually accepted terms. So what are you saying is that Finns had a general will to sign it since 1943, but terms offered were not acceptable for USSR. That is why I disagree that all those battles affected "timing only". They are certanly affected armistice terms also, i.e. was or was not Finland accepting itself as a losing side of the conflict. --Tbma (talk) 15:53, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Soviet goals (assuming STAVKA order for Karelian Front can not be found) can somewhat be deducted from the STAVKA orders issued to Leningrad Front where it defines clear operational boundaries for both fronts - unless it was intention for the Karelian Front to reach that line then why would it have been defined in such accuracy. It could also be assumed that town of Sortavala was the main goal of Karelian Front as that was important transportation hub - both to rear of the Finnish troops on the Isthmus as well as directly deeper into Finland. Also or alternative disruption and disorganization in support of Leningrad Front's offensive could be taken as one - which apparently didn't work as both Leningrad Front and Karelian Fronts offensives were either stopped or (in Ilomantsi) driven back. In any case Karelian Front seemed (as i haven't seen their orders) to have failed to accomplish any reasonable goals they could have received. But granted that remains unverified.

Leningrad Front continued (well tried to - repeatedly, at heavy cost) after June 20 all the way until mid July. Are you claiming that repulsed Soviet attacks against Finns (which were all made under Leningrad Front command in the Karelian Isthmus - proven by the STAVKA command i linked above) as well as Germans (Kuhlmey and 122nd Div) caused 0 casualties? Because Krivosheyev's list makes clear that it does not include Leningrad Front losses after June 20. 59th Army took part in landing operations in Vyborg Bay and took casualties in there. It was not reserve formation. Read from these discussions Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk_Offensive. Krivosheyev's omits data according to his owm admission (as the cut off date in his data is for Leningrad Front operations was set to June 20 - while operations continued until mid July).

Don't forget that final armistice agreement was not as harsh as the Soviet demands of Spring 1944. And also the Soviet surrender demand issued in June ~20 was summarily (both before and after SU claimed it was not an unconditional surrender demand) rejected by Finns. Agreement on the armistice was made only as late as in September well over a month after the Soviet offensive was stopped. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:51, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

I guess we do agree both then, that Karelian front not meeting it's goals is a speculation. The same goes for talks about Krivosheev errors until there are no another sources or citations provided. Krivosheev actually makes another error calling Leningrad front right flank, and Karelian front left flank. But they look that way only to the Finns, not if you look from the russian side.

I do remember the dates, and also statements about secondary importance of the offensive (i.e. planned transfer of troops to the Baltics) in the same source that you've cited above. The only goals that I could find in any sources stated "push Finnish forces back from the Leningrad" and "initiate Finland exit" from the war. As I understand both of those were reached, and by September SU had much more important offensive to deal with - Bargation op. with 2.4 million of troops committed. --Tbma (talk) 21:46, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Well, no. 1) STAVKA orders define Karelian front goals as liberating Sortavala, reaching 1940 border and preparing to advance deeper into the central Finland. 2) There is no Krivosheev errors at the time he includes in his calculations. The only error he does is that he stops counting the casualties of the Leningrad front at June 20 as he himself states in his tables. This interpretation is valid, as elsewhere he uses the same date notation to indicate fronts starting and leaving the offensives. (For example 2nd Belorussian leaving East Prussian offensive and starting right away Pomeranian offensive even as the same time Baltic fronts continue East Prussian.) 3) It is not an error, as it was the right flank of the Leningrad Front and the left flank of the Karelian Front. 4) STAVKA orders specify very clearly the targets of the offensive. And this (as well as casualties) are discussed already (several times) at Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk_Offensive#Stavka_orders and in fact the whole talk page of Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk_Offensive. --Whiskey (talk) 23:27, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

1) not really, if you are using sources used by Wanderer602. The goals stated were to "continue advancing in a direction of Sortavala". Other than that Sortavala is not mentioned in STAVKA docs, and "central Finland" is not there. 2) Now you are trying to interpret and speculate on Krivosheev errors and stating that some errors are correct while another are errors. 3) 4) the same.

Nope. I only say that Krivosheev is correct in his and his group's writings. I only read his tables consistently at the way they are written. It is you who claim that there is an error in his tables where he writes that Leningrad front casualties are not between June 10 and June 20 but instead between June 10 and August 9. It is you who claim there is an inconsistency in his handling of Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive and East Prussian/Pomeranian offensives. I find it very peculiar to claim that the STAVKA order, with all location names and dates do not say what is written to that order.--Whiskey (talk) 00:44, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

In this case all russian losses are pure speculation, the same thing as with tanks and sp.guns losses below. I could not find the discussion about STAVKA order #122 (23 june), the only one mentioning Sortavala. (there is another one #278, but it's post-armistice). If you have any real STAVKA order numbers, related to that, I would be happy to discuss it.--Tbma (talk) 01:48, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

Not pure speculation. Manninen used Soviet military casualty reports (not some hearsay or Finnish estimates) for fill the gap which was present in Krivosheyev's data. Though his data is slightly biased to have slightly higher amount of WIAs at the cost of KIAs - as some WIAs ended up KIAs in after they 'left' the unit roster for hospitals - it is the best data available (and it is not speculative data).

And regarding the Sortavala.. Well they never reached it - not even close. Karelian Fronts offensive was stopped at U-line (see Battle of Nietjärvi).

As for the fronts and their flanks... Leningrad Front extended all the way from some point south of St. Petersburg to the line mentioned in the STAVKA order. Its right flank was facing the Finns on the Isthmus and left flank was facing Germans (and Balts) in the Estonia/southern coast of Bay of Finland). Karelian front however reached all the way north from there (though iirc at one point there was an arctic front there as well..) with its left flank facing Finns north of lake Ladoga and its right flank facing Germans north of the Finnish-German operational boundary. So the offensive against the Finns had on its left flank the right flank of the Leningrad front and on its right flank the left flank of the Karelian front. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:43, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

Google books sources stated in the article are even funnier than that. One calls it "defensive victory" [3] and states 300 tanks destroyed, second one [4] 600 tanks already (thats 75% of all tanks used by both fronts) :) but just a "victory", third one [5] "decisive defensive victory" and "history major armor battle" but does not provide any numbers. I wonder it it was 1200 tanks lost based on this trend. All of those full of speculations about losing Helsinki etc. That is some science. --Tbma (talk) 23:58, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Additionally, your description how armstice was reached is faulty, because there is always two sides making the deal. In truth both Soviets and Finns wanted to made deal before summer 1944 but unfortunately they couldn't agree on the terms. At February/March 1944 they were quite close, and there were only two sticking points: An amount of reparations and the timetable of German withdrawal. During the negotiations Paasikivi explained to Molotov that demanded reparations were too high and Finns couldn't intern Germans as quickly as demanded. At that time Molotov refused to alter these demands. Six month later both of these points were amended and the treaty was signed.--Whiskey (talk) 23:50, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Tbma, if you are not schooled in military tremolgy, pls dont make up your own unacademic vocabulary to replace your lack of credible sources. Tell me why its not to beconsider a Decisive Finnish Victory when the Finnish army manged to destroy over 40% of all the tanks the Soviet hade on Karelian Isthmus at Tali-Ihantal? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.237.134.146 (talk) 21:31, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Could you please provide reliable sources stating 40% of tanks destroyed on 7km wide front, and any "academic sources" calling Tali-Ihantala "decicive" without S? --Tbma (talk) 21:52, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Krivosheev here [6] for example states 294 tanks and sp. guns lost during the whole 61 day of operaions. --Tbma (talk) 22:25, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Can't really comment on that. It might contain similar error like the rest of the Krivisheyev's data regarding the offensive. Also it is possible that SU did not list armored vehicles that were fit to be repaired as 'lost' (any idea about this) as AFAIK it was not that uncommon for armor to be repaired even if it had been a 'combat loss'. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:25, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

POV discussion

Seen removal of soviet sources in article, and I think we should discuss it here. As far as soviet and russian historiography is concerned - none of this ever happened. No 150 000 men shoulder to shoulder advancing on 7km wide front, no hundreds of destroyed tanks. Only overinflated Finnish propaganda. --Tbma (talk) 04:57, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Maybe i put a NPOV on the article about Moscow, i havent see it so it can not exsist. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.250.234.124 (talk) 06:17, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

There are a lot of articles and books about Moscow in many languages and by many authors. It is hard to find any mentioning of Tali-Ihantala except in Finnish sources or by Finnish authors. In Russian sources it is not mentioned at all. --Tbma (talk) 15:34, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Therefore it the article is based almost solely on Finnish POV, Russian POV is not reflected. Which is far from neutral. --Tbma (talk) 15:38, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Well Russian have been silent of this battle due to their great loss, but we use Platonov a Soviet lieutenant-general who writings fairly well fits to the Finnish view of the events. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 15:51, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Platonov writes about attacks on VKT line as a whole, not about Tali-Ihantala specifically, so this point is void. The same goes on in about every other book i've read. Other than that - requests for deeper verification has been removed, and any other sources has been removed as well. I don't see any NPOV in this article. --Tbma (talk) 15:57, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Idont care if you (YMB29?) dont see any NPOV or not,

This article has been verified by lots of book, and I have about 5x times more literature in this subject confirming the event. Actually this is not the main problem, you have to search for reason in your disagreement in your own psychic (post-soviet neurosis?.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 16:12, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

You want to fill WP with fantasies and fairy tales - it is nobody's problem. But why should the readers of the WP suffer for that daydreaming? And please restrain your personal attack here. --Tbma (talk) 16:25, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Yeehh,, haha, and the picture of destroyed Soviet tank? And the first count account from the war veterans? I think you have to make a reality check.

But where are pictures of 300 or 600 destroyed tanks? Pictures of hundred thousands of advancing Russian troops maybe? I am sure that was easy to take, since 150 000 people on 7 km front would make 20 lines of densely packed troops. No such pictures? Single destroyed tank there and there does not make hundreds of them. It is easy to find a destroyed tank picture for every other battle, that does not necessary makes every single clash a biggest battle in a history. --Tbma (talk) 17:09, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Just because you seem to lack knowledge about Soviet warfare in 1944 don't give right, in the battle Soviet units consist of among other 14 divisions, 3 armoured brigades,840 artillery pieces. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 17:24, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

I know enough about Soviet 1944-45 warfare to say that numbers are grossly incorrect and exaggerated, and go against Soviet combined arms doctrine arrived in 1943. Those armies were not tailored for the goals, that article claims they were going to do. The numbers you are citing are for the whole western side of VKT line. That is hundreds of kilometers long. In no way that whole number could participate in discussed battle. --Tbma (talk) 17:31, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

VKT-line appears to be that long. However the line run - after the loss of Viipuri - along extensive waterway network (both Vuoksi and Viipuri) which severely limited troop deployments. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:17, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

And what's your source for the numbers being "grossly incorrect"? Nazhin? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 17:35, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

STAVKA documents cited above. Soviet combined arms doctrine is in detail discussed in "August Storm" by David Glantz, where you can find numbers, tactics, and standard areas of operation for soviet armies and divisions of the period. --Tbma (talk) 17:42, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Thats no argument, You dont prove anything. Ex: The following Soviet Division was involved in the Tali-Ihantala battle the 30 June-1 July, identified and located: 358, 314,,172,372,90,46, 45gd,63gd, 64gd, 72, 286, 168, 269,does Glanz disapprove? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 17:57, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

1st - Identified by who? Where are those numbers come from? There are no independent NPOV sources, just Finnish authors. 2nd - Glantz discusses general doctrine and numbers. IN no way he would discuss a battle of huge scale happened only in minds of Finnish scholars. --Tbma (talk) 19:40, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Have you any sources who contradicts this? My grandfather was there him self, do you call him a liar? We have come to an end in this discussion, there is no further point pushing this, its We who have the high ground in in sources and facts, you have absolute no valid argument and your are only lead by your neo-fascist Russian nationalism. Its petty that a great country like Russia is such a dwarf when its comes to handling its own history.

If you still persist in your childish view, you are welcome to take the mater to WP:NPOVN. BTW you have just proven an old Finnish saying " A Russian is A Russian even if you fry him in butter" —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 19:55, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

You are continuing to discuss me, instead of discussing the article, and that is of no interest to me. As I understand that your have no other arguments, - I don't see a point of continuing this discussion. I will return the {{POV}} and {{Disputed}} tags, as admin have recommended and wait for couple of days for more reasonable editors. If that will not happen - I will certainly arise WP:NPOVN request. --Tbma (talk) 20:09, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Do you have any opposing Soviet/Russian sources on the strength or identities of the Soviet forces that took part on the Leningrad Front's 21st army's offensive after June 20? There are several Soviet/Russian sources which agree that Tali-Ihantala (or in other words Soviet 21st Army battles) took place (Platonov, Morozov). - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:02, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes please raise your question at WP:NPOVN so we can have swift end to this long running bad Russian farce who stopped being funny a long time ago when you where YMB29. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 20:13, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Source for this battle [7]

There are sufficent sources (english language) to conviince me that this battle happened.Slatersteven (talk) 20:53, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Battles happened along all VKT line and there are numerous sources about that. But the actual factuality, and numbers portraying the scale of Tali-Ihantala differs from one book to another so greatly, that indicates high amount of speculation. All requests for further sources, and all links to the books questioning the importance of that front (and therefore questioning huge numbers of involved troops) has been removed from the article. --Tbma (talk) 22:46, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

You don't know what you are talking about, most of the VKT where quiet for example Taipale and most was covered by impassible river, making Tail-Ihantala the best point to breach the line as was shown during the winter war and during the Finnish liberation of Karelia 1941. This home made claim of you that "Battles happened along all VKT line and there are numerous sources about that." Shows that you lack basic knowledge and are not fit to edit this article on facts.Posse72 (talk) 23:02, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

This charade has been going long enough and must have an end now, if Tbma don't provide any reliable source for his claim or specify his criticism of the source the NPOV and dispute tag must be removed. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 23:09, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

For example Kantakoski, Pekka (1998) (in Finnish). Punaiset panssarit - Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918-1945 (Red tanks - the Red Army's armoured forces 1918-1945). - Gives exact soviet forces there as following armored units: 30th Guards tank brigade, 27th tank regiment, 124th tank regiment, 27th Guards "Breakthrough" tank regiment, 260th Guards "Breakthrough" tank regiment and 1 Assault gun regiment. - that gives total only 199 tanks, if those units were at full strength. Which is far less then even losses stated in the article. He also mentions that total involved Soviet troops were 60-70 000 - that again is more than twice less than stated in the article. Sources used in article give either 300 or 600 of tanks lost (speculation!) - which is also 2-3 times greater than number of all tank losses for all armies for all fronts in Pertosavodsk-Vyborg op in Russian books. The article shamefacedly states losses as 300+ - speculation again, instead of simply "unknown". --Tbma (talk) 23:25, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Articles are written upon sources, the only one speculating is you, this is the same Russian habits as in all articles like how many where murdered in Katyn?, How many perished in Gulag? How many tank where lost in Kursk. I cant help that you dont trust Finnish sources, but together with what you have written here earlier you dont have much creddit.

Kantakoskis book covers the Soviet armoured in whole Soviet during 1918-1945 and should not by any mean be seen a a prim source for Tail-Ihantal battle. BTW his research fail to identify many of the armoured units in Karelia 1944. Prim sources are Manninen and Kosikmaa who rehearsed the main subject both with high academic skill.

Your tags will be removed soon if you dont come up with better facts.Posse72 (talk) 00:28, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

So you are agreeing that factual details are controversial, and prefer one sources over another. I don't know anything about Kosikmaa and his academic importance, but I see that the article based on his works is already a laughing stock of the Internets. Please refrain from personal attacks in the comments on me again, I did not say a single nationalistic word yet. If you continue - I will issue you another warning and see if admins can do something to stop you. Until details of the article will remain controversial - please leave tags in place. --Tbma (talk) 00:49, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Laughing stock according to you? or www.Sovietempire.ru? Koskimaa was the head of Finnish military academy. All your edits are highly nationalistic. Nothing is controverial in the article, its just you provoking.Posse72 (talk) 00:58, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

This is not a forum, and I don't wish to discuss me here. I wish to discuss the article. If you are unable to do that - I don't see what we can discuss. --Tbma (talk) 01:02, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Show me who misstrust Koskimaa? The Putinyouth? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 01:04, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Not sure that are you talking about. What Putinyouth? --Tbma (talk) 01:43, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Section break

You are saying the battles happened along all of the VKT line. In this case you should notice that Soviet 59th Army was responsible for the operations in the bay of Viipuri and that 23rd army was responsible for the whole front reaching from Vuosalmi (Äyräpää) to the lake Ladoga. Most of the front - in 23rd army's area of operations, if measured in kilometers of front - was held by the troops of fortified regions (gun and machine gun divisions) on the south/west bank of Vuoksi waterway. In addition as User:Posse72 said Taipale was quiet, as was the Valkjärvi/Kiviniemi crossing. Fighting (well there were some small scale fighting on other sections but no major operations) that took place happened on three specific spots. One area was the region starting from Viipuri and reaching east from there to Vuoksi (which includes Tienhaara as well as Tali and Ihantala). It held the most 'armor friendly' terrain in the line. That area was responsibility of 21st Army. In area west from this is bay of Viipuri where 59th Army fought and was responsible for and from east of it is Vuosalmi where 23rd army fought and was responsible for.

In other words all that 21st Army was responsible for was Tali-Ihantala region. Even if there was fighting elsewhere on the VKT line (and given the extensive waterways it was impossible for there to have been battles 'along all of the VKT line') it wouldn't have been 21st Army's issue.

AFAIK problem with Soviet strength on the Tali-Ihantala area is just the lack of Soviet/Russian literature of the issue. Even Krivosheyev's data manages to ignore the losses and strength of Karelian Front after June 20. What is known that 21st Army threw several (pretty much all of its) army corps into Tali-Ihantala but failed to break through. I do not have actual division numbers at hand (or the numbers of assisting separate armored and artillery formations) but Karelian Front's 21st Army used at Tali-Ihantala 4 rifle corps (97th, 108th, 109th, and 110th) and three division (45th Guards, 63rd Guards, 64th Guards) strong 30th Guards rifle corps. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:44, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

As for the armored losses.. Finns counted all immobilized and abandoned tanks as kills in addition to tanks blown to bits (combat loss vs true loss). It is entirely possible that same tank would have been 'killed' several times by Finns in different engagements. In 21st Army Soviets had - according to [8] - one armor brigade (~60 combat vehicles), 5 separate tank regiments, 5 SPG regiments (assume each with ~20 combat vehicles) and 1 armored battalion (presumably 10 tanks). And you get roughly ~300 (270) tanks available for the 21st Army and also therefore available for Tali-Ihantala. Its not impossible (though there might be some overhead) for the Finns to mark 300 as combat losses for the Soviets from that number (most were probably repaired and returned to duty) as the battle lasted some 20 days and Soviet units presumably got resupplied. - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:27, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

If those are estimates, then it should be said in the article - "300 estimated" or "claimed". And those are all estimates and claims - because as You know yourself this battle is completely ignored by Soviet side. Not only any that, but also many people who should have been mentioned it - ignore it (as it never happened) in their books. So all the Finnish authors do - is to continuing to inflate the myth of gigantic scale battle, that happened on a secondary importance front. Because they don't have any real numbers. --Tbma (talk) 19:09, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

As Soviet troops advanced (and even in Tali-Ihantala in the end most of the battleground was in Soviet hands) most of the wrecks and disabled and/or abandoned tanks were within Soviet lines so Finns were unable to confirm their status. Its the same issue everywhere.

Soviet/Russian choice to ignore it is their own problem. Battle in which one side had 5 rifle corps (97th, 108th, 109th, 110th and 30th Guards) with combined 14-15 infantry divisions (with Soviet avg div. being ~7 000 men that gives us ~ 100 000 men in infantry alone) supported by at least 300 tanks and several artillery brigades and regiments is not a small one (and it seems that force estimate of 175 000 for the 21st army is not that far of as it first might appear).

Battle might not appear large compared to the other operations but it should be noted that it was of pretty much the same scale as the Normandy landings. And it was the largest single engagement fought in the Northern Europe. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:59, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

Many battles have probloms with both OB's and casualties (for example d-day) but no one would claim that means that d-day never happened. At teh end of the day there are many sources that confirm this battle happeened, if there are probloms wioth details then we have a full coverage of the discrepancies we do not delete the page.Slatersteven (talk) 11:58, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

Forgot to add that the number of armored units i listed does not yet include the units included to the offensive from the Leningrad Front reserves (for example Soviet 1st armor brigade participated to Tali-Ihantala). Also some of the divisions of the reserve formations were attached to the active front line units for the offensive (for example Finnish books mention that 59th army tried to cross bay of Viipuri with 124th and 224th rifle divisions). All this adds to the difficulty of getting an accurate count of units and vehicles. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:51, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

What reserves have to do with the numbers? Why not to include all Soviet army reserves - there were a lot of those. Soviet books mentioned that 23th army actually crossed Vyoksa and held land until the armistice, that is why I was saying the battles happened along all VKT line. The 59th army involvement was noted only on island. --Tbma (talk) 19:13, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

Reserves are relevant as some of those were 'activated' and used in the attacks (identified at least by Finnish (radio) intelligence). And i wont be claiming that all Leningrad Front reserves would have taken part in battles on the Isthmus or in specifically in the battle of Tali-Ihantala. And yes, Soviet 23rd Army did eventually cross the Vuoksi at Battle of Vuosalmi but it was unable to continue from the small (7 km x 2 km) bridgehead it had gained. Soviet 59th Army did (try to do) more than take the few islands (Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944)) in the bay of Viipuri. It took from the 59th Army four days to clear the few islands and then on July 8 they tried to land on the opposite side of the bay only to run into fresh if understrength German 122nd division which promptly drove the landing troops back into the bay. But most of the VKT line (the Tali-Ihantala as well as Vuosalmi were fought on rather short or narrow area of the front) remained fairly calm. Depending on the historian in question the battles in questions are considered to be something from three separate engagements, to Vuosalmi and Viipuri bay being described as diversions for Tali-Ihantala, and eventually to Viipuri bay as being described as diversion for the Tali-Ihantala and Vuosalmi as the last desperate attempt to gain breakthrough (there probably are additional theories and combinations as well). What seems to be generally agreed is that all three took place, all three happened on relatively narrow strips of the front, and that all three happened separate (geographically) from the other each other. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:12, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

==Tbma own original research

First Tbma only a few days after calling this whole article a hoax has fund a new sources to breakdown this article to crap.

First he claims the Soviet had preplanned its withdraw from the front, but Finnish sources who is supported by POW interview, intellegnce data and Otho Manninen extended archives research in SOviet/Russian archives have pinpointed exactlly witch Soviet units where pressent in the battle and when they left.

What we now for certaint is: The composistion of the Soviet major combat formations where pressent, they Soviet was reinforced by 100 tanks and SPG before the battle, and during the battle 21 Soviet army sent more of its formation in to the battle.

This contradics any statment of withdraw to other fronts or the redicules low figure as only 60000 Soviet red army men.

What about Tbma sources?

The Sources of 60000 men from "Punaiset panssarit - Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918-1945" is by no mean to be seen as a final statment over the battle as the book is abour red army tank, and just uses a few phrases on the Tali-Ihantala battle.

On the "withdraw" is issue i cant find the first source, where does this article support this???:under ed. Zolotarev V.A. (1999). Russkij arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya. STAVKA VGK: Dokumenty i materialy 1944-1945. [Russian Archive. The Great Patritic War. STAVKA. Documents and materials 1944-45]. Moscow: Terra. p. 97. ISBN 5-300-01162-2. The second : ^ Vasilevsky, Aleksandr (1978). Delo moyei zhizni [The point of my life]. Moscow: Politizdat. p. Does in NO WAY support TBMA case and i wonder why its even there? The third:^ N.I. Baryshnikov (2006). "Fenomen falshi: "Pobeda v protivostoyanii. Finskaya istoriografiya o zavershayushchikh boyakh leta 1944 g. s sovetskimi voyskami" [The fenomen of lies: The victory in the confrontation. Finnish historiography about final battles of summer "-is so vauge in deatails that it contradicts with deatailed sources like Manninens on the event but gives no fact like witch units was withdraw? when where they withdrawn? The value of this text is very poor, and if it should be in the text it should be moved down to section like Russian neofacist view of the battle. Posse72 (talk) 09:38, 25 July 2010 (UTC) Tbma sources doen not support his claim! —Preceding unsigned comment added by Posse72 (talk • contribs) 10:15, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Please stop talking about me, you are going to be punished for personal attacks again. As fot the sources - all this stuff is easy to check. --Tbma (talk) 13:22, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

I'm rather interested in the claim of 60 000 men. As 21st Army used pretty much all the available forces in Tali-Ihantala region that would mean that 14 Soviet divisions (of which 3 guards divisions) would have avg strength of ~ 4 300 men - and that is by discounting all armor and artillery. Given that formations used in the Karelian Isthmus had prolonged training and R&R period before the offensive it would be rather surprising that they wouldn't be filled to at least 7 000 like - AFAIK - most Soviet divisions (for example the divisions in the Karelian Front's 32nd army were at level) in R&R. Do you have archival sources which state the strength as 60 000? - Wanderer602 (talk) 13:51, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

And yes... Soviets had planned to withdraw some of their forces to support the Operation Bagration in end of the July 1944. It may have contributed to the Soviet failure at Tali-Ihantala by forcing Soviet commanders to rush their attacks sooner than what would have been preferable. However Soviet plans called for troops be at Kymijoki or even further at that point. - Wanderer602 (talk) 13:51, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

For the defense/withdrawal - 1st reference is the STAVKA directives, and on page 97 is a directive from 21st june is talking about goals for the Leningrad front. "First to take Imatra-Lapperanta-Virojoki. Then try to advance to Kouvola-Kotka and then switch to defense on east bank of Kymi river. Support the main forces from the north". Vasilevsky, who was in STAVKA during the planning stage of this operation is literally repeating the above directive, and then writes - "and then hold on Karelian isthmus, switch there to defense and focus all the attention on Estonia". 3rd reference on professor Baryshnikov's work that cites the above references and also talking about goals of the operation. --Tbma (talk) 13:59, 25 July 2010 (UTC)