Talk:Zumwalt-class destroyer

Rewrite

I am suggesting that this section be removed:

Up to 2006, the remaining Iowa-class battleships were kept on the Naval registry, in part to fill a naval fire support role. The Navy had never had any intention of recommissioning either battleship; their high manpower and fuel requirements were far in excess of the Navy's projected allotment of either for the fire support role (a fully manned Iowa-class battleship can have a crew of over 1,000 sailors, vs the 400 sailors needed to operate one Ticonderoga-class cruiser). Their 16" (406 mm) guns are capable of firing 2,700 lb projectiles approximately 24 nautical miles inland, but very large crews are required for them; whereas the current 5" weapon can be operated by a single loader and the 6.1" weapon requires no crew members. Experimental sabot shells for the 405 mm with multiple times this range were proposed, but none ever reached prototype stage. Since the decommissioning of USS New Jersey and USS Missouri in the early 1990's, all naval gunfire support has been through missiles or through 5"-armed cruisers and destroyers and 3"-armed frigates. DDG-1000 is noted to be able to fire a specially designed "guided" artillery shell some 63 nautical miles inland.[15] However, this shell has a reduced warhead size and uses new technology, so most of the shells carried on the DDG would have vastly shorter range. The specific concern of the Marine Corps is that the last 2 Iowas will be let out of reserve. This would leave the Marines with an insignificant shore bombardment support capability.

The same shells placed in a sabot 406 mm round would achieve the same effect with much farther range but considerably reduced accuracy due to the lower inherent accuracy of the 16" weapon and a much lower rate of fire (2 rounds per minute per tube versus 8-10) due to the slower manual reloading of the 16" weapon, versus fully automatic loading of the 6.1" weapon. With only a few hundred shells at its disposal, the DDG-1000 could fire at a cyclic rate for less than an hour before needing resupply (in practice, the DDG-1000 would only seldom be firing at a cyclic rate). In fact, with planned number of long-range shells, the DDX could only fire a fraction of that time at the longest range. However because both guns are on the bow, and the helicopter pad is at the stern a DDG-1000 could be supplied with ammunition by helicopter while continuing to fire.

I am also recommending the entire 16" vs 6.1" section be removed.

• The Iowa's have all been stricken and are slated to become museums afloat. They will not return due to the manning requirements and the fact that they are helpless against modern submarines, mines, and mass missile attacks. It is well known that 1 Kilo type conventional boat would sink an Iowa very quickly. This class of ship is not fit for littoral combat in this age.
• NGS missions are a point of hot debate but how to accomplish it will not be answered by a Battleship. For the money spent you can build an Arsenal class with much more firepower and flexibility, not to mention automated barges outfitted with VLS bombardment systems like an enhanced MRLS type system.
• I strongly doubt that the Navy is ever again going to allow major warships near a hostile coastline without mine scanning sonar and mine hunting ROV's. We came very close to losing a CG-47 class USS Princeton (CG-59) to a pair of bottom influence mines in Desert Storm. Had the mine had better punch we would have lost it. The mere existence of the LCS program is a candid admission that our counter mine littorial combat capabilities in current platforms is not sufficient to the threat.
• Truck mounted 801 class missiles are a very real threat to littorial combat vessels. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that you can mount 8 of those things to a semi truck and send a convoy of 40 missile bearing trucks within range of ships engaged in NGS. At that point it all comes down to how effective the ships self defensive capabilities are. Rapid ECM, Point defense, area defense, and coordination, will determine the fate of the task force. None of this will be found in a WWII battleship

Tirronan 18:09, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

Allright, let's do it. NoClass 05:01, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

Let us wait a week or two to hear from the other editors on this subject if you don't mind? I prefer to work in concert with the folks that wrote this rather than try to impose my will on a document. While I still stand by my argument that the inclusion of stricken BB class in a destroyer article is silly its not the only view here by a long shot and those folks need to be heard from. Tirronan 15:51, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

Gentlemen and Ladies, the more I read on the DD 1000 program the more concerned I get that this article took off in the wrong direction. there is much we should cover from the new side mount VLS, dual band radar, signature reduction, tumblehome contruction, hull design contraversy, actual advancements, ect. Instead we get an article that is 2/3 NGS and BB vs DDG 1000 argument.

• Twin magazines holding 600 rounds
• 10 rpm per gun or equivalent to 3 batteries of 155mm land artillery
• Tumblehome bottom heavy design
• Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS):(designed to blow off rather than blow the ship up)
• twin band phase array radar (revolutionary)
• quiet as a LA class sub
• Gas Turbine/Electric drive system 10x power supply
• Permanent Magnet Motors
• Automated fire suppression
• Advanced sonar suite
• Automated stores loading
• Advanced computer suite
• 10 new technologies (extreme high risk project)

[[1]]

Each of these features should be discussed instead of this devolving into an "bring back the BB" article this page has come to.

I am going to create a Future Naval Gunfire Support page for the various sections here that relate to that and perhaps then we can have an article about the actual ship instead of what this is. Tirronan 17:22, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

I have created the page and moved the DDX vs BB sections to that. If this causes a problem then please revert. I will be expanding the article from here. Tirronan 17:19, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

I have added the sections that I have said that I would and they can use expansion again. The Future Naval Gunfire Support page has not been well received to say the least. I think it set a new record to make the speedy deletion request. If anyone has a burning desire to edit this page please do so quickly. I will attempt to rewrite it Sunday but I need to find good sources and I question if it should be done at all, looking at the page it looks very POV and really adds up to whining about the BB's being stricken. When I checked further much of it had been lifted in total from the Iowa Class Battleship page.

There needs to be a fair amount of inline citation added to the article and my stance on my edits is "nothing I write is beyond editing or complete revision". I assure everyone that the last person on earth that thinks he is infallible is me... Tirronan 20:46, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

Ok I've made more changes so that the folks that want the BB sections in there can work them up to something that is acceptable to the rest of the community. I believe that Nauticle is the fellow most interested in that so I am giving this 48 hours from this time stamp to see something done on this. Tirronan 21:50, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

I've checked and there is a Naval gunfire support page that I think this stuff belongs in. Check it out and let me know Tirronan 22:28, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

BATTLSHIPS ARE MORE CAPABLE THAN DDG-1000

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2007-05_JFSC_Thesis_NFS_and_DDG-1000.pdf

US Joint Forces Staff College (May 15/07) – JAWS Masters Thesis by Col. Shawn Welch, USARNG: Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap. National Defense University 2007 Award for best thesis. Persuasively argue that current capabilities are insufficient, casts doubt on the DDG-1000 Class as a solution, and makes a case that faulty assumptions have helped to create this problem. Includes a number of interesting anecdotes, as well as analysis:

This is why the BATTLESHIPS comparison to DDG-1000 should remain. The DDG-1000 doesn't even come close to matching what the Iowa Class Battleships can provide for NSFS. The Study includes the same WAR GAME scenario that was used for the DDG-1000 but includes a Battleship. The BB is by far a better solution. It is clear the Navy is not interested in solving the NSFS issue. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.28.242.194 (talk) 15:40, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

The article is about the DDG-1000 not naval gunfire support and I would suggest that belongs in that article not this one. They will be building this ship and right wrong or indifferent this is what this article has to be about not warring on battleships. Tirronan (talk) 22:31, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

The above study link contains the war game scenario used to justify the construction of the DDG-1000. The study belongs here take the time to read it. The DDG-1000 primary mission is NSFS. Colonel Welch takes you through the history of NSFS and the bad decision making that has the Navy constructing the DDG-1000. DDG-1000 traces its orgins to Arsenal Ship which had nothing to do with NSFS. I strongly suggest you take the time to read the study. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Porsche996 (talk • contribs) 01:24, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

I did take the time to read it, all 117 pages of it as a matter of fact however I am not about to allow this to become "Bring back the BB's" article highjack that this page was. Every ship type worth of an article doesn't have to have 1/2 the article turned over to alternative ship types. The Colonel is a artillery officer in the US Army Reserve if I remember correctly and hasn't a clue about modern naval warfare as his entire thesis was on NGFS which isn't bad at all, and where other issues arise its treated lightly and without consideration. I came to the conclusion that this entire article was justification to bring back the Iowas but that is not what this article is about. Please take the time to visit the NGFS page and like that there. It is a worthy addition but there not here please. Tirronan (talk) 15:46, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

I am glad that you took the time to read it and most likely you came away from reading the study that there is something horribly wrong with the way the Navy leadership is doing its analysis for decision making. It is that failure that the Colonel points out that has us left with the Navy's solution to the NSFS problem being the flawed DDG-1000. From the war game scenario it is clear that the DDG-1000 does not and will not be enough to provide adequate NSFS for troops ashore. The primary mission of this vessel is to provide NSFS. Colonel Welch's study, truly belong in the controversy section of the DDG-1000 page. This study is a contributing factor as to why Congress has little faith in the Navy's ability to provide a solution to the NSFS problem. Had the study been produced sooner it would most likely have halted the decommissioning of the Iowa’s. As to the Colonel's knowledge of modern naval warfare I would say you are incorrect about him being clueless. His thesis/study received the National Defense University's award for best thesis for 2007. The thesis was read and proofed by several naval experts. Most thesis are 50 to 70 pages. Colonel Wech's was a monster and was given approval to go over their page limit. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Porsche996 (talk • contribs) 15:01, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

He may not "have a clue about modern naval warfare" but, as you observed, the Colonel is an Artillery Officer. I would think that would count for something atleast, especially in the topic of Naval Surface Fire Support. He may not be a naval warfare expert, but he is an expert in Fire Support. 121.218.215.96 (talk) 06:50, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

I don't have a problem with what I consider an excellent review of NGFS but that belongs in the NGFS page. Please don't misunderstand me I believe that DDG 1000 has its issues in more than one way and this isn't to excuse those issues. I've writen on the subject in the article. However, and I'm being blunt here, a reasonably competent opponent can take a kilo class sub, hardly state of the art and very available, and put an Iowa down in about 30 minutes tops. Its helpless in a mine warfare operation, and blind and dumb against massed ASM attack where you would have the armored raft floating and nothing else. I have nothing against the battleships I love them but their day has passed and it doesn't belong in a destroyer article. Tirronan (talk) 22:28, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

The Study is about NSFS and Solutions. The Navy is only constructing the DDG-1000 to help with the Lack of NSFS, its Primary Mission. As the Colonel clearly shows with the Navy's own original war game the DDG-1000 is not and never will be capable of providing adequate NSFS for troops ashore. It is for that reason this DOD authorized study should be posted on the DDG-1000 site. The Colonel puts the Navy's answer to the NSFS issue to the test and it fails miserably with their own data! The obvious solution, a Capital Surface Warship with Major Caliber Guns and lots of stored ammunition is a real solution. The same Navy simulated war game with the CSW clearly showed this to be the case. As for a simple sub sinking an Iowa Class Battleship this would be a failure of modern naval warfare tactics because that is why we have Submarines, DDG’s , CG’s and other aircraft for. That is their mission not a CSW/ Battleship. Plus sinking an Iowa with torps is no easy task. The Colonel’s study references several documents and individuals that discuss the Battleships survivability. Page 73

James F. O'Bryon, “Distortions about ships,” Washington Times, 17 June, 2005. Accessed 6 March 2007 at http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050616-100901-9551r.htm. DD(X) is now DDG-1000. 272 U.S. Department of the Navy. Ship Vulnerability Assessment for Missouri BB-63 (Bathesda, MD: Department David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center, January 1987). 273 Mark Cancian,. “Retaining Battleships” [information paper]. (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (GPP/FSAD), 20 November 1990), 8. The classified nature of this subject prohibits greater specificity.

The David W. Taylor Naval Ship Vulnerability Assessment for Missouri is a study that goes into detail just how many torpedo’s and missile hits the ship can survive. Let’s say it’s a lot. There is also James O’Bryon the former DOT&E deputy director, who is also the same person who wrote the JMEMs. I think they know a bit more about just how survivable the Battleships are and what modern weapons effect they would have. As for Mines I guess you are unaware that Wisconsin and Missouri both were tasked with mine sweeping duty? Yes using 1930's technology they swept mines. But as the Study points out a CSW/BB would have a 25 Mile standoff. I thought the purpose of Wikipedia is to present factual information. Not unsubstantiated claims? No US Battleship has been sunk since Dec. 7, 1945 and the US has had a Battleship present in all of our major conflicts up to 1992. Even with the Iowa turret explosion the ship was still operational and continued its mission. Please do not take offense to this post as it is to clearly outline as to why the Colonel's study should appear here. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Porsche996 (talk • contribs) 20:31, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

I don't have much of an issue with a link to the report, and even a one liner pointing it out. However be aware that at one point no less than 1/2 of the article was detailed to the Iowas bemoaning their fate and offering arguments to why they should be returned to service which is not what this article is about. As it stands there are no less than 2 sections calling out possible failures in the DDG 1000 in NGFS I know I wrote some of it myself. However the article is about the DDG-1000 class ship not the Iowas. I will repeat there is a article about NGFS and by God you are correct it is good information but this isn't the article to place alternative platforms except in passing. You may note by the tone of the article of which most which was writen by this editor, is not overly supportive of some of its features. It may in fact be part of the NGFS answer though I doubt it will be all of it. There are many ways to deliver an explosive package onto a target, and a 16" cannon may well be the cheapest way to do so. However, if I were an admiral, and I am not, I don't think I would be very keen to place an Iowa in a mine/ASM/ASW litorial threat environment. After the Princeston incident I haven't seen a rush to move into brown waters with a blue water ship. What I am pointing out to you is that there is more to a gun platform survivability than armor and guns. Its an interesting problem and it sure deserves a discussion but that should be on the NGFS page where all this can and should be discussed and it should make a great article. Tryping to shoehorn it into a single class article is a high jack of that article. Tirronan (talk) 22:56, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

I thought you were going to add the Colonel's Study to this section? Also most of the news shows lawmakers are pretty much going to kill this program. Some law makers have read this study and conclude that this ship has very little if any capability to provide NSFS. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Porsche996 (talk • contribs) 15:15, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

I am not going to add the Colonel's Study to this article, you might consider a link to his work stating that here is a thesis on the work but, is not the place for said article... again and for the last time there is a naval gunfire support page... it does belong there. I have no idea if Congress will kill this off or it will remain a 2 ship demonstrator and neither do you. I have strong doubts about this ship for many reasons and the guns are the least of them but all you seem to want to do is talk about the colonel's work which is only marginally about this ship and very little about the guns. Naval Gunfire Support Tirronan (talk) 23:27, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

The Zumwalt class destroyer has such a comparison to the Iowa Class battleships because of the roles that the projected class will fullfil with regards to land-support (seeing as the Iowa class fullfils that role already). Furthermore, there are two Iowa class ships that can still be called into active service (the USS Iowa is in layup, and the USS Wisconson is on the US Navy's reserve list and can be called back into active service if the need is great enough. Thus, I believe that the section of this article reffering to the Iowa Class battleships should be left alone. --Bismarck43 (talk) 17:51, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Ironclad

I'm just going off of the artist render, but would this qualify at all as a sort of modern ironclad? It looks very ironclad-ish to me. Some guy (talk) 00:52, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

USS Zumwalt shares a certain look with the CSS Virginia for a very good reason. Both ships are designed to take things thrown at them from the sides and deflect them upwards. In this case it's radar beams instead of cannon balls. Hcobb (talk) 15:27, 30 November 2008 (UTC)

It does not qualify as any kind of modern ironclad. First, ironclads used to come in all kinds of appearances, the Virginia is not a typical example of that type of ship, just one sub-type really. After all, the term "ironclad" means exactly that - a ship possessing a hull that is covered with a protective armor (made of iron or steel). This leads to Two - modern warships are not armored in any kind of sense similar to past designs. That development ended after WW2. Third, as mentioned above, the superficial similarity is caused by the tumblehome hull of DD(X) being a result of RCS reduction measures. 58.171.225.135 (talk) 10:49, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Holy shit is this thing expensive. $10 billion for three destroyers with delusions of grandeur? They could buy another carrier at that price 165.134.209.176 (talk) 12:52, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

Number of ships cancelled

If 32 ships were originally planned and only three are going to be built, shouldn't the number of ships cancelled be 29? Captain Cheeks (talk) 09:41, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

You cannot cancel ships that you have not even ordered. I feel that the term "cancelling" is used quite a bit arbitrarily these days, especially with certain military procurements. The high initial number was thrown around in projections, but these never went beyond rough first sketches really. I guess, the "4-5" number is based upon the assumption, that the eventual, rather solid, number agreed upon was seven ships with the procurement of the third ship still being in question. 58.171.138.147 (talk) 10:38, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Too Young to die

An interesting article by Young pleading for the DD(X), but he doesn't mention the ABM issues the Navy noted for the cancellation.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3935896&c=AME&s=SEA "There are a lot of reports that you can upgrade 51s, but I will tell you, you cannot do that without significant changes in that ship. You will have to add cooling capacity, you will have to add electrical generating capacity, and this ship has already gained weight because it's like [20] years into its service life. And ships are designed with a certain amount of weight-carrying capacity. Putting more radar will definitely add more weight, eat up more of its [design] margins, and - oh by the way, the ship prices I gave you [for the first ship of a restarted DDG 51 production line] of $2.1 billion and $2.7 billion are not ships with more cooling, more electrical generating capability and more radar. That will push the price up of that ship significantly close, if not beyond, 1000. Hcobb (talk) 19:22, 6 February 2009 (UTC)

Interesting in light of the fact that the yards haven't finished rolling out flight 11a's yet... Tirronan (talk) 21:05, 7 February 2009 (UTC)

No anti ship capability

For such a grand warship it has no anti ship missles —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jeneral28 (talk • contribs) 00:04, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

It's a battleship. Its main guns outrange most anti-ship missiles and the cruise missiles outrange the rest. And the ESSM are buff enough to deal with most surface combatants in hostile navies. Hcobb (talk) 14:09, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

It'll carry Tomahawks. That would make them compatible with the anti-ship version. 69.73.47.181 (talk) 23:32, 23 December 2012 (UTC)

Boeing laser contract is not DD(X) related

The Register is a poor source for mil-spec info. The Boeing FEL is for ship defense and not an offensive weapon to replace the main guns. The Boeing FEL is more of a CIWS replacement that would be used on many different ship classes. See their PR: http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2009/q2/090415c_nr.html Hcobb (talk) 03:32, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

The Register article says the FEL is for "dreadnoughts" and also mentions Zumwalt destroyers have power for such lasers."Boeing: Raygun dreadnoughts will rule the oceans by 2019". 17 April 2009. -Fnlayson (talk) 09:06, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

It's just not a very good source and I'd rather go with more mainstream media or the companies involved. Hcobb (talk) 16:55, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Sure. What I was getting at is the Register's conclusion is a leap of faith and would be considered OR here. -Fnlayson (talk) 21:37, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Planned features graphic is not informative

Under the heading, "Design Elements," there's a picture labeled "Planned Features of the DDG-1000." However, this picture doesn't point out and explain the ship's design features, but rather looks more like something in an advertisement. Such labels as "Advanced gun system" don't tell us anything about the gun system that we don't already know, but instead merely assure us that the gun is "advanced" (and that politicians should approve its purchase). "Total Ship Computing Environment" means absolutely nothing, as does "Integrated Undersea Warfare." These are phrases meant to sell, not to inform. The image adds only confusion. Therefore, I am removing this image from the article. Starsword333 (talk) 01:55, 30 May 2009 (UTC)

AGS is the term that The Navy is using and the name that the system is known as generally. Hcobb (talk) 02:06, 30 May 2009 (UTC)

Tumblehome Warships in Action

Someone removed some examples of actual tumblehome warships in actual service. I for one, would place more credibility on an actual Russian tumblehome hulled battleship in actual service, than MODEL ship in a test tank. I'm sure many other researchers would agree; the Russian Navy's experience with REAL warships such be taken into consideration, and supplemented to the "Model Ships" being tested in test tanks. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.60.156.2 (talk) 20:22, 22 March 2010 (UTC) while I agree that any practical tests with tumblehome designs are invaluable in assessing the merits of that design, I feel it is important to note that this is not the article on tumblehome designs. if the USN used that example in their assessment of zumwalt then it would be reasonable, unfortunately the US military has a tendency to redo everything from scratch, not even looking at their own research data from the 60's. unless you can show that this Russian ship design was used in creating zumwalt then it should be placed elsewhere.24.246.70.135 (talk) 17:14, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Conflicting cost estimates - 6.6bn or 3.45?

The estimated procurement cost is $3.4525Bn according to this Congressional Research paper: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:tx78LeaBiZoJ:www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiHVGm8g6vNDF5_Ev0cxYXqJGdHe5UJO1--muauL-jDIpMwLtZfL8oPNyCy9zRTteFcHEYdJwLH9OqPcKL9PQlwZQSF7D39jNlNGy88WuOK0mQmB-JFoSkkrVSffUW9333hdh3L&sig=AHIEtbRPNRV6I7dXwmos5sV2B9-a1ovJhA&pli=1 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.66.93.252 (talk) 21:39, 13 June 2012 (UTC)

Also, the article on hull number 1000 Zumwalt puts it's cost at 3.3bn. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.66.93.252 (talk) 21:53, 13 June 2012 (UTC)

Fleet assignment

• Any of these destroyers gonna be in the Pacific Fleet? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.71.125.62 (talk) 04:15, 14 November 2012 (UTC)