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Dano-Mughal War

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The Dano-Mughal War or The Danish East India Company’s War against the Mughal Empire was a colonial and maritime conflict between the Mughal Empire and the Danish East India Company over trade commerce in the Bay of Bengal. Lasting from 1642 to 1698 (56 years). The conflict has also been reffered to by historians as The Dano-Bengali Thirty years' war[1][2]

Dano-Mughal War

Map of the Bay of Bengal
Date1642-1692
Location
Result See peace
Territorial
changes		 Dannemarksnagore ceded to Denmark
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Denmark–Norway Christian IV
Von Kalnein
Poul Nielsen
Willem Leyel		 Shah Jahan
Mohammed Ajumadi
Malik Kasim

Background

Further information: Western imperialism in Asia § Early European exploration of Asia, Mercantilism, and Christian IV of Denmark § Exploration and colonies
Danish king Christian IV, founder of the Danish East India Company
Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan I, Emperor at the start of the war

In the start of the 17th century European colonialism started to expand. Christian IV, an ambitious king who wanted to show off Denmark–Norway on the international stage, sought to increase Denmark’s sphere of influence and its financial and economic independence[3], so he founded the first Danish East India Company in 1642. Nevertheless he stimulated the establishment of trading companies for Greenland, Iceland, and the West and East Indies. The company was initially weak- It had had a rough First expedition and wanted to expand its Mercantilism.

Declaration of War

In 1642 the Danish East India Company Declared war on the Mughal Empire. This may sound unreasonable, by comparing the two nations. The Mughals were a vast Asiatic Empire, while Denmark was a Declining power. For instance the Mughal Empire’s army was perhaps fifty times larger than Denmark’s entire population.[4][5]

Reasons to why the Danish East India Company declared war on the Mughal Empire lay in the nature of European Maritime trade. Violence was used to ensure the safe transport of Goods and was key to the success of Commercial enterprise in medieval Europe.[6]Another mean, mercantilism, the dominant economic theory in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe was also contributing to the competition and conflict in the area. It associated states’ strength with their economic dominance. It also emphasized commercial competition. Such competition was used by various European Charter companies like the Danish East India Company.

In 1640, On a voyage from Makassar to Masulipatnam, the St. Jacob was seized and wrecked by Bengali local authorities, the Danes could not negotiate the release of the cargo.[7] Dutch records claims that the St. Jacob’s cargo was seized because of Danish debts, but the Danes viewed the seizure as a tyrannous act[8] and in 1642 made a formal declaration of war

Danish and other European settlements in Sri Lanka and India.

War (first phase 1643-1650)

War at sea

Shortly after declaring war, Denmark swiftly dispatched two of Tranquebar's finest vessels towards Bengal, where they successfully captured a ship that they later renamed Den Bengalske Prise.[9]

For the Danes, the war served as a means to finance their company, a vital source of revenue during the period from 1639 to 1668, when the company faced dissolution and resurrection, with no reinforcements arriving from Denmark to assist in Asia.[10]The Danes exhibited a clear inclination towards financial gain, with their primary focus lying in maximizing profits rather than directly attacking the Mughals. They particularly targeted ships returning from Southeast Asia due to their immensely valuable cargoes.[11]

Danish seizures of Bengali ships became alarmingly frequent for the Mughals, and a letter from Willem Leyel states " they were doing their best to cause the Bengalis as much harm as possible,"[12]The repercussions of these seizures took a severe toll on the businesses and professional lives of Bengali individual merchants, instilling a deep fear that discouraged them from venturing to sea, fearful of potential capture by the Danes.[13] Resistance against the Danish sailors was scarce. According to Danish colonial historian Gunnar Olsen, the Bengalis exhibited a sense of resignation, as described in his writings. “the Bengalis seem to have given up in advance on any form of resistance against the Danish ships."[14]

Altho resistance was rare,it was not entirely absent. In a notable incident off the Gingeli coast in 1644, the yacht Walby intercepted two sizable Bengali ships carrying elephants, resulting in a skirmish where some of the elephants tragically perished,[15] documenting the use of voilent resistance by bengalis. The overall lack of efficacy in resisting the Danish forces can be attributed to the stark contrast in naval warfare capabilities between the Europeans and the Mughals.[16]

Land skirmishes

Recorded land confrontations were rare, with only two notable instances.

The initial occurrence took place in the early 1640s, prior to the official declaration of war.The Danes, stationed at Pipli under the leadership of Poul Nielsen, encountered significant financial troubles. A Persian merchant, who owed a substantial amount to the Danes, adamantly refused to settle his debts. In response, the Danes resorted to imprison him within his own residence. However, when this approach proved ineffective, they proceeded to seize one of his slaves and impound a portion of his goods at the Danish trading post. The Mughals, considering this a violation of their sovereignty, promptly dispatched a force of 300 men to seize and set ablaze the Danish trading station. All the confiscated goods were taken and the Danish factors were imprisoned, although Nielsen and several others managed to escape to Tranquebar.[17]

Fort Dansborg at Tranquebar, the first and main Danish Indian outpost

The second encounter occurred during the mid-1640s, following the formal declaration of war. A Danish vessel, carrying a crew of six, was wrecked along the Bengali coast. The surviving crew members were subsequently detained by the Bengalis, prompting the initiation of a Danish rescue operation. Led by Nielsen, a group of 16 men set out towards the Mughal governor's residence in Pipli, where the captured crew was rumored to be held captive. They confronted the guards, causing the governor to hastily flee. However, their search yielded no sign of the castaways. Nielsen then proposed investigating the town hall, which was vigilantly guarded by soldiers who had already been informed of the ongoing mission. Despite the guards' alertness, the Danes managed to overpower several of them, forcing the others to flee. Subsequently, they gained access to the town hall, where they discovered the castaways confined in formidable iron chains. Remarkably, the Danish rescue mission achieved its objective with minimal casualties and zero fatalities.

Danish manifesto

A Portuguese-written manifesto was crafted to justify the Danish stance. Bearing the date August 24, 1644, this concise document spans five pages and serves to outline the grievances the Danes sought to address. Commencing with the Danish loss of Jupiter, a vessel carrying valuable cargo, as well as the subsequent imprisonment of its crew in 1625. Additionally, it recounts the distressing incident involving the abduction of a young Danish boy, who was forcefully converted to Islam and disappeared without a trace. The documents blame the Mughal governor for both the instances. Then it explains how the Danes stopped trading in Bengal because of these “robberies, offenses and tyrannies”

It also describes several other instances of Mughal agression like the Mughal governor’s obstruction of commerce, the assault on Danish factors at Pipli, and the poisoning of shipwrecked Danish servants. Some of these instances are rejected by scholars[18][a]

The manifesto, in its essence, appears as trying to protrait their enemy’s lack of morality and shame, while simultaneously underscoring the Danish continued willingness to negotiate.

Failed negotiations

Because of the lack of naval power, the Mughals sought to put an end to the war by instead negotiating and making compromises with the Danes. First in 1645, where they offered 80,000 rupees in compensation for peace. Yet Danish governor, Willem Leyel, rejected the offer, hoping to instead recieve 436,500 rix-dollars. Leyel instead intensified the fighting.

The Mughals again tried to compromise with Denmark in 1647 or early 1648, but did not result in any significant peace[19]

In 1647, the Danish instructions stated that for peace to be established with the Bengalis, three conditions had to be met.

  1. A substantial cash payment was required.
  2. The Danes were to be granted equal trading privileges as the Dutch.
  3. Arrangements were to be made for the forgiveness of all debts that Pessart had incurred in Masulipatnam.
Danish Colonial Merchant Ensign of India

Having themselves failed to negotiate with the Danes, the Mughals instead tried to pressure other European colonial powers to intervene. After a Danish seizure of two large Bengali ships, the Mughals were enraged[20] Yet they could not revenge the Danes because the Danish East India Company no longer had any territory inside of the Mughal Empire[21] Therefore Shah Shuja, Mughal Prince, made an ultimatum for the Dutch East India Company to either stop Danish agreesion or leave Bengal, However, after discussions, he was persuaded against pursuing the ultimatum.[22]

In 1649, local authorities attempted a similar action by refusing favorable trading terms from the VOC, if the Dutch could not assure the protection of their merchants against the Danes. The Dutch, deeming this proposition as ridiculous, rejected.[23]VOC eventually accepted protections of merchants with Muslims background, against Danish aggression[24]

The loyalty of certain Danish Company servants added complexity to the peace negotiations. Christian IV had a strong bond with the Danish East India Company, so much so that he became the "Head and Lord of the whole Company" in 1629.[25] He had consistently declined to dissolve the Company, even though it was not profitable, due to concerns about losing his reputation in Denmark and abroad.[26] The company was eventually dissolved[b] after Christian's death[27] when informed about its dissolution, the Danish factors stationed in Asia had no choice but to continue operating the Asian settlements as they were the property of the Crown.[28]

Latter phase (1669

Christian V of Denmark

After the dissolution of the first company and conflicts at home, relations between Denmark and Tranquebar were reestablished in 1669 after a succesful expedition by the frigate Færø in 1668, which resulted in the renewal of Danish instrests in the region. In 1672 Christian V wrote a letter to the Mughals, asking for compensation for Danish vessels during the conflict.[29] The compensation was never fullfiled, the Danes became increasingly frustrated and even chased and blew up two greater vessels near Hughli[30] The incidents and skirmishes continued, until eventually, the Danes felt the absence of the Bengali market and decided to resume negotiations.

Peace

A provisional peace was agreed upon in 1674[31] However, this period of peace was short-lived as the Danes continued to pillage Bengali merchants for their own financial benefit. Danish hostilities were renewed against Bengal after the vessel Christianshavn was wrecked by the local faujdar (commander responsible for administering sub-districts) acording the Danish claims.[32] Danish harassments of both hostile but also peaceful Bengali merchants went on until In the late seventeenth century. The Danes wished to regain their influence in Bengal by reestablishing their presence in the region. They yet again tried to negotiate a peace with the Mughals, this time succeding. In 1698, Andreas Andræ, along with Thomas Schmertz, was dispatched to Bengal by the Danish government. They arrived with ships, Indian servants, money, goods, and Danish settlers with the intention to establish a trading presence in the region. Andræ successfully negotiated a peace agreement with the Bengali governor, Mohammed Ajumadi, wherein both parties agreed to set aside their claims over previously confiscated ships. The Danish delegants also gifted 15,000 rupees and four cannons to the prince.[33] Moreover, Andræ secured a lease for a plot of land at Gondalapara close to the French settlement of Chandernagore for 30,000 rupees to be paid over a period of ten years. This area eventually became known as Dannemarksnagore, where the Danes established a trading post that served as the foundation for their operations in Bengal.[34]

Notes

  1. ^ Numerous scholars have doubted the likelihood that the locals would have deliberately poisoned the Danes.
  2. ^ The initial company was in operation from 1616 to 1650, while the second company existed between 1670 and 1729, before being re-established in 1730 as the Asiatic Company (Danish: Asiatisk Kompagni), .

References

  1. ^ Rasmussen, Jens (1982). To verdenshistorier [Two world histories] (in Danish). Copenhagen and Oslo: Politikens Forlag. p. 65.
  2. ^ Clausen, Sven (1983). Den Dansk-Begalske Trediveårskrig [[The Dano-Bengali Thirty Years War]] (in Danish). Aarhus.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  3. ^ Nair, P. C. (June 1974). "Sociétés et Compagnies de Commerce en Orient et dans l'Ocean Indien. By Michel Mollat editor. (Actes du Huitième Colloque International d'Histoire Maritime, Beirut, 1966). Paris: S. E. V. P. E. N., 1970. Pp. 731, 8 plates. 62 Francs". The Journal of Economic History. 34 (2): 514–515. doi:10.1017/s0022050700080281. ISSN 0022-0507. S2CID 154693349.
  4. ^ Raychaudhuri, Tapan (1982-04-01), "The Mughal Empire", The Cambridge Economic History of India, Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–193, doi:10.1017/chol9780521226929.011, ISBN 978-1-139-05451-5, retrieved 2023-11-11
  5. ^ Johansen, Hans Chr. (January 1972). "Some aspects of Danish rural population structure in 1787". Scandinavian Economic History Review. 20 (1): 61–70. doi:10.1080/03585522.1972.10407711. ISSN 0358-5522.
  6. ^ Davis, Lance E. (September 1980). "Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises. By Frederic C. Lane. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979. Pp. 128. $24.95 cloth, $7.95 paper". The Journal of Economic History. 40 (3): 675–676. doi:10.1017/s0022050700085892. ISSN 0022-0507. S2CID 154335771.
  7. ^ Larsen, Øivind (2012). "Historie, helse og makt i Dansk Vestindia". Tidsskrift for den Norske Legeforening. 132 (17): 1990–1991. doi:10.4045/tidsskr.12.0778. ISSN 0029-2001.
  8. ^ Coolhaas, W. P. (August 1970). "Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Vol. III: 1655-1674". The Economic History Review. 23 (2): 417. doi:10.2307/2593871. ISSN 0013-0117. JSTOR 2593871.
  9. ^ Larsen, Kay (1907). "Danske Kapertoger i den bengalske Havbugt, 1642-1648," (in Danish). Olsen, Dansk Ostindien. pp. 435–436.
  10. ^ "1830, 1831", Twenty-Nine Years in the West Indies and Central Africa, Cambridge University Press, pp. 30–49, 2010-09-16, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511711473.003, ISBN 9781108016698, retrieved 2023-12-26
  11. ^ Hauge, Peter (2002-06-01). "Et brev fra diplomaten Stephen Lesieur til Chr. IV's lutenist John Dowland". Magasin Fra Det Kongelige Bibliotek. 15 (2): 3–13. doi:10.7146/mag.v15i2.66844. ISSN 1904-4348.
  12. ^ Lo Russo, Rosaria (2020), "Mettere in voce il verso. La pratica del reading di poesia fra letteratura e vocalità", L'arte orale, Accademia University Press, pp. 71–90, doi:10.4000/books.aaccademia.8090, ISBN 9791280136176, retrieved 2023-12-26
  13. ^ Goor, J. van (1972-01-01). "W.Ph. Coolhaas, Generale missiven der V.O.C., I, 1610-1628, II, 1639-1655,III, 1655-1674, IV, 1675-1684". BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review. 87 (1): 108–110. doi:10.18352/bmgn-lchr.1712. ISSN 2211-2898.
  14. ^ "Vore Gamle Tropekolonier. Edited by <italic>Johannes Bröndsted</italic>. Volume I, Dansk Ostindien og Dansk Guinea. By <italic>Gunnar Olsen, Kamma Struwe, Aage Rasch</italic>, and <italic>Georg Nörregaard</italic>. Volume II, Dansk Vestindien. By <italic>Jens Bro-Jörgensen, Jens Vibœk, Fridlev Skrubbeltrang</italic>, and <italic>Georg Nörregaard</italic>. (Copenhagen: Westermann. 1952, 1953. Pp. 665; 577. Kr. 550.)". The American Historical Review. April 1954. doi:10.1086/ahr/59.3.607. ISSN 1937-5239.
  15. ^ Hauge, Peter (2002-06-01). "Et brev fra diplomaten Stephen Lesieur til Chr. IV's lutenist John Dowland". Magasin Fra Det Kongelige Bibliotek. 15 (2): 3–13. doi:10.7146/mag.v15i2.66844. ISSN 1904-4348.
  16. ^ Marshall, P. J. (February 1980). "Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion". Modern Asian Studies. 14 (1): 13–28. doi:10.1017/s0026749x00012142. ISSN 0026-749X. S2CID 143911505.
  17. ^ Goebel, Erik (November 2011). "The trials and travels of Willem Leyel: an account of the Danish East India Company in Tranquebar, 1639–48". Journal for Maritime Research. 13 (2): 164–165. doi:10.1080/21533369.2011.622877. ISSN 2153-3369. S2CID 161425363.
  18. ^ Dewhurst, R. P. (October 1924). "Recent books on India - 8.—From Akbar to Aurangzeb. A Study in Indian Economic History. By W. H. Moreland, C.S.I., C.I.E. 9 × 5¾, xiii + 346 pp., 2 maps. London: Macmillan & Co., 1923". Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. 56 (4): 684–686. doi:10.1017/S0035869X00065710. ISSN 1356-1863. S2CID 163256348.
  19. ^ Olsen. Dansk Ostindien. pp. 139–141.
  20. ^ Goor, J. van (1972-01-01). "W.Ph. Coolhaas, Generale missiven der V.O.C., I, 1610-1628, II, 1639-1655,III, 1655-1674, IV, 1675-1684". BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review. 87 (1): 108–110. doi:10.18352/bmgn-lchr.1712. ISSN 2211-2898.
  21. ^ Feldbæk. No Ship for Tranquebar for Twenty-nine Years. p. 35.
  22. ^ Raychaudhuri, Tapan (1962-01-01). Jan Company in Coromandel 1605-1690. BRILL. doi:10.1163/9789004286641. ISBN 978-90-04-28664-1.
  23. ^ Goor, J. van (1972-01-01). "W.Ph. Coolhaas, Generale missiven der V.O.C., I, 1610-1628, II, 1639-1655,III, 1655-1674, IV, 1675-1684". BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review. 87 (1): 108–110. doi:10.18352/bmgn-lchr.1712. ISSN 2211-2898.
  24. ^ Ibid III. p. 864.
  25. ^ Bredsdorff. The Trials and Travels of Willem Leyel. p. 22.
  26. ^ Bellamy, Martin (2006-10-13). Christian IV and his Navy. BRILL. doi:10.1163/9789047411291. ISBN 978-90-474-1129-1.
  27. ^ "Ostindisk Kompagni, 1616-1729". danmarkshistorien.dk (in Danish). Retrieved 2024-01-06.
  28. ^ Feldbæk and Justesen. Kolonierne i Asian og Afrika. p. 76.
  29. ^ Clausen, Sven (1983). Den Dansk-Begalske Trediveårskrig [The Dano-Bengali Thirty Years War] (in Danish). Aarhus. p. 109.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  30. ^ Coolhaas, W. P. (August 1970). "Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Vol. III: 1655-1674". The Economic History Review. 23 (2): 417. doi:10.2307/2593871. ISSN 0013-0117. JSTOR 2593871.
  31. ^ Olsen. Dansk Ostindien [Danish East India] (in Danish). p. 184.
  32. ^ Larsen, Øivind (2012). "Historie, helse og makt i Dansk Vestindia". Tidsskrift for den Norske Legeforening. 132 (17): 1990–1991. doi:10.4045/tidsskr.12.0778. ISSN 0029-2001.
  33. ^ Coolhaas, W. P. (August 1970). "Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Vol. III: 1655-1674". The Economic History Review. 23 (2): 417. doi:10.2307/2593871. ISSN 0013-0117. JSTOR 2593871.
  34. ^ Larsen, Kay (1940). "Da Fattiromany blev taget: En dansk Kup i Bengalen 1714," [When Fattiromany was Taken: A Danish Coup in Bengal 1714] (in Danish). p. 31.
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