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Lobster War

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Lobster War

A Brazilian Air Force Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress flying over the French escort vessel Tartu, off the coast of Brazil in 1963.
Date1961–1963
Location
Waters of Pernambuco, Brazil
Result

Peaceful resolution of the conflict: Withdrawal of French vessels;

  • End of the mobilization of warships on both sides
  • Extension of Brazil's territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile zone
  • Fishing authorization granted to French lobster fishing boats for five years if a portion was given to Brazilian lobster fishermen
Belligerents
 Brazil France
Commanders and leaders
Jânio Quadros
João Goulart
Ad. Arnoldo Toscano
Charles de Gaulle
Units involved
Brazilian Navy
Brazilian Air Force
French Navy
Strength

Brazilian Navy fleet in the dispute zone:
1 Corvette

6 Destroyers

2 Cruisers

1 Aircraft carrier

1 Submarine

Brazilian Air Force:
1 Squadron

1 Squadron

1 Squadron

Offshore Brazil:
First Escort squadron
1 Destroyer:

  • Tartu

1 Aviso

  • Paul Goffeny

Offshore West Africa:
1 Aircraft carrier

1 Cruiser

Second Escort squadron
7 Destroyer:

  • Cassard
  • Jauréguiberry
  • Picard
  • Le Gascon
  • L'Agenais
  • Le Béarnais
  • Le Vendéen

1 Tanker

  • La Baise
Casualties and losses
None[1][2][3] None[4]

The Lobster War (also known as the Lobster Operation; Portuguese: Guerra da Lagosta; French: Conflit de la langouste) was a dispute over spiny lobsters that occurred from 1961 to 1963 between Brazil and France. The Brazilian government refused to allow French fishing vessels to catch spiny lobsters 100 miles (160 km) off Brazil's northeastern coast[5] by arguing that lobsters "crawl along the continental shelf". The French maintained that "lobsters swim" and so they could be caught by any fishing vessel from any country. The dispute was resolved unilaterally by Brazil, which extended its territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile (370 km; 230 mi) zone and took in the disputed lobsters' bed.[6]

Although the historical incident of coercive diplomacy may have taken place long before the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the dispute ended with the signing of an agreement on 10 December 1964[4] that granted to 26 French ships the right to fish for a period no longer than five years if they delivered to Brazilian fishermen a certain amount of profit from their fishing activities in the so-called "designated areas".[4]

Context

The lobster fishing crisis

In the early 1960s, France had lost almost all of its colonies on the African continent and consequently lost maritime areas where it exploited and dominated fishing.[7][8] These losses, especially in Mauritania, put the French stock of lobsters in jeopardy.[8]

Interest in the Brazilian Northeast

With the shortage, there was increased interest from fishermen at the fishing port of Camaret, on the northwest coast of France, in the Brazilian Northeast and the lobsters that inhabited there. The French then sent a delegation to Recife to conduct research on lobster nurseries. In March 1961, the authorization was issued and was valid for 180 days; however, only three vessels could be sent, following a French request.[9] Moreover, the Brazilian government required representatives from the Brazilian Navy to board as inspectors. Thus, it didn't take long for the reports to show that instead of three, there were four fishing vessels in action. Furthermore, there was no research being conducted. The four boats were fishing uncontrollably and intended to take the lobsters to Europe.[10]

In November of the same year, France requested authorization again, now with João Goulart as the nation's president, as Jânio Quadros had resigned a month earlier. The authorization was granted, and as before, the French continued to commit illegal fishing and were expelled from the Brazilian maritime territory. From then on, vessels considered illegal began to be seized – but were soon released without further consequences.[10]

Diplomatic battle

Throughout 1962, a diplomatic dispute between the two countries ensued. Brazil claimed that the lobsters were in the exclusive economic zone of the country, while France relied on the 1958 Geneva Convention, which established guidelines for high seas fishing, even though neither country had signed the convention.[10] Early in the year, the Brazilian corvette Ipiranga seized the fishing vessel Cassiopée, 10 miles off the northeast coast.[10]

During the negotiations to establish a form of modus vivendi regarding the crustacean, France argued that the lobster moved from one place to another by jumping and, therefore, should be considered as a fish and not a resource of the continental shelf. According to Commander Paulo de Castro, of the Brazilian Navy, the argument was weak and, ironically, he said:[11]

“By analogy, if a lobster is a fish because it moves by jumping, then a kangaroo is a bird.”[11]

Brazilian response

With the continued arrival of fishing boats on the Brazilian coast aiming to fish for lobsters, admiral Arnoldo Toscano, given the reports from fishermen from Pernambuco, decided to send corvettes from the Navy to the region to escort the French out of Brazilian territory. The aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, the star of the Navy at the time, was not sent towards the disputed waters, generating criticism of the government by the population. However, the use of an aircraft carrier would not be necessary in the conflict.[12]

French response

When peacefully approached by Brazilian warships, the fishermen, instead of ceasing their illegal activities, requested help from the French government, especially the French Navy, which promptly responded.[13]

At the time, the leader of the French was the former general and war hero Charles de Gaulle, known for being nationalist, conservative, and ruling with an iron fist.[14] In his third year as president, De Gaulle sent destroyers and an aircraft carrier of the Clemenceau class to the Atlantic Ocean to escort the fishing boats in their unauthorized activities from Brazilian warships.[13]

Incident and dispute

Squadron of the Brazilian Navy. In the center, the cruiser Almirante Tamandaré, escorted by four Fletcher-class vessels.

From 1960, France had lost almost all of its colonies in Africa and, consequently, lost maritime areas where it explored and dominated fishing. These losses, mainly from Mauritania, put the French stock of lobsters in check. In 1961, some groups of French fishermen who were operating very profitably off the coast of Mauritania decided to extend their search to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. They settled on a spot off the coast of Brazil at which lobsters are found on submerged ledges at depths of 250–650 feet (76–198 m).[15] Since local fishermen complained that large boats were coming from France to catch lobster off the state of Pernambuco, Brazilian Admiral Arnoldo Toscano ordered two corvettes to sail to the area of the French fishing boats.[16] Seeing that the fishermen's claim was justifiable, the captain of the Brazilian vessel then demanded for the French boats to recede to deeper water and to leave the continental shelf to smaller Brazilian vessels. The situation became very tense once the French rejected that demand and radioed a message asking for the French government to send a destroyer to accompany the lobster boats, which prompted the Brazilian government to put its many ships on a state of alert.

The same day, Brazilian Foreign Minister Hermes Lima considered the French approach as an act of hostility: "The attitude of France is inadmissible, and our government will not retreat. The lobster will not be caught."[17] He called a secret meeting with his assistants to review the latest developments in the lobster war against France. Meanwhile, French President Charles de Gaulle reacted to perceived Brazilian interference with the French fishing boats that were looking for lobsters off the Brazilian coast by dispatching on 21 February the 2750-ton T 53-class destroyer Tartu to watch over the fishing boats,[n 1][18] but it decided to withdraw it to soothe tensions.[19] The Brazilian President João Goulart then gave France 48 hours to withdraw all the French boats, but as they refused to leave the area, the Brazilian Navy apprehended the French vessel Cassiopée off of the Brazilian coast on 2 January 1962.[4] By April 1963, both nations were considering whether they should go to war over lobsters.[20]

Tribunal acts

On the scientific thesis

On 6 July 1966, the Administrative Tribunal of Rennes summarized the French government's claims that lobsters are like fish and that since they swim about in the open sea, they could not be considered part of the continental shelf. Brazil claimed that lobsters are like oysters in that they cling to the bottom of the ocean and so were part of the continental shelf.[21] Admiral Paulo Moreira da Silva, Brazil's Navy expert in the field of oceanography who had been sent to assist the diplomatic committee during the general discussions,[22] argued that for Brazil to accept the French scientific thesis that a lobster would be considered a fish when it "leaps" on the seafloor, it would be required in the same way to accept the Brazilian premise that when a kangaroo "hops", it would be considered a bird.[22]

On shipowner claims

It was also observed that the claims of Celton and Stephan, two of the shipowners who sought compensation from France for losses occurred during the January–March 1963 fishing season, had no right to any compensation at all once the French government could not be held responsible for the unsuccessful seizure because of the unilateral position by the Brazilian government.[23]

Decisions of the Conseil d'État then dismissed the allegations that the French government had authorized the plaintiff shipowners to send their vessels to go fish for lobsters on high seas or to off the coast of Brazil. It stated that the licenses given to the plaintiffs accorded to the masters of the vessels and not to the shipowners. The derogation was decided to have authorized the masters to exercise full command of their vessels for fishing on high seas, not in a particular zone. There is no evidence that the French government had authorized such actions and so their claims were rejected.[19]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ On 21 February 1963, a task force from Toulon followed, headed by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and followed by the cruisers De Grasse, Cassard, Jauréguiberry, the destroyer Tartu, the corvettes Le Picard, Le Gascon, L'Agenais, Le Béarnais and Le Vendéen (all T52 class) and the tanker La Baïse and Paul Goffeny. Initially, it was to be only "one more commission" off the west coast of Africa to show the flag and to perform routine exercises.

References

  1. ^ Braga, Cláudio da Costa (2009). A Guerra da Lagosta. Armazém das Letras. pp. 90–165–166–167. ISBN 978-8590479017.
  2. ^ "O dia em que a lagosta virou peixe". FAB Ministério da Defesa. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
  3. ^ "Navios de Guerra Brasileiros". Navios Brasileiros. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
  4. ^ a b c d Rainer Lagoni; Peter Ehlers; Marian Paschke; Duygu Damar (2011). Recent developments in the law of the sea. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 26. ISBN 978-3-643-10946-0.
  5. ^ AP (25 Feb 1963). "France Recalls Ship Sent to Lobster War". The Milwaukee Journal: 22. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
  6. ^ Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan; Mango, Anthony (2004). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. Vol. 2 G-M. Routledge. p. 1334. ISBN 0415939224..
  7. ^ Andrade, Ana Luíza Mello Santiago de. "Colonização francesa na África - História". InfoEscola (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  8. ^ a b Muniz, Túlio de Souza (November 2013). "A "Guerra da Lagosta": um Laboratório para o Golpe Militar de 1964". Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian Studies. Vol. 2: 352. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  9. ^ Poggio, Guilherme (2016-01-28). "A Guerra da Lagosta e suas lições". Poder Naval (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  10. ^ a b c d Poggio, Guilherme (2016-01-28). "A Guerra da Lagosta e suas lições". Poder Naval (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  11. ^ a b "A GUERRA DA LAGOSTA – O QUE FOI, COMO ACONTECEU, A ATUAÇÃO E OS PROBLEMAS DA MARINHA DO BRASIL". TOK de HISTÓRIA (in Brazilian Portuguese). 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  12. ^ Falconi, 2009, pp. 104–105.
  13. ^ a b Lobato, Ricardo (2021-01-01). "Como um crustáceo quase mergulhou a América do Sul no maior conflito desde a Guerra do Paraguai". Aventuras na História (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  14. ^ Abreu, Augusto (2017-01-11). "Charles de Gaulle". Portal São Francisco (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
  15. ^ Reynaud, Paul (1964), In The foreign policy of Charles de Gaulle: a critical assessment, Odyssey Press, p. 118. LCCN 64-529.
  16. ^ (1963), In Arab Observer National Publications House (Cairo, Egypt), p. 142. OCLC 2641710
  17. ^ "Brazil: Force de Flap". Time. March 8, 1963. Archived from the original on December 22, 2008. Retrieved 12 October 2010.
  18. ^ "Ships Augment 'Lobster War' Water Patrol". St. Petersburg Times. 79 (216): 5. 25 Feb 1963. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
  19. ^ a b Kulski, W. W. (1966), In De Gaulle and the World:The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic, Syracuse University Press, p. 360. ISBN 0-8156-0052-6.
  20. ^ Ziegler, David W. (1990), In War, peace, and international politics, Scott Foresman, p. 362. ISBN 0-673-52023-4
  21. ^ Ziegler, David W. (1990), In War, peace, and international politics, Scott, Foresman, p. 360. ISBN 0-673-52023-4.
  22. ^ a b Fehlberg, Carlos. "Solução surge através da argumentação e um debate entre os oficiais da Marinha, após crise diplomática chegar ao extremo". Institutojoaogoulart.org.br. Instituto Joao Goulart. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
  23. ^ Lauterpacht, E. (1974) In International Law Reports, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 47, p. 2, ISBN 0-521-46392-0.