Dehousing
Dehousing refers to area bombardment of residential areas to demoralize the enemy with the demolition of housing (as opposed to terror bombing), particularly using aerial bombing of cities or carpet bombing. The first use in World War II was the Nazi Germany Bombing of Frampol, Poland in September 1940, followed by the British "city bombing attack" of Mannheim, Germany, in December 1940.[1]. After the 14 February 1942 Area Bombing Directive was issued to RAF Bomber Command,[2] a subsequent British analysis known as[citation needed] the dehousing cabinet paper estimated about one-third of the German population would be turned out of house and home if the forecasted output of RAF heavy bombers were used against built-up areas.
Timeline regarding WWII City Bombing
- September 1940: Luftwaffe Bombing of Frampol
- 1940 - early 1942: Hitler repeatedly warned the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff not to start terror bombing of England as long as there were industrial and military targets to be destroyed.[3]
- August 18, 1941: The officially-commissioned Butt report revealed bombing to be shockingly inaccurate (Churchill recognised "this is a very serious paper and seems to require urgent attention"),[4]
- September 21, 1941: The Directorate of Bombing Operations delivered a rebutal to the Butt report and claimed that with a bomber force of 4,000 they could destroy the forty-three German towns with a population of more than 100,000.[citation needed] The Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal argued with such a force RAF Bomber Command could win the war in six months.[citation needed]
- February 14, 1942: After debate[5] by the government's military and scientific advisers (e.g., the Tizard-Cherwell Feud),[6] the Cabinet issued the Area bombing directive for TBD
- February 22, 1942: Air Chief Marshall Harris became Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command
- March 30, 1942: Lord Cherwell sent a memorandum to Winston Churchill that became known as[citation needed] the dehousing cabinet paper:
The following seems a simple method[7] of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany
Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20-40 dwellings and turns 100-200 people out of house and home.
We know from our experience that we can count on nearly fourteen operational sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next fifteen months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its life-time drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4000-8000 people homeless.
In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in fifty-eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of these fifty-eight German towns the great majority of their inhabitants[7] (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home. Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed. At Hull[8] signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the fifty-eight principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.[2]
- 1942: In a speech to the House of Commons, the Member of Parliament for the University of Cambridge pointed out that "The total [British] casualties in air-raids – in killed – since the beginning of the war are only two thirds of those we lost as prisoners of war at Singapore ... The loss of production is the worst month of the Blitz as only equal to that of due to the Easter holidays ... The air ministry have been ... too optimistic[7] ... we know most of the bombs we drop hit nothing of importance. ..."[2][2]p126
- 1942: The chief scientist to the Royal Navy said that the dehousing cabinet paper's estimate of what could be achieved was 600% too high.
- April 15, 1942: Sir Henry Tizard wrote to Cherwell on April 15 -- his criticisms of the paper was that on past experience only 7,000 bombers would be delivered not the 10,000 in the paper and since only 25% of the bombs were likely to land on target the total dropped would be no more than 50,000 so the strategy would not work with the resources available.[2]
- May 20, 1942: The Singleton Report was delivered and stated: "If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months’ continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale).:[5][9]}}
- January 21, 1943: The Casablanca Directive decided[clarification needed] that the "primary objective will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened".
- October 1943: "Bomber" Harris urged the UK government to openly announce that "the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive...should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany"[10] and to emphasize "that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories."[11]
- February 13-15, 1945: The Bombing of Dresden in World War II raised the second of two firestorms by RAF Bomber Command
References and Notes
- ^ Davis, Richard G (April 2006). "Bombing of the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive 1939-1945" (pdf). Air University Press. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ a b c d e
Longmate, Norman (1983). The Bombers: The RAF offensive against Germany 1939-1945. Hutchinson. p. p131-134,138. ISBN 0-09-151580-7.
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NOTE:Page 134 citing p. 49-51 in either Snow Science and Government (1961) or Snow A Postscript to Science and Government (1962) {Longmate simply says Snow science on page 393, but lists both books in the sources (page 387)} - ^
Harris, Arthur T (1995), Despatch on War Operations: 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945 (html), p. xliii, ISBN 071464692X, retrieved 2008-07-04
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suggested) (help) - ^ Davis, Rob. "Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command 1939-1945" (html). Retrieved 2008-07-03.
- ^ a b
Copp, Terry (September/October 1996), "The Bomber Command Offensive", Legion Magazine
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(help) - ^
Crook, Paul. "The Case Against Area Bombing" (html). Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, and Socialist. Retrieved 2008-07-4.
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(help) - ^ a b c NOTE: Harris' "simple method" gives:
- 10,000 bombers x 14 missions per bomber x 3 tons per mission x 100-200 people per ton (average)
- = 42-84 million people out of house and home (average)
- ^
"Listed status for bombed cinema". BBC News. 2007-02-02. Retrieved 2007-02-02.
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(help) NOTE: Hull was the most severely-bombed [British] city or town apart from London during World War II, with 95% of houses being damaged or destroyed. - ^ "Issues : Singleton - World War Two" (html). Bomber Command Death By Moonlight. Retrieved 2008-07-08.
- ^ John V. Denson, "The costs of war: America's Pyrrhic Victories" p.352 (Google books), further referenced to Garret, "Ethics and Air Power in World War II" pp.32-33
- ^ "Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice" p.36 Strategic Studies Institute (Google books)
- Hore, Peter, editor (2003). Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, and Socialist, Routledge, ISBN 0714653179. Chapter 10 "The case against Area Bombing" by Paul Crook pp 167-186
- CABINET PAPERS: Complete classes from the CAB & PREM series in the Public Record Office Series One: PREM 3 - Papers concerning Defence & Operational Subjects, 1940-1945 Winston Churchill, Minister of Defence, Secretariat Papers