Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah
Detained at	Guantanamo
Other name(s)	Abu Zubaydah زين العابدين محمد حسين
ISN	10016
Charge(s)	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Abu Zubaydah (Arabic: ابو زبيدة; born 12 March 1971 as Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn) is currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a detainee in the war on Terror. Zubaydah's name is often transliterated as Abu Zubaidah, Abu Zubeida, or Abu Zoubeida. Born Zein al-Abideen Mohamed Hussein (Arabic: زين العابدين محمد حسين), he is also known by over thirty-five aliases.

Biography and his early years in Afghanistan

Born in Saudi Arabia, Abu Zubaydah moved to the West Bank as a teenager where he joined in Palestinian demonstrations against the Israelis.

Abu Zubaydah moved to Afghanistan in 1991 to assist the mujahideen in their fight against the Afghan and Soviet Communists. In 1992, while fighting for the mujahideen Abu Zubaydah was injured from a mortar shell blast which left shrapnel in his head and caused severe memory loss, as well as the loss of his ability to speak for over one year. Abu Zubaydah eventually became involved in the jihad training camp known as the Khalden Camp.

The Khalden Camp has been described by the U.S. Government as an al-Qaeda training facility -- an assertion that has been utilized as evidence of Abu Zubaydah's, and over 50 other Guatanamo detainees' alleged connection to al-Qaeda. This allegation has been contested, however, by multiple detainees, the 9/11 Commission Report, and Brynjar Lia, head of the international terrorism and global jihadism at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. Abu Zubaydah testified in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal that the Khalden Camp was at such odds with al-Qaeda and Bin Laden that is was closed by the Taliban in 2001, at al-Qaeda's request. This account was corroborated by two other detainees, Noor Uthman Muhammed, who was alleged by the U.S. Government to have been the emir, or leader, of the Khalden Camp, and a close friend of Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi. In addition, Noor Uthman Muhamed's charge sheet references the closing of the Khalden camp at the request of terrorist leaders. Brynjar Lia states in his book that there was an ideological conflict between the leaders of the Khalden Camp on one side, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the other, and that this lead to the closing of the Khalden Camp. Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi, and Noor Uthman Muhammed confirmed this divide in their CSRT testimony. Of the 57 detainees the U.S. Government claims are associated with the Khalden Camp, 27 have been released, including Abu Zubaydah's good friend Khalid Sulayman Jaydh Al Hubayshi.

Early activities

By 1999, the U.S. Government was attempting to run surveillance on Abu Zubaydah. By March 2000, United States officials were reporting that Abu Zubaydah was a "senior bin Laden official", the "former head of Egypt-based Islamic Jihad", a "trusted aide" to bin Laden with "growing power," who had "played a key role in the East Africa embassy attacks." None of these allegations have been corroborated at this point, however.

Internationally Abu Zubaydah was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court for his alleged role in plots to bomb U.S. and Israeli targets in Jordan. A senior Middle East security official stated Abu Zubaydah had directed the Jordanian cell and was part of “bin Laden’s inner circle."

In August, 2001 a classified FBI report entitled “Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S.”, which would not become public until much later, stated that the foiled millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, had confessed that Abu Zubaydah had not only encouraged him to blow up the Los Angeles airport, but had facilitated his mission. The report also claims Abu Zubaydah was planning his own attack on the U.S. An unclassified FBI report also stated that Ahmed Ressam attempted to buy a laptop for Abu Zubaydah. Despite all of these supposed connections, when Ahmed Ressam went to trial in December 2001 federal prosecutors did not attempt to link him to Abu Zubaydah, and did not use any of this supposed evidence in its case. He also recanted his confessions after the trial saying he was coerced into giving them.

Capture

It is unclear how the Government found Abu Zubaydah. U.S. officials claimed he was tracked down after making a phone call to al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen. However, this has been questioned by a C.I.A. official who stated that the U.S. paid $10 million to the Pakistani government, who had in turn bribed the information on his whereabouts from a local driver in Faisalbad. Saudi Arabian officials claimed Abu Zubaydah was captured after intelligence gleaned during an interrogation by their GSS. It was also reported in 2008 that Deuce Martinez, a C.I.A. analyst had played an integral role in narrowing down Abu Zubaydah’s supposed hideouts to the 14 targeted by the joint raids.

Whoever was responsible for finding Abu Zubaydah, on March 28, 2002, CIA and FBI agents, in conjunction with Pakistani intelligence services, raided several safe houses in Pakistan searching for him. Abu Zubaydah was apprehended from one of the targeted safe houses in Faisalabad, Pakistan. During his apprehension he was shot in the thigh, the testicle, and the stomach with rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle. He was not recognised at first, and simply thrown into a pick-up truck along with other prisoners by the Pakistani forces, until a senior FBI agent identified him as Abu Zubaydah. He was taken by the FBI to a Pakistani hospital nearby and treated for his wounds, where the attending doctor admitted to John Kiriakou, the co-leader of the CIA group that apprehended Abu Zubaydah, he had never before seen a patient survive such severe wounds. The FBI and CIA flew in a doctor from Johns Hopkins University to ensure Abu Zubaydah would not succumb to his wounds during transit out of Pakistan.

His pocket litter supposedly contained two bank cards which showed he had access to Saudi and Kuwaiti bank accounts, which was considered rare since most al-Qaeda members used the preferred untraceable hawala banking. According to James Risen

"It is not clear whether an investigation of the cards simply fell through the cracks, or whether they were ignored because no one wanted to know the answers about connections between al Qaeda and important figures in the Middle East -- particularly in Saudi Arabia." One of Risen's sources chalks up the failure to investigate the cards to incompetence rather than foul play: "The cards were sent back to Washington and were never fully exploited. I think nobody ever looked at them because of incompetence." When American investigators finally did get around to looking into the cards, they worked with "a Muslim financier with a questionable past, and with connections to the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and Saudi intelligence." He reported back that "Saudi intelligence officials had seized all of the records related to the card from the Saudi financial institution in question; the records then disappeared. There was no longer any way to trace the money that had gone into the account."

A search of the safehouse turned up his personal 10,000 page diaries, in which he recorded his thoughts in seemingly split personalities of a young boy, old man, and himself.

Abu Zubaydah was turned over to the CIA, and was transferred to CIA operated prisons in Pakistan, Thailand, Afghanistan, Poland, Northern Africa, and Diego Garcia. Historically renditions to countries which commit torture have been illegal, however, a memo written by John Yoo and Jay Bybee days before Abu Zubaydah's capture, provided legal cover for renditions to places such as Thailand. In March, 2009, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee launched a year-long study on how the CIA operated the secret prisons around the world.

The interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah was interrogated by two separate interrogation teams, one from the FBI and one from the CIA.

Ali Soufan and the FBI interrogation team

Following Abu Zubaydah’s capture he was interrogated by FBI agents Ali Soufan and Steve Gaudin. The interrogation followed standard FBI protocol and involved cleaning and dressing Abu Zubaydah’s wounds. Ali Soufan stated that "[w]e kept him alive... It wasn't easy, he couldn't drink, he had a fever. I was holding ice to his lips." The agents attempted to convince Abu Zubaydah that they knew of his activities in languages he understood; English and Arabic. Both agents believed they were making good progress in gathering intelligence from Abu Zubaydah.

Within a matter of days, however, a CIA interrogation team began participating in Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. The CIA team has headed by outside CIA contractor and former Air Force psychologist James Mitchell. Mitchell ignored Soufan's previously successful strategy and ordered that Abu Zubaydah answer questions or face a gradual increase in aggressive techniques. According to Soufan, Abu Zubaydah cooperated with the FBI interrogators on multiple occasions. Soufan testified before Congress that his FBI team was removed from Abu Zubaydah's interrogation multiple times, only to be asked to return when the harsher interrogation tactics of the CIA proved unsuccessful. Soufan asked Mitchell whether he had ever interrogated anyone, to which Mitchell replied that he hadn't, but "Science is science. This is a behavioral issue" and suggested Soufan was the inexperienced one at the facility.

Ali Soufan was alarmed by the CIA’s interrogation tactics, and was so enraged that he challenged a CIA agent's authority to go through with them, shouting "We're the United States of America, and we don't do that kind of thing." The CIA agent told him in April 2002 that the tactics were approved by the "highest levels" in Washington, and even stated that the approvals "are coming from [Alberto] Gonzales." Soufan reported to his FBI superiors that the CIA’s interrogation constituted “borderline torture.” He was particularly concerned about a coffin-like box he discovered that had been built by the CIA interrogation team. He was so angry he called then FBI Assistant Director for counterterrorism, Pasquale D'Amaro and shouted "I swear to God, I'm going to arrest these guys!" After Soufan’s complaints to the FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director Pasquale D’Amuro were communicated to the CIA, both FBI agents were ordered to leave the facility immediately by FBI Director Robert Mueller. Ali Soufan left, but Steve Gaudin stayed an additional few weeks and continued to participate in the interrogation.

Shortly thereafter Pasquale D'Amaro met with FBI director Robert Mueller III and told him the FBI should not participate in interrogations using harsh techniques because FBI protocol prohibited agents from being involved. Robert Mueller III agreed with D’Amuro and ordered all FBI agents to stop participating in any interrogations where the CIA used harsh interrogation techniques. In 2008, a report by the Justice Department’s Inspector General alleged the FBI complained repeatedly beginning in 2002 about harsh CIA tactics. Top FBI officials apparently debated for six months after Abu Zubaydah’s capture as to what to do, before formally severing ties with any CIA interrogations where harsh tactics were used.

Ali Soufan's Congressional testimony

Ali Soufan testified about Abu Zubaydah's interrogation in front of Congress May 13, 2009. In his testimony he stated:

The case of the terrorist Abu Zubaydah is a good example of where the success of the Informed Interrogation Approach can be contrasted with the failure of the harsh technique approach. I have to restrict my remarks to what has been unclassified. (I will note that there is documented evidence supporting everything I will tell you today.)

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence...

During his capture Abu Zubaydah had been injured. After seeing the extent of his injuries, the CIA medical team supporting us decided they were not equipped to treat him and we had to take him to a hospital or he would die. At the hospital, we continued our questioning as much as possible, while taking into account his medical condition and the need to know all information he might have on existing threats.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.) All this happened before the [CIA] team arrived.

A few days after we started questioning Abu Zubaydah, the CTC interrogation team finally arrived from DC with a contractor who was instructing them on how they should conduct the interrogations, and we were removed. Immediately, on the instructions of the contractor, harsh techniques were introduced, starting with nudity. (The harsher techniques mentioned in the memos were not introduced or even discussed at this point.)

The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking. At that time nudity and low-level sleep deprivation (between 24 and 48 hours) was being used. After a few days of getting no information, and after repeated inquiries from DC asking why all of sudden no information was being transmitted (when before there had been a steady stream), we again were given control of the interrogation.

We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence...

After a few days, the contractor attempted to once again try his untested theory and he started to re-implementing the harsh techniques. He moved this time further along the force continuum, introducing loud noise and then temperature manipulation.

Throughout this time, my fellow FBI agent and I, along with a top CIA interrogator who was working with us, protested, but we were overruled. I should also note that another colleague, an operational psychologist for the CIA, had left the location because he objected to what was being done.

Again, however, the technique wasn't working and Abu Zubaydah wasn't revealing any information, so we were once again brought back in to interrogate him. We found it harder to reengage him this time, because of how the techniques had affected him, but eventually, we succeeded, and he re-engaged again.

Once again the contractor insisted on stepping up the notches of his experiment, and this time he requested the authorization to place Abu Zubaydah in a confinement box, as the next stage in the force continuum. While everything I saw to this point were nowhere near the severity later listed in the memos, the evolution of the contractor's theory, along with what I had seen till then, struck me as "borderline torture."

As the Department of Justice IG report released last year states, I protested to my superiors in the FBI and refused to be a part of what was happening. The Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, a man I deeply respect, agreed passing the message that "we don't do that," and I was pulled out.

As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah wasn't cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of interrogating him.

In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that doesn't add up: Waterboarding wasn't approved until 1August 2002 (verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla was arrested in May 2002.

The same goes for KSM's involvement in 9/11: That was discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success are false.

Nor can it be said that the harsh techniques were effective, which is why we had to be called back in repeatedly. As we know from the memos, the techniques that were apparently introduced after I left did not appear to work either, which is why the memos granted authorization for harsher techniques. That continued for several months right till waterboarding was introduced, which had to be used 83 times – an indication that Abu Zubaydah had called the interrogator's bluff knowing the glass ceiling that existed.

Intel gleaned during FBI interrogations

Ali Soufan states that the assertion that traditional, rapport building interrogation methods were not working, and therefore harsher interrogation tactics were necessary to obtain actionable intelligence, was incorrect. He further alleged that the claim Abu Zubaydah only revealed actionable intelligence after the harsher interrogation techniques were applied is also incorrect. "I was in the middle of this, and it's not true that these [aggressive] techniques were effective," Soufan said in a Newsweek interview. "We were able to get the information about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a couple of days. We didn't have to do any of this [torture]. We could have done this the right way." Other intelligence officials also dispute the need for harsher interrogation techniques. Two high-ranking FBI officials, as well as another person close to Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, and the Government's expert on the Jose Padilla case, Rohan Gunaratna, reported the only actionable intelligence from Abu Zubaydah came before the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. In addition, Daniel Coleman a retired FBI official involved in Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, commented that after the CIA's use of coercive methods "I don't have confidence in anything he says, because once you go down that road, everything you say is tainted. He was talking before they did that to him, but they didn't believe him. The problem is they didn't realize he didn't know all that much."

Ali Soufan reports some of the actionable intelligence gleaned from Abu Zubaydah:

Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence. We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.

Defenders of these techniques have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don’t add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May.

Abu Zubaydah also disclosed Khalid Sheihkh Muhamed’s alias, “Mukhtar,” as well as other details of the 9/11 attacks. However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report the CIA had identified Khalid Sheihkh Muhamed's alias in August 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "The final piece of the puzzle arrived at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit on August 28 in a cable reporting that KSM's nickname was Mukhtar. No one made the connection to the reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the spring. This connection might also have underscored concern about the June reporting that KSM was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United States."

Notably, however, it has been reported that Paul Wolfowitz, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense admitted there was no actual plot for Jose Padilla to detonate a dirty bomb. In fact, Jose Padilla was never charged with a plot to detonate a 'dirty bomb.'

Finally, he testified before Congress that:

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence.

The information was so important that, as I later learned from open sources, it went to CIA Director George Tennet who was so impressed that he initially ordered us to be congratulated. That was apparently quickly withdrawn as soon as Mr. Tennet was told that it was FBI agents, who were responsible. He then immediately ordered a CIA CTC interrogation team to leave DC and head to the location to take over from us.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.) All this happened before the [CIA] team arrived...

We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence.

This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber." To remind you of how important this information was viewed at the time, the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, held a press conference from Moscow to discuss the news. Other important actionable intelligence was also gained that remains classified.

CIA interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

The CIA interrogation strategies were based on work done by James Elmer Mitchell and Bruce Jessen in the Air Force's Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) program. The CIA contracted with the two psychologists to develop alternative, harsher interrogation techniques than those allowed at the time. However, neither of the two psychologists had any experience in conducting interrogations. Air Force Reserve Colonel Steve Kleinman stated that the CIA "chose two clinical psychologists who had no intelligence background whatsoever, who had never conducted an interrogation... to do something that had never been proven in the real world." Associates of Mitchell and Jessen were skeptical of their methods and believed they did not possess any data about the impact of SERE training on the human psyche. The CIA came to learn that Mitchell and Jessen's expertise in waterboarding was probably "misrepresented" and thus, there was no reason to believe it was medically safe or effective. Despite these shortcomings of experience and know-how, the two psychologists boasted of being paid $1000 a day plus expenses, tax-free by the CIA for their work.

The SERE program was originally designed to be defensive in nature and was used to train pilots and other soldiers on how to resist harsh interrogation techniques and torture if they happened to fall into enemy hands. The program subjected trainees to torture techniques such as “waterboarding . . . sleep deprivation, isolation, exposure to extreme temperatures, enclosure in tiny spaces, bombardment with agonizing sounds at extremely damaging decibel levels, and religious and sexual humiliation.” Under CIA supervision, Miller and Jessen adapted SERE into an offensive program designed to train CIA agents on how to use the harsh interrogation techniques to gather information from terrorist detainees. In fact, all of the tactics listed above would later be reported in the International Committee of the Red Cross Report as having been used on Abu Zubaydah.

The psychologists relied heavily on experiments done by American psychologist Martin Seligman in the 1970s known as “learned helplessness.” In these experiments caged dogs were electrocuted in a random way in order to completely break their will to resist. Mitchell strongly believed in his interrogation methods and applied them to Abu Zubaydah. Mitchell believed that Abu Zubaydah must be treated “like a dog in a cage.” He stated the interrogation “was like an experiment, when you apply electric shocks to a caged dog, after a while, he’s so diminished, he can’t resist.”

In 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta delivered a letter to Congress which banned CIA contractors from conducting any further interrogations. The letter also explained how the CIA will close the black sites it operated during the Bush Administration.

Intel gleaned from CIA interrogations

During his interrogation under harsher techniques Abu Zubaydah confessed to a universe of alleged plots and plans, none of them have ever been corroborated or substantiated. A former intelligence official stated "[w]e spent millions of dollars chasing false alarms," and "sent hundreds of CIA and FBI investigators scurrying in pursuit of phantoms." Ron Suskind, the author of The One Percent Doctrine, told Wolf Blitzer during an interview, "I show in the book exactly the useful information he provided, and at the same time I show that essentially what happened is we tortured an insane man and jumped screaming at every word he uttered, most of them which were nonsense." In fact, as early as May, 2002, officials stated they doubted the veracity of Abu Zubaydah’s warnings., and by August 2002, on-scene CIA interrogators were already reporting to CIA Headquarters that Abu Zubaydah had no more actionable intelligence. Indeed, according to former senior government officials who closely followed the interrogations, despite all of Abu Zubaydah's confessions, not a single plot was foiled. Abu Zubaydah claims he lied under interrogation to prevent further torture.

Among the various confessions, Abu Zubaydah confessed that:

• Al Qaeda planned on blowing up “soft targets” such as apartment buildings, supermarkets, and shopping malls.
• There were plots against banks in the Northeastern United States, and New York monuments such as the Brooklyn Bridge and the Statue of Liberty. However, Abu Zubaydah’s warnings about the Statute of Liberty and the Brooklynn Bridge were “the statute in the water” and the “bridge in that movie” (referring to Godzilla).
• There was going to be a nerve gas attack on a major U.S. subway system sometime around July 4.
• Revealed that Omar al-Faruq was planning attacks on U.S. embassies and other facilities to coincide with the anniversary of September 11 in Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia.
• Divulged an al Qaeda plot to detonate a jacket full of explosives on a civilian air-liner. He went so far as to say that the planners had used their own metal and explosive detectors to figure out how to successfully accomplish the mission.
• Used a website to “plan the Sept. 11 attacks”, communicate with the hijackers, and download 2,300 encrypted messages between May 2000 and September 9, 2001.
• Confirmed the fourth September 11 flight, UA 93, was intended to hit the White House. His information is contradicted by Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi Binalshibh though, who stated UA 93 was on its way to the capitol, not the White House.
• Identified Usama Bin Laden's voice on a tape and said it was a clear signal for impending attack.

In addition, an unnamed U.S. official claimed Abu Zubaydah stated al-Qaeda knew how to smuggle a dirty-bomb into the United States. The official said Zubaydah’s information was further proof al-Qaeda was attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. However, a memo by Michael H. Mobbs filed in Ahmed Ressam’s terrorism case stated Abu Zubaydah recanted his confession that al-Qaeda was planning on building a dirty bomb to be detonated in the United States.

9/11 Commission Report

File:CommissionReportOnTravel.jpg

A sample page of footnotes from the 9/11 Commission shows the degree to which it relied on Zubaydah's statements

Zubaydah's interrogations are cited frequently in the 9/11 Commission Report, although he is the sole person to make many of the claims. Human Rights Watch noted that "The 9/11 Commission report refers to the intelligence reports of seven interrogation sessions with Zubayda,[sic] dating from February 2002 to April 2004." Based on Abu Zubaydah's confessions during these seven interrogation sessions the 9/11 Commission Report alleged that:

• Abu Zubaydah wrote in his diary in late 1992 that he was getting ready to go to an al Qaeda military camp. “Perhaps later I will tell you about the Qa’ida and Bin Ladin group.”
• Abu Zubaydah was a “sympathetic peer” of Osama bin Laden.
• Abu Zubaydah was reportedly complimentary of Khalid Sheikh Muhammed’s leadership abilities giving praise for his ability to incorporate the improvements suggest by others.
• Abu Zubaydah allegedly played a key role in facilitating the travel of al Qaeda operatives, along with Khalid Sheikh Muhammed.
• Abu Zubaydah was planning to attack Israel in 2001.

CIA destroys Abu Zubaydah's interrogation tapes

Starting in 2002 and around the time of Abu Zubaydah's capture the CIA began videotaping hundreds of hours of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations. Video cameras recorded Abu Zubaydah twenty-four hours a day during his detention in 2002. The CIA ended the recording procedure after Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded.

Several requests for the videotapes were made by judges, government organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The ACLU requested copies of the tapes under a Freedom of Information Act, but was rebuffed by the CIA. The ACLU would later file legal action against the CIA wherein New York District Court Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein stated he was “disappointed” the agency destroyed the tapes and believes the court was “gulled.” The CIA also denied the existence of the tapes to the 9/11 Commission Report during its investigation. In November 2005, during a pending Guantanamo case, U.S. District Court Judges Gladys Kessler, Richard W. Roberts, and Henry H. Kennedy ordered the preservation of the CIA’s interrogation tapes as evidence for the cases before it. In addition,the Judge presiding over Zacarias Moussaoui’s criminal case, Leonie M. Brinkema, had also requested the tapes only to be told they did not exist. The CIA was advised by top lawyers at the White House and the Justice Department not to destroy the interrogation tapes. Michael Hayden, the Director of Central Intelligence, sent a letter to CIA staff, briefing them on the tape's destruction. Hayden asserted that key members of Congress had been briefed on the existence of the tapes, and the plans for their destruction. United States Senator Jay Rockefeller, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, disputed Hayden's assertion, saying that he only learned of the tapes in 2006, a year after their destruction. Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, who was one of just four senior members of Congress who was briefed on the existence of the tapes, acknowledged being briefed. Harman responded to Hayden's assertions by stating she had objected, in writing, to the tapes' destruction, and that it would "put the CIA under a cloud of suspicion." However, the CIA did not comply with any of the advice or the 17 orders from various judges and courts and destroyed the tapes. The Department of Justice is now investigating the CIA’s destruction of the tapes and has appointed John Durham as the special prosecutor for the case.

Originally the CIA claimed that only two videotapes and one audiotape had been destroyed. In all, however, the CIA destroyed 92 tapes of interrogations, of which 90 were of Abu Zubaydah, and 12 depicted his waterboarding. The tapes were held in a safe in the CIA's secret prison in Thailand.

Several motives were given for recording the tapes. Originally the CIA claim it taped the interrogations to prevent agents from a wrongful death suit if Abu Zubaydah happened to succumb to the injuries he suffered in his apprehension, However, during his testimony, Michael Hayden the director of the CIA asserted that the continued existence of the tapes represented a threat to the CIA personnel involved. He asserted that if the tapes were leaked they might cause the CIA personnel to be identified and targeted for retaliation. However, the tapes were only destroyed once CIA officials determined that written summaries of detainees answers would suffice for intelligence gathering purpose, leading some to hypothesize the videos were made to preserve the confessions of the interrogated detainees.

The torture of Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah's treatment at the hands of the CIA has been called torture by Ali Soufan, the FBI interrogator who witnessed part of Abu Zubaydah's CIA interrogation, multiple U.S. officials including President Obama, and by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to various forms of increasingly harsh interrogation techniques including temperature extremes, music played at debilitating volumes, and sexual humiliation. Abu Zubaydah was also subjected to beatings, isolation, waterboarding, long-time standing, continuous cramped confinement, and sleep deprivation. During Abu Zubaydah's interrogation President Bush learned he was on painkillers for the wounds he suffered during his capture and was therefore difficult to get information from. President Bush exclaimed to then C.I.A. director George Tenet “[w]ho authorized putting him on pain medication?” It would later be reported that Abu Zubaydah was denied painkillers during his interrogation.

Many of the interrogation techniques used against Abu Zubaydah, including waterboarding, cold cell, long-time standing, and sleep deprivation were previously considered illegal under U.S. and international law and treaties at the time of Abu Zubaydah’s capture. In fact, the United States had prosecuted Japanese military officials after World War II and American soldiers after the Vietnam War for waterboarding. Since 1930, the United States had defined sleep deprivation as an illegal form of torture. Many other techniques developed by the CIA constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and torture under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

At least one detainee claims to have seen pictures of the injuries caused to Abu Zubaydah during his torture. During his own Combatant Status Review Tribunal, in 2004, Ibrahim Mahdy Achmed Zeidan told his Tribunal that, during their interrogation, some captives had been shown pictures they were told were the scars left on Abu Zubaydah by his interrogation.

Q:

You told us about a man named Abu Zubaydah and how he said false things about you. You mentioned he was tortured to say those things. Can you tell us more about that and how you know that happened?

A:

In his statement he never said he was tortured, that's impossible. We know from the American interrogators, not only me, but also a lot of other detainees on this island know that he was subject to a lot of torture. There was a picture of him, I didn't see it, and someone else did showing the signs of torture on his body. Another detainee saw an article in a magazine, I don't remember which one, he read that American interrogators said he was under psychological pressure and was in a special holding place.

International Committee of the Red Cross report

The International Committee of the Red Cross concluded a report on the treatment of 14 high-value detainees in February 2007. The report would be made public April 7, 2009. The report is composed of interviews with the detainees, although the ICRC stated "[t]he ICRC wishes to underscore that the consistency of the detailed allegations provided separately by each of the fourteen [detainees] adds particular weight to the information provided." The ICRC outlined twelve interrogation techniques suffocation by water (waterboarding), prolonged stress standing position, beatings by use of a collar, beating and kicking, confinement in a box, prolonged nudity, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold temperature, prolonged shackling, threats of ill-treatment, forced shaving, and deprivation/restricted provision of solid food. Of the 12 interrogation techniques, only Abu Zubaydah was subjected to all of them. Not even Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was subject to as many.

Abu Zubaydah was the only one of the fourteen detainees to be put into close confinement. This would be corroborated, in part, by one of the Torture Memos written by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, which noted "[i]n OMS's view, however, cramped confinement "ha[s] not proved particularly effective" because it provides "a safehaven offering respite from interrogation." In Abu Zubaydah's case, however, this is debatable since the smaller of the close confinement boxes caused his wound to reopen and begin to bleed again. He was placed in two boxes, a 'large' one in which he could stand upright, and a much smaller one, in which he had to crouch down.

Waterboarding

Abu Zubaydah was one of three high value detainees to be waterboarded. Originally the Government's position was that Abu Zubaydah had only been waterboarded once. Indeed, John Kiriakou, a CIA officer who had seen the cables regarding Abu Zubaydah's interrogation publicly stated Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded only once for 35 seconds before he started talking. Even before the May 30, 2005 Torture Memo surfaced, Government officials familiar with Abu Zubaydah's detention questioned this account of events. In fact, intelligence sources claimed as early as 2008 that Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded no less than ten times in the span of one week. In reality, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times within the month of August, 2002, which happens to be the same month waterboarding was approved for use on him.

Many believe the 83 sessions violated the May 10, 2005 Torture Memo which stated no more than 60 applications of water could be conducted in a 30 day period. However, the May 10th Memo only restricts waterboarding to 60 applications of "ten seconds or more." A U.S. official with knowledge of the interrogation program reported to Fox News that many of the applications "lasted 'a matter of seconds'" and it was these less than ten second applications "that created the huge numbers." He further stated that "[a]ll of those individual pours were scrupulously counted by the CIA, according to the memos, to abide by the procedures set up for the waterboardings."

However, the May 10, 2005 torture memo reported that the Department of Justice, Inspector General report noted that

[T]he waterboard technique… was different from the technique described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee’s breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and in the DoJ opinion the subject’s airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passage; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator… applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee’s mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency’s use of the technique is different from that used in SERE training because it is ‘for real’ and is ‘more poignant and convincing.’” The Inspector General further reported that “OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogator on the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either efficacious or medically safe.

The Inspector General also noted that the use of waterboarding was discontinued in every armed services branch except the Navy SERE training "because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects." The CIA Office of Medical Services contradicted this conclusion, however, stating that “[w]hile SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain psychological resistance to the waterboard our experience was otherwise. Some subjects unquestionably can withstand a large number of applications, with no immediately discernible cumulative impact beyond their strong aversion to the experience.” The memo also noted that at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for Victims of Torture, testified that some U.S. military personnel who have undergone waterboard training have apparently stated “that it’s taken them 15 years of therapy to get over it", although his claim has not substantiated. Despite the conflicting information the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel approved all of the tactics listed above.

Several people who have subjected themselves to controlled waterboarding have stated that it is torture. Conservative Chicago radio host, Erich "Mancow" Muller agreed to be waterboarding so he could "prove it wasn't torture." Instead Muller stated "It is such an odd feeling to have water poured down your nose with your head back... It was instantaneous... and I don't want to say this: absolutely torture."

Malcolm Wrightson Nance, an instructor at the Navy’s SERE school in California testified before congress that waterboarding “is an overwhelming experience that induces horror and triggers frantic survival instincts. As the event unfolded, I was fully conscious of what was happening: I was being tortured.” Nance further testified that waterboarding is “[N]ot simulated anything. It’s slow motion suffocation with enough time to contemplate the inevitability of blackout and expiration.” Richard E. Mezo, who was waterboarded during training to become a Navy flight crewmember described waterboarding as an act that is “indeed torture” which is “real drowning that simulates death.” The experience was so horrific, Mezo stated that “Pulling out my fingernails or even cutting off a finger would have been preferable.” Henri Alleg, who was waterboarded by the French during the Algerian War, wrote that “a terrible agony, that of death itself, took possession of me.”

Abu Zubaydah said of his experience:

I struggled against the straps, trying to breathe, but it was hopeless. I thought I was going to die.

During his waterboarding Abu Zubaydah lost control of his bladder and would later admit to the ICRC that "[s]ince then I still lose control of my urine when under stress."

Some politicians and administration officials, including Richard Armitage, the former Deputy Secretary of State, Mike McConnell, the former National Intelligence Directorate, Tom Ridge, the former Homeland Security Secretary, and former Republican Presidential Candidate John McCain, have also declared it unequivocal torture. Senator John McCain stated “It is not a complicated procedure. It is torture.”

Top U.S. officials approved enhanced interrogation techniques

In the Spring of 2002, immediately following Abu Zubaydah’s capture, top US Government officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, George Tenet, Condoleeza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Ashcroft discussed at length whether or not the CIA could legally use harsh techniques against Abu Zubaydah. Condoleeza Rice specifically mentioned the SERE program during the meeting stating “I recall being told that U.S. military personnel were subjected to training to certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques…” In addition, in 2002 and 2003, several Democratic congressional leaders were briefed on the proposed “enhanced interrogation techniques.” These congressional leaders included Nancy Pelosi, the future Speaker of the House, and Representative Jane Harman. Congressional officials have stated that the attitude in the briefings ranged from “quiet acquiescence, if not downright support.” The documents show that top U.S. Officials were intimately involved in the discussion and approval of the harsher interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah. Condoleeza Rice ultimately told the CIA the harsher interrogation tactics were acceptable, and Dick Cheney stated "I signed off on it; so did others." During the discussions John Ashcroft is reported as saying “Why are we talking about this in the White House? History will not judge this kindly.”

The torture memos

In 2009, President Obama released four Justice Department memos which outlined the procedures CIA operatives wished to use on Abu Zubaydah. The memos were written at the request of Dick Cheney and the Bush White House and were written under extreme pressure from the Office of the Vice President. In e-mails to former U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg, Jim Comey, former Deputy Attorney General, stated that the Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, had informed him he was "under great pressure from the Vice President to complete both [May] memos."

Pressure from the White House

Jim Comey opposed the "combined effects" memo from the outset. His e-mails outline the birth of the May, 2005, torture memos in his e-mails, along with his and others' dissent. Relevant passages are quoted below. From his April 27, 2005 e-mail:

Some weeks ago [Pat Philbin] alerted me to his serious concerns about the adequacy of the "combined effects" analysis, particularly as it relates to the category of "severe physical suffering,"...

In particular, Pat reported that he was repeatedly marking up drafts to highlight the inadequacy of the analysis under that category -- especially in the combined effects memo -- only to have his comments ignored.

At a meeting last Friday with Pat, the Attorney General, and Steve Bradbury in the Attorney General conference room, I expressed my concerns, saying the analysis was flawed and that I had grave reservations about the second opinion. The Attorney General explained that he was under great pressure from the Vice President to complete both memos, and that the President had even raised it last wee, apparently at the VP's request and the Attorney General had promised they would be ready early this week. He added that the VP kept telling him "we are getting killed on the Hill." (Patrick had previously reported that Steve was getting constant similar pressure from Harriet Miers and David Addington to produce the opinions...)

Yesterday morning, I got the most recent draft of the second opinion and read it. My concerns were not allayed, only heightened. Patrick felt just as strongly that this was wrong.

...In our private meeting yesterday afternoon, I told him the Attorney General I was here to urge him not to allow the "combined effects" memo to be finalized. I told him it would come back to haunt him and the Department. I told him I did not concur with the [combined effects memo] and asked him to stop it.

After I explained my concerns in detail, urging him to view them through the lens of hindsight that would be applied at a future hearing, he said he agreed and that I was to instruct the OLC to finalize the first, but not the second, opinion and that he would speak to Harriet Miers and share the concerns...

Today, I left a message for Rizzo. Patrick came to me a short while ago to tell me he had met with Steve and Todd Ullyot... After visiting the White House today, the Attorney General's instructions were that the second opinion was to be finalized by Friday, with whatever changes we thought appropriate. Pat explained to me (as he had to them) that we couldn't make the changes I thought necessary by Friday. I told him to go back to them and reiterate that fact and the fact that I would oppose any opinion that was not significantly reshaped...

Please stay in touch with Pat on this. He has been very strong and principled, as usual, but they will put a lot of pressure on him in my absence. Keep me posted.

Pertinent passages from Jim Comey's April 28, 2005 e-mail:

I just finished a long call from Ted Ullyot... He said Pat had shared my concerns, which he understood as concerns about the prospective nature of the opinion and its focus on "prototypical" interrogation.

I responded by telling him that was a small slice of my concerns... I told him that this opinion would come back to haunt the Attorney General and Department of Justice and urged him not to allow it.

He asked if I felt like I had the chance to adequately air my views with the Attorney General. I told him I had, so much so that the Attorney General had agreed with me, which left me puzzled about the need to send the opinion now.

I told him that the people who were applying pressure now would not be there when the shit hit the fan... It would be Alberto Gonzalez in the bullseye. I told him that my job was to protect the Department and the Attorney General and that I could not agree to this because it was wrong. I told him it could be made right in a week, which was a blink of an eye, and that nobody would understand at a hearing three years from now why we didn't take that week.

I suggested to him that he explain to the White House that the "______ Deputy Attorney General" (my words) had gone on record against this, which would jam them in the future, so we needed to wait. I told him I was leaving [office] and was perfectly willing to catch that spear, as I had in other contexts.

...At the end, he said he just wanted me to know that it appeared the second opinion would go tomorrow... I told him I understood, that I had been heard, and that I was sorry to be blunt, but that I was opposed and believed it was a big mistake.

I then spoke to Patrick, and relayed the above... Pat agreed that everyone seemed to be thinking as if they still worked at the White House and not the United States Department of Justice.

...It leaves me feeling sad for the Department and the Attorney General. I don't know what more is to be done, given that I have already submitted my resignation. I just hope that when all of this comes out, this institution doesn't take the hit, but rather the hit is taken by those individuals who occupied positions at OLC and OAG and were too weak to stand up for the principles that undrgird [sic] the rest of this great institution.

Once again, Patrick Philbin has been the voice of intellectual rigor and honesty, and principle. The world will never know what a hero that young man is. With Jack Goldsmith, he managed to rescue the president and executive branch from disaster on that other classified program. He has tried to do the same on interrogation, but he (and I) have not carried the day.

People may think it strange to hear me say I miss John Ashcroft, but as intimidated as he could be by the White House, when it came to crunch-time, he stood up, even from an intensive care hospital bed. That backbone is gone.

Opposition within the Bush Administration

The memos were opposed by members of the White House and Congress. Within the White House Philip Zelikow, a top advisor to Condoleeza Rice, opposed the new, harsher interrogation techniques. Upon reading the August 1, 2002 memo which justified the torture, Zelikow authored his own memo contesting the Justice Department's conclusions, since he believed they were legally incorrect. The Bush Administration attempted to collect all of the copies of Zelikow's memo and destroy them. In addition, military advisors to the CIA declared the proposed tactics as torture thirteen times within two pages in a memo regarding the techniques. The memo was written one month before the torture memos were drafted and the interrogation techniques were used against Abu Zubaydah.

In Congress, House Representative Jane Harman, who was briefed on the proposed enhanced interrogation techniques in 2002, was the sole member of Congress to object.

Former CIA Inspector General, John Helgerson, drafted a report in 2004 which reportedly condemns not only the legality of the torture memos, but also the effectiveness of the torture techniques used. The report was so appalling it prompted then director of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, to repudiate the John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Stephen Bradbury memos.

In addition, a federal judge in San Francisco has ruled that Jose Padilla has standing to sue John Yoo for his detention and torture, due to John Yoo's role in drafting the torture memos. Dick Cheney's order to keep secret from Congress a CIA program recently killed by CIA Director Leon Panetta may also come under legal fire. Under the Intelligence Authorization Act, the office of the President is required to keep the Congress completely informed of the operations of the intelligence community.

August 1, 2002 memo

In August 2002, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, Jay Bybee and John Yoo drafted the first Torture Memo. The purpose of the memo was to gain approval for harsh interrogation tactics to be used on Abu Zubaydah. Although some believe the harsh tactics were already in effect before the memo granting authority to use them was written, and was used to provide after-the-fact legal support for harsh interrogation techniques. In fact, a Department of Justice report regarding prisoner abuses reportedly stated the preparation of the memos occurred one month after Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the techniques allowed in the August 1, 2002 memo. John Kiriakou stated in July, 2009, that Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded in the early summer of 2002, months before the August 1, 2002 memo was written. Alberto Gonzales would later testify before Congress that the opinion was sought after the detention of Abu Zubaydah. Questions by C.I.A. officers over which tactics could be used on Abu Zubaydah had spurred the torture memo’s existence, which is reflected in the language of the memo; "You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu Zubaydah." The memo's author, John Yoo, acknowledged the memo was the basis for Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. Yoo even told an interviewer “there was an urgency to decide so that valuable intelligence could be acquired from Abu Zubaydah, before further attacks could occur.” John Yoo would later be harshly criticized by the Department of Justice for failing to cite legal precedent and existing case law when drafting his memos. In particular, the report chastises Yoo for failing to cite Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a seminal case on the powers of the Executive in times of war. In addition, Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the Office of Legal Counsel who withdrew the torture memos before resigning, stated he was "astonished" by the "deeply flawed" and "sloppily reasoned" legal analysis in the memos. David Luban, a law professor at Georgetown Law School, testified before Congress on May 13, 2009 that the memos were "an ethical train wreck" and had been drafted to "reverse engineer" a defense for illegal actions already committed.

The memo contemplated ten techniques the interrogators wanted to use: "(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.” Many of the techniques were, until then, generally considered illegal. Many other techniques developed by the CIA constituted inhumane and degrading treatment and torture under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

According to a psychological evaluation conducted of Abu Zubaydah upon his capture, the memo alleges that Abu Zubaydah:

• Quickly rose from very low level mujahedin to third or fourth man in al Qaeda
• Served as Usama Bin Laden’s senior lieutenant
• Managed a network of training camps
• Was instrumental in the training of operatives for al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan
• Acted as the Deputy Camp Commander for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all trainees during 1999-2000
• Approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training camps from 1996-1999
• No one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan without his knowledge and approval
• Acted as al Qaeda’s coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications
• Acted as al Qaeda’s counter-intelligence officer and had been trusted to find spies within the organization
• Was involved in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda
• Was a planner for the Millennium plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets during the Millennium celebrations in Jordan
• Served as a planner for the Paris Embassy plot in 2001
• Was one of the planners of 9/11
• Engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interests
• Wrote al Qaeda’s manual on resistance techniques

May 10, 2005 memo

Another subsequent memo addressed the legality of additional interrogation techniques such as nudity, dietary manipulation, abdominal slap, water dousing, and water flicking. It also expanded on the techniques of walling, stress positions, and sleep deprivation, allowing for an additional stress position and extended sleep deprivation up to 180 consecutive hours. The memo also outlined the amount of waterboarding applications a detainee could be subjected to.

The waterboard can only be used with a given detainee during one 30-day period. During that 30-day period the waterboard can be used no more than 5 days. In any given day that waterboarding occurs interrogators may use no more than two “sessions”, with a “session” defined as the time that the detainee is strapped to the board, and that a session can last no more than 2 hours. During any session no more than six applications of water of 10 seconds or more can be used. The total cumulative time of all water applications in a 24 hour period may not exceed 12 minutes.

May 10, 2005 memo (combined interrogation techniques)

Another memo penned on May 10, 2005 authorized the use of the above outlined individual techniques in conjunction with one another, but stressed the importance of constant vigilance on the part of medical observers to ensure the techniques did not cause "severe physical or mental pain."

May 30, 2005 memo

The final memo mentioned Abu Zubaydah several times and claimed that due to the increased interrogation techniques Zubaydah also "provided significant information on two operatives, [including] Jose Padilla[,] who planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area." This claim is heavily disputed, however, by Ali Soufan the FBI interrogator who first interrogated Abu Zubaydah following his capture, and other intelligence officials. Ali Soufan, when asked by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse during a Congressional hearing if the memo was incorrect, testified that it was. In fact, the memo itself noted that not all of the waterboarding sessions were necessary for Abu Zubaydah, since the on-scene interrogation team determined he had stopped producing actionable intelligence. The memo reads:

This is not to say that the interrogation program has worked perfectly. According to the IG Report, the CIA, at least initially, could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have the information. See IG Report at 83-85. On at least one occasion, this may have resulted in what might be deemed in retrospect to have been the unnecessary use of enhanced techniques. On that occasion, although the on-scene interrogation team judged Abu Zubaydah to be compliant, elements within CIA Headquarters still believed he was withholding information. See id at 84. At the direction of CIA Headquarters interrogators therefore used the waterboard one more time on Zubaydah.

U.S. officials defend interrogation techniques

Dennis C. Blair, President Obama's new director of national intelligence wrote in a memo to his staff in April 2009 that "high value information came from interrogations in which [enhanced interrogation] methods were used." Former Vice-President, Dick Cheney claims there are memos in existence which show the success of the enhanced interrogation techniques. Cheney stated:

I haven't talked about it, but I know specifically of reports that I read, that I saw, that lay out what we learned through the interrogation process and what the consequences were for the country I've now formally asked the CIA to take steps to declassify those memos so we can lay them out there and the American people have a chance to see what we obtained and what we learned and how good the intelligence was.

Additionally, four successive CIA directors echoed these sentiments, with the most recent, Michael V. Hayden, stating that he believed the methods "got the maximum amount of information" from prisoners, specifically Abu Zubaydah. As noted, however, the belief that enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to get actionable intel from Abu Zubaydah has been heavily contested. John McLaughlin, former acting CIA director, stated in 2006 "I totally disagree with the view that the capture of Abu Zubaydah was unimportant. Abu Zubaydah was woven through all of the intelligence prior to 9/11 that signaled a major attack was coming, and his capture yielded a great deal of important information." In his memoir, former CIA Director George Tenet writes:

A published report in 2006 contended that Abu Zubaydah was mentally unstable and that the administration had overstated his importance. Baloney. Abu Zubaydah had been at the crossroads of many al-Qa'ida operations and was in position to - and did - share critical information with his interrogators. Apparently, the source of the rumor that Abu Zubaydah was unbalanced was his personal diary, in which he adopted various personas. From that shaky perch, some junior Freudians leapt to the conclusion that Zubaydah had multiple personalities. In fact, Agency psychiatrists eventually determined that in his diary he was using a sophisticated literary device to express himself. And, boy, did he express himself.

The changing depiction of Abu Zubaydah

When Abu Zubaydah was captured, the Bush Administration believed he was an unparalleled source of intelligence on al-Qaeda and terrorism plots. Abu Zubaydah was touted as the biggest catch of the War on Terror until the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Immediately after Abu Zubaydah’s capture the director of the FBI stated Abu Zubzaydah’s capture would help deter future attacks. Also, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated Abu Zubaydah could provide a treasure-trove of information about al-Qaeda. Donald Rumsfeld echoed these sentiments claiming Abu Zubaydah was “a man who knows of additional attacks”, who has “trained people to do this”, and was a big fish who had a fountain of knowledge.

U.S. government accounts of Abu Zubaydah's importance

After Abu Zubaydah's capture, officials from the U.S. Government spoke out publicly about Abu Zubaydah's supposed role in al-Qaeda. However, as would later be reported in 2009, the U.S. Government's depiction of Abu Zubaydah was overly inflated and he was, as Justice Department Officials stated, "[t]he above ground support... To make him the mastermind of anything is ridiculous", a "personnel clerk", a "logistics chief", and a "travel agent." In fact, the CIA reportedly told Abu Zubaydah during his interrogation that they discovered he was not an al-Qaeda figher, partner, or even a member.

The allegations included:

• Abu Zubaydah was "sinister" and "[t]here is evidence that he is a planner and a manager as well. I think he’s a major player.” - Former State Department director of counter-terrorism, Michael Sheehan
• Abu Zubaydah was “extremely dangerous” and a planner of 9/11. - John B. Bellinger III in a June 2007 briefing on Guantanamo Bay.
• Abu Zubaydah was a trainer, a recruiter, understood bomb-making, was a forger, a logistician, and someone who made things happen, and made “al-Qaeda function.” - Former CIA station chief, Bob Grenier
• “I don’t think there’s any doubt but a man named Abu Zubaydah is a close associate of UBL’s, and if not the number two, very close to the number two person in the organization. I think that’s well established.” -Donald Rumsfeld
• Abu Zubaydah was “a very senior al Qaeda official who has been intimately involved in a range of activities for the al Qaeda.” - Donald Rumsfeld
• Abu Zubaydah was a “very senior al Qaeda operative.” - Donald Rumsfeld
• Abu Zubaydah was a “key terrorist recruiter and operational planner and member of Osama bin Laden’s inner circle.” - White House spokesman Ari Fleischer
• The capture of Abu Zubaydah was a “very serious blow” to al-Qaeda and that one of al-Qaeda's “many tentacles" was "cut off.” - White House spokesman Ari Fleischer
• Abu Zubaydah was “one of the top operatives plotting and planning death and destruction on the United States.” - Former President George W. Bush
• Abu Zubaydah was “one of al-Qaeda’s top leaders” who was “spending a lot of time as one of the top operating officials of al Qaeda, plotting and planning murder.” - Former President George W. Bush
• Abu Zubaydah was “al Qaeda’s chief of operations.” - President George W. Bush
• “Abu Zubaydah was one of the top three leaders” in al-Qaeda. - President George W. Bush
• Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation “led to reliable information”, that Abu Zubaydah was a “prolific producer” of information, and that roughly 25 percent of the information on al Qaeda that came from human sources originated from Abu Zubaydah. - Michael Hayden
• Abu Zubaydah was one of three individuals “best positioned to know about impending terrorist atrocities.” - Michael Hayden
• Abu Zubaydah is someone who was “carefully trained in techniques of disinformation.” - Richard C. Shelby
• Nancy Pelosi, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee would describe Abu Zubaydah as being “very skilled at avoiding interrogation. He is an agent of disinformation.”

Numerous anonymous U.S. officials have also made allegations against Abu Zubaydah in the press, including:

• “One Abu Zubaydah is worth a ton of guys at Gitmo.”
• He was a “senior bin Laden official” and the “former head of Egypt-based Islamic Jihad.”
• He “played a key role in the East Africa embassy attacks.”
• He was listed as a “trusted aide” to bin Laden with “growing power.”
• Western officials believed al-Qaeda may have been under the control of Abu Zubaydah.
• Abu Zubaydah was an aide of bin Laden who ran training camps in Afghanistan and “coordinated terror cells in Europe and North America.”
• Abu Zubaydah was a “key terrorist recruiter, operational planner, and member of Osama Bin Laden’s inner cicrcle.”
• Abu Zubaydah was “bin Laden’s CEO”, “a central figure in Al Qaeda”, and a “bin Laden lieutenant.”
• Abu Zubaydah is Bin Laden’s “travel planner.”
• Abu Zubaydah is one of bin Laden’s “confidants.”
• Abu Zubaydah is “one of a handful of men entrusted with running the terrorism network in the event of Osama bin Laden’s death or capture.”
• Abu Zubaydah was a senior bin Laden lieutenant who was believed “to be organizing al Qaida resources to carry out attacks on American targets.”
• Abu Zubaydah was the fourth ranking member of al Qaida behind Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Muhamed Atef.
• Abu Zubaydah was the “successor as chief of operations for al Qaida” after Muhamed Atef’s death.
• Abu Zubaydah knows the identities of “thousands” of terrorists that passed through al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan.
• Abu Zubaydah briefed Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber.
• Abu Zubaydah was one of bin Laden’s top planners of terrorist operations who knew of al Qaida plots and cells.
• Abu Zubaydah was captured after he made a cell phone call to al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen.
• Abu Zubaydah stated al-Qaeda knew how to smuggle a dirty-bomb into the United States. Abu Zubaydah’s information was further proof al-Qaeda was attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
• Abu Zubaydah is the “connection between bin Laden and many of al-Qaida’s operational cells.”
• Abu Zubaydah is linked to plots to detonate apartment buildings.
• Abu Zubaydah confirmed the fourth September 11 flight, UA 93, was intended to hit the White House. (His claim is contradicted by Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi Bin al Shibh though, who stated UA 93 was on its way to the capitol, not the White House.)
• Osama bin Laden wrote a handwritten note to Abu Zubaydah in December, 2001. The letter allegedly tells Abu Zubaydah to continue fighting the United States if bin Laden passes away.

While Abu Zubaydah would provide important intelligence on the War on Terror, his value as an intel source was greatly inflated, much like his role in the global terror network.

Despite all of these allegations the U.S. Government has not officially charged Abu Zubaydah with any crimes.

Exploitation of Abu Zubaydah's perceived value

President Bush personally used Abu Zubaydah’s perceived “value” as a detainee to justify the use of the CIA's harsher interrogation techniques as well as Abu Zubaydah’s detention in secret C.I.A. prisons around the world.

In a speech in 2006, President Bush claimed that Abu Zubaydah initially revealed useful intelligence, including information that allegedly helped foil a terrorist attack on American soil, but that Abu Zubaydah became uncooperative. It was only then, he reported, that an “alternative set of procedures” was used on Abu Zubaydah in order to gain valuable intelligence and were “safe and lawful.” He also stated that Abu Zubaydah had received training in how to resist interrogation, and thus more aggressive techniques were mandated. These claims directly conflict with the reports of the original F.B.I. agents tasked with interrogating Abu Zubaydah who had been receiving crucial pieces of information from him without the use of harsher techniques, as well as other government officials.

The Iraq War

The U.S. Government used questionable intel from Abu Zubaydah in order to justify the invasion of Iraq. U.S. officials stated that the allegations that Iraq and al-Qaeda were linked in the training of people on chemical weapons came from Abu Zubaydah. The officials noted there was no independent verification of his claims. The U.S. Government included statements made by Abu Zubaydah in regards to al Qaeda’s ability to obtain a dirty bomb in its attempts to show a link between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to a Senate Intelligence Committee report Abu Zubaydah also “indicated that he had heard that an important al Qaeda associate, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and others had good relationships with Iraqi intelligence.” However, in June, 2003 Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were reported as stating there was no link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.

In the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the abuses of detainees, it was revealed that pressure from the Bush administration was applied to interrogators to find a link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. Indeed, Major Paul Burney, a psychiatrist with the United States Army, reported that "while we were [at Guantanamo] a large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful." He stated that higher-ups for more "frustrated" and applied "more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce more immediate results."

Additionally, Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the former chief of staff for former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that:

Likewise, what I have learned is that as the administration authorized harsh interrogation in April and May of 2002--well before the Justice Department had rendered any legal opinion--its principal priority for intelligence was not aimed at pre-empting another terrorist attack on the U.S. but discovering a smoking gun linking Iraq and al-Qa'ida.

So furious was this effort that on one particular detainee, even when the interrogation team had reported to Cheney's office that their detainee "was compliant" (meaning the team recommended no more torture), the VP's office ordered them to continue the enhanced methods. The detainee had not revealed any al-Qa'ida-Baghdad contacts yet. This ceased only after Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, under waterboarding in Egypt, "revealed" such contacts. Of course later we learned that al-Libi revealed these contacts only to get the torture to stop.

The Military Commissions Act

President Bush also asked Congress in a speech in September 2006 to formulate special rules in order to try Abu Zubaydah via military commission in Guantanamo Bay. In fact, in late April 2002 less than one month after Abu Zubaydah’s capture, Justice Department officials stated Abu Zubaydah “is a near-ideal candidate for a tribunal trial.” However, only several months later US Officials acknowledged there was “no rush” to try Abu Zubaydah via military commission. In September 2006, President Bush stated in an interview that if Congress could pass a “good bill” out of the Senate in regards to setting up a military commission system, then Abu Zubaydah “is going to go on trial.” The U.S. Government has yet to try Abu Zubaydah by military commission, article 3 court, or in any other capacity.

The Bush Administration's domestic spying program

In addition to justifying the use of presently illegal torture techniques, the Bush administration used Abu Zubaydah’s capture as justification to accelerate its domestic spying program to allow quick action on the phone numbers and addresses seized during Abu Zubaydah’s capture. Inexplicably the NSA expanded its surveillance beyond the numbers seized during Abu Zubaydah’s capture. The spying program would later be revamped in order to make it theoretically legal.

U.S. government worries about Abu Zubaydah

In 2004 media coverage of Abu Zubaydah began listing him as a “disappeared” prisoner claiming he had no access to the International Red Cross.

In February 2005, U.S. officials claim the CIA was growing uncomfortable keeping Abu Zubaydah in indefinite custody. Less than 18 months later Abu Zubaydah and the other high value detainees who had been in secret C.I.A. custody were transferred to Guantanamo Bay.

After his transfer the CIA denied access to Abu Zubaydah even to the Department of Justice's Inspector General who was investigating the United States' treatment of its detainees.

According to U.S. officials quoted in Ron Suskind’s book, President Bush allegedly told C.I.A. director George Tenet “I said [Abu Zubaydah] was important. You’re not going to let me lose face on this, are you?” Tenet replied “No sir, Mr. President.”

U.S. government retreats on Abu Zubaydah

Top officials in the U.S. government refused to believe Abu Zubaydah was not the operative they believed him to be. The May 30, 2005 Department of Justice memo noted that while on-scene interrogators believed Abu Zubaydah no longer had any information to disclose, CIA Headquarters ordered additional waterboarding. The interrogators believed the waterboarding was "unnecessary." Orders for the additional waterboarding likely came from Dick Cheney directly. Additionally, the Bush White House and CIA officials couldn't believe Abu Zubaydah didn't have additional information. One official stated the pressure from upper levels of government was "tremendous," and that "[t]hey couldn't stand the idea that there wasn't anything new." The official said, "[t]hey'd say, 'You aren't working hard enough.' There was both a disbelief in what he was saying and also a desire for retribution - a feeling that 'He's going to talk, and if he doesn't talk, we'll do whatever.'"

Charge sheet discrepancies

In 2005, the U.S. Government charged several detainees at Guantanamo Bay and ordered them to stand trial in Military Commission Tribunals. Of the ten detainees charged, four of them, Binyam Mohamed, Ghassan Abdullah al Sharbi, Sufyian Barhoumi, and Jabrad Said bin Al-Qahtani referenced Abu Zubaydah in their charge sheets. Three of the four detainees, Ghassan Abdullah al Sharbi, Sufyian Barhoumi, and Jabran Said bin Al-Qahtani, had identical 2005 charge sheets and referenced Abu Zubaydah in six different paragraphs. The fourth detainee, Binyam Mohamed, referenced Abu Zubaydah five times.

In 2006, before the U.S. Government could hold a trial of the four detainees in a Military Commission Tribunal, the Supreme Court struck down the Tribunals as unconstitutional in Hamdan v. Bush. The U.S. Government responded by amending the tribunals, although they were forced to recharge Binyam Mohamed, Ghassan Abdullah al Sharbi, Sufyian Barhoumi, and Jabran Said bin Al-Qahtani in 2008.

The new 2008 charge sheets contained almost identical charges against each of the four detainees, as were found in their 2005 charge sheets. However, Abu Zubaydah’s name was entirely removed from each detainee’s charge sheet. On October 21, 2008, all charges were dropped against the four men. Binyam Mohamed was released from Guantanamo Bay on February 20, 2009 despite his alleged connections to Abu Zubaydah, and thus has been removed from the Department of Defense Military Commissions Page.

In addition, the alleged emir of Khalden Camp, Noor Uthman Muhammed, was charged in 2008 with conspiring with Abu Zubaydah against the United States. However, the charges against Noor Uthman Muhammed were also completely dropped on October 21, 2008. The U.S. Government recharged Noor Uthman Muhammed on December 22, 2008. Abu Zubaydah's name is not found in any of the charges even though he was a facilitator for Noor Uthman Muhammed's Khalden Camp.

Abu Zubaydah’s name is also not mentioned in any other detainee’s charge sheets, not even Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the admitted mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. Government has also failed to charge Abu Zubadyah, even though they have charged other high ranking al-Qaeda members, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, who has been in custody less time than Abu Zubaydah.

In 2009, the U.S. Government recharged two of the men, Ghassan Abdullah al Sharbi and Jabran Said bin Al-Qahtani. Sufyian Barhoumi has not been recharged. The 2009 charge sheet of al Sharbi reincorporates Abu Zubaydah in three paragraphs, while the 2009 charge sheet of Al-Qahtani reincorporated Abu Zubaydah in four paragraphs. Unlike the 2005 charge sheets, which are archived on the Department of Defense website, Ghassan Abdullah al Sharbi's 2008 Charge Sheet has been removed from his page.

International cases involving Abu Zubaydah

Several individuals being held or tried internationally, who have been connected by the U.S. Government to Abu Zubaydah, have had their charges dropped, been released, or received other relief from their handlers.

Abousofian Abdelrazik

Abousofian Abdelrazik was alleged by the State Department to be closely associated with Abu Zubaydah. In 2008, Canada asked the United Nations to remove Abousfian Abdelrazik from its terrorism watch-list. In June, 2009, Canada agreed to repatriate Abousfian Abdelrazik from Sudan where he has been stranded since 2008.

Mohamed Harkat

Abu Zubaydah supposedly knew Mohamed Harkat “since the early 90’s” and claimed Harkat ran a guest house in Pakistan. Mohamed Harkat’s attorney sought access to Abu Zubaydah for testimony relating to Harkat’s trial, but the US refused to respond to his requests.

Originally in Harkat’s Canadian trial, however, Abu Zubaydah’s claims were not part of the charges brought against Harkat. After CIA director Michael Hayden’s public admittance of Zubaydah’s waterboarding, Canadian officials deleted all references to Zubaydah’s statements in its public dossier. A spokesman for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service stated “The CSIS director has stated publicly that torture is morally repugnant and not particularly reliable. CSIS does not knowingly use information which has been obtained through torture.” Mohamed Harkat was released on bail by Canadian authorities.

The Algerian Six

The U.S. Government alleged that six Algerian men living in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzagovina were associated with Abu Zubaydah and a plan to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. The United States chargé d'affaires reportedly told the prime minister of Bosnia that the U.S. would withdraw its personnel and cut diplomatic relations if Bosnia did not arrest and investigate the Algerian Six. The Algerian Six were arrested by Bosnian authorities within the week, were investigated fully, and tried for the alleged plot to bomb the U.S. and British Embassies in Sarajevo. All six men were released by the Supreme Court of Bosnia for lack of evidence against them. The Human Rights Chamber of the Bosnian Judiciary explicitly ruled that the government must take all steps to prevent their forcible deportation, as well. However, upon leaving the courthouse they were apprehended by U.S. officials and taken to Guantanamo Bay. Wolfgang Petritsch, the international community’s top official in Bosnia at the time remembers being told by Bosnian leaders that the U.S. applied a lot of pressure on Bosnia to be allowed to take the Algerian Six to Guantanamo. In fact, Wolfgang states that the U.S. conveyed to him they would remove their support for an international mission he was leading if Bosnia didn’t comply.

Since the capture of the six men by the United States, the Bosnian government has argued for their release from Guantanamo Bay. In November 2008, Judge Richard J. Leon of the Federal District Court in Washington DC ruled all of the men except Bensayah Belkacem were being held illegally at Guantanamo, and should be released “forthwith.” Four of the men have been released, although two of them are still being held in Guantanamo Bay despite Judge Leon's order.

Ahmed Ressam and the Millenium Plot

In April 2001, Ahmed Ressam was convicted of plotting to detonate a bomb at the Los Angeles International Airport. Ahmed Ressam had previously trained at the Khalden camp before coming to the United States to undertake his mission. Abu Zubaydah admits in his CSRT testimony that he recommended to the leader of Khalden Camp that Ahmed Ressam be allowed to train there. Abu Zubaydah further testified that he facilitated Ahmed Ressam’s travel to the camp as well as to Algeria once Ressam’s training was complete. The U.S. Government alleges, in Abu Zubaydah’s summary of evidence, that Ahmed Ressam identified Abu Zubaydah as the leader of the Khalden camp and an associate of Usama Bin Laden “equal to and not subordinate to UBL.” The U.S. Government further alleges that Ahmed Ressam stated that Abu Zubaydah had “known of Ahmed Ressam’s operation, although not specifically the date and exact target” and that Abu Zubaydah wanted Ressam to acquire “fraudulently-obtained Canadian passports” for himself and five others, in order to facilitate their travel into the United States to “possibly bomb several cities.”

Abu Zubaydah admits he attempted to procure Canadian passports for Ahmed Ressam and other trainees, but not for "terrorist-related activities.”. Abu Zubaydah denies ever having participated in the planning of the Millennium Plot or encouraging Ahmed Ressam to attack American targets or civilians. The U.S. Government has not produced any further evidence of Abu Zubaydah’s alleged role in the Millennium Plot, nor was this connection even mentioned in Ahmed Ressam's criminal trial. In fact, Ressam's confessions were only brought up during his sentencing in an attempt to mitigate the sentence he would receive, and he later recanted them.

Abu Zubaydah's mental health

Some people contest Abu Zubaydah's mental health. Ron Suskind noted in his book, The One Percent Doctrine, that Zubaydah turned out to be mentally ill, keeping a diary "in the voice of three people: Hani 1, Hani 2, and Hani 3" -- a boy, a young man and a middle-aged alter ego. Abu Zubaydah's diaries spanned ten years and recorded in numbing detail "what he ate, or wore, or trifling things [people] said." Dan Coleman, then the FBI's top al-Qaeda analyst, told a senior bureau official, "This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality." According to Suskind, this judgment was "echoed at the top of CIA and was briefed to the President and Vice President." Dan Coleman, the FBI's senior expert on al Qaeda, echoed many of Suskind's sentiments in an interview with the Washington Post. Coleman stated Zubaydah was a "safehouse keeper" with mental problems, who "claimed to know more about al-Qaeda and its inner workings than he really did." Abu Zubaydah's co-counsel, Joseph Margulies, wrote in an OpEd in the LA Times that:

Partly as a result of injuries he suffered while he was fighting the communists in Afghanistan, partly as a result of how those injuries were exacerbated by the CIA and partly as a result of his extended isolation, Abu Zubaydah's mental grasp is slipping away. Today, he suffers blinding headaches and has permanent brain damage. He has an excruciating sensitivity to sounds, hearing what others do not. The slightest noise drives him nearly insane. In the last two years alone, he has experienced about 200 seizures. Already, he cannot picture his mother's face or recall his father's name. Gradually, his past, like his future, eludes him.

Torture

Through Freedom of Information Act requests the American Civil Liberties Union was able to acquire less redacted versions of the transcripts from Abu Zubaydah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, and those of three other captives.

External links

• The Final 9/11 Commission Report
• Committee on Armed Services United States Senate: Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
• Jay Bybee and John Yoo Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002
• Steven Bradbury Memorandum for John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legal Counsel Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005
• Steven Bradbury Memorandum For John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005
• Steven Bradbury Memoradnum for John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005
• U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, May 2008