Talk:Maginot Line

Initial post

You sure about the Germans punching through the line, Tim? If I recall correctly, the second prong of the German attack was through the Ardennes forest, and I think the rough terrain was considered to be its own defense. I remember reading a very detailed article about the construction of the line and it said that it did not fall but rather surrendered after the rest of France did, and it mentioned nothing about the Germans breaking through.

What I wrote is what I recall from reading General Bradley's memoirs and Liddell Hart's history. The attack was through the Ardennes, and researching it just now, apparently the Maginot Line was to the south of the Ardennes. So I will restore the old version of this page - Tim

Error in the opening

I know nothing about the maginot line, so not confident to edit it myself. However, the opening reads: "which France constructed along its borders with Germany and with Italy in the wake of World War II."

Now, "wake of World War II" means AFTER WWII, right? Isn't it meant to say wake of WWI? It seems to have been built between WWI and WWII best I can tell.

A greater account of the Maginot Line can be found in Alistair Horne's book To Lose A Battle France 1940,as well as an in depth look at the events surrounding it

Cheers- David P Shirk —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.82.135.172 (talk) 19:22, 12 November 2009 (UTC)

Schizophrenic article

On the one hand this article acknowledge that the line actually did the job it was intended to do: entice an attack trough Belgium, and on the other hand it tries to explain us how, though successfully fulling its objectives, it was still a failure. I removed the unsupported failure claims, especially the claim that French strategy did not use the Line correctly. If someone can provide a source how the French authorities believed to be invincible thanks to the line, we could put that back.

Cost of construction

The current text says: "The main construction was largely completed by 1935 at a cost of around 3 billion francs."

Where does this figure come from?

In The Second World War John Keegan writes (p.61): "The original vote for the Maginot Line was for 3000 million francs; by 1935, 7000 million had been spent, one-fifth of the year-on-year military budget, but only 87 miles of fortification had been completed."

Alistair Horne in "To Lose a Battle" quotes those figures as well, i suspect the person who originally wrote 3 billion was using the amount approved, and not the final cost (3000 million is the same as 3 billion) Nyenyec 18:38, 16 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Magniot Line metaphor...

I'm not sure the description of the Magniot Line metaphor in the article is appropriate. In most cases, the context where it is used is for something like missile defence, where it might defend against the specific threat it was intended for but is easily evaded by a more flexible attacker. --Robert Merkel 07:21, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Are you sure that the Line was constructed in the wake of WW I?

Name

Perhaps I'm missing something obvious, but why was it called the Maginot Line? -- Finlay McWalter | Talk 21:20, September 6, 2005 (UTC)

...named after French minister of defense André Maginot)... It was Andre Maginot who finally convinced the government to invest in the scheme. Maginot was another veteran of WW I who became France's Minister of Veteran Affairs and then Minister of War (1928–1931).--216.174.135.50 15:28, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Error on the Map

The Maginot Line was essentially from the Swiss border ot the Luxembourg border. It is described as such in the article. However, the diagram provided shows in extending right to the English Channel.

"When Belgium abrogated the treaty in 1936 and declared neutrality, the Maginot Line was quickly extended along the Franco-Belgian border, but not to the standard of the rest of the Line."Thmars10 00:21, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

Book reference

I vote to remove the section titled "Referenced in A Separate Peace". It should be in the article for that book, if anywhere. A5 17:23, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

French Version?

Anyone know what the WP process and/or policy is for adding cross-references within the text to another WP language version? A much more comprehensive entry for Ligne Maginot is being developed in the French version of WP, with additional illustrations, etc. It seems silly to just copy all their images here. JXM 02:04, 29 November 2006 (UTC) (PS Yes, I know it's already linked in the sidebar!]

German invasion

Text from "german invasion":

the German 1st Army went over to the offensive in "Operation Tiger” and attacked the Maginot Line between St. Avoid and Saarbrücken achieving penetrations in several locations

Except for the "Ouvrage of Ferté", germans have never penetrated the Maginot Line with normals conditions of combat. The north of the Maginot Line had been taken by germans when it was desert by the french army. Martial BACQUET 10:14, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

Organization of the line

I'm editing a new section about the organization of the line. If you see errors or anything else, please tell me here, but do not remove directly, except for spelling or grammar errors. Thank you. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Martial75 (talk • contribs) 14:55, 22 January 2007 (UTC).

Grammar in "Purpose of the Line"

Is it just me, or does the grammar in the section entitled "Purpose of the Line" seem incorrect? As I don't really known how it should be, so I am not going to change it. Specifically this "To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium." and this "To save the forces (France counted 39,000,000 inhabitants, Germany 70,000,000)." -Wil101 —The preceding [[Wikipedia:Sign your posts on talk pages|67.101.127.167 00:24, 13 May 2007 (UTC)]] comment was added by 67.101.127.167 (talk) 00:22, 13 May 2007 (UTC).

I really hate when historians debate the necessity of the line

From my prespective the line was not a waste in any sense. The French had limited amount of troops and as such had to decide where to place them. A fortified line like the Maginot reduces the number of troops needed to defend an area. By sealing off your direct border with germany it reduces their options for planned attacks. As such the french did what any country did mass their mobile forces together in 2 massive armies with a 3rd one organized during the phony war. The 1st and 2nd Armies were to advance through belguim as fast as possible in preset defensive lines. The 7th Army was to advance to cover southern Netherlands with the BEF providing imediate support to the belgiums. As such a gap existed in the ardennese area. Since that area was deemed to be difficult to traverse with mobile forces it was given the 3rd Army which was a predomintaly cavalary army. That happened to be in the center of the line. The germans knew what was going to happen when they invaded when the french and bef setup to meet the germans in the fall of 39. It ended up getting post ponned and both forces settled down and as such gave the germans perfect intellangence. The key thing about the whole invasion was both sides knew what each side was going to do so it came down to who could exploit each other the best. Thats what the Maginot line did. It made sure France knew exactly where the Germans were going to attack. --Mihsfbstadium 17:46, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

Um, except that it didn't, and thus the french did not know, and their plan played into German hands. Your entire line of reasoning is invalid. DMorpheus 21:07, 2 June 2007 (UTC)

Actually you didnt understand what I said. The French knew they would be forced to go through Belguim. Hence they put their best troops to meet them. They did not put any armor of any major size behind the Magiot and hence they were able to mass a nice force. I think the only problem was trying to save the Dutch with the 7th Army but alas they probally did not think paratroopers would have played a part. --Mihsfbstadium 19:20, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

First of all I want to apologize about my English, I'm French. I completly agree with Mihsfbstadium. I work in a French association called AALMA. We restore ouvrages (works) of the Maginot Line and we organize visits to the people. I wrote a great part of this article and I've never said that the line was useless or ineffective, I just didn't want to erase other edits about this subject.

If you are able to read French, I invite you to read our website over this question: www.lignemaginot.com you will see historical proofs.

Cordialy Martial BACQUET 14:17, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

"Both sides knew what each side was going to do" ???? I'm sorry, I see little evidence that the French Army knew the Germans would attempt to pass through the Ardennes and fight on the other side. I will look at the French site, I can read a little, but looking at the French dispositions I don't see how they match any foreknowledge of German intentions.

I agree that the line made a lot of sense as an economy-of-force measure; that is, it allowed the French Army to place mininal forces in secondary or well-fortified sectors so that the best assets could be concentrated where they were most needed. But they did not in fact concentrate them where they were most needed. DMorpheus 15:14, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

Okay this is a little project you can do. Take a map of the present border of Germany, France, and the Low Countries. Now rotate it 90 degrees so the North Sea and Switzerland is on the left and right sides of the map. Now the fortified line pretty much ran from Luxembourg to Switzerland. That means you are limited to just the Belgium Border to go through. As such if you were to base any force where would you place it at. There is one more thing you should also remember is that the ardennese forest area is really hilly and military commanders felt that with a poor road network and the such it would be pointless to cover it with tons of tanks and felt that time would be on their side if anybody would invade that region. So the French did what any intellegant commander would do put thier force in a position to stop the most likely invasion route. Its was not the Strategic operations of the french that doomed them but rather the fact that the germans were operating on a very fast response time versus the french. Thats because the commanders were using encrypted radios to broadcast notes back and forth along with just using radios in the majority of the tanks. The french were still using older technology like the telegraph and the like that is slow and as a result could not adapt fast enough for the changing enviroment. --Mihsfbstadium 00:12, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

It's what I wrote on this article:

The Maginot Line was built to fulfill several purposes:

-To avoid a surprise attack and to give alarm.

-To cover the mobilization of the French Army (which took between 2 and 3 weeks).

-To save the forces (France counted 39,000,000 inhabitants, Germany 70,000,000).

-To protect Alsace and Lorraine (returned to France in 1918) and their industrial basin.

-To be used as a basis for a counter-offensive.

-To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium.

Martial BACQUET 22:02, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

France did what any unimaginative commander would do. They chose the obvious position which was forseen by the germans (by one very imaginative general). It's not an intelligent decision, as it is so obvious a kid can see through it. And then the Germans can as well. Regarding the speed of communications etc. it's difficult to find a defence for the French actions. However they did make strategical errors besides the disasterous dicision to ignore the Ardennes. For instance their operations of armor. IIRC, France had very good armored capabilities but squandered it away piecemeal (as did any army except the German - but that's not a defence).--Nwinther (talk) 14:09, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

The Maginot Line doesn't seem like like it was a waste at all. It allowed the French to concentrate resources where they were most needed: on the border of the Low Countries. The Germans never managed to break the Maginot Line in force; indeed, it seems they really didn't even try. It forced them, as Mr. Bacquet said, to go through Belgium. Unfortunately, Belgium remained neutral until they were invaded, they were unprepared but put up a valiant fight, but the Belgian army was stabbed in the back by their king who surrendered them to the Germans, without their government's approval. Then the French were alone--only a few UK divisions to help them--and those UK divisions were quickly encircled by Rommel's armor at Dunkirk and had to be evacuated or face annihilation. The Low Country border was teeming with German armor--and, on top of that, some Germans managed to sneak through the Ardennes, which was thought to impassable. The French were outnumbered and outflanked by a massive concentration of overwhelming force...they were a country of 40 million to the German 80 million...and compared to Germany, they weren't bent on building an army of world conquest. Their military did all they could, they gave a good account of themselves...and then the French got stabbed in the back by Petain and Darlan. The Maginot Line was successful because if it wasn't there, the Germans would have gone through Belgium AND through Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes...the French would have been attacked all along their entire northeastern border. They would have had to spread their resources, thin as they were, even thinner, which would have certainly doomed them. In retrospect, perhaps, if the Maginot Line was longer, if the Belgians hadn't capitulated, and the UK had a few more divisions to spare, they might have had something of a chance. As it was, they were doomed by a combination of bad luck, the Belgian king, Rommel's drive to the sea, and lack of manpower on a scale compared to Germany.Katana0182 05:17, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

The belgians didn't surrender until 28 May. By that time the BEF was already back in England. I can't see how the Belgians could keep fighting and expecting to win. The French was outnumbered, that's an undisputable fact. But they had more armor and more guns than the Germans. And while they were a country of only 40 million, they had a huge empire of colonies to draw upon (and also to maintain of course). To say that the French did "all they could" or even "gave a good account of themselves" seems like wishful thinking. Rommel simply scared away french forces. I respect the french fighting man, though morale seems a bit low. But looking at the general staff and supreme command, more inept men is hard to come across. IMO, the French lost fair and square. The Maginot Line served a purpose - funnelling the germans into what the french thought would be a trap. The funnel was leaky though and the French themselves got caught. Had the Magiont Line never been built, I actually think the French would've come across better. By building it, they forced the Germans to be innovative, while remaining ignorant themselves. NOT building it would force the French themselves to be innovative - so much so that they could better stand up against the Germans. (There would be no reason for the Germans to go through Belgium so the french could meet them head on). I doubt that the French would've been victorious anyway, because german Blitzkrieg-tactics were simply too awestriking. It just goes to show that you shouldn't start a war you can't win (as is the case with the British DoW on Germany over the Danzig-matter). And what do you expect from Petain and Darlan? Would France have been able to fight on? No. They were destroyed and demoralized and did, at the time, the only reasonable thing. Vichy France was a certainty - if not by the hand of Petain, then in some other form by someone else, just as Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands came to terms with the nazis.--Nwinther (talk) 14:33, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

The Maginot line was not a bad idea, as has already been said. It limited the opportunties in where germany could attack. There is one point that no one mentioned: it actually turned out to be too good. The French thinking was that "Oh, the Maginot line is impenetrable," which it was, "so we can deploy our best units in the north. The problem with that thinking, coupled with the thinking that the Ardennes was too difficult for tank divisions to transverse, and it is indeed difficult, but not impossible, was that to the French there seemed no need for strategic reserve in the south. Had there been a substantial strategic reserve in the south a large counter attack against German armoured could have been carried out. Additionally, the strength in the Maginot line gave the French a false confidence in their abiltiy to set defensive positions deep into Belgium. Even in the Dyle plan had been carried out perfectly (one could argue that would play into Germany's hand), there was to be a large salient in the Ardennes. Had the French not had the Maginot line they would not have been as agressive and then would have been forced to have a larger strategic reserve becasue no one knew where the attack was going to come from. In summary, the maginot line gave the French the wrong idea that a large strategic reserve was unecessary. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.151.59.42 (talk) 06:41, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

I think there's a couple of things missing here. Firstly the BEF wasn't "safe in England" when Belgium surrendered, most of the evacuation took place in the 4 days after that, although it is true that it started before the surrender. The French command wasn't as inept as is sometimes seen. Gamelin deduced the correct counter strategy when the blow came. The problem was that he couldn’t react fast enough. The Germans moved faster than he believed they could. Weygand devised his “hedgehog” strategy to counter the blitzkrieg. That, again, was a good strategy, but he lacked the time, and by that period, the numbers to make it work. The French weren’t inept. Von Manstein was brilliant, and the Germans performed brilliantly and had luck go their way. Another factor on the selection of the Maginot line is French politics. France was deeply divided between the wars, and there was a very strong pacifist sentiment as well. Tanks and aircraft can be used for offensive purposes. The Maginot line, by contrast, is purely defensive, as the fortifications cannot advance across the frontier. So, politically, it was the safest option for military spending as it was, for a pacifist, the least objectionable project. I think the article needs to include some more of inter-war French political realities, which must have played a significant part in swinging the decision in favour of the Maginot line. The failure wasn’t the Maginot line itself, but broader French Strategy, including the use of armoured formations (and to an extent Britain not adopting conscription until 1938). The plan was not to rely upon the Maginot line forever, but to go on the offensive once the Allies had superiority in numbers, which was supposed to be in 1941 when Britain was finally fully mobilised. The Maginot Line was only part of French Strategy, and hence the fact that it was largely successful in its intended role doesn’t alter the fact that the strategy as a whole was a disastrous failure. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.146.84 (talk) 17:37, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

France LOST!

Any interpretation of the Maginot Line has to take account of the catastrophic French loss. The Maginot Line was a component of a French strategy, which failed.

This is a poor analysis. During WWI, the Germans, utilizing a modified Schlieffen Plan attacked France through Belgium where four years of war ravaged Northeastern France. Between WWI and WWII France builds the Maginot line to defend the shared border with Germany knowing full well that Germany had attacked in the first war through Belgium. The French strategy was to secure the French Army's right flank with fewest number of soldiers and to actually fight the war in Belgium. The flaw in the French strategy wasn't the Maginot line, the line achieved its purpose, it compelled the Germans to flank it. Problem with the strategy was they didn't think the Germans were coming through the Ardennes.

France never lost, Otherwise we would be Germans. The French strategy has completed is 5 missions. (cf. article) Martial BACQUET 20:20, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

It is a ridiculous bias to defend the Maginot Line as a qualified success, just because you have an antiquarian interest in it.

What's my interest? To spend a lot of money to restore historical true?

The Maginot Line was not "designed" to channel a German invasion thru the Ardennes. That was a surprise.

If you read more documents over this subjet you will see that it was completely scheduled. Martial BACQUET 20:20, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

The German invasion of France in the first World War had come through Belgium, precisely because that's where the necessary rail network was. The Low Countries are a highway to France, offering no natural obstacles, and a good highway and rail network. The Germans would prefer Belgium and the Netherlands in all circumstances, to move very large armies; to think otherwise is silly.

Maginot Line was conceived after the first World War. Belgium was a neutral country witch will become an Allied in case of Germany prefer Belgium. Martial BACQUET 20:20, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Maybe, the Maginot Line could have been an element in a rational and successful French strategy for World War II, but this is history, not counterfactual fantasy.

The Maginot Line is rational, it anchored the French right flank. The French wanted the decisive battle to occur in Belgium, NOT France. The French KNEW the Germans came through Belgium in WWI; they knew the Maginot Line didn't defend the Franco-Belgian border; they KNEW the Germans would come through Belgium again and at the end of the day the Anglo-French army amassed against the Germans IN Belgium outnumbered the Germans. The blunder is in not covering the Ardennes; not in the Maginot Line.

It is perfectly sensible to point out that the Maginot Line could economize on the forces needed to defend France. To say that the Maginot Line made anything whatsoever "impossible" with regard to a German conquest of France, is unsupported. BruceW07 23:08, 31 July 2007 (UTC)

Co-ordinates

It would be very helpful if someone could add the map co-ordinates to the articles about the individual installations to place them in context. Cheers Bikeroo (talk) 06:54, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

External link

I would like to propose this link as I find it interesting and useful.

It includes a well-done map of the maginot line in its Alsacion and Lorraine part with a path for a travel by bike. As well geneeral information about the Maginot Line and pictures worth to see.

Hope you approve it and enjoy:

http://www.europebybike.org/travels_by_bike_in_europe/maginot-line/maginot-line.html —Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.249.39.3 (talk) 08:34, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Resistance of Line to Schwere Gustav?

Hello guys. I am a fortifications enthusist from the U.S. AS the maginot line was probably the most powerful line of fortifications ever built, at least on a large scale, I have always been fascinated by it. However, I have recently come to the conclusion that it's resistance capabilites became obscelescent upon the introduction of the German 80 cm "Schwere Gustav", which was able to fire a 7.1 tonn shell which could penetrate at least 7 meters of concrete. I imagine that one hit would have been enough to destroy any maginot line block. Even given the fact that the block's dispersion would have made them fairly difficult targets, I can't imagine that it would take more than a day or two to demolish an entire ourage, and this could be done from a range of 32 km, outside the range of most retaliatory artillery. If anyone has any objections to my opinions, I want to hear them! I want to be wrong. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Cbmclean (talk • contribs) 22:09, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

They wouldn't have had enough of them to have a decisive impact. In WWI the artillery got bigger and bigger in the hope of breaking the stalement. Didn't happen. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.31.248 (talk) 07:31, 4 October 2008 (UTC)

I'm sure that the Gustav would make a terrible impact on the Maginot Line. I don't know if it was made for entirely destroying the line or just punch a hole in it for the divisions to pass through. However, if it was used extensively, I'm sure RAF and the french airforce would've prioritized its destruction. But the "Sichelschnitt" plan rendered it obsolete. Had it been ready in time, I'm sure that it could've been used for drawing large french forces from the north in order to contain any breakthrough by convincing the french that the main assault would come from due east rather than north and northeast. --Nwinther (talk) 13:58, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

Well, the 800 mm guns weren't ready until 1941 at best (actual firing batteries never deployed until early 1942), so they are a bit irrelevant. Had even one or two been available I would think they'd have been able to destroy a short section of line fairly easily, but if that effort took even a couple days, it would have been enough time for the French to identify the attack zone and begin the movement of reserve units to the threatened sector. I don't think the allied air forces could have seriously threatened these guns in 1940 though. It took them a while to become effective at actually destroying or interdicting anything. All in all I think these super-guns must be considered real white elephants. DMorpheus (talk) 20:41, 11 December 2008 (UTC)

Deleted paragraphs on the significance of the line

I see that someone deleted the two paragraphs on the significance of the Line, and the perhaps unfair bad press it has received through the years. I didn't write the deleted paragraphs, but I recognize the idea as coming from the Osprey Publishing book written by William Allcorn titled The Maginot Line 1928-45 (Paperback). If I can find my copy of the book I'll restore the deleted paragraphs, but I may not be able to put my hands on my copy. Perhaps another editor has the book and wants to put the paragraphs back with proper attribution. pmcyclist (talk) 13:16, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

Armoured cloches section should be expanded

The content from all the individual main article links to stub articles in the Maginot Line#Armoured cloches section really should be merged into this section to expand it. -- œ^™ 05:52, 9 November 2009 (UTC)