Federalist No. 51
Federalist No. 51 is an essay by James Madison, the fifty-first of the Federalist Papers. It was published on Friday February 8, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. One of the most famous of the Federalist Papers, No. 51 addresses means by which appropriate checks and balances can be created in government and also advocates a separation of powers within the national government. One of its most important ideas is the pithy and often quoted phrase, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
The Federalist Papers, as a foundation text of constitutional interpretation, are frequently cited by American jurists. Of all the essays, No. 51 is the fourth-most cited.[1]
Purpose
The purpose of No. 51 is to "form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the Constitutional Convention"[2]. In the paper, this is done by informing the reader of the safeguards created by the convention to maintain the separate branches of government, and to protect the rights of the people.
Appointment of members
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own: and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.... Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted." [3]
Madison stresses that while, in order to maintain liberty, it is desirable that no governmental branch be involved with the appointment of the others, if this principle were "rigorously adhered to", all branches of government would then be directly elected by the people. [4] Madison illustrates some of the potential problems observing that in the case of the judicial department, it is impractical to follow this method. Members of the judicial branch need to be insulated from political pressure — this is essential to their job. It would be harmful to subject the judicial branch to elections, which would potentially lead to improper political motivations by judges who are supposed to be impartial and/or non-partisan.
Dependency and encroachment
Madison's key point here is that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible from the members of the other departments, and to stay independent, their own department must not encroach on the others. To secure these ends, Madison suggests that "the great security against a...concentration of power in the same department"[5] is to enable each department (or the leader of the department) to fend off attempts to encroach upon each other's departments' government.
Legislature
In a republican form of government, Madison asserts, the legislative branch is the strongest, and therefore must be divided into different branches, be as little connected with each other as possible, and render them by different modes of election. He deems the legislative branch to be the strongest since it is essentially the true voice of the people.(Before the Seventeenth Amendment, the House of Representatives were chosen directly by the people, while the Senate was chosen by state legislatures.) He stresses the need for the checks and balances. Many Constitutional scholars believe the Seventeenth Amendment eliminated a critical check within the legislative branch onto itself, an effort to consolidate more power within the already powerful legislature.
Usurpations and security
The government is guarded from usurpations because it is divided into distinct and separate departments.
In 1788, power over people was divided both through federalism (between the federal government and the state governments) and through branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) within the national (or federal) government. Because of the division of power, a "double security arises to the rights of the people. The governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself"[6].
Factions
Madison discusses at great length at the end the issue of factions. He recognizes that factions will always be present and that the only way to counteract the effects of factions is to have numerous factions. In other words, the fact that individuals co-mingle in different social groups, ideals, and goals,- then no one particular group should be able to become so strong as to thwart the interest of all other groups.
Factions were more discussed in Federalist 10
Notes
- ^ Ira C. Lupu, "The Most-Cited Federalist Papers." 15 Constitutional Commentary 403-410 (1998)
- ^ James Madison, "Federalist, No. 51." (1788)
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