Jump to content

Singapore strategy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Hawkeye7 (talk | contribs) at 00:07, 18 January 2011 (→‎Criticism: re-worded). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

The Singapore strategy was a strategy of the British Empire between 1919 and 1941 to deter or defeat aggression by the Empire of Japan through basing a fleet of the Royal Navy at Singapore. Ideally, this fleet would be able to intercept a Japanese fleet heading south towards India or Australia, and blockade the Japanese home islands.

The Singapore strategy became the cornerstone of British Imperial defence policy in the far east during the 1920s and 1930s, but a combination of financial, political and practical difficulties ensured that it could not be implemented. During the 1930s, the Singapore strategy came under sustained criticism in Britain and abroad.

The Singapore strategy ultimately led to the despatch of Force Z to Singapore and the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Japanese air attack on 10 December 1941. The subsequent ignominious fall of Singapore was described by Winston Churchill as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history."[1]

Origins

Following the conclusion of the First World War, the Imperial German Navy's High Seas Fleet that had challenged the British Royal Navy for supremacy was scuttled in Scapa Flow in 1919. However, the Royal Navy was already facing serious challenges to its position as the world's most powerful fleet from two of its erstwhile allies, the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy.[2] The United States' determination to create, in the words of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, "a navy second to none", presaged a new maritime arms race.[3]

The US Navy was still smaller than the Royal Navy in 1919, but ships laid down under the wartime construction program were still being launched, and their more recent construction gave the American ships a technological edge.[4] The "Two-Power Standard" of 1889 had called for a Royal Navy strong enough to take on any two other powers. In 1909, this had been scaled back to a policy of 60% superiority in dreadnoughts.[5] Rising tensions over the US Navy's building program resulted in heated arguments between the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss and the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William S. Benson in March and April 1919.[6] In 1920, the First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Walter Long announced a "One-Power Standard", under which the policy was to maintain a navy "not... inferior in strength to the Navy of any other power".[5]

While the United States had constructed a graving dock capable of taking battleships at Pearl Harbor between 1909 and 1919, the Royal Navy had no such base east of Malta.[4] In April 1919, the Plans Division of the Admiralty produced a paper which examined possible locations for a naval base in the Pacific in case of a war with the United States or Japan. Hong Kong was considered but regarded as too vulnerable, while Sydney was regarded as secure but too far from Japan. Singapore emerged as the best compromise location.[7]

In November 1918, the Australian Minister for the Navy, Sir Joseph Cook, had asked Wemyss' predecessor, Admiral Lord Jellicoe to draw up a scheme for the Empire's naval defence. Jellicoe set out on a tour of the Empire in the battlecruiser HMS New Zealand in February 1919.[7] He presented his report to the Australian government in August 1919. In a secret section of the report, he advised that the interests of the British Empire and Japan would inevitably clash. He called for the creation of a British Pacific Fleet strong enough to counter the Imperial Japanese Navy, which he believed would require 8 battleships, 8 battlecruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 36 submariness and supporting auxiliaries. Although he did not specify a location, Jellicoe noted that the fleet would require a major dockyard somewhere in the Far East. A paper entitled "The Naval Situation in the Far East" was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence in October 1919. In this paper the naval staff pointed out that maintaining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might lead to war between the British Empire and the United States.[4]

In 1920, the Admiralty issued War Memorandum (Eastern) 1920, a series of instructions in the event of a war with Japan. In it, the defence of Singapore was described as "absolutely essential".[4]

Plans

The Singapore strategy envisaged that a war with Japan would have three phases:

  • In the first phase, the garrison of Singapore would defend the fortress while the fleet made its way from home waters to Singapore. This was estimated to take up to 90 days.
  • In the second phase, the fleet would sally from Singapore and relieve or recapture Hong Kong.
  • The third would see the fleet blockade Japan and force its surrender by economic pressure. The idea of invading Japan was rejected as impractical.[8]
A massive liner, viewed from aft and above, sits in a dry dock.
The troopship RMS Queen Mary in Singapore Graving Dock, August 1940

Most planning focused on the first phase, which was seen as the most critical. This phase involved construction of defence works for Singapore. For the second phase, a naval base capable of supporting a fleet was required. The third phase received the least consideration, but naval planners were aware that Singapore was too far from Japan to provide an adequate base for it. Moreover, the further the fleet proceeded from its base, the weaker it would become.[8] If American assistance was forthcoming, there was the prospect of Manila being used as a forward base.[9]

The Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 provided for a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships of the British, United States and Japanese Navies.[10] The possibility of Japan taking advantage of a war in Europe was foreseen. However in June 1939, the Tientsin Incident demonstrated another possibility: that Germany might attempt to take advantage of a war in the Far East. However, this did not change the Singapore strategy, as the Kriegsmarine was relatively small and France was an ally.[11]

In the event of a worst-case scenario of simultaneous war with Germany, Italy and Japan, two approaches were considered. The first was to reduce the war to one against Germany and Japan only by knocking Italy out of the conflict as quickly as possible. The other, advanced by the former First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, was to send a "flying squadron" to the Far East. Previously, all plans had called for a force sufficiently large to challenge the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Admiralty chose the first option in 1939.[12] In the end though, the naval planners were overridden by the politicians and the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sent to Singapore.[13]

Base development

Main article: Singapore Naval Base

Following surveys, a site at Sembawang was chosen for a naval base.[14] The Straits Settlements made a free gift of 2,845 acres (1,151 ha) of land for the site.[15] A sum of £250,000 for construction of the base was donated by Hong Kong in 1925. The exceeded the United Kingdom's contribution that year of £204,000 towards the floating dock.[16] Another £2,0000,000 was paid by the Federated Malay States and New Zealand donated another £1,000,000.[17] The contract for construction of the naval dockyard was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sir John Jackson Limited, for £3,700,000.[18] The dockyard covered 21 square miles (54 km2) and had what was then the largest dry dock in the world, the third-largest floating dock, and enough fuel tanks to support the entire Royal Navy for six months.[19]

A view of a large warship from the floor of a dry dock
A British warship inside the Admiralty IX floating dry dock at Singapore Naval Base in September 1941

To defend the naval base, heavy 15-inch naval guns were stationed at Johore battery, Changi, and at Buona Vista to deal with battleships. Medium BL 9.2 inch guns were provided for dealing with smaller attackers. Batteries of smaller calibre anti-aircraft guns and guns for dealing with raids were located at Fort Siloso, Fort Canning and Labrador.[20] Four of the five 15-inch guns were given an all-round (360°) traverse and subterranean magazines.[21] Aviation was not neglected. Plans called for an air force of 18 flying boats, 18 reconnaissance fighters, 18 torpedo bombers and 18 single-seat fighters to protect them. Royal Air Force airfields were established at RAF Tengah and RAF Sembawang.[22] Lord Trenchard argued that 30 torpedo bombers could replace the 15-inch guns. The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Beatty, did not agree. A compromise was reached whereby the guns would be installed, but the issue reconsidered when better torpedo planes became available.[23] Test firings of 15-inch and 9.2-inch guns at Malta and Portsmouth in 1926 indicated that greatly improved shells were required if the guns were to have a chance of hitting a battleship.[24]

Criticism

A large calibre gun fires, creating a cloud of smoke
One of Singapore's 15-inch coastal defence guns elevated for firing

The King George VI dry dock was formally opened by the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Shenton Thomas, on 14 February 1938. Two squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm provided a flypast. The 42 vessels in attendance included three US Navy cruisers. The presence of this fleet gave an opportunity to conduct a series of naval, air and military exercises. The aircraft carrier HMS Eagle was able to sail undetected to within 135 miles (217 km) of Singapore and launch a series of surprise raids on the RAF airfields. The local air commander, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Tedder, was greatly embarrassed. The local land commander, Major-General Sir William Dobbie was no less disappointed by the performance of the anti-aircraft defences. Reports recommended the installation of radar on the island, but this was not done until 1941. The naval defences worked better, but a landing party from HMS Norfolk was still able to capture the Raffles Hotel. What most concerned Dobbie and Tedder was the possibility of the fleet being bypassed entirely by an overland invasion of Malaya from Thailand. Dobbie conducted an exercise in southern Malaya which demonstrated that the jungle was far from impassable. The Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded that the Japanese would most likely land on the east coast of Malaya and advance on Singapore from the north.[25]

In Australia the conservative Nationalist Party of Australia government of Stanley Bruce favoured the Singapore strategy, which called for a reliance on the British navy, supported by as strong an Australian naval squadron as could be afforded. Between 1923 and 1929, £20,000,000 was spent on the RAN while the Army and the munitions industry received only £10,000,000 and the diminutive RAAF got just £2,400,000.[26] As early as September 1926, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Wynter gave a lecture to the United Services Institute of Victoria entitled "The Strategical Inter-relationship of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force: and Australian View", which was subsequently published in the British Army Quarterly in April 1927. In this article he argued that war was most likely to break out in the Pacific at a time when Britain was involved in a crisis in Europe, which would prevent Britain from sending sufficient resources to Singapore. He contended that Singapore was vulnerable, especially to attack from the land and the air, and argued for a more balanced policy of building up the Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) rather than relying on the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).[26] "Henceforward," wrote Australian official historian Lionel Wigmore, "the attitude of the leading thinkers in the Australian Army towards British assurances that an adequate fleet would be sent to Singapore at the critical time was (bluntly stated): 'We do not doubt that you are sincere in your beliefs but, frankly, we do not think you will be able to do it.'"[27]

The Australian Labor Party, which was in opposition for all but two years of the 1920s and 1930s, pressed for an alternative to the Singapore strategy, by which Australia's first line of defence was a strong air arm, supported by developing the munitions industry in order to allow the Army to be quickly expanded.[26] This soon became indistinguishable from the position of the Army and RAAF. When the British naval theorist Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond attacked the Labor party's position in an article in British Army Quarterly in 1933, Colonel John Lavarack wrote a rebuttal. In 1936, the leaders of the opposition, John Curtin read an article by Wynter in the House of Representatives. Wynter's outspoken criticism of the Singapore strategy led to his being transferred to junior post.[28] In 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies replaced the heads of the Army and RAAF with British officers.[29] By 1937, according to Captain Stephen Roskill, "the concept of the 'Main Fleet to Singapore' had, perhaps through constant repetition, assumed something of the inviolability of Holy Writ."[30]

Outcome

Map of Malaya indicating the route of the Japanese advance on Singapore
The progress of the Malayan Campaign

War broke out with Germany in September 1939. During 1940, the situation slowly but inexorably slid towards a worst-case scenario. In June 1940, Italy joined the war on Germany's side and France was knocked out.[31] In July, the British government bowed to Japanese pressure and agreed to close the Burma Road.[32] In July 1941, the Japanese occupied Cam Ranh Bay, which the British fleet had hoped to use on its northward drive. It put the Japanese uncomfortably close to Singapore.[33] In June 1940 the Chiefs of Staff Committee reported that:

the security of our imperial interests in the Far East lies ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in the south-western Pacific, for which purpose adequate fleet must be based at Singapore. Since our previous assurances in this respect, however, the whole strategic situation has been radically altered by the French defeat. The result of this has been to alter the whole of the balance of naval strength in home waters. Formerly we were prepared to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean and dispatch a fleet to the Far East, relying on the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean to contain the Italian fleet. Now if we move the Mediterranean fleet to the Far East there is nothing to contain the Italian fleet, which will be free to operate in the Atlantic or reinforce the German fleet in home waters, using bases in north-west France. We must therefore retain in European waters sufficient naval forces to watch both the German and Italian fleets, and we cannot do this and send a fleet to the Far East. In the meantime the strategic importance to us of the Far East both for Empire security and to enable us to defeat the enemy by control of essential commodities at the source has been increased.[34]

In August 1940, the Chiefs of Staff Committee reported that the force necessary to hold Malaya and Singapore in the absence of a fleet, was 336 first-line aircraft and a garrison of nine brigades. Churchill then sent reassurances the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand guaranteeing that everything but the British Isles would be sacrificed if they were attacked.[35]

In secret talks in Washington, D.C. in June 1939, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, raised the possibility of an American fleet being sent to Singapore.[36] In April 1940, the American naval attaché in London, Captain Alan Kirk, approached the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Thomas Phillips to ask if, in the event of a United States fleet being sent to the Far East, the docking facilities at Singapore could be made available, as those at Subic Bay were inadequate. He received full assurances that they would be.[37] Hopes for American assistance were dashed at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, D.C. in February 1941. The US Navy was primarily focused on the Atlantic. The American chiefs envisaged relieving British warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean so a British fleet could be sent to the Far East.[38]

On 8 December 1941, the Japanese occupied the Shanghai International Settlement. A couple of hours later, landings began at Kota Bharu in Malaya. An hour after that, the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor.[39] On 10 December, the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by Japanese air attack.[40] After the disastrous Malayan Campaign, Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942.[41] During the final stages of the campaign, the 15-inch and 9.2-inch guns had bombarded targets at Johore Bahru, RAF Tengah and Bukit Timah.[42]

In retrospect

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, in a 1942 article in The Fortnightly Review, charged that the loss of Singapore illustrated "the folly of not providing adequately for the command of the sea in a two-ocean war". He now argued that the Singapore strategy had been totally unrealistic. Privately he blamed politicians who had allowed Britain's sea power to be run down.[43] Most critics of the campaign in Malaya agree that the resources were inadequate to hold Singapore, but many have also argued that the employment of what was available was frequently poor.[44] As for the Singapore strategy itself, a fleet was necessary for the defeat of Japan, and eventually a sizeable fleet, the British Pacific Fleet, did go to the Far East.[45] Many historians felt that the Singapore strategy was unrealistic all along:

The Singapore naval base was the symbol of a great illusion—that Britain's Victorian world power remained intact. Its emptiness was eloquent of the post-1918 realities. As Churchill once said, in another context, "facts are better than dreams".[46]

Notes

  1. ^ Churchill 1950, p. 81
  2. ^ Callahan 1974, p. 69
  3. ^ "Urges Navy Second to None: Admiral Dewey and Associates Say Our Fleet Should Equal the Most Powerful in the World". New York Times. 22 December 1915. Retrieved 25 December 2010.
  4. ^ a b c d McIntyre 1979, pp. 19–23
  5. ^ a b Callahan 1974, p. 74
  6. ^ Callahan 1974, p. 70
  7. ^ a b McIntyre 1979, pp. 4–5
  8. ^ a b Bell 2001, pp. 608–612
  9. ^ McIntrye 1979, p. 174
  10. ^ McIntrye 1979, pp. 30–32
  11. ^ McIntrye 1979, pp. 156–161
  12. ^ Bell 2001, pp. 613–614
  13. ^ Bell 2001, p. 624
  14. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 25–27
  15. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 55
  16. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 57–58
  17. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 61–65, 80
  18. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 67
  19. ^ Callahan 1974, p. 80
  20. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 71–73
  21. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 120
  22. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 74
  23. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 75–81
  24. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 83
  25. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 135–137
  26. ^ a b c Long 1952, pp. 8–9
  27. ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 8
  28. ^ Long 1952, pp. 19–20
  29. ^ Long 1952, p. 27
  30. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 214
  31. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 165
  32. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 167
  33. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 182
  34. ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 19
  35. ^ Callahan 1974, p. 83
  36. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 156
  37. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 163
  38. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 178–179
  39. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 192–193
  40. ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 144
  41. ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 382
  42. ^ McIntyre 1979, p. 208
  43. ^ Bell 2001, pp. 605–606
  44. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 214–216
  45. ^ McIntyre 1979, pp. 221–222
  46. ^ Callahan 1974, pp. 90–91

References

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Singapore_strategy&oldid=408491557"