Jump to content

Battle of the Paracel Islands

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 12.144.36.2 (talk) at 18:16, 31 May 2011 (→The battle). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Battle of Hoang Sa (Vietnamese)
Battle of Xisha (Chinese:中越西沙海战)
Battle of Paracel Islands
File:HoangSa3.PNG
DateJanuary 19, 1974
Location
Paracel Islands
Result
  • Chinese victory
  • PRC control over the Paracel Islands and surrounding waters
  • Continued dispute between China and Vietnam
Belligerents
People's Liberation Army Navy Republic of Vietnam Navy
Commanders and leaders
Unknown Colonel [navy captain] Hà Văn Ngạc
Strength
4 Corvettes
2 Hainan Class Submarine Chasers
marine battalions
unknown number of militia		 3 Frigates
1 Corvette
commando platoon
demolition team
militia platoon
Casualties and losses
4 Corvettes damaged.
18 killed		 1 Corvette sunk
1 Frigate heavily damaged
2 Frigates lightly damaged
53 killed
16 injured
48 captured

The Battle of the Paracel Islands was an engagement fought between the naval forces of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in the Paracel Islands on January 19, 1974.

Historical background

The tiny, uninhabited Paracel Islands, called Quan Dao Hoang Sa (Quần Đảo Hoàng Sa) in Vietnamese (Hoang Sa Islands) and Xisha Qundao (西沙群島) in Chinese (Xisha Islands), lie in the South China Sea roughly 200 miles from the nearest Asian mainland shore. With no native population, the archipelago's ownership has been in dispute frequently since the early 20th century.

On July 3, 1938, French troops, who had colonized Indochina in the 19th century, invaded and occupied Paracel Islands despite Chinese protests. This took place shortly after the breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese War, when China was fully engaged in resisting Japan's invasion. Three days later, on July 6, the Japanese Foreign Ministry also issued a declaration in protest of the French occupation:

The statement of Great Britain and France made respectively in 1900 and 1921 already declared that the Xisha [Paracel] Islands were part of the Administrative Prefecture of Hainan Island. Therefore, the current claims made by An'nan or France to the Xisha Islands are totally unjustifiable.[1]

During the Second World War, Japanese expelled the French troops and took over the islands in spite of the 1938 declaration. At the end of the war (Asian-Pacific Region), the Government of the Republic of China formally retook the Paracels, Spratlys and other islands in the South China Sea in October and November 1946. In Geneva accord of 1954 Japan formally renounced all of its claims to, inter alia, the South China Sea islands which it had occupied during the World War II.[2] This arrangement was prepared, observed, and signed by a number of nations, including the People's Republic of China according to some sources.[3] In 1958, the People's Republic of China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters which encompassed the Spratly and Paracel Islands. North Vietnam's prime minister, Pham Van Dong, sent a diplomatic note to China stating that "We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of China fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision."[4][5] However, South Vietnam claimed jurisdiction over the islands on the basis of the prior French occupation,[6] and landed its forces on one of the Paracel Islands in 1973.[7]

Despite the ongoing disputed proclamation, the South Vietnamese Government continued to maintain a small weather observation garrison on Pattle Island, the largest island in this group. There was no action initiated by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to displace this presence. By 1973, after the Paris Peace Accords, the United States of America significantly reduced and eventually cut off military supplies to its ally. As a result, the ARVN forces presence on the Paracels was reduced to a single platoon of soldiers.

On January 16, six South Vietnamese Army officers and an American observer were sent to the Paracels for an inspection tour. They discovered two Chinese "armored fishing trawlers" were laying off Drummond Island supporting troops from the PLA that had occupied the territory. In addition, Chinese soldiers were observed around a bunker on nearby Duncan Island, with a landing ship moored directly on the beach and two additional Kronstad-class guided missile gun boats in the vicinity of the island. The findings were reported back to the regional headquarters in Da Nang and immediately over to Saigon. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam decided to attempt eviction of the PRC forces.[8][9]

In January, 1974, South Vietnamese naval vessels were dispatched to confront a fleet of the People's Republic of China.

The battle

Balance of forces

Four warships of the Republic of Vietnam participated in the battle: three frigates, Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-5),[1] Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16),[2] and Trần Khánh Dư (HQ-4), [3], and one corvette, Nhật Tảo (HQ-10).[4] In addition, a platoon of South Vietnamese naval commandos, an underwater demolition team, and a regular ARVN platoon were stationed on the islands.

The People's Republic of China had four warships for most parts of the battle, (PLAN corvettes # 271, #274, # 389 and # 396). This force was then reinforced by two more Kronstad-Class submarine chasers (# 281 and # 282) after the end of the battle. In addition, two PLA marine battalions and an unknown number of irregular militia landed on the islands.

In comparison, the total displacements and weapons of the Republic of Vietnam's four warships were remarkably more than those of the People's Republic of China. There were four ships of each side engaging in the battle. The supporting and reinforcement forces of China's PLAN did not take part in this battle for real.

Prelude

On January 16, 1974, the Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16) witnessed a small band of Chinese militia on one of the islands (called Robert Island by international navigators, Cam Tuyen by the Vietnamese). The militia set up a flag and stelae representing Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels; they were supported by Chinese warships (# 389, # 396) and minesweepers (# 402, # 407).

Frigate HQ-16 signaled the Chinese squadron to withdraw, but received the same orders in return. Overnight the two forces remained shadowing each other but did not engage.

On January 17, some 30 Vietnamese commandos waded ashore to Robert Island and, unopposed, removed the Chinese flag. Soon reinforcements arrived: the frigate Trần Khánh Dư (HQ-4) joined HQ-16, while two PLAN corvettes (# 274 and # 271) joined the Chinese.

On January 18, 1974, the frigate Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-5) arrived at the scene carrying the commander of the South Vietnamese fleet, Colonel Hà Văn Ngạc. The corvette Nhật Tảo (HQ-10) also took its place, moving in cautiously because she had only one functioning engine at the time.

The battle

In the early morning of January 19, 1974, Vietnamese troops from HQ-5 landed on Duncan Island (Quang Hòa in Vietnamese) and came under fire from Chinese troops, after HQ-5 opened fire first on the Chinese troops stationed on the island while advancing toward the shores of Duncan Island. Three Vietnamese soldiers were killed and two others were injured. Outnumbered, the Vietnamese ground forces withdrew by landing craft, but their small fleet itself did not: instead, they drew up close to the Chinese ships in a tense standoff.

At 10:24 a.m., two Vietnamese ships, HQ-16 and HQ-10 opened fire against Chinese ships. Then, HQ-4, HQ-5 did the same thing. The ensuing sea battle lasted for about 40 minutes, with numerous vessels on both sides sustaining damage. The Chinese succeeded in damaging all four Vietnamese ships, particularly the HQ-10. The Nhật Tảo (HQ-10) could not retreat because her last working engine was disabled in the battle: the ship's crew was ordered to evacuate, but her captain, Major [navy Lt. Commander] Ngụy Văn Thà, remained under fire and went down with his ship. HQ-16, severely shot by a friendly ship, the HQ-5, was forced to retreat westwards. Meanwhile, HQ-4 and HQ-5, were forced to retreat.

The next day, Chinese jet fighters and ground-attack aircraft from Hainan bombed the three islands, and were followed up with an amphibious landing force. The South Vietnamese Marine garrison was captured, and the naval force retreated to Đà Nẵng.

While the battle was going on, the Vietnamese fleet detected two Chinese reinforcing warships rushing to the area; China later acknowledged that these were the Hainan-Class submarine chasers #281 and #282. Despite reports that at least one Vietnamese craft had been struck by a missile, China insisted that no missile-bearing ships were involved in the battle. In addition, the South Vietnamese fleet also received warnings from the United States that their naval radar had detected additional Chinese guided missile frigates and MIG jet fighters on their way from nearby Hainan. South Vietnam requested assistance from the US Seventh Fleet, but the request was rejected.

Results

The Paracel Islands have been under the control of the People's Republic of China since the end of combat. The casualties of the Republic of Vietnam were agreed on by both sides, but the casualties of the People's Republic of China were not.

Vietnamese casualties

The South Vietnamese claim of her own casualties were agreed to by the Chinese. According to the claim, warship HQ-10 was sunk, HQ-16 was heavily damaged, HQ-5 and HQ-4 were both lightly damaged. Fifty-three (53) Vietnamese soldiers including Captain Ngụy Văn Thà of HQ-10 were killed, 16 others were injured. On January 20, 1974, the Dutch tanker Kopionella rescued 23 survivors of HQ-10. On January 29, 1974, Vietnamese fishermen found a group of 15 Vietnamese soldiers near Mũi Yến (Qui Nhơn), who had participated in the combat on Quang Hòa island, and escaped on lifeboats.[5]

After their amphibious assault on January 20, the Chinese held 48 war prisoners, including 1 American advisor[6]. They were all later released in Hong Kong through the Red Cross.

Chinese casualties

According to South Vietnam, corvette #271 of China sunk, #396 ran aground, and #274 and #389 were both heavily damaged. The Western press also reported at least one Chinese vessel had been sunk.

According to China, however, although all Chinese ships were hit numerous times, none of the vessels sank. China said warships # 271 and # 389 suffered speed-reducing engine damage, but they returned to port safely and were rapidly repaired. Warship #274 was damaged more extensively and had to stop at Yongxing Island for emergency repair, returning to Hainan under its own power the next day. Warship #396 was damaged the most, with an engine room explosion: with the help of the minesweepers, it managed to run aground and put out the fire, and was towed back to its base. The Chinese confirmed 18 deaths among their various forces; Vietnamese estimates were markedly higher.

Because the Vietnamese force was not a high-seas fleet, their radar and surveillance equipment was perhaps inadequate for assessing actual combat damage. According to the Chinese, the heavy smoke reported around #271 and others was not the result of damage but a deliberately laid smokescreen, although this explanation has been viewed skeptically. The reluctance of the Chinese military to release further details or evidence has left the issue clouded. In any case, the Chinese squadron left the pursuit of the Vietnamese to their reinforcements (ships #281 and #282, among others), giving the impression that they were unable to continue.

Aftermath

As a result of the battle, the People's Republic of China established control over all of the Paracel Islands, which it calls the Xisha Islands. South Vietnam protested bitterly to the United Nations, but was unable to achieve any action nor even public consideration: China, with veto power on the UN Security Council, blocked all efforts to bring up the matter. By January 25, the President of the Security Council, Gonzalo Facio Segreda, publicly advised South Vietnam to give up, because they simply "could not muster the votes." (NYT, 1/26/74.)

China's motivations for the seizure remains speculative. Although the remote islands held little value militarily, geological surveys had indicated the potential for significant petroleum deposits in the surrounding waters: after a year of worldwide fuel crises, this alone may have been sufficient motivation. Diplomatically, the projection of power was certainly beneficial to China during a time of regional turmoil; it also proved humbling to the older superpowers, who pointedly took no sides in the matter from the very beginning. (NYT, 1/19/74, 1/21/74.)

North Vietnam gave a glimpse at its worsening relationship with China by conspicuously not congratulating their erstwhile allies: official statements mentioned only a desire for "a peaceful solution". Indeed, after the reunification of Vietnam in 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam publicly renewed their claim to the Paracels, and this dispute continues to the present day.

A potential diplomatic crisis was averted when China quietly released an American prisoner taken during the battle. Gerald Emil Kosh, 27, was a former US Army captain captured with the Vietnamese on Pattle Island. He was described as a "regional liaison officer" for the US Embassy, Saigon, on assignment with the South Vietnamese Navy. China released him from custody on January 31 without comment. Kosh is sometimes described as having been a civilian employee of the Pentagon at this time.[10] He died around 2002 at the age of 56.[11]

Notes

  1. ^ Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict A Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, của Ralph A. Cossa, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998, trang B-2
  2. ^ Nhân Dân No. 1653, September 22, 1958 [7]
  3. ^ Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Data (DyMID), version 2.0 tabulations
  4. ^ Hải Chiến Hoàng Sa, Bão biển Đệ Nhị Hải Sư, Australia, 1989, page 101
  5. ^ DyMID
  6. ^ This warship is formerly USCGC Chincoteague (WHEC-375), and was transferred to South Vietnam and renamed RVNS Tran Binh Trong (HQ-5). It was later transferred to the Philippines and renamed RPS Andres Bonifacto (PF-7) in 1975 when South Vietnam fell.
  7. ^ This warship is formerly USS Bering Strait (AVP-34), and was transferred to South Vietnam and renamed RVNS Ly Thuong Kiet (HQ-16). It was later transferred to the Philippines and renamed RPS Diego Silang (PF-9) in 1975 when South Vietnam fell.
  8. ^ This warship is formerly USS Forster (DE-334), loaned to South Vietnam on September 25, 1971 and renamed Tran Khanh Du (HQ-4). Captured by North Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon and was renamed Dai Ky (HQ-03).
  9. ^ This warship is formerly USS Serene (AM-300), and was transferred to South Vietnam January 24, 1964. It was re-designated as RVNS Nhut Tao (Nhật Tảo).
  10. ^ Counterpart, A South Vietnamese Naval Officer's War Kiem Do and Julie Kane, Naval Institute, Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, chương 10.
  11. ^ Thế Giới Lên Án Trung Cộng Xâm Lăng Hoàng Sa Của VNCH. Tài liệu Tổng cục Chiến tranh Chính trị, Bộ Tổng tham mưu QLVNCH, Sài Gòn, 1974, trang 11.
  12. ^ 西沙海战――痛击南越海军, Xinhua, January 20, 2003, online
  13. 西沙海战详解[图], online.

See also

References

  1. ^ Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, University of Virginia, "Security flashpoints: oil, islands, sea access and military confrontation", p181
  2. ^ Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, University of Virginia, "Security flashpoints: oil, islands, sea access and military confrontation", p185
  3. ^ Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, IUniverse, 2002. ISBN 0595225942. Retrieved on 4-23-2009.
  4. ^ 1958 diplomatic note from Pham Van Dong
  5. ^ King C. Chen, "China's war with Vietnam, 1979: issues, decisions, and implications", p45
  6. ^ Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, University of Virginia, "Security flashpoints: oil, islands, sea access and military confrontation", p185
  7. ^ King C. Chen, "China's war with Vietnam, 1979: issues, decisions, and implications", p47
  8. ^ Thomas J. Cutler, The Battle for the Paracel Islands, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. Retrieved on 4-24-2009.
  9. ^ Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty Over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, p.3, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000. ISBN 9041113819. Retrieved on 4-24-2009.
  10. ^ http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908427,00.html
  11. ^ http://bco3bn12inf.centreconnect.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=43
  • New York Times, "Saigon Reports Clash with China". 1/19/74.
  • New York Times, "Saigon Says China Bombs 3 Isles and Lands Troops". 1/20/74.
  • New York Times, "Saigon Says Chinese Control Islands, But Refuses to Admit Complete Defeat". 1/21/74.
  • New York Times, "U.S. Cautioned 7th Fleet to Shun Paracels Clash". 1/22/74.
  • New York Times, "23 Vietnamese Survivors of Sea Battle Are Found". 1/23/74.
  • New York Times, "Peking Reports Holding U.S. Aide". 1/26/74.
  • New York Times, "American Captured on Disputed Island is Freed by China". 1/31/74.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_the_Paracel_Islands&oldid=431865364"