Structuration theory

The theory of structuration, proposed by Anthony Giddens, most significantly in The Constitution of Society (1984), is a social theory of the creation and reproduction of social systems that is based in the analysis of both structure and agents (see structure and agency), without giving primacy to either. It examines phenomenology, hermeneutics, and social practices at the heart of the intersection between structures and agents, emphasizing the inseparability of the two. Its proponents have adopted this balanced position, treating structure and agency equally, while expanding the theory through criticism and further authorship. The core tenets of the theory of structuration hold that human society cannot be exclusively explained by subjective (agent-focused) or objective (structure-focused) analysis, nor by micro- or macro-focused analysis. Instead, these lenses should be combined equally. Though the theory has received much criticism, it remains a pilar in contemporary sociological theory.

Premises and origins of structuration theory

Sociologist Anthony Giddens draws upon a post-empiricist frame in his development of the theory of structuration, as he is concerned with understanding the general characteristics and features of social relations at the philosophical and abstract level. This leaves each level more accessible to be analyzed in terms of the most expansive ontologies which constitute the human social experience: space and time ("and thus, in one sense, 'history'."). His aim was to build a broad social theory which viewed "[t]he basic domain of study of the social sciences... [as] neither the experience of the individual actor, not the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time." His focus on abstract ontology occurs in conjunction with a purposeful neglect—though not an utter lack—of epistemology or detailed research methodology (examined below).

Giddens purposefully seeks to use concepts from objectivist and subjectivist social theories, discarding what he sees as incorrect emphases, respectively: objectivism's focus on detached structures which lacked regard for humanist elements and subjectivism's exclusive attention to individual or group agency without consideration for socio-structural context. He develops the underlying concepts of structuration by critically engaging with the major works of classical nineteenth and early twentieth century social theorists such as Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Alfred Schutz, Robert K. Merton, Erving Goffman, and Jürgen Habermas, and, in doing so, examines both the worth as well as weaknesses of their major theoretical statements. The theoretical features that Giddens felt were worth keeping became core concepts in structuration theory. Thus, in many ways, structuration emerged from an endeavor in theoretical reconstruction, or, as Giddens said in the 1993 version of New Rules of Sociological Method, "...an exercise in clarification of logical issues." Structuration theory had its origins in other fields, as well: "He also wanted to bring in from other disciplines novel aspects of ontology that he felt had been neglected by social theorists working in the domains that most interested him. Thus, for example, he enlisted the aid of geographers, historians and philosophers in bringing notions of time and space into the central heartlands of social theory." In the creation of structuration theory, Giddens hoped for a subject-wide "coming together" might occur which would involve greater cross-disciplinary dialogue and cooperation, especially between anthropologists, social scientists and sociologists of all types, historians, geographers, and even novelists (believing, as he did, that "literary style matters" and that social scientists are communicators who share frames of meaning across cultural contexts through their work by utilizing "the same sources of description (mutual knowledge) as novelists or others who write fictional accounts of social life.")

Despite its use of other social theories and fields, structuration theory cannot be confused with appearing excessively similar to the theories upon which it draws. For instance, structuration theory differentiates itself from structuralism in that it sees the reproduction of social systems not "as a mechanical outcome, [but] rather... as an active constituting process, accomplished by, and consisting in, the doings of active subjects." Nor does structuration theory give agents the passivity of Althusser's concept of agents as "bearers" of structures. Structuration theory also distinguishes itself from the philosophy of action and other forms of interpretative sociology by focusing on structure rather than production exclusively. Similarly, while the cycle of structuration might resemble that of Saussure's production of an utterance, language is seen as a tool from which to view society, not as the constitution of society–parting paths with structural linguists such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Noam Chomsky. While post-structuralist theory, such as that of Derrida, put similar focus on the effects of time and space, it could be seen as recognizing only movement, change, and transition in the formation of social systems. Giddens's concept of structure also differs from that of functionalism, in which structures and their virtual synonyms, "systems," comprise organizations; whereas in structuration theory, structures and systems are separate concepts, the former of which consists of generative rules and resources, while the latter is defined by homeostatic causal loops, conscious self-regulation, and reflexive (unconscious) self-regulation on the part of agents. Meanwhile, Marxism as a method of social inquiry is seen as using too restrictive a concept of "society" and is limited by its reliance on a universal "motor of history" (i.e., class conflict), its theories of societal "adaptation," and its insistence on the working class as universal class and socialism as the ultimate form of modern society. Lastly, while structuration is an inherently critical discipline (in that it draws critically from other theories), "...structuration theory cannot be expected to furnish the moral guarantees that critical theorists sometimes purport to offer."

Duality of structure

Giddens contends that in social analysis, the term structure referred generally to "rules and resources" and more specifically to "the structuring properties allowing the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them "systemic" form." Agents—groups or individuals—draw upon these structures to perform social actions through embedded memory, called memory traces. Memory traces are thus the vehicle through which social actions are carried out. Structure is also, however, the result of these social practices. Thus, Giddens conceives of the duality of structure as being:

...the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution.|

Giddens calls this concept "the duality of structure" in order to emphasize its twofold nature as both medium and outcome. Structures exist internally in agents (as "memory traces," which are the product of phenomenological and hermeneutic inheritance) and externally as the manifestation of social actions. Similarly, social structures contain agents and/or are the product of past actions of agents. Giddens holds this concept, alongside "structure" and "system," as making up "...the core of structuration theory." Consequently, this theory has been adopted by those with structuralist inclinations, but who wish to situate such structures in human practice rather than to reify them as an ideal type or material property. (This is different, for example, from actor-network theory which appears to grant a certain autonomy to technical artifacts.)

Social systems have patterns of social relation that exist over time; the changing nature of space and time will determine the interaction of social relations and therefore structure. Hitherto, social structures or models of society were taken to be beyond the realm of human control—the positivistic approach—or posit that action creates society—the interpretivist approach. The duality of structure emphasizes that, in the most basic assumption, they are one and the same; different sides to the same central question of how social order is created.

Gregor McLennan has suggested a renaming of this process the duality of structure and agency, since both aspects are involved in using and producing social actions.

Cycle of structuration

The duality of structure is essentially a feedback—feedforward process whereby agents and structures mutually enact social systems, and social systems in turn become part of the duality of structure. Structuration thus recognizes a social cycle. In examining social systems, structuration theory examines structure, modality, and interaction. As defined above, structure is constituted by "rules and resources" governing and available to agents. The "modality" (discussed below) of a structural system is the means by which structures are translated into action. "Interaction" is the activity instantiated by the agent acting within the social system and situated in space and time.

Interaction

"Interaction" is the activity instantiated by the agent acting within the social system and situated in space and time. "It can be understood as the fitful yet routinized occurrence of encounters, fading away in time and space, yet constantly reconstituted within different areas of time-space." Rules are implicated in interaction, a concept originally suggested by Goffman. These rules are clustered in frames. Frames consist of the ordering of activities and meanings in a social context as "clusters of rules which help to constitute and regulate activities, defining them as activities of a certain sort and as subject to a given range of sanctions." Frames are necessary for agents to feel ontological security in their routines in their daily lives. "Ontological security" refers to the trust people have in social structure; everyday actions have some degree of predictability, thus ensuring social stability. Whenever individuals interact in a specific context they address—without any difficulty and in many cases without conscious acknowledgement—the question: "What is going on here?" Framing is the practice by which agents engaging in interactions "make sense" of what they are doing both for themselves and for others involved.

Routinization

Structuration theory is centrally concerned with order as "the transcending of time and space in human social relationships" when analyzing social systems. institutionalized action and routinization are foundational in the establishment of social order and the reproduction of social systems. Routine persists in society, even in social and political revolutions, where daily life is systematically deformed, "as Bettelheim demonstrates so well, routines, including those of an obnoxious sort, are re-established." Routine interaction in time and in space become institutionalized features of social systems. Routinization comes from tradition, custom and/or habitual actions, but this is no easy societal task and it "is a major error to suppose that these phenomena need no explanation. On the contrary, as Goffman (together with ethnomethodology) has helped to demonstrate, the routinized character of most social activity is something that has to be "worked at" continually by those who sustain it in their day-to-day conduct." Therefore, routinized social practices are not the erratic result of social coincidences, "but the skilled accomplishments of knowledgeable agents."

Certain criteria are necessary for routinization: trust and tact (basic properties which participants bring to encounters) are essential for the existence of a "basic security system, the sustaining (in praxis) of a sense of ontological security, and [thus] the routine nature of social reproduction which agents skilfully organize. [Additionally, t]he monitoring of the body, the control and use of face in 'face work'—these are fundamental to social integration in time and space."

Explanation

When I utter a sentence I draw upon various syntactical rules (sedimented in my practical consciousness of the language) in order to do so. These structural features of the language are the medium whereby I generate the utterance. But in producing a syntactically correct utterance I simultaneously contribute to the reproduction of the language as a whole. ...The relation between moment and totality for social theory... [involves] a dialectic of presence and absence which ties the most minor or trivial forms of social action to structural properties of the overall society, and to the coalescence of institutions over long stretches of historical time.

Thus, even the smallest social actions contribute to the alteration or reproduction of social systems. Social stability and order is not permanent; agents always possess a dialectic of control (discussed below) which allows one to break away from normative actions, and depending on the sum of social factors at work, they may instigate generative action in the form of shifts, however small, in the social structure.

The cycle of structuration is not a defined sequence; there is rarely a direct succession of causal events. The relationship between structures and agents is more complex than that. Structures and agents are both internal and external to each other, intermingling, interrupting, and continually changing each other. The cycle of structuration is only a guideline, not a prescribed list of events. For example, social systems have patterns of social relations that exist and change over time; the dynamic nature of space and time will determine the interaction of social relations and therefore structure. As Giddens opines, "The degree of "systemness" is very variable. ...I take it to be one of the main features of structuration theory that the extension and 'closure' of societies across space and time is regarded as problematic."

To understand how the cycle of structuration manifests, consider how the signification of a concept (e.g., the use of the word "patriot" in political speech) borrows from and contributes to legitimization (e.g., nationalistic norms) and coordinates forms of domination (e.g., a police state), from which it in turn gains further force.

Structure and society

Structures are the "rules and resources" which are embedded in the memory processes, or memory traces, of agents, who call upon them via knowledgeability in order to perform social actions. "Knowledgeability" refers to "what agents know about what they do, and why they do it." Giddens divides these structures that can be drawn upon by agents (structures-within-knowledgeability) into three types:

• domination (power);

  (Giddens also uses "resources" to refer to this structure when indicating control over economic or allocative power, control over people, or authoritative resources.) Authoritative resources allow agents to control persons, whereas allocative resources allow agents to control material objects.)

• signification (meaning);
• legitimation (norms);

  (Giddens sometimes uses "rules" to refer to either signification or legitimation. An agent draws upon these stocks of knowledge via memory to inform him or herself about the external context, conditions, and potential results of an action.)

When an agent uses these structures of domination, legitimation, and signification for definite social interactions, they are called modalities and present themselves in the forms of:

• facility (domination);
• interpretive scheme/communication (signification); and
• norms/sanctions (legitimation).

  (Thus, he distinguishes between the overall "structures-within-knowledgeability" that are potentially available within the memory traces of individuals and then the more limited and task-specific "modalities" on which these agents subsequently draw when they engage in interaction.)

The dual nature of structure (defined above) means that it enters "simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution." Structures are a "virtual order" which exist in the generation of human action. They do not exist physically; they are located in the memory traces of an agent. "Structures exist paradigmatically, as an absent set of differences, temporally "present" only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments of social systems." Giddens draws upon structuralism and post-structuralism in theorizing that structures and their meaning are understood by their differences.

Agents and society

Giddens bases his conception of agents on previous psychoanalysis work done by Freud and others. Agency, as Giddens calls it, is human action. To be human is to be an agent, although not all agents are human beings. Agents' knowledgeability of their society informs their action, which reproduce or change social structures, which in turn enforce and maintain the dynamics of action (as seen in the duality of structure and the cycle of structuration). Thus, agency is critical to both the reproduction and the transformation of society. Another way to explain this concept is by what Giddens calls the "reflexive monitoring of actions." Reflexive monitoring is a commonplace, yet utterly essential, characteristic of agency, and refers to the ability of agents to pursue their wants and desires through monitoring the flow of their actions as well as the settings and contexts in which those actions occur. Agents subsequently "rationalize," or evaluate, the success of those efforts. All humans engage in this process, and expect the same from their peers. Through action, agents can produce structures; thrugh reflexive monitoring and rationalization, they can transform them.

To act, agents:

• must be motivated to act;
• are knowledgeable and able to rationalize the action; and
• reflexively monitor the action.

Agents, while bounded in structure, also draw upon their knowledge of that structural context when they perform social action. However, these actions are constrained by the agent's inherent capabilities and their understandings of available actions and external limitations. Practical consciousness and discursive consciousness inform these abilities. Practical consciousness refers to the practical knowledgeability that an agent brings to the tasks required by everyday life, which is so integrated as to be hardly noticed. Reflexive monitoring occurs at the level of practical consciousness. Practical consciousness is contrasted with "discursive consciousness," which is the ability verbally express knowledge. Alongside practical and discursive consciousness, Giddens recognizes actors as having knowledge that is reflexive and situated in context, and that habitual, widespread use of knowledgeability makes structures become institutionalized.

Agents rationalize, and in doing so, link the agent and the agent's knowledgeability. Simultaneously, agents must coordinate other ongoing projects, goals, and contexts while performing actions. This coordination is called reflexive monitoring and is tacit, taken for granted, and connected to ethnomethodology's emphasis on the intrinsic sense of accountability that agents bring to multiple endeavors.

Factors which can enable or constrain an agent, as well as how an agent uses structures, are known as capability constraints:

• where the agent's physical body exists in the passage of time toward death;
• the agent's physical limitations (including limits on multi-tasking and on being in more than one place at one time);
• amount of time; and
• the relationship between movement in space and movement in time.

Spatial categories are a particular type of capability constraint:

• locales;
• regionalization, the artificial construction of places such as political or geographical zones, or rooms in a house;
• presence availability of other actors in the interaction (see co-presence); and
• time-space "distanciation" (i.e., are the other actors physically present in time and space?).

Agents are always able to engage in a dialectic of control, able to "intervene in the world or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs." In essence, agents always have some inherent and contrasting amounts of autonomy and dependence; it is always possible for agents to either act or refuse to do so.

Methodology of structuration theory

The methodology of structuration theory as a research tool has been a problematic aspect for academics. Giddens originally intended structuration theory to be abstract and theoretical, informing the hermeneutic aspects of research rather than guiding practices. Giddens wrote that structuration theory "establishes the internal logical coherence of concepts within a theoretical network." Giddens criticized many researchers who used structuration theory for empirical research, critiquing their "en bloc" use of the theory's abstract concepts in a way that was burdensome to their work. "The works applying concepts from the logical framework of structuration theory that Giddens approved of were those that used them more selectively, 'in a spare and critical fashion.'" Giddens and academics following him used structuration theory more as "a sensitizing device" Structuration theory is relevant to research, but does not prescribe a methodology for how it should be done.

Structuration theory allows researchers to focus on any one of the structures or concepts independently, or in combination, without necessitating strict formats. In this way, structuration theory prioritizes ontology over epistemology. Giddens believes this is useful as a sensitizing tool for researchers. In his own uses of structuration, Giddens focuses on describing a world or situation and its production and reproduction of social practices, looking for stasis and change, finding agent expectations, being alert to the relative degrees of routine, tradition, behavior, and creative, skillful, and strategic thought simultaneously, as well as examining the spatial organization, intended and unintended consequences, skilled and knowledgeable agents, discursive and tacit knowledge, dialectic of control, actions with motivational content, and constraints to the active involvement of the agents. Giddens and fellow structuration theorists often seek out aspects of structuration in empirical research of social relations, rather than organically discovering them, since they use structuration theory more as a sensitizing tool to be used in the pursuit of a more highly specific research question, though that technique has been criticized as cherry-picking.

Giddens prefers a form of analysis called strategic conduct analysis, a form of social analysis which focuses on contextually-situated activities of agents. Strategic conduct analysis utilizes rich description, sophisticated accounts of agents' knowledgeability, motivation, and an attempt to interpret the dialectic of control.

Criticisms and additions to Giddens's structuration theory

Though structuration theory has received critical expansion since its origination in the New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies (1976) (and more significantly explained by Giddens in later works such as Studies in Social and Political Theory (1977), Central Problems of Social Theory, 1979), A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981), and The Nation-State and Violence (1985)), his definition of the core concepts of the theory remain foundational and pivotal for any later extension of the theory, especially his concept of the "duality of structure": agents and society.

"Strong structuration"

Rob Stones argues that while Giddens's core contributions to structuration theory are foundational, many aspects of his original theory have little place in its modern manifestation. Stones focuses on clarifying the scope of the theory, reconfiguring some core concepts and inserting new ones, and strengthening and defining methodology and research orientations. Strong structuration:

1. Places the ontology of structuration more in "situ" than on an abstract level.

2. Introduces the quadripartite cycle, which details the elements involved in Giddens's "duality of structure." These are:

* external structures as conditions of action;

* internal structures within the agent;

* "active agency, "including a range of aspects involved when agents draw upon internal structures in producing practical action"; and

* outcomes (as both structures and events).

3. Increases attention to epistemology and methodology. Ontology supports epistemology and methodology by prioritizing:

* the question-at-hand;

* appropriate forms of methodological bracketing;

* distinct methodological steps in research; and

* "the specific combinations of all the above in composite forms of research."

4. Discovering the "meso-level of ontology between the abstract, philosophical level of ontology and the in-situ, ontic level." Strong structuration has room for a wide range of variations in abstract ontological concepts as they manifest themselves in experiential conditions.

5. Focusing on the meso-level at the temporal and spatial scale.

6. Conceptualizing independent causal forces and irresistible causal forces, which takes into account how external structures, internal structures, and active agency affect agent choices (or lack of them). "Irresistible forces" are the connected concepts of a horizon of action with a set of "actions-in-hand" and a hierarchy and ordering of purposes and concerns. An agent is affected by historical and present external influences. Overall, this aspect of "strong structuration" helps reconcile an agent's "dialectic of control" and his/her more highly constrained set of "real choices."

"Post-structuration" and dualism

Margaret Archer objects to the inseparability of structure and agency in structuration theory. She explicates a notion of dualism rather than "duality" of structure. She primarily examines structural frameworks and the action within the limits allowed by those conditions. She combines realist ontology and a social analysis methodology called analytical dualism. She maintains that structure precedes agency in the cycle of social structure reproduction and thus in analytic importance, and that structure and agency should be kept apart as much as possible. In her dualistic model, she emphasizes the importance of temporality in social analysis, dividing it into four stages: structural conditioning (time 1), social interaction and its immediate outcome (times 2 and 3), and structural elaboration (time 4). Thus her analysis looks at embedded "structural conditions, emergent causal powers and properties, social interactions between agents, and subsequent structural changes or reproductions arising from the latter." Archer criticizes structuration theory for denying temporality a place in its analysis because of the inseparability between structure and agency, though other theorists disagree.

Nicos Mouzelis offers a reconstruction of Giddens's original theories, rather than a replacement. Mouzelis keeps Giddens's original formulation of structure as "rules and resources." However, he is still considered a dualist, because he argues for dualism of structure and agency to be as important in social analysis as the duality of structure. Mouzelis re-examines human social action in time and space at the "syntagmatic" level. in time and space at the syntagmatic level. According to his argument, Giddens's duality of structure does not account for all of the types of social relationships available to agents. The duality of structure works when agents do not question or disrupt rules, and their interaction resembles "natural/performative" actions with a practical orientation. However, in other contexts, the relationship between structure and agency can resemble dualism more than duality, such as systems that are the result of powerful actors. In these situations, rules are not viewed as resources, but are in states of transition or redefinition, where actions are seen from a "strategic/monitoring orientation." In this orientation, dualism is more important because it denotes distance between agents and structures. These situations are called syntagmatic duality. Mouzelis gives an example of how a professor has the capacity to greatly and easily change the class he or she teaches, but very little capability to change the larger university structure. "In that case, syntagmatic duality gives way to syntagmatic dualism." This implies that systems are the outcome, but not the medium, of social actions. Mouzelis also criticizes the lack of consideration for social hierarchies in Giddens's formulation of structuration.

John Parker interrogates the two pre-eminent modern structurationists (Bourdieu and Giddens) using previous criticism from Margaret Archer and Nicos Mouzelis. Parker, using Archer and Mouzelis, proposes that the "dualism of structure and agency" (as opposed to the "duality of structure") is a more useful way of analyzing how structures are made. "Dualism" distinguishes between structure and agency more concretely, whereas Parker argues that the "duality of structure" conflates the two, making it virtually impossible to distinguish one from the other. Parker advocates for a theoretical reclamation historical sociology and macro-structures using concrete historical cases, because such a model better explains the creation and transformation of social structures such as institutions and rules, cultural traditions, patterns of regular behaviour, and distributions of power and inequality.

In-depth critique by John B. Thompson

Though he agrees with the soundness and overall purposes of Giddens's most expansive structuration concepts (i.e., against dualism and for the study of structure in concert with agency), John B. Thompson ("a close friend and colleague of Giddens at Cambridge University") wrote one of the most widely-cited critiques of structuration theory. His central argument is that Giddens's structuration theory needs to be more specific and more consistent both internally and with conventional social structure theory. Thompson focuses on problematic aspects of Giddens's concept of structure as "rules and resources," focusing on "rules." He argues that the concept of "rule" is too vague; Thompson calls for a precise definition. He further argues:

• Giddens presupposes a criterion of importance in contending that rules are a generalizable enough tool to apply to every aspect of human action and interaction; "on the other hand, Giddens is well aware that somerules, or some kinds or aspects of rules, are much more important than others for the analysis of, for example, the social structure of capitalist societies." The term is imprecise and does not designate which rules are more relevant for which social structures.
• Thompson uses the example of linguistic analysis to point out that there needs to be some sort of prior existing framework which enables the tool of "linguistic analysis" to analyze, for example, the social structure of contemporary Britain. While the study of semantic rules may be relevant to studying social structure, to study them "presupposes some structural points of reference which are not themselves rules, with regard to which [of] these semantic rules are differentiated" according to class, sex, region and so on. He calls this structural differentiation.
• There is a difference in rules which apply to variously situated individuals. Thompson uses the example of a private school which restricts enrollment and thus participation. Thus rules–in this case, restrictions–"operate differentially, affecting unevenly various groups of individuals whose categorization depends on certain assumptions about social structures." The analysis of rules alone does not reflect their variable applications.
• Thompson highlights that there is no way of formulating structural identity in Giddens's structuration theory. There are some "rules" which are better conceived of as broad inherent elements (i.e., Ford and Macmillan are "capitalistic"). These institutions may be different in certain ways, but have certain traits in common due to their "capitalistic" nature. Thompson theorizes that these traits are not "rules" in the sense that that a manager could draw upon a "rule" to fire a characteristically tardy employee; rather, they are elements which essentially "limit the kinds of rules which are possible and which thereby delimit the scope for institutional variation." It is necessary to outline the broader social system to be able to analyze agents, actors, and rules within that system.

Thus Thompson concludes that Giddens's use of the term "rules" is problematic. "Structure" is similarly objectionable: "But to adhere to this conception of structure, while at the same time acknowledging the need for the study of 'structural principles,' 'structural sets' and 'axes of structuration,' is simply a recipe for conceptual confusion."

Thompson proposes several amendments to Giddens's theory of structuration. He argues for a sharper differentiation between the reproduction of institutions and the reproduction of social structure. He also proposes an altered version of the cycle of structuration. He defines "institutions" as "characterized by rules, regulations and conventions of various sorts, by differing kinds and quantities of resources and by hierarchical relations of power between the occupants of institutional positions." When agents act within institutions and conform to the institutional rules and regulations or use institutionally-endowed power, institutional replication results. "If, in so doing, the institutions continue to satisfy certain structural conditions, both in the sense of conditions which delimit the scope for institutional variation and the conditions which underlie the operation of structural differentiation, then the agents may be said to reproduce social structure."

Thompson also proposes a concept of adding a range of alternatives to Giddens's conception of constraints on human action, suggests a direct confrontation of the paradoxical relationship between Giddens's "dialectic of control" and his acknowledgement that external or internal constraints may reduce the options of an individual to one, and proposes that Giddens conduct a more thorough explication of how an agent's wants and desires relate to agent action and choice.

In Giddens's response to Thompson's criticism, he iterates that a structural principle is not equivalent with rules, and hearkens to a definition he proposed in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: "Structural principles are principles of organisation implicated in those practices most "deeply" (in time) and "pervasively" (in space) sedimented in society," and further articulates structuration as a "mode of institutional articulation" with emphasis on the relationship between time and space and a host of institutional orderings including, but not limited to, rules. However, for Thompson and others, his notions of the concept of structure as "rules and resources" in an elemental and ontological way–the concept which is at the heart of structuration theory–has resulted in conceptual confusion for many theorists, many of whom support Thompson's argument that an analysis "based on structuration's ontology of structures as norms, interpretative schemes and power resources radically limits itself if it does not frame and locate itself within a more broadly conceived notion of social structures."

Change

Sewell provides a useful summary of the theory as well as taking on one of its underspecified aspects: the question "Why are structural transformations possible?" He argues against Giddens's perceived overreliance on the idea of "rules," further modifying Giddens's argument by re-defining "resources" as the embodiment of cultural schemas. He argues that change arises from:

• the "multiplicity of structures": "Societies are based on practices that derived from many distinct structures, which exist at different levels, operate in different modalities, and are themselves based on widely varying types and quantities of resources. ...It is never true that all of them are homologous." The multiplicity of structures implies that the knowledgeble social agents whose actions produce societal systems are extremely versatile and capable of applying a wide range of schemas to varying contexts with differing resources, contrary to any conception of a universally homologous habitus.
• the transposable (a term originally from Bourdieu) nature of schemas: they can be "applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context in which they were initially learned." Since, for Sewell, one cannot be said to "know" or have agency over a schema until it can successfully be applied in unfamiliar contexts, then the capacity to do so "is inherent in the knowledge of cultural schemas that characterizes all minimally competent members of society.")
• the unpredictability of resource accumulation may lead to schema modification based on its resource yield (e.g., the effect of any action, such as a joke, is never quite certain, but a comedian may alter his repertoire or routine based on the amount of laughter it garners regardless of this variability);
• the polysemy of resources: the variability in interpretation of resource accumulation, empowering different agents and furthering different schemas than that which was originally intended (e.g., a brilliant commander could accumulate wealth through his conquests, but this wealth could also be interpreted by other agents in a variety of ways, such as a blessing from the gods or a stroke of luck rather than battle prowess); and
• the intersection of structures: structures often overlap, leading to interpretation confusion (e.g. in the structure of capitalist society there are both the modes of production based on private property and profit, as well as the mode of labor organization based on worker solidarity).

Sewell concludes that structures consist of mutually sustaining resources and cultural schemas which enable, constrain, and are reproduced by social action. These structures are nonetheless "at risk" due to their multiple and intersecting natures, the transposable quality of schema, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate erratically. Thus he finds that by primarily examining the relationship between resources and cultural schemas, it is possible to show why social change occurs.

Technology

This theory has been adapted and augmented by researchers interested in the relationship between technology and social structures (see Theories of technology), such as information technology in organizations. DeSanctis and Poole borrow from Giddens in order to propose an "adaptive structuration theory" with respect to the emergence and use of group decision support systems. In particular, they use Giddens' notion of modalities which inform how social structures are appropriated into concrete situations, to consider how technology is used with respect to its "spirit." Appropriations are the immediate visible actions that evidence deeper structuration processes and are enacted with moves. Appropriations may be faithful or unfaithful, be used instrumentally, and be used with various attitudes.

Orlikowski borrows Giddens' structuration theory and applies her critique of the duality of structure to technology: "The duality of technology identifies prior views of technology as either objective force or as socially constructed product–as a false dichotomy." She compares this to previous models (the technological imperative, strategic choice, and technology as a trigger) and considers the importance of meaning, power, norms, and interpretive flexibility within the theory of structuration. Orlikowski later revisits the theory of structuration so as to replace the notion of embedded properties for enactment (use). The 'practice lens' permits one to examine how people, as they interact with a technology in their ongoing practices, to enact structures which shape their emergent and situated use of that technology. While Orlikowski's work has been focused on multinationals and corporates, it is equally applicable to the technology cultures which have emerged in smaller community-based organizations, and can be further adapted through the lens of sensitivity to gendered differences in approaches to the governance of technology.

In addition to the human computer interaction aspect of adaptive structuration theory, structuration theory has also been rearticulated as structuration agency theory for modeling socio-biologically inspired structuration in security software applications. From this frame of reference, it is not only human agents who are actors in structuration, but software agents may also engage in social actions of information exchange, giving and receiving instructions, reflexive actions to other agents' actions, and pursue goals and desires individually or cooperatively.

Business

Pavlou and Majchrzak argue that common perspectives regarding research on business-to-business e-commerce portrays technology as overly deterministic and thus a futile area of study. The authors use structuration theory to re-examine business-to-business intermediaries on process outcomes such as economic/business success as well as trust, coordination, innovation, and advantages of shared knowledge. They also use structuration theory to look beyond the technology into the organizational structure and the natures of the tasks at hand, and examines the effects on the structure of "adapting" to new technologies. The authors find that the technology needs to be aligned and compatible with the existing "trustworthy" practices of the management for successful use, the task at hand, and the organizational and market structure. The authors recommend measuring long-term dynamic adaptations using ethnography, monitoring, and other methods for the future of business-to-business research to observe causal relationships and generate better predictions on future adaptations or misalignments.

Group communication

Called "group structuration theory," researchers have questioned how to integrate macrosocial theories and individuals or small groups, as well as how to avoid the binary categorization of either "stable" or "emergent" groups. Poole, Seibold, and McPhee wrote that the theory provides "a theory of group interaction commensurate with the complexities of the phenomenon." Waldeck et al. conclude that the theory needs to do a better job predicting outcomes of group communication, rather than simply explaining it. Decision rules are the method which supports decision-making, which manifests in a type of communication pattern which can be directly observable. However, research has not yet examined the "rational" function of group communication and decision-making (i.e., how well they achieve their goals), nor structural production or constraints. Researchers must empirically demonstrate the recursivity of action and structure, examine how structures stabilize and change over time due to group communication, and may want to integrate argumentation research.

Public relations

Falkheimer theorizes that integrating structuration theory into public relations strategies could result in a less agency-driven business, return theoretical focus to addressing the role of power structures in public relations, and reject massive PR campaigns in favor of a more "holistic understanding of how PR may be used in local contexts both as a reproductive and [transformational] social instrument." Structuration theory sees PR as a method of communication and action whereby social systems, most likely dominant group ideologies, are reproduced or transformed. Structuration theory also reinvigorates the study of space and time in PR theory. Applied structuration theory in PR may put emphasis on community-based approaches, storytelling, rituals, and informal communication systems. Moreover, structuration theory would integrate all organizational members in the process of performing the PR action, and PR would be more integrated into all organizational levels rather than an separate office. Finally, PR viewed from a structuration perspective has interesting ethical considerations: a method of reproduction of social systems, or the purposeful transformation and emancipation thereof.

See also

• Social structure
• Structure and agency
• Social change
• Text and conversation theory
• Macrosociology
• Constitutive criminology
• Health geography
• A Community of Witches: Wicca and modernity
• Comparative contextual analysis
• Sociology of space
• Theories of technology
• Grand theory
• Archaeology of religion and ritual
• Action theory.

External links

• Anthony Giddens'sThe constitution of society: An outline of the theory of structuration.. Giddens's most comprehensive work on structuration theory. Available in part for free online via Google Books.
• This book is intended to provide an accessible introduction to Giddens's work and also to situate structuration theory in the context of other approaches. Available in part for free online via Google Books.
• A critical assessment of Giddens's entire body of work. Available in part for free online via Google Books.
• Social theory for beginners. Available in part for free online via Google Books.
• A YouTube video detailing the structure of structuration theory as contrasted with Talcott Parsons's action theory.