Jump to content

Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 222.252.32.116 (talk) at 15:42, 13 May 2016 (→Background). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Sino-Vietnamese conflicts, 1979–90
Part of the Third Indochina War and Cold War

A Chinese officer reports to his command after a battle against Vietnamese forces on 14 October 1986
Date1979–90
Location
Sino-Vietnamese border
Result The conflict subsided without the outbreak of war. Normalization of relations between China and Vietnam.
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
 China  Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
China Deng Xiaoping
China Ye Jianying
(Chairman of the SCNPC, 1979–83)
China Li Xiannian
(President, 1983–88)
China Yang Shangkun
(President, 1988–90)
Yang Dezhi
Xu Shiyou		 Vietnam Lê Duẩn
(General Secretary, 1979–86)
Vietnam Trường Chinh
(General Secretary, 1986
Chairman of the CS, 1981–87)
Vietnam Nguyễn Văn Linh
(General Secretary, 1986–90)
Vietnam Tôn Đức Thắng
(President, 1979–80)
Vietnam Nguyễn Hữu Thọ
(President, 1980–81)
Vietnam Võ Chí Công
(Chairman of the CS, 1987–90)
Văn Tiến Dũng
Strength
~200,000[1]–400,000[2] ~600,000[2]–800,000[1] (including irregular units)
Casualties and losses
Several thousands killed[3]

The Sino-Vietnamese conflicts of 1979–90 were a series of border and naval clashes between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam following the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. These clashes lasted from the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 until 1990.

When the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew from Vietnam in March 1979 after the war, China announced that they were not ambitious for "any square inch of the territory of Vietnam".[4] In fact, Chinese troops occupied an area of 60 square kilometres (23 sq mi), which was disputed land controlled by Vietnam before hostilities broke out.[5] In some places such as the area around Friendship Gate near the city of Lạng Sơn, Chinese troops occupied territories which have no military value but important symbolic value. Elsewhere, Chinese troops occupied the strategic positions of military importance as springboards to attack Vietnam.[6]

The Chinese occupation of border territory angered Vietnam, and this ushered in a series of fights between the two sides to gain control of the area. Border conflicts between Vietnam and China continued until 1988, peaking in the years 1984–1985.[7] By the early 1990s, along with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries gradually returned to normality.

Background

After 1979, there were at least six clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border in June and October 1980, May 1981, April 1983, April 1984, June 1985, and from October 1986 to January 1987. According to Western observers, all were initiated or provoked by the Chinese to serve their political objectives.[8] The imminent threat of another invasion by the northern neighbor impelled Vietnam to build up an enormous defending force. During the 1980s, around 600,000[2]–800,000[1] Vietnamese regulars and paramilitaries were estimated to have been present in frontier areas, confronted by some 200,000[1]–400,000[2] Chinese troops.

Throughout the conflict, the Vietnamese Vị Xuyên District had become the most violent front, which entangled many interchanged units from both sides. According to cursory examination, seven divisions (313th, 314th, 325th, 328th, 354th, 356th, and 411th) and one separate regiment (266th/341st) among Vietnamese forces used to be involved in this battlefield in the mid-1980s.[9] On the Chinese side, armies from seven military regions had been rotated through this area to "touch the tiger's butt", an implication of obtaining combat experiences given by Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping.[10] From 1984 to 1989, at least 14 Chinese armies had been substitutionally committed to the fight in the area (1st, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 20th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 38th, 41st, 42nd, 47th, and 67th),[9] totaling 180,000 men.[11]

Besides the use of regular forces, China also armed and trained ethnic resistance groups (especially those of the Hmong ethnic) to wage unconventional warfare against Vietnam and Laos.[12] Only from 1985 did Chinese support for these insurgents begin to shrink, as the Laotian government had initiated the normalization of relations with China.[13]

1980: Shelling of Cao Bằng

Since early 1980, Vietnam had orchestrated military operations during the dry season to sweep Khmer Rouge forces over the Cambodian-Thai border. To put pressure on Vietnam to withdraw military forces from Cambodia, China had garrisoned several armies along the Sino-Vietnamese border. China also provided military training for some 5,000 anti-Laotian Hmong insurgents in Yunnan Province and used this force to sabotage the Muang Sing area in northwestern Laos near the Sino-Laotian border.[14] Vietnam responded by increasing forces stationed at the Sino-Vietnamese border, and China no longer had the overwhelming numerical superiority as it did in its campaign in February 1979.[15]

In June 1980, the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) crossed the Thai–Cambodian border during the pursuit of the defeated Khmer Rouge.[8] Despite swift Vietnamese withdrawal from Thai territory, the Vietnamese incursion made China feel that it had to act to support its allies, Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. From 28 June to 6 July, in addition to outspoken criticism of Vietnam in diplomatic announcements, the Chinese continuously shelled the Vietnamese Cao Bằng Province.[16] Small-scale skirmishes also took place along the border later in the year, with seven incidents occurring just in the first half of October. China accused Vietnam of conducting cross-border raids against Chinese positions in the Luojiaping area, Maguan County, Yunnan Province on 30 September and 1 October, killing at least 5 Chinese.[17] The Chinese then replied by an attack against Vietnamese positions in the same area on 15 October, in which they claimed to have killed 43 Vietnamese troops.[18]

The Chinese shellings did not aim at any strategic military target or create any substantial damage in Vietnam at all but were symbolic. Vietnam felt that the conduct of military operations on a larger scale was beyond Chinese capabilities, and therefore having a free hand to conduct military operations in Cambodia. However, Chinese shellings had shaped the type of conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese border in the next 10 years.[16]

1981: Battle of Hill 400 (Battle of Fakashan)

On 2 January 1981, the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a ceasefire during the Lunar New Year festival. This proposal was rejected by China on 20 January. However, two sides continued the exchange of prisoners of war. The situation was relatively calm in the next few months.

In May 1981, ferocious fighting suddenly erupted in Cao Lộc District, Lạng Sơn Province when the PLA launched a regiment-sized attack a height named Fakashan (法卡山) by the Chinese, or Hill 400 by the Vietnamese. In Hà Tuyên Province (now Hà Giang and Tuyên Quang Provinces), Chinese forces also stormed another strategic peak called Hill 1688, which was known as Koulinshan (扣林山) by the Chinese, and several other positions in its vicinity. Bloody engagements claimed hundreds of lives from each side.[8][19] The two battles began on 5 and 7 May respectively; the one at Hill 400 was sustained until 7 June in a succession of Vietnamese counter-attacks to reclaim the hill.[20] To justify this military operation, China announced that the attacks were in response to acts of aggression by Vietnam during the first quarter of that year.[8]

In retaliation, Vietnamese forces carried out raids against Guangxi Province on 5 and 6 May. A Vietnamese infantry company also struck the Mengdong co-operative commune in Malipo County, Yunnan Province. The Chinese claimed to have fought off these attacks, wiping out hundreds of enemy soldiers in Guangxi. On 22 May, they claimed to have killed 85 Vietnamese in Koulin, Yunnan. In total, China asserted to have eliminated about 300 Vietnamese soldiers during these border clashes.[8] These numbers have not included losses in the battles at Fakashan and Koulinshan, in which Chinese reports accounted over 1,700 Vietnamese personnel killed or wounded.[20]

Although the conflict went on fiercely, China did not want to escalate[8] and only deployed border guard units instead of regular troops into the battles. Western observers assessed that China was unlikely to teach Vietnam a "lesson" like one in 1979, especially when Vietnam had strengthened its regular forces in border areas and had a clear advantage in terms of equipment.[21] Other analysts pointed out that the upcoming rainy season and the recent cut in China's defense budget would not enable the country to carry out a large-scale invasion.[22]

1984: Battle of Vị Xuyên (Battle of Laoshan)

From 2 to 27 April 1984, in support of Cambodian rebel forces, whose bases were being overrun by the Vietnamese Army during the K5 dry season offensive, China had conducted the heaviest artillery barrage since 1979 against the Vietnamese border region, with 60,000 shells pounding 16 districts of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Ha Tuyen, and Hoang Lien Son Provinces. This was accompanied by a wave of infantry battalion-sized attacks on 6 April. The largest of them took place in Tràng Định District, Lạng Sơn Province, with several Chinese battalions assaulting Hills 820 and 636 located near the routes taken during the 1979 invasion at the Friendship Gate. Despite using a massive force, Chinese troops were either beaten back or forced to abandon the captured positions by the next day.[8][23] Chinese documents later revealed that the ground attacks primarily served the diversionary objective, with their scale much lower than that reported by Western sources.[24]

In Ha Tuyen from April to July 1984, Chinese forces struck a strip of hills in Vi Xuyen District, named Laoshan (老山) by the Chinese. Laoshan is actually a streak of mountains running from the western Hill 1800 to another hill at the elevation of 1,200 m in the east. This easternmost hill has been referred to by the Chinese as either Dongshan (东山) or Zheyinshan (者阴山), and was also the only position on the eastern bank of the Lô River where fighting occurred.[25]

The PLA launched their assault at 05:00 on 28 April after intense artillery bombardment. The PLA 40th Division of the 14th Army crossed the border section to the west of the Lô River, while the 49th Division (probably from the 16th Army) took Hill 1200 on the eastern bank.[26] The Vietnamese defenders, including the VPA 313th Division and 168th Artillery Brigade, were forced to retreat from the hills. PLA troops captured the hamlet of Na La, as well as Hills 233, 685 and 468, creating a salient of 2.5 km thrusting into Vietnam. These positions were protected by steep cliffs covered by dense forests along the Thanh Thuy River, and could only be accessed by crossing the exposed eastern side of the Lo River valley.[25][27]

After 28 April, fighting remained see-sawing in other locations such as Hills 1509 (Laoshan), 772, 233, 1200 (Zheyinshan) and 1030, over which control constantly changed hands. The battle came to an interval on 15 May, as Chinese forces had virtually secured these hills, but resumed on 12 June and then on 12 July when the VPA staged counter-attacks to recapture the lost positions.[25][28] Afterwards, fighting was gradually reduced to sporadic artillery duels and skirmishes.[25]

According to U.S. intelligence reports, Vietnamese forces were unsuccessful in retaking the eight hills.[29] As the result, the PLA occupied 29 points within Vietnamese territory, including Hills 1509 and 772 west of Lo River, as well as Hills 1250 and 1030 and Mount Si-La-Ca in the east. Along the 11-kilometer border segment, the deepest Chinese intrusion was made at Hills 685 and 468 located approximately 2 km to the south.[8] However, the Chinese failed to advance any further than 5 km southward, despite their outnumbering forces.[25] The heights continued to be contested in a string of later engagements, which lasted no earlier than 1986.[30]

To defend the captured area, the PLA stationed two armies in Vi Xuyen region, consisting of four infantry divisions, two artillery divisions, and several tank regiments. Chinese artillery positioned on the hills included 130 mm field guns, 152 mm howitzers, and 40-barrel multiple rocket launchers, while infantry regiments were equipped with 85 mm guns and 100-D mortars. The PLA even used tanks in some of the fights.[28]

Official Vietnamese reports in June claimed the decimation of one regiment and eight battalions of the PLA, equivalent to 5,500 Chinese casualties.[31] This number had been raised to 7,500 by August.[32] In contrast, the Chinese claimed to have inflicted approximately 2,000 casualties on Vietnamese forces, while losing 939 soldiers and 64 laborers killed during the five-week offensive campaign in Laoshan.[28] The Vietnamese admitted that during the action on 12 July, the VPA 356th Division alone suffered 600 killed.[33]

1986 to 1987: Continuation of border shelling

In 1985, the Chinese fired more than 800,000 shells into Vi Xuyen among about 1 million shells targeted on the border regions; this number, however, had significantly dropped in the period from 1986 to early 1987, with only several tens of thousands rounds per month. In 1986, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev called for the normalization of relations between Vietnam and China in a speech in Vladivostok. In October 1986, China also succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to conduct negotiations on the Cambodia affairs in the ninth round of negotiations between the USSR and China.[34]

However, amid positive diplomatic signals, the situation in the border region suddenly intensified. On 14 October 1986, Vietnam accused China of firing 35,000 shells into Vi Xuyen and making territorial encroachment. The Vietnamese also claimed to have repelled three Chinese charges at Hill 1100 and the Thanh Thuy Bridge. This development was probably China's reaction to the Soviet Union's refusal to raise pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.[35] In January 1987, China had fired some tens of thousands of shells (60,000 shells on 8 January alone) and launched 15 division-sized attacks against Vietnamese positions on Hills 233, 685, 1509, and 1100. Vietnam put the number of Chinese losses in these attacks at 1,500. China, on the other hand, claimed to have inflicted 500 casualties on the Vietnamese, giving that the casualty figures of its own side were lower.[8] On 5 October 1987, a MiG-21 fighter of the Vietnam People's Air Force was shot down over the Chinese Longzhou County, Guangxi Province.[36]

1988: Johnson South Reef Skirmish

Main article: Johnson South Reef Skirmish

On 14 March 1988, a naval battle was fought between the Vietnam People's Navy and the People's Liberation Army Navy within the Spratly Islands. The battle resulted in the death of at least 64 Vietnamese soldiers and Chinese control over the Johnson South Reef.

Aftermath

During 5-year period from 1984 to 1989, the Chinese had dumped over 2 million artillery rounds in Ha Giang Province, mainly in the area of 20 square kilometres (7.7 sq mi) of Thanh Thuy and Thanh Duc Communes. The situation was quiet at the town of Hà Giang, 10 miles south of the battle sites, without any considerable barrages.[33]

From April 1987, the PLA began to scale down their military operations, yet still routinely patrolled the Laoshan and Zheyinshan areas. From April 1987 to October 1989, they conducted only 11 attacks, mostly artillery strikes. By 1992, China had formally pulled out its troops from Laoshan and Zheyinshan.[10] The withdrawal had been gradually carried out since 1989. Atop Laoshan, the Chinese built concrete bunkers and a memorial after the conflict. Only earthen structures remained on the Vietnamese sector, which has been delimited and returned to Vietnam under the 2009 Border Agreement between the two countries.[citation needed] China and Vietnam negotiated the normalization of their relations in a secretive summit in Chengdu in September 1990 and officially normalized ties in November 1991.

Thousands of people from both sides were killed in these border clashes. In the military cemetery at Vị Xuyên, there are more than 1,600 graves of Vietnamese soldiers killed during the conflict.[3][9]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d Xiaobing Li, p. 259.
  2. ^ a b c d "Chinese Invasion of Vietnam – February 1979". Global Security.org. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
  3. ^ a b Zhou Yu, "The Sino-Vietnamese War: A Scar on the Tropic of Cancer", Phoenix Weekly, 5 April 2009, p. 34. Retrieved 6 May 2016.
  4. ^ Nayan Chanda, "End of the Battle but Not of the War", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 1979, p. 10. Chanda quoted Chinese officials on announcement of withdrawal on 5 March 1979
  5. ^ Edward C. O’Dowd, p. 91
  6. ^ Nayan Chanda, p. 10. The most symbolic part was a 300-meter section of railroad track between the Friendship Gate and the Vietnamese border post.
  7. ^ François Joyaux, p. 242
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i Carlyle A. Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War", Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1987.
  9. ^ a b c Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 101.
  10. ^ a b Xiaobing Li, p. 263.
  11. ^ Xiaoming Zhang, p. 161.
  12. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 70.
  13. ^ Keith Quincy, p. 441.
  14. ^ John McBeth, "Squeezing the Vietnamese", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 December 1980, p. 9
  15. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 92.
  16. ^ a b Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 93.
  17. ^ "Armed skirmishes on the border between China and Vietnam...", UPI, 16 October 1980.
  18. ^ Xiaoming Zhang, p. 146.
  19. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 94.
  20. ^ a b Xiaoming Zhang, p. 147.
  21. ^ Michael Weisskopf and Howard Simmons, "A Slow Burn on the Sino-Vietnam Border", Asiaweek, 22 May 1981, p. 24.
  22. ^ Michael Weisskopf (from Beijing), International Herald Tribune, 25 May 1981.
  23. ^ Edward C. O’Dowd, p. 98
  24. ^ Xiaoming Zhang, p. 151-152.
  25. ^ a b c d e Edward C. O’Dowd, p. 100
  26. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 100, citing from Ziwei Huanji (Counter-Attack in Self-Defence against Vietnam). According to B. P. Mahony, at least three Chinese divisions participated in the attack (B. P. Mahony, "Sino-Vietnamese Security Issues: Second Lesson Versus Stalemate", meeting of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, University of Sydney, 12-16 May 1986). Other sources have identified the PLA 31st Division of the 11th Army as the unit that assaulted Hill 1200. It is possible both divisions were involved. Even if only two Chinese divisions had been present, they would still have outnumbered Vietnamese forces, with about 24,000 men against probably 10,000 soldiers of the VPA 313th Division.
  27. ^ B. P. Mahony, "Sino-Vietnamese Security Issues: Second Lesson Versus Stalemate", p. 14.
  28. ^ a b c Xiaobing Li, p. 260.
  29. ^ "Intelligence", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 August 1984
  30. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 101.
  31. ^ Paul Quinn-Judge, "Borderline Cases", Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 1984, p. 26
  32. ^ The Nation Review, 7 August 1984. Referenced from the Hanoi Radio.
  33. ^ a b (in Vietnamese) "Hàng nghìn chiến sĩ thương vong ngày cao điểm trận chiến Vị Xuyên", VnExpress, 25 July 2014.
  34. ^ The Canberra Times, 6 October 1986. Referenced from the AFP in Beijing.
  35. ^ "A Crescendo for Withdrawal", Asiaweek, 2 November 1986, p. 11.
  36. ^ Edward C. O'Dowd, p. 105-106.

References

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sino-Vietnamese_conflicts_(1979–1991)&oldid=720076321"