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Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo

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Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

United States Marines wade ashore on Tulagi Island on August 7, 1942.
DateAugust 7 – August 9, 1942
Location
Tulagi and Gavutu in the Solomon Islands
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
United States
Australia		 Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Alexander Vandegrift,
William H. Rupertus		 Isoroku Yamamoto,
Shigeyoshi Inoue
Strength
3,000[1] 886[2]
Casualties and losses
122 killed[3] 863 killed,
23 captured[4]

The Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II, between Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied (mainly United States (U.S.) Marine) ground forces. It took place August 7 – August 9, 1942 on the Solomon Islands, during the initial Allied landings in the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, successfully landed and captured the islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo among which the Japanese Navy had constructed a naval and seaplane base. The landings were fiercely resisted by the Japanese Navy troops who, outnumbered and outgunned by the Allied forces, fought and died almost to the last man.

At the same time that the landings on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo were taking place, Allied troops were also landing on nearby Guadalcanal, with the objective of capturing an airfield under construction by Japanese forces. In contrast to the intense fighting on Tulagi and Gavutu, the landings on Guadalcanal were essentially unopposed. The landings on both Tulagi and Guadalcanal initiated the six-month long Guadalcanal campaign and a series of combined-arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands area.

Background

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet and led to a state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the American fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. Japanese forces also attacked and took control of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, and Guam.[5]

Two attempts by the Japanese to extend their defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific were thwarted in the battles of Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942). These two strategic victories for the Allies provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific.[6] The Allies chose the Solomon Islands, specifically the southern Solomon islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida.[7]

As part of the offensive that resulted in the Coral Sea battle, the Japanese Navy sent troops to occupy Tulagi and nearby islands in the southern Solomons. These troops, mainly members of the 3d Kure Special Naval Landing Force, occupied Tulagi on May 3, 1942 and constructed a seaplane, ship refueling, and communications base, all of which were soon operational. Aware of the Japanese efforts on Tulagi, the Allies' concern increased in early July 1942 when the Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield near Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. By August 1942, the Japanese had about 900 troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (many of whom were Korean construction specialists) on Guadalcanal.[8] The airfield, when complete, would protect Japan's major base at Rabaul, threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for possible future offensives against Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa.

Japanese officers and petty officers of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force which seized Tulagi in May, 1942.

The Allied plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the objective of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines.[9] U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Allied commander in chief for Pacific forces, created the South Pacific theater, with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in command, to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.[10]

In preparation for the offensive, in May, 1942, U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift was ordered to move his U.S. 1st Marine Division from the U.S. to New Zealand. Other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia.[11] Espiritu Santo in New Caledonia was selected as the headquarters and main base for the impending offensive, codenamed Operation Watchtower, with the commencement date set for August 7, 1942. At first, the Allied offensive was planned just for Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands, omitting Guadalcanal. However, after Allied reconnaissance discovered the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, capture of that airfield was added to the plan and the Santa Cruz operation was dropped.[12]

The Allied Watchtower expeditionary force of 75 warships and transports, which included vessels from both the U.S. and Australia, assembled near Fiji on July 26, 1942, and engaged in one rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on July 31.[13][14] Vandegrift was the overall commander of the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) ground forces involved in the landings and personally commanded the assault on Guadalcanal. In command of the 3,000 U.S. Marines set to land on Tulagi and the nearby islands of Florida, Gavutu, and Tanambogo was U.S. Brigadier General William H. Rupertus.[15]

Battle

Prelude

Routes of Allied amphibious forces for landings on Guadalcanal (TG X-ray) and Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo (TG-Yoke), August 7, 1942.

Due to bad weather, the Allied expeditionary force arrived in the vicinity of Guadalcanal undetected by the Japanese on the morning of August 7.[16] The landing force ships split into two groups, with one group assigned for the assault on Guadalcanal, and the other tasked with the assault on Tulagi, Florida, and Gavutu-Tanambogo.[17] Aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carrier Wasp dive-bombed Japanese installations on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo and strafed and destroyed Japanese seaplanes floating in the anchorage between the three islands.[18] The U.S. cruiser San Juan and U.S. destroyers Monssen and Buchanan bombarded planned landing sites on Florida Island. To cover the assaults on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, U.S. Marines from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment made an unopposed landing on Florida Island at 07:40. They were guided to their objective by several Australians who were familiar with the Tulagi-Florida area.[19]

Battle of Tulagi

At 08:00, two battalions of U.S. Marines, including the 1st Raider Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson (Edson's Raiders), and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) made an unopposed landing on the western shore of Tulagi about halfway between the two ends of the oblong-shaped island.[20] Due to beds of coral near the shore, the landing craft were unable to reach the shorline. The Marines, however, were able to wade the remaining 100 yards without hindrance from the Japanese forces, who were apparently taken by surprise by the landings and had yet to begin any organized resistance. At this time, the Japanese forces on Tulagi, a detachment of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, signaled their headquarters at Rabaul, stating that they were under attack, were destroying their equipment and papers, and signed-off with the message, "Enemy troop strength is overwhelming, We will defend to the last man."[21]

Map overlay on an aerial photo of Tulagi showing U.S. Marine advance on the southeastern end of the island and the center of Japanese resistance around Hill 281.

2/5 secured the northwest end of Tulagi without opposition and then joined Edson's Raiders in their advance towards the southeastern end of the island. The Marines advanced towards the southeast end of the island throughout the day while defeating a few isolated pockets of Japanese resistance. The Japanese forces on Tulagi established their main defenses on a hill, called Hill 281 (Hill 280 in some sources) by U.S. forces due to its elevation, and a nearby ravine located at the southeast end of the island. The Marines reached these defenses near dusk, realized that they didn't have enough daylight left for a full-scale attack, and dug-in for the night.[22]

During the night, the Japanese attacked the Marine lines four times.[23] The attacks consisted of frontal charges along with individual and small group infiltration efforts that at times resulted in hand to hand combat with the marines. However, in spite of taking a few casaulties, the Marine lines held. At daybreak on August 8, six Japanese infiltrators hiding under the porch of the former British colonial headquarters shot and killed three unsuspecting Marines. Within five minutes other Marines killed the six Japanese with grenades. Later that morning, the Marines, after landing reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (2/2), surrounded Hill 281 and the ravine, pounded both locations with mortar fire throughout the morning, and then assaulted the two positions, utilizing improvised explosive charges to kill the Japanese defenders taking cover in the many caves and fighting positions spread throughout the hill and ravine.[24] Employing the improvised explosives, the individual Japanese fighting positions were destroyed one by one. Significant Japanese resistance ended by the afternoon, although a few stragglers were found and killed over the next several days.[25] In the battle for Tulagi, 307 Japanese and 45 U.S. troops died. Three Japanese were taken prisoner.[26]

Battle of Gavutu-Tanambogo

Map overlay on an aerial photo showing the U.S. Marine assaults on Gavutu and Tanambogo.

The nearby small islands or islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo housed the Japanese seaplane base as well as 536 Japanese naval personnel from the Yokhama Air Group, the 14th Construction Unit, and a platoon from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force.[27] The two islets were basically mounds of coral, both about 140 feet high, and connected to each other by a 500 meter-long causeway.[28] The Japanese on both islets were well entrenched in bunkers and caves.[29] Also, the two islets were mutually supportive as both were in machinegun range of each other.[30]

At 12:00 on August 7, Gavutu was assaulted by the U.S. Marine 1st Parachute Battalion consisting of 397 men. The preceeding naval bombardment had damaged the seaplane ramp, forcing the Marine landing craft to land the Marines in a more exposed location on a nearby dock. Japanese machinegun fire began inflicting heavy casualties, killing or wounding one in ten of the landing Marines as they scrambled inland in an attempt to get out of the crossfire coming from the two islets.[31] Pushing forward, the Marines were able to secure the top of the hill on Gavutu within a couple of hours and then set to work clearing the Japanese fighting positions on the hill, most of which still remained, with explosive charges and grenades.[32] The Marine battalion commander on Gavutu radioed General Rupertus with a request for reinforcements before attempting to assault Tamambogo.[33]

Rupertus detached one company of Marines from the 2nd Marine Regiment on Florida Island to assist in assaulting Tamambogo, in spite of advice from his staff that one company wasn't enough. Incorrectly believing that Tamambogo was only lightly defended, this company attempted an amphibious assault directly on Tanambogo shortly after dark on August 7. Illuminated by fires started during a U.S. naval bombardment of the islet, the five landing craft carrying the Marines were hit by heavy fire as they approached the shore, with many of the U.S. Navy boatcrews being killed or wounded, as well as heavily damaging three of the boats. Realizing the position was "untenable" the Marine company commander ordered the remaining boats to depart with the wounded marines, and he and a dozen men who had already landed sprinted across the causeway to cover on Gavutu.[34]

U.S. Brigadier General Rupertus (center) supervises the assaults on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo from his command ship on August 7 or 8. In the background are landing craft and a U.S. destroyer.

Throughout the night, as the Japanese staged isolated attacks on the marines on Gavutu under the concealment of heavy thunderstorms, Vandegrift prepared to send reinforcements to assist with the assault on Tamambogo. The 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines (3/2), still embarked on ships off Guadalcanal, was notified to prepare to assault Tamambogo on August 8.[35]

The 3rd Battalion began landing on Gavutu at 10:00 on August 8 and assisted in destroying the remaining Japanese defenses on that islet, which was completed by 12:00.[36] The 3rd Battalion now prepared to assault Tamambogo. In preparation for the assault, U.S. carrier dive bombers and naval gunfire bombardment were requested. After the carrier aircraft twice accidentally dropped bombs on the U.S. Marines on Gavutu, killing four of them, further carrier aircraft support was canceled. The San Juan, however, placed its shells on the correct island, and shelled Tamambogo for 30 minutes. The Marine assault began at 16:15, both by landing craft and across the causeway, and, with assistance from two marine light tanks, began making headway against the Japanese defenses. One of the tanks became isolated from the its infantry support and was surrounded by a "frenzied mob" of Japanese who killed two of its crew and severely beat the tank's driver before most of them were killed by Marine rifle fire. The Marines later counted 42 Japanese bodies around the burned-out hulk of the tank. Throughout the day, the Marines methodically dynamited the caves one-by-one, destroying most of them by 21:00.[37] The few surviving Japanese conducted isolated attacks throughout the night, with hand to hand engagements occurring. By noon on August 9, all Japanese resistance on Tamambogo ended.[38] In the battle for Gavutu and Tanambogo, 476 Japanese defenders and 70 U.S. Marines or naval personnel died. Of the 20 Japanese prisoners taken during the battle, most weren't actually Japanese combatants, but Korean laborers belonging to the Japanese construction unit.[39]

Landings on Guadalcanal

The U.S. Marine officers commanding the units that assaulted Tulagi pose for a group photo shortly after the battle.

In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on August 7, General Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except for "tangled" rain forest, and halted for the night about 1,000 yards from the Lunga Point airfield. The next day, again against little resistance, the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga River, and secured the airfield by 16:00 on August 8. The Japanese naval construction units had abandoned the airfield area, leaving behind food, supplies, and intact construction equipment and vehicles.[40][41]

Aftermath

During the battle, about 80 Japanese troops escaped from Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo by swimming to Florida Island. However, they were all hunted-down and killed by Marine patrols over the next two months.[42]

The Allies quickly turned the Tulagi anchorage into a naval base and refueling station. During the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands' campaigns, Tulagi would serve as an important base for Allied naval operations. Due to the Japanese exerting control over the nearby seas at night throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, any Allied ships in the Guadalcanal area that couldn't depart by nightfall usually took refuge in Tulagi's harbor. Allied ships damaged in the naval battles that occurred between August and December, 1942 in the vicinity of Guadalcanal usually anchored in Tulagi's harbor for temporary repairs before heading to rear-area ports for permanent repairs. Later in the campaign, Tulagi also became a base for U.S. PT boats that attempted to interdict Tokyo Express missions by the Japanese to resupply and reinforce their forces on Guadalcanal. However, except for some troops left to build, garrison, operate, and defend the base at Tulagi, the majority of the U.S. Marines that had assaulted Tulagi and the nearby islets were soon relocated to Guadalcanal to help defend the airfield, later called Henderson Field by Allied forces, located at Lunga Point, for it was to be on Guadalcanal where all of the future, crucial, land battles in the Guadalcanal campaign would be fought.[43]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Guadalcanal Campaign.

References

Notes

  1. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 51.
  2. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 50.
  3. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 79.
  4. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 78-79. 15 of those captured were Korean laborers, not Japanese military troops.
  5. ^ Murray, War to be Won, p. 169-195
  6. ^ Murray, War to be Won, p. 196.
  7. ^ Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 3.
  8. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 23–31, 129, 628.
  9. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 12.
  10. ^ Murray, War to be Won, p. 199–200.
  11. ^ Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 5.
  12. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 35–37, 53.
  13. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 15.
  14. ^ McGee, The Solomons Campaigns, p. 20–21.
  15. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 57, 619–621.
  16. ^ McGee, The Solomons Campaigns, p. 21.
  17. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 60.
  18. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, p. 46–47.
  19. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 26–27.
  20. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 72–73.
  21. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 27–28.
  22. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 28–31.
  23. ^ Shaw, First Offensive, p. 8–9.
  24. ^ Hoffman, Marine Raiders.
  25. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 33.
  26. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 77–78.
  27. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 628.
  28. ^ Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 266–267.
  29. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 61.
  30. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 34.
  31. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 75–76.
  32. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 61–62.
  33. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 35.
  34. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 77.
  35. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 62.
  36. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 36–38.
  37. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 78–79.
  38. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 38.
  39. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 79.
  40. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 15.
  41. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 61–62, 81.
  42. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 79.
  43. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 93.

Books

  • Alexander, Joseph H. (2000). Edson's Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557500207. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Frank, Richard (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-394-58875-4.
  • Griffith, Samuel B. (1963). The Battle for Guadalcanal. Champaign, Illinois, USA: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06891-2. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Hammel, Eric (1999). Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942. St. Paul, MN, USA: Zenith Press. 0760320527. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Loxton, Bruce (1997). The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. ISBN 1-86448-286-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • McGee, William L. (2002). The Solomons Campaigns, 1942-1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville--Pacific War Turning Point, Volume 2 (Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII). BMC Publications. ISBN 0-9701678-7-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help) Online views of selections of the book:[1]
  • Murray, Williamson (2001). A War To Be Won : Fighting the Second World War. United States of America: Belknap Press. ISBN 0-674-00680-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Tregaskis, Richard (1943). Guadalcanal Diary. Random House. ISBN 0-679-64023-1.

Web

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