Connecticut Compromise

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The Connecticut Compromise (also known as the Great Compromise of 1787 or Sherman Compromise) was an agreement that large and small states reached during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that in part defined the legislative structure and representation that each state would have under the United States Constitution. It retained the bicameral legislature as proposed by Roger Sherman, along with proportional representation of the states in the lower house, but required the upper house to be weighted equally between the states. Each state would have two representatives in the upper house.

The Compromise

On June 14, when the Convention was ready to consider the report on the Virginia plan, William Paterson of New Jersey requested an adjournment to allow certain delegations more time to prepare a substitute plan. The request was granted, and, on the next day, Paterson submitted nine resolutions embodying necessary amendments to the Articles of Confederation, which was followed by a vigorous debate. On June 19, the delegates rejected the New Jersey Plan and voted to proceed with a discussion of the Virginia Plan. The small States became increasingly discontented, and some threatened to withdraw. On July 2, the Convention was deadlocked over giving each State an equal vote in the upper house, with five States in the affirmative, five in the negative, and one divided.

The problem was referred to a committee consisting of one delegate from each State to reach a compromise. On July 5, the committee submitted its report, which became the basis for the “Great Compromise" of the Convention. The report recommended that in the upper house each State should have an equal vote and in the lower house, each State should have one representative for every 40,000 inhabitants,[1] counting slaves as three-fifths of an inhabitant,[1] and that money bills should originate in the lower house (not subject to amendment by the upper chamber).

After six weeks of turmoil, North Carolina switched its vote to equal representation per state and Massachusetts abstained, and a compromise was reached, being called the "Great Compromise." In the "Great Compromise," every state was given equal representation, previously known as the New Jersey Plan, in one house of Congress, and proportional representation, known before as the Virginia Plan, in the other. Because it was considered more responsive to majority sentiment, the House of Representatives was given the power to originate all legislation dealing with the federal budget and revenues/taxation, per the Origination Clause.

Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, both of the Connecticut delegation, created a compromise that, in a sense, blended the Virginia (large-state) and New Jersey (small-state) proposals regarding congressional apportionment. Ultimately, however, its main contribution was in determining the apportionment of the Senate. Sherman sided with the two-house national legislature of the Virginia Plan but proposed "That the proportion of suffrage in the 1st. Branch [house] should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more."[2] Although Sherman was well liked and respected among the delegates, his plan failed at first. It was not until July 23 that representation was finally settled.[2]

What was ultimately included in the constitution was a modified form of this plan, partly because the larger states disliked it. In committee, Benjamin Franklin modified Sherman's proposal to make it more acceptable to the larger states. He added the requirement that revenue bills originate in the house.

The final July 16 vote on the Connecticut Compromise left the Senate looking to the Confederation Congress. In the preceding weeks of debate, Madison, King, and Gouverneur Morris each vigorously opposed the compromise for this reason.[3] For the nationalists, the Convention’s vote for the compromise was a stunning defeat. However, on July 23, they found a way to salvage their vision of an elite, independent Senate. Just before most of the convention’s work was referred to the Committee of Detail, Morris and King moved that state representatives in the Senate be given individual votes, rather than voting en bloc, as they had in the Confederation Congress. Then Oliver Ellsworth, a leading proponent of the Connecticut Compromise, supported their motion, and the Convention adopted it.[4] As the Convention had early acquiesced in the Virginia Plan’s proposal that senators have long terms, restoring that Plan’s vision of individually powerful senators stopped the Senate from becoming a strong safeguard of federalism. State governments lost their direct say in Congress’s decisions to make national laws. As the personally influential senators received terms much longer than the state legislators who appointed them, they became substantially independent. The compromise nonetheless continued to serve the self-interest of small-state political leaders, who were assured of access to more seats in the Senate than they might otherwise have obtained.[5]

Aftermath

Senate representation was explicitly protected in Article Five of the United States Constitution:

...no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.[6]

This agreement allowed deliberations to continue, and thus led to the Three-Fifths Compromise, which further complicated the issue of popular representation in the House.

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Yazawa, Melvin (2016). Contested Conventions: The Struggle to Establish the Constitution and Save the Union, 1787–1789. JHU Press. p. 67. ISBN 978-1-4214-2026-4.
  2. ^ a b US Constitution.net. "Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention". Retrieved October 17, 2007.
  3. ^ 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489, 490, 551 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
  4. ^ 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 94-95 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
  5. ^ See Laurence Claus, Power Enumeration and the Silences of Constitutional Federalism http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837390
  6. ^ National Archives and Records Administration. "The Constitution of the United states Article V". archives.gov.