Historiography in the Soviet Union: Difference between revisions

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File:The Commissar Vanishes.jpeg
The book The Commissar Vanishes by David King discusses falsification of historic photos in Soviet Union in depth, with numerous examples. Some of them can be seen on this cover.
File:The Commissar Vanishes 1.jpg
Before 1940
File:The Commissar Vanishes 2.jpg
After: People's Commissar for the Interior Nikolai Yezhov, the young man strolling with Stalin to his left, was shot in 1940. He was edited out from a photo by Soviet censors.[1]

Soviet historiography until the death of Stalin in 1953 was strictly based on Marxist formula. A theory that history is governed by historical law. The Marxist historical laws determined everything in the Soviet history. No real political history was written, all the Russian revolution leaders except Stalin and Lenin had become non-persons, meaning unmentionable in print. [2]

At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 Khrushchev denouncing Stalin opened the door for some level of scholarship although constraints and dogmas on the Communist party as vanguard of the working class still had to be observed. It became possible to mention in a pejorative context the non-persons like Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev. Khrushchev decoupled Lenin and Stalin that allowed Soviet historians to produce books and articles of more diversity than during the Stalin era. The reform in history writing was referred to as the return to Leninist norms. [3]

The era of Brezhnev was the time of samizdat(circulating unofficial manuscripts within the USSR) and tamizdat (illegal publication of work abroad). The most prominent Soviet tamizdat historian was Roy Medvedev, the author of Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. [4] published in 1971 in the West. The most famous dissident author of the era was historical polemicist and novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. His Gulag Archipelago was published in the West in 1973. Both authors were unable to publish in the USSR until the era of Perestroika and Glasnost.

Party line

Historians are dangerous and capable of turning everything upside down. They have to be watched.
Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1956[5]

Soviet historiography had been severely criticized by scholars, chiefly — but not only — outside Soviet Union, with its very status as scholarly called into question, and described as ideology and pseudoscience.[6] In particular, Robert Conquest concluded that [7]

All in all, unprecedented terror must seem necessary to ideologically motivated attempts to transform society massively and speedily, against its natural possibilities. The accompanying falsifications took place, and on a barely credible scale, in every sphere. Real facts, real statistics, disappeared into the realm of fantasy. History, including the History of the Communist Party, or rather especially the history of the Communist Party, was rewritten. Unpersons disappeared from the official record. A new past, as well as new present, was imposed on the captive minds of the Soviet population, as was, of course, admitted when truth emerged in the late 1980s".

That criticism stems from the fact that in the Soviet Union, science was far from independent. Since the late 1930s, Soviet historiography treated the party line and reality as one and the same.[8] As such, if it was a science - it was a science in service of a specific political and ideological agenda, commonly employing historical revisionism.[9] In the 1930s, historic archives were closed, original research severely restricted. Historians were required to pepper their works with references — appropriate or not — to Stalin and other "Marxist-Leninist classics", and to pass judgment — as prescribed by the Party — on pre-revolution historic Russian figures.[10]

The state-approved history was openly subjected to politics and propaganda, similar to philosophy, art, and many fields of scientific research.[5] The Party could not be proven wrong, it was infallible and reality was to conform to this line. Any non-conformist history had to be erased, and questioning of the official history was illegal.[5]

Many works of Western historians were forbidden or censored, many areas of history were also forbidden for research as, officially, they never happened.[5] As such, it remained mostly outside the international historiography of the period.[6] Translations of foreign historiography were often produced in a truncated form, accompanied with extensive censorship and corrective footnotes. For example, in the Russian 1976 translation of Basil Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War pre-war purges of Red Army officers, the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, many details of the Winter War, the occupation of the Baltic states, the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Allied assistance to the Soviet Union during the war, many other Western Allies' efforts, the Soviet leadership's mistakes and failures, criticism of the Soviet Union and other content were censored out.[11]

The official version of Soviet history has been dramatically changed after every major governmental shake-up. Previous leaders were always denounced as "enemies", whereas current leaders were usually a subject of a personality cult. Textbooks were rewritten periodically, with figures - such as Lev Trotsky or Stalin himself - disappearing from their pages or being turned from great figures to great villains.[12][5]

Certain regions and periods of history were made unreliable for political reasons. Entire historical events could be erased, if they did not fit the party line. For example, until 1989 the Soviet leadership and historians, unlike their Western colleagues, had denied the existence of a secret protocol to the Soviet-German Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, and as a result the Soviet approach to the study of the Soviet-German relations before 1941 and the origins of World War II were remarkably flawed.[13] In another example, the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 as well as the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 were censored out or minimized from most publications, and research suppressed, in order to enforce the policy of 'Polish-Soviet friendship'.[5] Similarly, the enforced collectivisation, the wholesale deportations or massacres of small nationalities in the Caucasus or the disappearance of the Crimean Tatars are not recognized as facts worth of mention.[5] Soviet historians also engaged in producing false claims and falsification of history, for example Soviet historiography falsly claimed that Katyn massacre was made by Germans rather then by Soviets as was the case.[14]

Marxism influence

Further information: Marxist historiography

The problems of Soviet historiography are the problems of our Communist ideology.
Anna Pankratova, Soviet academician, 1956[9]

A major factor influencing unreliability of Soviet historiography was that the Soviet interpretation of Marxism predetermined much of the research done by historians. Due to that, Soviet historians could not offer non-Marxist explanations for their theories, even on occasions where other theories fit the reality much better.[6][5]

The creation of the Soviet Union was presented as the most important turning event in the human history, based on the Marxist theory of historical materialism. This theory identified means of production as chief determinants of the historical process. They led to the creation of social classes, and class struggle was the 'motor' of history. The sociocultural evolution of societies had to progress inevitably from slavery, through feudalism and capitalism to communism. Furthermore, the Communist Party became the protagonist of history, as a "vanguard of the working class", according to development of this theory by Lenin. Hence the unlimited powers of the Communist Party leaders were claimed to be as infallible and inevitable as the history itself [15]. It also followed that a world-wide victory of communist countries is inevitable. All research had to be based on those assumptions and could not diverge in its findings.[5]

The Marxist bias has been also criticized, for example, for assigning to the Roman rebellions the characteristics of the social revolution, or for errors in comparing the recent developments in Russia with those in the Western countries (for example, Soviet Union mostly "skipped" the period of capitalism required by Marxist theory before the period of communism can be reached).[5][6]

Often, the Marxist bias and propaganda demands mixed: hence the peasant rebellions against the early Soviet rule were simply ignored - as inconvenient politically and contradicting the Marxist theories.[8] The Kronstadt rebellion, for example, was one of many events that, according to Soviet historiography, simply never happened.[5]

Reliability of statistical data

"The deceptive figure". This is the translation of a widely cited article ("Lukavaia Tsifra") by journalist Vasilii Seliunin and economist Grigorii Khanin, in Novyi Mir, February 1987, #2: 181-202[16]

The quality (accuracy and reliability) of data published in the Soviet Union and used in historical research is another issue raised by various Sovietologists.[17][7][18][19] The Marxist theoreticians of the Party considered statistics as a social science; hence many applications of statistical mathematics were curtailed, particularly during the Stalin's era.[20] Under central planning, nothing could occur by accident.[20] Law of large numbers or the idea of random deviation were decreed as "false theories".[20] Statistical journals were closed; World renown statisticians like Andrey Kolmogorov or Eugen Slutsky abandoned statistical research.[20]

As with all Soviet historiography, reliability of Soviet statistical data varied from period to period.[19] The first revolutionary decade and the period of Stalin's dictatorship both appear highly problematic with regards to statistical reliability; very little statistical data were published from 1936 to 1956 and [19] The reliability of data has improved after 1956 when some missing data was published and Soviet experts themselves published some adjusted data for the Stalin's era;[19] however the quality of documentation has deteriorated.[18]

While on occasion statistical data useful in historical research (such as economical data invented to prove great successes of the Soviet industrialization, and some published numbers of Gulag prisoners and terror victims) have been completely invented by the Soviet authorities[7] there is little evidence that most statistics were significantly affected by falsification or insertion of false data with the intent to confound the West.[18] Data was however falsified both during collection - by local authorities who would be judged by the central authorities based on whether their figures reflected the central economy prescriptions - and by internal propaganda, with its goal to portray the Soviet state in most positive light to its very citizens.[17][19] Nonetheless the policy of not publishing - or simply not collecting - data that was deemed unsuitable for various reasons was much more common than simple falsification; hence there are many gaps in Soviet statistical data.[18] Inadequate or lacking documentation for much of Soviet statistical data is also a significant problem.[18][19][17]

Myths of Soviet historiography

A number of specific claims made by Soviet historians and supported by some of their Western colleagues have been described as examples of big lie by prominent historians Robert Conquest and Richard Pipes. The examples of alleged fallacies included the following:

  1. Myth: The Bolshevik party during the October revolution was supported by masses, and especially by Russian working class.
    Reality: "Bolsheviks only got a quarter of the vote at the height of their popularity in the elections that followed". Massive strikes by Russian workers were "mercilessly" (as Lenin said) suppressed during Red terror [7]
  2. Myth: "Stalinism was a success, having fulfilled its historical mission to force the rapid industrialization of an undeveloped country".
    Reality: "Russia had already been fourth to fifth among industrial economies before World War I." Russian industrial advances could have been achieved without collectivization, famine or terror. The industrial successes were far less than claimed. The Soviet-style industrialization was "an anti-innovative dead-end" [7]
  3. Myth: Mass terror during Stalin ruling was an aberration of the communist system, which resulted from Stalin's personal paranoia and his "cult of personality". If only Lenin had been alive, those abuses would never happened.
    Reality: It was Lenin who introduced Red terror with its hostage taking and concentration camps. It was Lenin who developed the infamous Article 58 that was used later during Great Terror. It was Lenin who established the autocratic system within the Communist Party [21] Vyacheslav Molotov, when asked who of two leaders was more "severe", replied: "Lenin, of course... I remember how he scolded Stalin for softness and liberalism".[21]

Credibility

Not all areas of Soviet historiography were equally affected by the ideological sturdiness of the regime's, which in any case varied considerably over time.[19] The degree of the ideologization of different areas of historic science varied as well. The worst was situation with history of 19th and, especially of 20th centuries.[citation needed] Therefore, despite part of the Soviet historiography being affected by extreme ideological bias, and compromised by the deliberate distortions and omissions, it has produced a large body of significant scholarship which continues to be used in the modern research.[22] For example, Soviet works on Byzantium, created and published in Soviet Union, are held in high regard.[citation needed]

Soviet historians

Mikhail Pokrovsky (1862-1932) was held in highest repute as a historian in the Soviet Union and was elected to the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1929. He emphasized Marxist theory, downplaying the role of personality in favour of economics as the driving force of history. However, posthumously, Pokrovsky was accused of "vulgar sociologism", and his books were banned. After Stalin's death, and the subsequent renouncement of his policies during the Khrushchev Thaw, Pokrovsky's work regained some influence.

In popular culture

These trends have been most famously portrayed by George Orwell in his classic dystopia, Nineteen Eighty-Four (see also Ministry of Truth).

Another notable criticism was delivered by Victor Suvorov in his book "The Liberator" [12]. He said that "Vladimir Lenin was an enemy", because all his friends were proven to be enemy of the people by the Soviet courts, which are the most democratic and just in the world. The enemies were Lev Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Karl Radek. It was Lenin who brought these "wrecklers" to power, so that brave chekists had to kill them all with bullets or ice axes. "Stalin was also an enemy", "as has been proven to the entire world at the historical 20th Congress of the Communist Party". Of course, "Stalin himself destroyed thousands of enemies and spies from his closest surrounding, but he could not exterminate them all", so that his "closest friend Lavrenty Beria and his notorious gang have been executed only after Stalin". Sadly enough, Khrushev, who got rid of Beria, turned out to be a traitor, just like his successor Leonid Brezhnev, who was guilty of terrible corruption.

References

  1. ^ The Commissar vanishes (The Newseum)
  2. ^ The Russian Revolution By Sheila Fitzpatrick; p.6; ISBN 0192802046
  3. ^ The Russian Revolution By Sheila Fitzpatrick; p.7; ISBN 0192802046
  4. ^ Let History Judge by Roy Medvedev; ISBN 0231063504
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Ferro, Marc (2003). The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught to Children. London; New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415285926. See Chapters 8 Aspects and variations of Soviet history and 10 History in profile: Poland.
  6. ^ a b c d Gwidon Zalejko, Soviet historiography as "normal science", in Historiography Between Modernism and Postmodernism, Jerzy Topolski (ed.), Rodopi, 1994, ISBN 9051837216, Google Print, p.179-191.
  7. ^ a b c d e Robert Conquest Reflections on a Ravaged Century (2000) ISBN 0-393-04818-7, page 101
  8. ^ a b Taisia Osipova, Peasant rebellions: Origin, Scope, Design and Consequences, in Vladimir N. Brovkin (ed.), The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars, Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0300067062. Google Print, p.154-176
  9. ^ a b Roger D. Markwick, Donald J. Raleigh, Rewriting History in Soviet Russia: The Politics of Revisionist Historiography, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, ISBN 0333792092, Google Print, p.4-5
  10. ^ John L. H. Keep: A History of the Soviet Union 1945-1991: Last of the Empires, pages 30–31
  11. ^ Lewis, B. E. (1977). Soviet Taboo. Review of Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina, History of the Second World War by B. Liddel Gart (Russian translation). Soviet Studies 29 (4), 603-606.
  12. ^ a b The Liberators (Освободитель), 1981, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-10675-3; cited from Russian edition of 1999, ISBN 5-237-03557-4, pages 13-16
  13. ^ Bidlack, Richard (1990). Review of Voprosy istorii i istoriografii Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny by I. A. Rosenko, G. L. Sovolev. Slavic Review 49 (4), 653-654.
  14. ^ Decision to commence investigation into Katyn Massacre, Małgorzata Kużniar-Plota, Departamental Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, Warsaw 30 November 2004, (Internet Archive) (also see the press release online), last accessed on 19 December 2005, English translation of Polish document
  15. ^ David Satter. Age of Delirium: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union, Yale University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-300-08705-5
  16. ^ Alan Smith, Russia and the World Economy: Problems of Integration, Routledge, 1993, ISBN 0415089247, Google Print, p.34-35
  17. ^ a b c Nicholas Eberstadt and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Tyranny of Numbers: Mismeasurement and Misrule, American EnterpriseInstitute, 1995, ISBN 084473764X, Google Print, p.138-140
  18. ^ a b c d e Edward A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality Versus Efficiency, Brookings Institution Press, 1988, ISBN 0815736037, Google Print, p.7 and following chapters
  19. ^ a b c d e f g Nikolai M. Dronin, Edward G. Bellinger, Climate Dependence And Food Problems In Russia, 1900-1990, Central European University Press, 2005, ISBN 9637326103, Google Print, p.15-16
  20. ^ a b c d David S. Salsburg, he Lady Tasting Tea: How Statistics Revolutionized Science in the Twentieth Century, Owl Books, 2001, ISBN 0805071342, Google Print, p.147-149
  21. ^ a b Richard Pipes Communism: A History (2001) ISBN 0-812-96864-6, pages 73-74.
  22. ^ Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, War Of Extermination: The German Military In World War II, Berghahn Books, 2004, ISBN 1571812326, Google Print, p.304

See also

Further reading

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