Talk:Treaty of Versailles

Assessment of the treaty

Given the scholarly division and changes in the mainstream assessment over time, the assessment of the treaty, in particular regarding its harshness or otherwise, seems to me to require improvement and better verification. In particular the introduction - rather than merely summarizing historians' opinions detailled elsewhere- actually seems to weigh and judge differing assessments in the sweeping and unsourced statement "However, historians have judged the reparations to have been lenient, designed to look imposing but were in fact not," which also leaves unclear

• whether the assessment is intended to apply to the reparations provided for in the treaty or to later interpretations or revisions of those provisions
• whether "historians" is meant to apply to all historians or an unspecified selection of historians
• whether "historians" is intended to distinguish historians from, say, economists (like Keynes, whose opposing view is mentioned in the previous sentence)
• what evidence is adduced for the assessment ("designed to look imposing but . . .") that the apparent harshness of the treaty was deliberate (and intended to mislead).

--Boson (talk) 15:34, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

It appears you have not read the article, since the statement is well sourced.

For starters, the reparation section details extensively how and why the reparations were not harsh: "In January 1921, the total sum due was decided by an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission and was set at 132 billion gold marks. This figure was divided into three categories. The A Bonds amounted to 12 billion gold marks and the B bonds a further 38 billion marks, which equated to around 12.5 billion dollars "an amount smaller than what Germany had recently offered to pay"[30] Class C bonds amounted for the remaining two-thirds of the total figure and were deliberately designed to be chimerical". "Their primary function was to mislead public opinion in the receiver countries into believing that the 132-billion mark figure was being maintained."[31] Therefore, the sum Class C bonds "amounted to indefinite postponement"[32]. Germany was only obliged to pay the Class A and B bonds.[33] The actual total payout from 1920 to 1931 (when payments were suspended indefinitely) was 20 billion German gold marks, worth about 5 billion US dollars or one billion British pounds. Of this amount, 12.5 billion was cash that came mostly from loans from New York bankers. The rest was goods like coal and chemicals, or from assets like railway equipment. The total amount of reparations was fixed in 1921 on the basis of the German capacity to pay, not on the basis of Allied claims. The highly publicized rhetoric of 1919 about paying for all the damages and all the veterans' benefits was irrelevant to the total, but it did affect how the recipients spent their share. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were also supposed to pay some reparations but they were so impoverished that they in fact paid very little. Germany was the only country rich enough to pay anything; it owed reparations chiefly to France, Britain, Italy and Belgium; the US received $100 million.[33] Historian Stephen Shucker notes how the overall payment amounts to "a unilateral transfer equal to a startling 5.3 percent of German national income for 1919-31."[34]

I am not even going to bother from quoting from the extensive 'Historical assessments' section, which details how historians have noted the treaty was lenient.

At the time, and still in popular perception, it was deemed to be harsh. Historians have deemed otherwise. Seems pretty clear cut and well sourced within the article.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:42, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

I agree with EnigmaMcmxc Rjensen (talk) 17:58, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Sorry, EnigmaMcmxc, for taking some time in replying. If I had realized that my comments would be so controversial, I would have probably not made them before taking a short break. I had, of course, read the article fairly carefully or I would not have made the comments that I did. I'm sorry, but I still don't think that "At the time, and still in popular perception, it was deemed to be harsh. Historians have deemed otherwise. " and historians have judged the reparation figure to be lenient, a sum that was designed to look imposing but was in fact not, that had little impact on the German economy" are correct and sufficiently nuanced, neutral summaries of the position. I also think some more points of view should be added to the "Historical Assessments" section, which should, perhaps, be in a more chronological order, better explaining the changes in views and the reasons for them (archives released, etc.). As I wrote elsewhere, I think The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 and the conference should be given more attention, since it deals specifically with the issue).

"At the time . . . it was deemed to be harsh" is already less extreme than the current lede, which implies that - in the opinion of (many?) historians -the powers that be knew from the beginning that it was lenient.

I tend to think even Sally Marks' position is being overstated when the figure is described as simply "lenient". When challenged by David Felix (Reparations Reconsidered with a Vengeance), I undertand her to respond that she had merely said that the reparations were "not outrageous" (rather than "lenient").

Stevenson is quoted, but he also wrote "Versailles continues to be attacked both as too severe and as too lenient." That does not sound to me like " it was deemed to be harsh. Historians have deemed otherwise." (unless "historians" is qualified in some way.

Eichengreen writes "There is 'some dispute in the literature whether the 82 billion gold marks of deferred payments (the C bonds) were simply a sop to inflamed public opinion in France and Italy and were not expected to be paid." "Some dispute does not sound like "historians agree".

Feldman does not agree that the Germans could have fulfilled their obligations (". . . apparently the only people who really believed that the Germans could fulfill their reparations obligations, the real obligations that is, . . . are some historians") . He very explicitly disagrees with Marks and insists on "some historians" ('I simply do not agree when Marks says, "The scholarly consensus now suggests that paying what was actually asked of it was within Germany's capacity."')

Fergusson describes the annuity demanded as "an intolerable strain on the state's finances" and writes some historians have come to view German complaints about the treaty with skepticism". That also sounds a bit different from our summary. He also indicates who is pushing the theory ("in particular Sally Marks and Stephen Schuker") who have "sought to demonstrate" (not "have demonstrated") "that the material burdens imposed by reparations were less onerous than the Germans claimed" (and "less onerous" is not the same as "lenient").

As late as 2010, we have Tim McNeese writing

"France and Britain had placed war damages on Germany to the tune of billions of gold marks, which the defeated Germans could not begin to pay in earnest. . . . When the Versailles Treaty reduced Germany to near pauper status at the close of World War I, Austrian-born Hitler was angered and filled with hatred towards those he blamed for Germany's losses, especially Great Britain, France, and the other western democracies that had prostrated his nation at Versailles. " [my emphasis] That also doesn't sound to me like " historians have judged the reparation figure to be lenient" and "little impact on the economy".

Perhaps the article should also discuss those mentioned above and Krüger, Felix, Kennan, Schulze, and others.--Boson (talk) 14:37, 2 July 2013 (UTC)

--Boson (talk) 14:37, 2 July 2013 (UTC)

What is the source for "However, historians have judged the reparation figure to be lenient, a sum that was designed to look imposing but was in fact not, that had little impact on the German economy"? It's clear that Marls believes this but not that historians as a body have rendered a judgment on this matter. A source(s) is needed to state that the consensus of most historians is in line with Marks' conclusions on the matter, and that's missing. JJL (talk) 20:02, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

see World War I reparations Historians cite "Reparations Reconsidered: A Reminder" by Sally Marks Central European History Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec., 1969), pp. 356-365 Published by: Cambridge University Press [in JSTOR] which explains what happened. The problem is that people read the Keynes book that came out BEFORE the reparations were paid and make Keynes' assumption that it will be for the worst. Germany actually paid out over 1920-31 20 billion German gold marks, worth about $5 billion US dollars or one billion British pounds. Of this amount, most came from loans from New York bankers. Rjensen (talk) 20:13, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

Agreed. It has been consensus since the late 1960s on what Germany really had to pay. Marks released a host of research on the matter, and furthermore there are three sources used in the reparation part of the article that support the overall point. Wording can always be improved, but Marks and those who agree with her are far from presenting a fringe theory on the subject.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:21, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

if anyone wants more evidence that Marks is the accepted view look at The Gold Standard and the Great Depression by B Eichengreen, & P Temin, 1992; On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace by D Kagan - 1995; Hyperinflation and stabilization in Weimar Germany by SB Webb - 1989 ; German socialism and Weimar democracy by R Breitman - 1981; Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919-1926 by E Maisel - 1994;; Light that Failed by Zara Steiner. (2005); Modern Germany Reconsidered: 1870-1945 by G Martel - 2002; The world economy between the world wars by CH Feinstein, P Temin, G Toniolo - Oxford 1997 [this is the most influential book]; The united states and the first world war by JD Keene - 2000; "Shame, guilt and reconciliation after war" by C Lu (2008); "Weimar on the Volga: Causes and Consequences of Inflation in 1990s Russia Compared with 1920s Germany" by Niall Ferguson, (2000); British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919-1939 by M Hughes - 2004 - etc. I have not seen anyone reject the Marks position. Rjensen (talk) 20:26, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

That article also says "The majority of historians" but doesn't cite that fact, which is a strong claim--over 50%. This article says simply "historians", implying again a strong consensus of the majority of historians (if not essentially all of them). I'm seeing that there are lots of sources that correspond with Marks' view but not a source that the majority do. The statement in the article is much stronger than what is in the sources. JJL (talk) 22:03, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

That article does not state "The majority of historians" anywhere. It states "However, historians have judged...". It appears you have ignored the point made by Rjensen above. It is not a fringe theory, it is the general consensus of historians since at least the 1960s. There is no wiki guideline that states there needs to be a source that specifically states the majority of anyone support a position. It appears you are being argumentative for the sake of it.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:14, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

The World War I reparations article to which I was referred in the reply to which I was responding does state "The majority of historians". This article makes an even stronger claim. I am not suggesting this is a fringe theory. I'm not even suggesting it's not the majority opinion. I'm saying that when you say the general consensus of historians is such-and-such, citing a few historians who agree with such-and-such is only enough to show that some historians feel that way, not that most do. I'm asking for a citation to the claim that this "is the general consensus of historians" as explicitly stated here and implicit in the wording in the actual article. As it stands it seems like WP:OR or at least WP:SYNTH. I absolutely disagree with your position that "There is no wiki guideline that states there needs to be a source that specifically states the majority of anyone support a position." when the article makes just such a claim. JJL (talk) 22:49, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

You are being argumentative for the pure sake of it and picking at technicalities. If historians have been stating it since the 1960s and multiple historians are used the article that support that position, it is not original research to summarize their views in the article introduction. You appear to have ignored the sources used in the article and the list produced above and deemed them "some". Not every single source or historians opinion on the matter can be listed. Never, in years of editing, have I seen a guideline or anyone ask for a single source that summarizes the views of decades worth of research and thousands of historians. Does such a source even exist for any other subject? The closest to your impossible demand is PMH Bell, and he supports the position.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:20, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

If the claim is unsupportable, the language must be softened. Other pages don't make such broad claims about the judgment of all historians. This standard isn't new on WP. JJL (talk) 23:44, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

However, the claim is supported. Historians do support the fact mentioned in the intro. The intro is further supported by an entire section that is sourced from several different sources and several different historians. The SOP of the wiki has been met.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:53, 28 June 2013 (UTC)

But see the questions I raised above - which have not been answered. Nobody is suggesting that Marks is a fringe view but, as I suggested, given the scholarly division and changes in the mainstream assessment over time, the bold statement in the lede without qualification (such as "the current view among most (?) historians") is not a neutral summary of the position.

Compare the bold statement in the article "however, historians have judged the reparations to have been lenient, designed to look imposing but were in fact not" (which to me implies much more than a simple majority of historians) with, say, the much more circumspect summary of opinions in the introduction to The Treaty of Versailles: A Re-assessment after 75 years:

". . . many analysts . . . have blamed the treaty for Germany's subsequent . . .

Some see its harsh indemnity provisions as the cause of the German economic and financial crisis 0f 1929-33, and even of the Depression itself. Others claim that the treaty helped National Socialists gain power in 1933. . . .

George F. Kennan has recently argued that the 'vindictiveness of British and French peace terms' helped paved the way for National Socialism . . .

Such revisionist judgements have held sway for generations. . . .

In recent years, however, detailed archival research has underscored the sucesses of the German peace compact. . . .

Scholars, although remaining divided, now tend to view the treaty as the best compromise that the negotiators could have reached in the existing circumstances. . . . Yet the broader public, to judge from newspaper opinion and textbook treatment, clings to the impression of a Carthaginian settlement . . .

Recently Hagen Schulze . . . describes the compact as a 'destructive middle course' that 'put Germany under special laws . . . ruined it economically and . . . " [my emphasis]

And Niall Ferguson, in his chapter in that book, is also more circumspect:

". . . by comparison with the ad hoc peace imposed on Germany in 1945, the Versailles peace was relatively lenient. . . . Consequently some historians have come to view German complaints about the treaty with skepticism. In particular Sally Marks and Stephen Schuker have sought to demonstrate that the material burdens imposed by reparations were less onerous than the Germans claimed, arguing that Germany could have paid a good deal more . . . " [my emphasis]--Boson (talk) 00:04, 29 June 2013 (UTC)

how do historians operate? if a theory (in this case by Sally Marks) is a) widely accepted there will be many citations to it and no mention of attacks on it. b) If it is contested historians will say so and cite the opposition view. what we have is situation a) -- many scholars cite Marks and no one says there is any alternative viewpoint in good standing. (before Marks c) some historians read the predictions of Keynes and assumed they later came true. That theory c) is no longer held by scholars.) This is all about the burden of reparations; consensus = low burden on Germany. That is NOT all there was to the Treaty--far from it. In addition there were serious issues of guilt, lost territories, lost colonies, demilitarization of Rhineland, and severe restrictions on the military. Rjensen (talk) 07:36, 30 June 2013 (UTC)

Yes, but in this case there was a conference of "experts from France, Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States" that gathered to re-assess the Treaty of Versailles "on the basis the latest archival evidence and the extant literature". The "resulting reappraisal", as documented in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years was a "new synthesis of peace conference scholarship". So in this case we have sources that specifically document and assess differing views. I would therefore suggest that we incorporate the views expressed by the editors of, and contributors to, that book. If new evidence has been discussed in the last decade, we could discuss that too.

I would suggest that the body discuss the (sourced and preferably quoted) opinions of some of the historians and economists mentioned on the talk page, particularly where they address the issue of differing views concerning the assessment of the treaty. Perhaps the following could be taken into account:

• Marks ("A substantial degree of scholarly consensus now suggests that paying what was actually asked of it was within Germany's financial capacity") [my emphasis]
• Stevenson, who is already quoted in the body ("Versailles continues to be attacked both as too severe and as too lenient.")
• Fergusson ("the annuity demanded in 1921put an intolerable strain on the state's finances" and "by comparison with the ad hoc peace imposed on Germany in 1945, the Versailles peace was relatively lenient. . . . Consequently some historians have come to view German complaints about the treaty with skepticism. In particular Sally Marks and Stephen Schuker have sought to demonstrate that the material burdens imposed by reparations were less onerous than the Germans claimed, arguing that Germany could have paid a good deal more . . . ". [my emphasis]
• Feldman ("Marks, ever eager to defend the feasibility of the reparations settlement, appears cheerlessly resigned to the hopelessness of the cause in the real world of post-Versailles Europe"; "Indeed, apparently the only people who really believed that the Germans could fulfill their reparations obligations, the real obligations that is, . . . are some historians. I emphasize some historians because I simply do not agree when Marks says, "The scholarly consensus now suggests that paying what was actually asked of it was within Germany's capacity. Peter Krüger does not share this view; neither do I, and neither does Ferguson . . . "

Since they specifically discuss others' opinions, I would suggest - tentatively - that we give particular weight to the statements of Fergusson, Stevenson, and Feldman.

If some views are more recent and some views represent the "conventional wisdom", we should document that (if we can provide an appropriate source). We should also, perhaps, distinguish what historians say and do when they are advancing a position, formulating interesting new theories, and supporting or attacking one school or another, and what they write when they are attempting to present a view of contemporary opinion.

--Boson (talk) 17:57, 30 June 2013 (UTC)

This is, at best, WP:SYNTH. JJL (talk) 18:34, 30 June 2013 (UTC)

let me comment on one quoted line that cites McNeese: https://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=%22+Britain+had+placed+war+damages+on+Germany+to+the+tune+of+billions+of+gold%22&num=10 "France and Britain had placed war damages on Germany to the tune of billions of gold marks, which the defeated Germans could not begin to pay".... well I helped write that book and that sentence and I think it's accurate. Versailles DID impose huge reparations that would cripple the German economy, as Keynes predicted. Versailles did indeed outrage Germans and it was a major rhetorical device used by the right and the Nazis. However Germany in fact only paid a small fraction of the Versailles costs, and the $$ they paid was borrowed via (Dawes & Young plans) from New York. Rjensen (talk) 23:14, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

After confirmation

I am working on updating the article, thus far I have incorporated everything sourced into a draft I am preparing and have double checked it to ensure accuracy. I have been unable to confirm the following, if anyone can double check to ensure the material is accurate:

Richard Evans who argues that the German right was committed to annannexationist program of Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa during the war, and found any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror unacceptable to them.(Evans, p. 107).

-Evans, Richard In Hitler's Shadow, New York: Panatheon 1989 page 107

Correlli Barnett argues that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany′s eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. But Barnett asserts that, because the Austrian empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states and Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the Treaty "much enhanced" German power (Barnett, p. 316). Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again (Barnett, p. 318). By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War" (Barnett, p. 319).

- Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: Pan, 2002)

Regards EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 05:02, 1 October 2013 (UTC)

I don't have the book at hand but I don't recall Evans saying the annexationists wanted "Most" of Africa (they only wanted central Africa at most). Much more important they wanted Eastern Europe & the Low Countries. there is a good discussion at Peter Duignan (1979). The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914. Stanford UP. pp. 229–30. Rjensen (talk) 12:03, 1 October 2013 (UTC)

As you have highlighted from Duignan's source, Central Africa was clearly the area Germany wanted. I shall modify my draft and drop the Africa part of the first quote pending further confirmation on what Evans stated.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:47, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

Nice effort, though you forgot to wikify your contributions. I also tried clarifying some of your sentences. Otherwise, the section seems to be shaping nicely. Out of curiosity, does Barnett suggest specific areas of Germany that could have been split-off into minor states? Dimadick (talk) 13:06, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

It should be perhaps mentioned, that not only German Empire planned to annex large areas of Central and Eastern Europe, but to ethnically cleanse these territories as well.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 21:39, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

If you have a source to back that up, the planned ethnic cleansing, I think that would be a good addition to the draft I am working on.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:20, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

Whole article Polish Border Strip--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 23:01, 2 October 2013 (UTC)

Complete rewrite

I think that much added in the complete rewrite is beyond the scope of this article and makes it difficult to read. Because of the size of the rewrite, it also makes it hard to check. In addition, the ownership comments are not needed, if a discussion is had first. --(AfadsBad (talk) 04:29, 4 October 2013 (UTC))