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:''"Animal liberation" redirects here. For other uses, see [[Animal liberation (disambiguation)]].''
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[[Image:Shanghai-monkey.jpg|right|thumb|220px|A man holds a [[monkey]] by a rope around the neck, a scene epitomizing the idea of animal ownership.]]
'''Animal rights''', also known as '''animal liberation''', is the idea that the most basic interests of animals should be afforded the same consideration as the similar interests of human beings.<ref name=EB3>"[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9007642/animal-rights Animal Rights]." ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2007.</ref> Advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, but agree that animals should be viewed as [[Juristic person|legal persons]] and members of the moral community, not property, and that they should not be used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment.<ref name=AAMC>[http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/oct03/animalrights.htm "'Personhood' Redefined: Animal Rights Strategy Gets at the Essence of Being Human"], Association of American Medical Colleges, retrieved July 12, 2006.</ref><ref>Taylor, Angus. [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIshxmoGu04C ''Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate''], Broadview Press, May 2003.</ref>
'''Animal rights''', also known as '''animal liberation''', is the idea that the most basic interests of animals should be afforded the same consideration as the similar interests of human beings.<ref name=EB3>"[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9007642/animal-rights Animal Rights]." ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2007.</ref> Advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, but agree that animals should be viewed as [[Juristic person|legal persons]] and members of the moral community, not property, and that they should not be used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment.<ref name=AAMC>[http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/oct03/animalrights.htm "'Personhood' Redefined: Animal Rights Strategy Gets at the Essence of Being Human"], Association of American Medical Colleges, retrieved July 12, 2006.</ref><ref>Taylor, Angus. [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIshxmoGu04C ''Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate''], Broadview Press, May 2003.</ref>


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{{alib}}
{{alib}}


==Development of the idea==
Development of the idea
===Moral status of animals in the ancient world===
=Moral status of animals in the ancient world=
{{main|Moral status of animals in the ancient world|Human exceptionalism}}
{{main|Moral status of animals in the ancient world|Human exceptionalism}}
[[Image:God2-Sistine Chapel.png|350px|thumb|right|[[Michelangelo]]'s [[The Creation of Adam]]. The [[Book of Genesis]] echoed earlier ideas about divine hierarchy, and that [[God]] and humankind share traits, such as intellect and a sense of morality, that non-humans do not possess.]]
[[Image:God2-Sistine Chapel.png|350px|thumb|right|[[Michelangelo]]'s [[The Creation of Adam]]. The [[Book of Genesis]] echoed earlier ideas about divine hierarchy, and that [[God]] and humankind share traits, such as intellect and a sense of morality, that non-humans do not possess.]]
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The 21st-century debate about these ideas can be traced back to the earliest philosophers and theologians.
The 21st-century debate about these ideas can be traced back to the earliest philosophers and theologians.


===17th century: Animals as automata===
=17th century: Animals as automata=
[[Image:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[René Descartes|Descartes]]' remains influential regarding how the issue of animal consciousness &mdash; or as he saw, lack thereof &mdash; should be approached.<ref name=Midgley1999/>]]
[[Image:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[René Descartes|Descartes]]' remains influential regarding how the issue of animal consciousness &mdash; or as he saw, lack thereof &mdash; should be approached.<ref name=Midgley1999/>]]
====1641: Descartes====
1641: Descartes
{{see|Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Scientific Revolution}}
{{see|Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Scientific Revolution}}
{{rquote|right|[Animals] eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing. &mdash; [[Nicolas Malebranche]] (1638&ndash;1715)<ref name=Malebranche>Malebranche, Nicholas. in Rodis-Lewis, G. (ed.). ''Oeuvres complètes''. Paris: J. Vrin. 1958-70, II, p. 394, cited in Harrison, Peter. "Descartes on Animals," ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Vol. 42, No. 167, April 1992, pp. 219-227; also see Carter, Alan. "Animals, Pain and Morality," ''Journal of Applied Philosophy'', Volume 22, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 17–22.</ref>}}
{{rquote|right|[Animals] eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing. &mdash; [[Nicolas Malebranche]] (1638&ndash;1715)<ref name=Malebranche>Malebranche, Nicholas. in Rodis-Lewis, G. (ed.). ''Oeuvres complètes''. Paris: J. Vrin. 1958-70, II, p. 394, cited in Harrison, Peter. "Descartes on Animals," ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Vol. 42, No. 167, April 1992, pp. 219-227; also see Carter, Alan. "Animals, Pain and Morality," ''Journal of Applied Philosophy'', Volume 22, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 17–22.</ref>}}
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In the ''[[Discourse on the Method|Discourse]]'', published in 1637, Descartes wrote that the ability to reason and use language involve being able to respond in complex ways to "all the contingencies of life," something that animals clearly cannot do. He argued from this that any sounds animals make do not constitute language, but are simply automatic responses to external stimuli.<ref>Descartes, René. ''[[Discourse on the Method]]''. First published 1637, cited in Cottingham, John. "Descartes, René" in Honderich, Ted. (ed.) ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy''. Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 188-192.</ref>
In the ''[[Discourse on the Method|Discourse]]'', published in 1637, Descartes wrote that the ability to reason and use language involve being able to respond in complex ways to "all the contingencies of life," something that animals clearly cannot do. He argued from this that any sounds animals make do not constitute language, but are simply automatic responses to external stimuli.<ref>Descartes, René. ''[[Discourse on the Method]]''. First published 1637, cited in Cottingham, John. "Descartes, René" in Honderich, Ted. (ed.) ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy''. Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 188-192.</ref>


====1635, 1641, 1654: First known laws protecting animals====
1635, 1641, 1654: First known laws protecting animals
Richard Ryder writes that the first known legislation against animal cruelty in the English-speaking world was passed in [[Ireland]] in 1635. It prohibited pulling wool off sheep, and the attaching of ploughs to horses' tails, referring to "the cruelty used to beasts," which Ryde writes is probably the earliest reference to this concept in the English language.<ref>''The Statutes at Large''. Dublin, 1786, chapter 15, pp. 168-9, cited in Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 49.</ref>
Richard Ryder writes that the first known legislation against animal cruelty in the English-speaking world was passed in [[Ireland]] in 1635. It prohibited pulling wool off sheep, and the attaching of ploughs to horses' tails, referring to "the cruelty used to beasts," which Ryde writes is probably the earliest reference to this concept in the English language.<ref>''The Statutes at Large''. Dublin, 1786, chapter 15, pp. 168-9, cited in Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 49.</ref>


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The Puritans passed animal protection legislation in England too. Katheen Kete of [[Trinity College (Connecticut)|Trinity College]], Hartford, Connecticut writes that animal welfare laws were passed in 1654 as part of the ordinances of the [[The Protectorate|Protectorate]] &mdash; the government under [[Oliver Cromwell]], which lasted 1653–1659 &mdash; during the [[English Civil War]]. Cromwell disliked blood sports, particularly [[cockfighting]], [[cock throwing]], [[dog fighting]], as well as [[bull baiting]] and [[bull]] running, both said to tenderize the meat. These could frequently be seen in towns, villages, in fairgrounds, and became associated for the Puritans with idleness, drunkenness, and gambling. Kete writes that the Puritans interpreted the dominion of man over animals in the [[Book of Genesis]] to mean responsible stewardship, rather than ownership. The opposition to blood sports became part of what was seen as Puritan interference in people's lives, which became a [[leitmotif]] of resistance to them, Kete writes, and the animal protection laws were overturned during the [[English Restoration|Restoration]], when [[Charles II of England|Charles II]] was returned to the throne in 1660.<ref name=Kete2>Kete, Kathleen. "Animals and Ideology: The Politics of Animal Protection in Europe," in Rothfels, Nigel. ''Representing Animals''. Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 19 ff.</ref> Bull baiting remained lawful in England for another 162 years, until it was [[Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822|outlawed in 1822]].
The Puritans passed animal protection legislation in England too. Katheen Kete of [[Trinity College (Connecticut)|Trinity College]], Hartford, Connecticut writes that animal welfare laws were passed in 1654 as part of the ordinances of the [[The Protectorate|Protectorate]] &mdash; the government under [[Oliver Cromwell]], which lasted 1653–1659 &mdash; during the [[English Civil War]]. Cromwell disliked blood sports, particularly [[cockfighting]], [[cock throwing]], [[dog fighting]], as well as [[bull baiting]] and [[bull]] running, both said to tenderize the meat. These could frequently be seen in towns, villages, in fairgrounds, and became associated for the Puritans with idleness, drunkenness, and gambling. Kete writes that the Puritans interpreted the dominion of man over animals in the [[Book of Genesis]] to mean responsible stewardship, rather than ownership. The opposition to blood sports became part of what was seen as Puritan interference in people's lives, which became a [[leitmotif]] of resistance to them, Kete writes, and the animal protection laws were overturned during the [[English Restoration|Restoration]], when [[Charles II of England|Charles II]] was returned to the throne in 1660.<ref name=Kete2>Kete, Kathleen. "Animals and Ideology: The Politics of Animal Protection in Europe," in Rothfels, Nigel. ''Representing Animals''. Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 19 ff.</ref> Bull baiting remained lawful in England for another 162 years, until it was [[Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822|outlawed in 1822]].


====1693: Locke====
1693: Locke
[[Image:JohnLocke.png|thumb|150px|[[John Locke]] argued against animal cruelty, but only because of the effect it has on human beings.]]
[[Image:JohnLocke.png|thumb|150px|[[John Locke]] argued against animal cruelty, but only because of the effect it has on human beings.]]
Against Descartes, the British philosopher [[John Locke]] (1632&ndash;1704) argued, in ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education'' in 1693, that animals do have feelings, and that unnecessary cruelty toward them is morally wrong, but &mdash; echoing [[Thomas Aquinas]] &mdash; the right not to be so harmed adhered either to the animal's owner, or to the person who was being harmed by being cruel, not to the animal itself. Discussing the importance of preventing children from tormenting animals, he wrote: "For the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men."<ref>Locke, John. ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education'', 1693, Ruth Weissbourd Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.). Hackett Publishing, 1996, p. 91. </ref>
Against Descartes, the British philosopher [[John Locke]] (1632&ndash;1704) argued, in ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education'' in 1693, that animals do have feelings, and that unnecessary cruelty toward them is morally wrong, but &mdash; echoing [[Thomas Aquinas]] &mdash; the right not to be so harmed adhered either to the animal's owner, or to the person who was being harmed by being cruel, not to the animal itself. Discussing the importance of preventing children from tormenting animals, he wrote: "For the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men."<ref>Locke, John. ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education'', 1693, Ruth Weissbourd Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.). Hackett Publishing, 1996, p. 91. </ref>


===18th century: The centrality of sentience, not reason===
=18th century: The centrality of sentience, not reason=
[[Image:Jean-Jacques Rousseau (painted portrait).jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] argued in 1754 that animals are part of [[natural law]], and have [[natural right]]s, because they are sentient.]]
[[Image:Jean-Jacques Rousseau (painted portrait).jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] argued in 1754 that animals are part of [[natural law]], and have [[natural right]]s, because they are sentient.]]
====1754: Rousseau====
1754: Rousseau
[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1712&ndash;1778) argued in [[Discourse on Inequality]] in 1754 that animals should be part of [[natural law]], not because they are rational, but because they are [[Sentience|sentient]]:
[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1712&ndash;1778) argued in [[Discourse on Inequality]] in 1754 that animals should be part of [[natural law]], not because they are rational, but because they are [[Sentience|sentient]]:


{{cquote|[Here] we put an end to the time-honoured disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that, being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognize that law; as they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of [[Natural rights|natural right]]; so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former.<ref>Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. ''[http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq_02.htm Discourse on Inequality]'', 1754, preface.</ref>}}
{{cquote|[Here] we put an end to the time-honoured disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that, being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognize that law; as they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of [[Natural rights|natural right]]; so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former.<ref>Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. ''[http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq_02.htm Discourse on Inequality]'', 1754, preface.</ref>}}


====1785: Kant====
1785: Kant
{{rquote|right|Animals ... are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man. &mdash; [[Immanuel Kant]]<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Lecture on Ethics''. L. Infield (trans.) HarperTorchbooks 1963, p. 239. Also see Ze'ev Levy, Ze'ev. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0411/is_n1_v45/ai_18338875 "Ethical issues of animal welfare in Jewish thought"], ''Judaism'', winter 1996.</ref>}}
{{rquote|right|Animals ... are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man. &mdash; [[Immanuel Kant]]<ref>Kant, Immanuel. ''Lecture on Ethics''. L. Infield (trans.) HarperTorchbooks 1963, p. 239. Also see Ze'ev Levy, Ze'ev. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0411/is_n1_v45/ai_18338875 "Ethical issues of animal welfare in Jewish thought"], ''Judaism'', winter 1996.</ref>}}
The German philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724&ndash;1804), following Augustine, Aquinas, and Locke, opposed the idea that human beings have duties toward non-humans. For Kant, cruelty to animals was wrong solely on the grounds that it was bad for humankind. He argued in 1785 that human beings have duties only toward other human beings, and that ''"cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to ''himself'', because it deadens in him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that is very useful to morality in relation to other human beings is weakened."''<ref name=Kant1785>Kant, Immanuel. ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]], part II (The Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue), paras 16 and 17.</ref>
The German philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724&ndash;1804), following Augustine, Aquinas, and Locke, opposed the idea that human beings have duties toward non-humans. For Kant, cruelty to animals was wrong solely on the grounds that it was bad for humankind. He argued in 1785 that human beings have duties only toward other human beings, and that ''"cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to ''himself'', because it deadens in him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that is very useful to morality in relation to other human beings is weakened."''<ref name=Kant1785>Kant, Immanuel. ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]], part II (The Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue), paras 16 and 17.</ref>


====1789: Bentham====
1789: Bentham
[[Image:Bentham.jpg|right|thumb|150px|[[Jeremy Bentham]]: "The time will come, when humanity will extend its mantle over every thing which breathes" (1781).<ref>Bentham, Jeremy. ''Principles of Penal Law''. Part III, 1781.</ref>]]
[[Image:Bentham.jpg|right|thumb|150px|[[Jeremy Bentham]]: "The time will come, when humanity will extend its mantle over every thing which breathes" (1781).<ref>Bentham, Jeremy. ''Principles of Penal Law''. Part III, 1781.</ref>]]
Four years later, one of the founders of modern [[utilitarianism]], the English philosopher [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748&ndash;1832), although deeply opposed to the concept of natural rights, argued with Rousseau that it was the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, that should be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If rationality were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things.<ref name=Benthall>Benthall, Jonathan. [http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00494.x "Animal liberation and rights"], ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April 2007, p. 1.</ref> He wrote in 1789, just as [[slave]]s were being [[Slavery in the British and French Caribbean|freed by the French]], but were still held captive in the British dominions:
Four years later, one of the founders of modern [[utilitarianism]], the English philosopher [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748&ndash;1832), although deeply opposed to the concept of natural rights, argued with Rousseau that it was the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, that should be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If rationality were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things.<ref name=Benthall>Benthall, Jonathan. [http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00494.x "Animal liberation and rights"], ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April 2007, p. 1.</ref> He wrote in 1789, just as [[slave]]s were being [[Slavery in the British and French Caribbean|freed by the French]], but were still held captive in the British dominions:
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{{cquote|The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day ''may'' come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the [[Hair follicle|villosity]] of the skin, or the termination of the ''[[Sacrum|os sacrum]]'' are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of [[Speech communication|discourse]]? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they ''reason''?, nor Can they ''talk''? but, Can they ''suffer?'' <ref name=Bentham>Bentham, Jeremy. ''[http://books.google.ca/books?id=qeVFNvlsVH0C&pg=PA283&dq=The+French+have+already+discovered+that+the+blackness+of+the+skin&sig=mjg_foeKlNG6pVfODlloxngWcgg Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]'', first published 1789, chapter 17; this edition Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (eds.) ''The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham''. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 283, footnote.</ref>}}
{{cquote|The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day ''may'' come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the [[Hair follicle|villosity]] of the skin, or the termination of the ''[[Sacrum|os sacrum]]'' are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of [[Speech communication|discourse]]? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they ''reason''?, nor Can they ''talk''? but, Can they ''suffer?'' <ref name=Bentham>Bentham, Jeremy. ''[http://books.google.ca/books?id=qeVFNvlsVH0C&pg=PA283&dq=The+French+have+already+discovered+that+the+blackness+of+the+skin&sig=mjg_foeKlNG6pVfODlloxngWcgg Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]'', first published 1789, chapter 17; this edition Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (eds.) ''The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham''. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 283, footnote.</ref>}}


====1792: Thomas Taylor====
1792: Thomas Taylor
Despite Rousseau and Bentham, the idea that animals did or ought to have rights remained ridiculous. When [[Mary Wollstonecraft]] (1759&ndash;1797), the British feminist writer, published ''[[A Vindication of the Rights of Woman]]'' in 1792, [[Thomas Taylor (neoplatonist)|Thomas Taylor]] (1758&mdash;1835), a [[Cambridge]] philosopher, responded with an anonymous tract called ''Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'', intended as a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]''. Taylor took Wollstonecraft's arguments, and those of [[Thomas Paine]]'s ''[[Rights of Man]]'' (1790), and showed that they applied equally to animals, leading to the conclusion that animals have "intrinsic and real dignity and worth," a conclusion absurd enough, in his view, to discredit Wollstonecraft's and Paine's positions entirely.<ref>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. New York Review/Random House, second edition 1990, p. 1; Sunstein, Cass R. [http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/02/20/reviews/000220.20sunstet.html?_r=1&oref=slogin The Chimps' Day in Court], ''The New York Times'', February 20, 2000. Also see Taylor, Thomas. ''A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'', London 1792, in Craciun, Adriana. ''A Routledge Literary Sourcebook on Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman''. Routledge, 2002, p. 40.</ref>
Despite Rousseau and Bentham, the idea that animals did or ought to have rights remained ridiculous. When [[Mary Wollstonecraft]] (1759&ndash;1797), the British feminist writer, published ''[[A Vindication of the Rights of Woman]]'' in 1792, [[Thomas Taylor (neoplatonist)|Thomas Taylor]] (1758&mdash;1835), a [[Cambridge]] philosopher, responded with an anonymous tract called ''Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'', intended as a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]''. Taylor took Wollstonecraft's arguments, and those of [[Thomas Paine]]'s ''[[Rights of Man]]'' (1790), and showed that they applied equally to animals, leading to the conclusion that animals have "intrinsic and real dignity and worth," a conclusion absurd enough, in his view, to discredit Wollstonecraft's and Paine's positions entirely.<ref>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. New York Review/Random House, second edition 1990, p. 1; Sunstein, Cass R. [http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/02/20/reviews/000220.20sunstet.html?_r=1&oref=slogin The Chimps' Day in Court], ''The New York Times'', February 20, 2000. Also see Taylor, Thomas. ''A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'', London 1792, in Craciun, Adriana. ''A Routledge Literary Sourcebook on Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman''. Routledge, 2002, p. 40.</ref>


===19th century: Emergence of ''jus animalium''===
=19th century: Emergence of ''jus animalium''=
[[Image:Smithfield Last day of Old Smithfield ILN 1855.jpg|left|thumb|270px|The first known prosecution for cruelty to animals was brought in 1822 against two men found beating horses in London's [[Smithfield Market]], where livestock had been sold since the 10th century. They were fined 20 [[shilling]]s each.]]
[[Image:Smithfield Last day of Old Smithfield ILN 1855.jpg|left|thumb|270px|The first known prosecution for cruelty to animals was brought in 1822 against two men found beating horses in London's [[Smithfield Market]], where livestock had been sold since the 10th century. They were fined 20 [[shilling]]s each.]]
====Legislation====
Legislation
{{see|Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822|Cruelty to Animals Act 1835|Cruelty to Animals Act 1849|Cruelty to Animals Act 1876}}
{{see|Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822|Cruelty to Animals Act 1835|Cruelty to Animals Act 1849|Cruelty to Animals Act 1876}}
{{rquote|right|What could be more innocent than [[bull baiting]], boxing, or dancing? &mdash; [[George Canning]], British Foreign Secretary in April 1800 in response to a bill to ban bull baiting.<ref>''Hansard'', April 18, 1800, cited in cited in Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Random House, 1990, p. 192.</ref>}}
{{rquote|right|What could be more innocent than [[bull baiting]], boxing, or dancing? &mdash; [[George Canning]], British Foreign Secretary in April 1800 in response to a bill to ban bull baiting.<ref>''Hansard'', April 18, 1800, cited in cited in Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Random House, 1990, p. 192.</ref>}}
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From 1800 onwards, there were several attempts in England to introduce animal welfare or rights legislation. The first was a bill in 1800 against [[bull baiting]], introduced by Sir William Pulteney, and opposed by the Secretary of War, [[William Windham]], on the grounds that it was anti-working class. Another attempt was made in 1802 by [[William Wilberforce]], again opposed by Windham, who said that bulls enjoyed being baited. In 1811, [[Lord Erskine]] introduced a bill to protect cattle and horses from malicious wounding, wanton cruelty, and beating, this one opposed by Windham because it would prejudice property rights. Judge [[Edward Abbott Parry]] writes that the [[House of Lords]] found the proposal so sentimental that they drowned Erskine out with cat calls and cock crowing.<ref>Parry, Edward Abbott. ''The Law and the Poor'', 1914; this edition The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2004, p. 219.</ref>
From 1800 onwards, there were several attempts in England to introduce animal welfare or rights legislation. The first was a bill in 1800 against [[bull baiting]], introduced by Sir William Pulteney, and opposed by the Secretary of War, [[William Windham]], on the grounds that it was anti-working class. Another attempt was made in 1802 by [[William Wilberforce]], again opposed by Windham, who said that bulls enjoyed being baited. In 1811, [[Lord Erskine]] introduced a bill to protect cattle and horses from malicious wounding, wanton cruelty, and beating, this one opposed by Windham because it would prejudice property rights. Judge [[Edward Abbott Parry]] writes that the [[House of Lords]] found the proposal so sentimental that they drowned Erskine out with cat calls and cock crowing.<ref>Parry, Edward Abbott. ''The Law and the Poor'', 1914; this edition The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2004, p. 219.</ref>


=====1822: Martin's Act=====
=1822: Martin's Act=
{{see|Badger baiting|Bull baiting|Cockfighting}}
{{see|Badger baiting|Bull baiting|Cockfighting}}
{{rquote|right|''If I had a donkey wot wouldn't go,''<br>
{{rquote|right|''If I had a donkey wot wouldn't go,''<br>
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Other countries followed suit in passing legislation or making decisions that favoured animals. In 1882, the courts in New York ruled that wanton cruelty to animals was a [[misdemeanor]] at [[common law]].<ref name=Francione7>Francione, Gary. ''Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement''. Temple University Press, 1996, p. 7.</ref> In France in 1850, [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi_Grammont Jacques Philippe Delmas de Grammont] succeeded in having the ''Loi Grammont'' passed, outlawing cruelty against domestic animals, and leading to years of arguments about whether bulls could be classed as domestic in order to ban bullfighting.<ref>McCormick, John. Bullfighting: Art, Technique and Spanish Society''. Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 211.</ref> The state of Washington followed in 1859, New York in 1866, California in 1868, Florida in 1889.<ref name=Legge50>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 50.</ref> In England, a series of amendments extended the reach of the 1822 Act, which became the [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1835]], outlawing [[cockfighting]], baiting, and [[dog fighting]], followed by another [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1849|amendment in 1849]], and [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1876|again in 1876]].
Other countries followed suit in passing legislation or making decisions that favoured animals. In 1882, the courts in New York ruled that wanton cruelty to animals was a [[misdemeanor]] at [[common law]].<ref name=Francione7>Francione, Gary. ''Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement''. Temple University Press, 1996, p. 7.</ref> In France in 1850, [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi_Grammont Jacques Philippe Delmas de Grammont] succeeded in having the ''Loi Grammont'' passed, outlawing cruelty against domestic animals, and leading to years of arguments about whether bulls could be classed as domestic in order to ban bullfighting.<ref>McCormick, John. Bullfighting: Art, Technique and Spanish Society''. Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 211.</ref> The state of Washington followed in 1859, New York in 1866, California in 1868, Florida in 1889.<ref name=Legge50>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 50.</ref> In England, a series of amendments extended the reach of the 1822 Act, which became the [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1835]], outlawing [[cockfighting]], baiting, and [[dog fighting]], followed by another [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1849|amendment in 1849]], and [[Cruelty to Animals Act 1876|again in 1876]].


=====1824: Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals=====
=1824: Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals=
{{rquote|right|At a meeting of the Society instituted for the purpose of preventing cruelty to animals, on the 16th day of June 1824, at Old Slaughter's Coffee House, [[St. Martin's Lane]]: [[Sir Thomas Buxton, 1st Baronet|T F Buxton]] Esqr, MP, in the Chair,
{{rquote|right|At a meeting of the Society instituted for the purpose of preventing cruelty to animals, on the 16th day of June 1824, at Old Slaughter's Coffee House, [[St. Martin's Lane]]: [[Sir Thomas Buxton, 1st Baronet|T F Buxton]] Esqr, MP, in the Chair,


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The Society became the Royal Society in 1840, when it was granted a [[royal charter]] by [[Queen Victoria]], herself strongly opposed to vivisection.<ref name=Legge47>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 47.</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878724-1,00.html "The Legacy of Humanity Dick"], ''Time'' magazine, January 26, 1970.</ref>
The Society became the Royal Society in 1840, when it was granted a [[royal charter]] by [[Queen Victoria]], herself strongly opposed to vivisection.<ref name=Legge47>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 47.</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878724-1,00.html "The Legacy of Humanity Dick"], ''Time'' magazine, January 26, 1970.</ref>


=====An early example of direct action=====
=An early example of direct action=
Noel Molland writes that, in 1824, Catherine Smithies, an anti-slavery activist, set up an SPCA youth wing called the Bands of Mercy. It was a children's club modeled on the [[Temperance movement|Temperance Society's]] Bands of Hope, which were intended to encourage children to campaign against drinking and gambling. The Bands of Mercy were similarly meant to encourage a love of animals.<ref name=Molland68>Molland, Neil. "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best & Nocella (eds), ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters'', Lantern Books, 2004, p. 68.</ref>
Noel Molland writes that, in 1824, Catherine Smithies, an anti-slavery activist, set up an SPCA youth wing called the Bands of Mercy. It was a children's club modeled on the [[Temperance movement|Temperance Society's]] Bands of Hope, which were intended to encourage children to campaign against drinking and gambling. The Bands of Mercy were similarly meant to encourage a love of animals.<ref name=Molland68>Molland, Neil. "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best & Nocella (eds), ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters'', Lantern Books, 2004, p. 68.</ref>


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[[Image:FrancesPowerCobbe2.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Frances Power Cobbe]] founded two of the world's first anti-vivisection societies.]]
[[Image:FrancesPowerCobbe2.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Frances Power Cobbe]] founded two of the world's first anti-vivisection societies.]]
=====1866: American SPCA=====
=1866: American SPCA=
The first animal protection group in the United States was the [[American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals]] (ASPCA), founded by [[Henry Bergh]] in April 1866. Bergh had been appointed by President [[Abraham Lincoln]] to a diplomatic post in Russia, and had been disturbed by the treatment of animals there. He consulted with the president of the RSPCA in London, the [[Earl of Harrowby]], and returned to the U.S. to speak out against bullfights, cockfights, and the beating of horses. He created a "Declaration of the Rights of Animals," and in 1866, persuaded the [[New York state legislature]] to pass anti-cruelty legislation and to grant the ASPCA the authority to enforce it.<ref>[http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2006/11/the-aspca-pioneers-in-animal-welfare/ "The ASPCA–Pioneers in Animal Welfare"], ''Encyclopaedia Britannica's Advocacy for Animals'', November 20, 2006.</ref>
The first animal protection group in the United States was the [[American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals]] (ASPCA), founded by [[Henry Bergh]] in April 1866. Bergh had been appointed by President [[Abraham Lincoln]] to a diplomatic post in Russia, and had been disturbed by the treatment of animals there. He consulted with the president of the RSPCA in London, the [[Earl of Harrowby]], and returned to the U.S. to speak out against bullfights, cockfights, and the beating of horses. He created a "Declaration of the Rights of Animals," and in 1866, persuaded the [[New York state legislature]] to pass anti-cruelty legislation and to grant the ASPCA the authority to enforce it.<ref>[http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2006/11/the-aspca-pioneers-in-animal-welfare/ "The ASPCA–Pioneers in Animal Welfare"], ''Encyclopaedia Britannica's Advocacy for Animals'', November 20, 2006.</ref>


====Other groups====
Other groups
The remainder of the century saw the creation of many animal protection groups. In 1875, the British feminist [[Frances Power Cobbe]] founded the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection, the world's first organization opposed to animal research, which became the [[National Anti-Vivisection Society]]. In 1898, she set up the [[British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection]], with which she campaigned against the use of dogs in research, coming close to success with the 1919 Dogs (Protection) Bill, which almost became law.
The remainder of the century saw the creation of many animal protection groups. In 1875, the British feminist [[Frances Power Cobbe]] founded the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection, the world's first organization opposed to animal research, which became the [[National Anti-Vivisection Society]]. In 1898, she set up the [[British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection]], with which she campaigned against the use of dogs in research, coming close to success with the 1919 Dogs (Protection) Bill, which almost became law.


====1824: Development of the concept of animal rights====
1824: Development of the concept of animal rights


The period saw the first extended interest in the idea that non-humans might have natural rights, or ought to have legal ones. In 1824, Lewis Gompertz, one of the men who attended the first meeting of the SPCA in June that year, published ''Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes'', in which he argued that every living creature, human and non-human, has more right to the use of its own body than anyone else has to use it, and that our duty to promote happiness applies equally to all beings.<ref name=Taylor60/>
The period saw the first extended interest in the idea that non-humans might have natural rights, or ought to have legal ones. In 1824, Lewis Gompertz, one of the men who attended the first meeting of the SPCA in June that year, published ''Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes'', in which he argued that every living creature, human and non-human, has more right to the use of its own body than anyone else has to use it, and that our duty to promote happiness applies equally to all beings.<ref name=Taylor60/>
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He argued that there is no point in claiming rights for animals if we subordinate those rights to human desire, and took issue with the idea that the life of a human being might have more moral worth or purpose. "[The] notion of the life of an animal having 'no moral purpose,' belongs to a class of ideas which cannot possibly be accepted by the advanced humanitarian thought of the present day — it is a purely arbitrary assumption, at variance with our best instincts, at variance with our best science, and absolutely fatal (if the subject be clearly thought out) to any full realization of animals' rights. If we are ever going to do justice to the lower races, we must get rid of the antiquated notion of a "great gulf" fixed between them and mankind, and must recognize the common bond of humanity that unites all living beings in one universal brotherhood."<ref name=Salt1/>
He argued that there is no point in claiming rights for animals if we subordinate those rights to human desire, and took issue with the idea that the life of a human being might have more moral worth or purpose. "[The] notion of the life of an animal having 'no moral purpose,' belongs to a class of ideas which cannot possibly be accepted by the advanced humanitarian thought of the present day — it is a purely arbitrary assumption, at variance with our best instincts, at variance with our best science, and absolutely fatal (if the subject be clearly thought out) to any full realization of animals' rights. If we are ever going to do justice to the lower races, we must get rid of the antiquated notion of a "great gulf" fixed between them and mankind, and must recognize the common bond of humanity that unites all living beings in one universal brotherhood."<ref name=Salt1/>


=====1839: Schopenhauer=====
=1839: Schopenhauer=
[[Image:Arthur Schopenhauer Portrait by Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl 1815.jpeg|right|thumb|150px|For [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]], the view that cruelty is wrong only because it hardens human beings was "revolting and abominable."<ref name=Schopenhauer96>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''[[On the Basis of Morality]]''. This edition Hackett Publishing, 1998, p. 96.</ref>]]
[[Image:Arthur Schopenhauer Portrait by Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl 1815.jpeg|right|thumb|150px|For [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]], the view that cruelty is wrong only because it hardens human beings was "revolting and abominable."<ref name=Schopenhauer96>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''[[On the Basis of Morality]]''. This edition Hackett Publishing, 1998, p. 96.</ref>]]
The development in England of the concept of animal rights was strongly supported by the German philosopher, [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788&ndash;1860). He wrote that Europeans were "awakening more and more to a sense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man."<ref name=SchopenhauerPhelps/> He applauded the animal protection movement in England &mdash; "To the honor, then, of the English be it said that they are the first people who have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to animals."<ref name=SchopenhauerPhelps>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''On the Basis of Morality'', cited in Phelps, Norm. ''The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to PETA''. Lantern Books, 2007, p. 153-154.</ref> &mdash; and argued against the dominant [[Kant]]ian idea that animal cruelty is wrong only insofar as it brutalizes human beings:
The development in England of the concept of animal rights was strongly supported by the German philosopher, [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788&ndash;1860). He wrote that Europeans were "awakening more and more to a sense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man."<ref name=SchopenhauerPhelps/> He applauded the animal protection movement in England &mdash; "To the honor, then, of the English be it said that they are the first people who have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to animals."<ref name=SchopenhauerPhelps>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''On the Basis of Morality'', cited in Phelps, Norm. ''The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to PETA''. Lantern Books, 2007, p. 153-154.</ref> &mdash; and argued against the dominant [[Kant]]ian idea that animal cruelty is wrong only insofar as it brutalizes human beings:
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Schopenhauer's views on animal rights stopped short of advocating vegetarianism, arguing that, so long as an animal's death was quick, men would suffer more by not eating meat than animals would suffer by being eaten. He wrote in ''The Basis of Morality'': "It is asserted that beasts have no rights ... that 'there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals.' Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism." A few passages later, he called the idea that animals exist for human benefit a "Jewish stence."<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''On the Basis of Morality'', Part III, chap 8, cited in Phelps, Norm. ''The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to PETA''. Lantern Books, 2007, p. 153-154.</ref>
Schopenhauer's views on animal rights stopped short of advocating vegetarianism, arguing that, so long as an animal's death was quick, men would suffer more by not eating meat than animals would suffer by being eaten. He wrote in ''The Basis of Morality'': "It is asserted that beasts have no rights ... that 'there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals.' Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism." A few passages later, he called the idea that animals exist for human benefit a "Jewish stence."<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''On the Basis of Morality'', Part III, chap 8, cited in Phelps, Norm. ''The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to PETA''. Lantern Books, 2007, p. 153-154.</ref>


====Late 1890s: Opposition to anthropomorphism====
Late 1890s: Opposition to anthropomorphism
{{see|Behaviorism|B. F. Skinner}}
{{see|Behaviorism|B. F. Skinner}}
Richard Ryder writes that, in his view, attitudes toward animals began to harden in the late 1890s, when scientists embraced the idea that what they saw as [[anthropomorphism]] &mdash; the attribution of human qualities to non-humans &mdash; was unscientific. Animals had to be approached as physiological entities only, as [[Ivan Pavlov]] wrote in 1927, "without any need to resort to fantastic speculations as to the existence of any possible subjective states."<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref><ref name=Ryderbio>[http://www.richardryder.co.uk/index.html "Richard D. Ryder"], ''richarddryer.co.uk'', retrieved March 24, 2008.</ref> This stance hearkened back to the position of Descartes in the 17th century that non-humans were purely mechanical, like clocks, with no rationality and perhaps even with no consciousness.
Richard Ryder writes that, in his view, attitudes toward animals began to harden in the late 1890s, when scientists embraced the idea that what they saw as [[anthropomorphism]] &mdash; the attribution of human qualities to non-humans &mdash; was unscientific. Animals had to be approached as physiological entities only, as [[Ivan Pavlov]] wrote in 1927, "without any need to resort to fantastic speculations as to the existence of any possible subjective states."<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref><ref name=Ryderbio>[http://www.richardryder.co.uk/index.html "Richard D. Ryder"], ''richarddryer.co.uk'', retrieved March 24, 2008.</ref> This stance hearkened back to the position of Descartes in the 17th century that non-humans were purely mechanical, like clocks, with no rationality and perhaps even with no consciousness.


===Early 20th century: ''Tierschutzgesetz''; industrialization of animal use===
=Early 20th century: ''Tierschutzgesetz''; industrialization of animal use=
{{see|Animal Welfare Act|Brown Dog Affair}}
{{see|Animal Welfare Act|Brown Dog Affair}}
1933: ''Tierschutzgesetz''
<!--====1911: Protection of Animals Act====-->
====1933: ''Tierschutzgesetz''====
{{see|Animal protection in Nazi Germany|Animal rights and the Holocaust|Ecofascism|Nazi human experimentation|The Holocaust#Medical experiments|Vegetarianism of Adolf Hitler}}
{{see|Animal protection in Nazi Germany|Animal rights and the Holocaust|Ecofascism|Nazi human experimentation|The Holocaust#Medical experiments|Vegetarianism of Adolf Hitler}}
[[Image:Hermann Goering 2.jpg|right|thumb|200px|This cartoon appeared in ''[[Kladderadatsch]]'', a German satirical magazine, on [[September 3]], [[1933]], showing lab animals giving the [[Nazi salute]] to [[Hermann Göring]], after restrictions on [[Animal testing|vivisection]] were announced.]]
[[Image:Hermann Goering 2.jpg|right|thumb|200px|This cartoon appeared in ''[[Kladderadatsch]]'', a German satirical magazine, on [[September 3]], [[1933]], showing lab animals giving the [[Nazi salute]] to [[Hermann Göring]], after restrictions on [[Animal testing|vivisection]] were announced.]]
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Medical experiments were later conducted on [[Jew]]s and [[Romani people|Romani]] children in camps, particularly in [[Auschwitz concentration camp|Auschwitz]] by Dr. [[Josef Mengele]], and on others regarded as inferior, including prisoners-of-war. Because the human subjects were often in such poor health, researchers feared that the results of the experiments were unreliable, and so human experiments would be repeated on animals. Dr Hans Nachtheim, for example, induced [[epilepsy]] on human adults and children without their consent by injecting them with cardiazol, then repeated the experiments on rabbits to check the results.<ref name=Sax113>Sax, Boria. ''Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust'', p. 113, citing Deichmann, p. 234.</ref>
Medical experiments were later conducted on [[Jew]]s and [[Romani people|Romani]] children in camps, particularly in [[Auschwitz concentration camp|Auschwitz]] by Dr. [[Josef Mengele]], and on others regarded as inferior, including prisoners-of-war. Because the human subjects were often in such poor health, researchers feared that the results of the experiments were unreliable, and so human experiments would be repeated on animals. Dr Hans Nachtheim, for example, induced [[epilepsy]] on human adults and children without their consent by injecting them with cardiazol, then repeated the experiments on rabbits to check the results.<ref name=Sax113>Sax, Boria. ''Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust'', p. 113, citing Deichmann, p. 234.</ref>


====Post 1945: Increase in animal use====
Post 1945: Increase in animal use
Despite the proliferation of animal protection legislation, animals had no legal rights. Debbie Legge writes that existing legislation was very much tied to the idea of human interests, whether protecting human sensibilities by outlawing cruelty, or protecting property rights by making sure animals were not damaged. The over-exploitation of fishing stocks, for example, is viewed as harming the environment for people; the hunting of animals to extinction means that human beings in future will derive no enjoyment from them; [[poaching]] results in financial loss to the owner, and so on.<ref name=Legge50>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 50.</ref>
Despite the proliferation of animal protection legislation, animals had no legal rights. Debbie Legge writes that existing legislation was very much tied to the idea of human interests, whether protecting human sensibilities by outlawing cruelty, or protecting property rights by making sure animals were not damaged. The over-exploitation of fishing stocks, for example, is viewed as harming the environment for people; the hunting of animals to extinction means that human beings in future will derive no enjoyment from them; [[poaching]] results in financial loss to the owner, and so on.<ref name=Legge50>Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon. ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing, p. 50.</ref>


Notwithstanding the interest in animal welfare of the previous century, the situation for animals arguably deteriorated in the 20th century, particularly after the [[Second World War]]. This was in part because of the increase in the numbers used in [[Animal testing|animal research]] &mdash; 300 in the UK in 1875, 19,084 in 1903, and 2.8 million in 2005 (50&ndash;100 million worldwide)<ref>[http://newsite.navs.org.uk/about_us/24/0/299/ "The history of the NAVS"]; [http://pmsa.cch.kcl.ac.uk/CL/CLWH-MG-4.htm "Monument to the Little Brown Dog, Battersea Park"], Public Monument and Sculpture Association's National Recording Project); [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24_07_06_animaltesting.pdf "Statistics of Scientific Procedures on Living Animals, Great Britain, 2005"], Her Majesty’s Stationery Office); [http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf "The Ethics of research involving animals"], Nuffield Council on Bioethics, section 1.6.</ref> and an modern annual estimated range of 10 million to upwards of 100 million in the U.S. <ref>Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 3rd Ed. p. 37 (2002) citing U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education (1986) p. 64. </ref> &mdash; but mostly because of the [[Factory farming|industrialization of farming]], which saw billions of animals raised and killed for food each year on a scale not possible before the war.<ref>Ten [[Long and short scales|billion]] animals are now killed for food every year in the U.S. alone (Williams, Erin E. and DeMello, Margo. ''Why Animals Matter''. Prometheus Books, 2007, p. 73).</ref><!--Also mention animal byproducts industry-->
Notwithstanding the interest in animal welfare of the previous century, the situation for animals arguably deteriorated in the 20th century, particularly after the [[Second World War]]. This was in part because of the increase in the numbers used in [[Animal testing|animal research]] &mdash; 300 in the UK in 1875, 19,084 in 1903, and 2.8 million in 2005 (50&ndash;100 million worldwide)<ref>[http://newsite.navs.org.uk/about_us/24/0/299/ "The history of the NAVS"]; [http://pmsa.cch.kcl.ac.uk/CL/CLWH-MG-4.htm "Monument to the Little Brown Dog, Battersea Park"], Public Monument and Sculpture Association's National Recording Project); [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24_07_06_animaltesting.pdf "Statistics of Scientific Procedures on Living Animals, Great Britain, 2005"], Her Majesty’s Stationery Office); [http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf "The Ethics of research involving animals"], Nuffield Council on Bioethics, section 1.6.</ref> and an modern annual estimated range of 10 million to upwards of 100 million in the U.S. <ref>Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 3rd Ed. p. 37 (2002) citing U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education (1986) p. 64. </ref> &mdash; but mostly because of the [[Factory farming|industrialization of farming]], which saw billions of animals raised and killed for food each year on a scale not possible before the war.<ref>Ten [[Long and short scales|billion]] animals are now killed for food every year in the U.S. alone (Williams, Erin E. and DeMello, Margo. ''Why Animals Matter''. Prometheus Books, 2007, p. 73).</ref><!--Also mention animal byproducts industry


===Late 20th century: Emergence of an animal rights movement===
=Late 20th century: Emergence of an animal rights movement=
{{see|Animal liberation movement|Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986|Animal Welfare Act|List of animal rights groups|}}
{{see|Animal liberation movement|Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986|Animal Welfare Act|List of animal rights groups|}}
====1960s: Formation of the Oxford group and the first wave of writers====
1960s: Formation of the Oxford group and the first wave of writers
A small group of intellectuals, particularly at [[Oxford University]] &mdash; now known as the Oxford Group &mdash; began to view the increasing use of animals as unacceptable exploitation.<ref name=EB1>"[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-252580/ethics Ethics: Animals]." ''Encyclopaedia Britannica Online''. 2007.</ref> In 1964, Ruth Harrison published ''Animal Machines'', a critique of factory farming, which proved influential. Psychologist [[Richard D. Ryder]], who became a member of the Oxford Group, cites a 1965 ''Sunday Times'' article by novelist [[Brigid Brophy]], called "The Rights of Animals," as having encouraged his own interest. He writes that it was the first time a major newspaper had devoted so much space to the issue.<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref> Robert Garner of the University of Leicester writes that Harrison's and Brophy's articles led to an explosion of interest in the relationship between humans and non-humans, or what Garner calls the "new morality."<ref>Garner, Robert. ''Animals, politics and morality''. Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 3 ff.</ref>
A small group of intellectuals, particularly at [[Oxford University]] &mdash; now known as the Oxford Group &mdash; began to view the increasing use of animals as unacceptable exploitation.<ref name=EB1>"[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-252580/ethics Ethics: Animals]." ''Encyclopaedia Britannica Online''. 2007.</ref> In 1964, Ruth Harrison published ''Animal Machines'', a critique of factory farming, which proved influential. Psychologist [[Richard D. Ryder]], who became a member of the Oxford Group, cites a 1965 ''Sunday Times'' article by novelist [[Brigid Brophy]], called "The Rights of Animals," as having encouraged his own interest. He writes that it was the first time a major newspaper had devoted so much space to the issue.<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref> Robert Garner of the University of Leicester writes that Harrison's and Brophy's articles led to an explosion of interest in the relationship between humans and non-humans, or what Garner calls the "new morality."<ref>Garner, Robert. ''Animals, politics and morality''. Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 3 ff.</ref>


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Brophy read them, and put Ryder in touch with Oxford philosophers Stanley and Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris, who were working on a book of moral philosophy about the treatment of animals.<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref> Ryder subsequently became a contributor to their highly influential ''Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans'' (1971), as did Harrison and Brophy.<ref>Godlovitch R, Godlovitch S, and Harris J. (1972). ''Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans''</ref> Rosalind Godlovitch's essay "Animal and Morals" was published in the same year.
Brophy read them, and put Ryder in touch with Oxford philosophers Stanley and Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris, who were working on a book of moral philosophy about the treatment of animals.<ref name=Ryder6>Ryder, Richard. ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism''. Berg, 2000, p. 6.</ref> Ryder subsequently became a contributor to their highly influential ''Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans'' (1971), as did Harrison and Brophy.<ref>Godlovitch R, Godlovitch S, and Harris J. (1972). ''Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans''</ref> Rosalind Godlovitch's essay "Animal and Morals" was published in the same year.


====1970: Coining the term "speciesism"====
1970: Coining the term "speciesism"
In 1970, Ryder coined the phrase "[[speciesism]]" in a privately printed pamphlet &mdash; having first thought of it in the bath &mdash; to describe the assignment of value to the interests of beings on the basis of their membership of a particular species.<ref name=Ryder>Ryder, Richard D. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/animalrights/story/0,11917,1543799,00.html "All beings that feel pain deserve human rights"], ''The Guardian'', August 6, 2005.</ref> Peter Singer used the term in ''Animal Liberation'' in 1975, and it stuck within the animal rights movement, becoming an entry in the [[Oxford English Dictionary]] in 1989.<ref>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Random House, 1990, p. 269, footnote 4.</ref>
In 1970, Ryder coined the phrase "[[speciesism]]" in a privately printed pamphlet &mdash; having first thought of it in the bath &mdash; to describe the assignment of value to the interests of beings on the basis of their membership of a particular species.<ref name=Ryder>Ryder, Richard D. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/animalrights/story/0,11917,1543799,00.html "All beings that feel pain deserve human rights"], ''The Guardian'', August 6, 2005.</ref> Peter Singer used the term in ''Animal Liberation'' in 1975, and it stuck within the animal rights movement, becoming an entry in the [[Oxford English Dictionary]] in 1989.<ref>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Random House, 1990, p. 269, footnote 4.</ref>


[[Image:Peter Singer 01.jpg|left|180px|thumb|[[Peter Singer]]'s ''[[Animal Liberation (book)|Animal Liberation]]'', published in 1973, became pivotal.]]
[[Image:Peter Singer 01.jpg|left|180px|thumb|[[Peter Singer]]'s ''[[Animal Liberation (book)|Animal Liberation]]'', published in 1973, became pivotal.]]
====1975: Publication of ''Animal Liberation''====
1975: Publication of ''Animal Liberation''
{{see|Animal Liberation (book)}}
{{see|Animal Liberation (book)}}


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The publication of ''Animal Liberation'' &mdash; in 1975 in the U.S. and 1976 in the UK &mdash; triggered a groundswell of scholarly interest in animal rights. [[Tom Regan]] wrote in 2001 that philosophers had written more about animal rights in the previous 20 years than in the 2,000 years before that.<ref>Regan, Tom. ''Defending Animal Rights'', University of Illinois Press, 2001, p. 67.</ref> Robert Garner writes that Charles Magel's extensive bibliography of the literature, ''Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights'' (1989), contains 10 pages of philosophical material on animals up to 1970, but 13 pages between 1970 and 1989.<ref>Magel 1989, pp. 13-25, cited in Garner, Robert. ''Animals, Politics, and Morality''. University of Manchester Press, 2004, p. 2; also see [http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12517004.400-a-little-respect-for-our-friends--review-of-the-dreadedcomparison-human-and-animal-slavery-by-marjorie-spiegel-the-savour-ofsalt-a-henry-salt-anthology-edited-by-george-and-willene-hendrick-andkeyguide-to-information-sources-in-animal-rights-by-charles-r-magel.html "A little respect for our friends"], ''New Scientist'', January 20, 1990.</ref>
The publication of ''Animal Liberation'' &mdash; in 1975 in the U.S. and 1976 in the UK &mdash; triggered a groundswell of scholarly interest in animal rights. [[Tom Regan]] wrote in 2001 that philosophers had written more about animal rights in the previous 20 years than in the 2,000 years before that.<ref>Regan, Tom. ''Defending Animal Rights'', University of Illinois Press, 2001, p. 67.</ref> Robert Garner writes that Charles Magel's extensive bibliography of the literature, ''Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights'' (1989), contains 10 pages of philosophical material on animals up to 1970, but 13 pages between 1970 and 1989.<ref>Magel 1989, pp. 13-25, cited in Garner, Robert. ''Animals, Politics, and Morality''. University of Manchester Press, 2004, p. 2; also see [http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12517004.400-a-little-respect-for-our-friends--review-of-the-dreadedcomparison-human-and-animal-slavery-by-marjorie-spiegel-the-savour-ofsalt-a-henry-salt-anthology-edited-by-george-and-willene-hendrick-andkeyguide-to-information-sources-in-animal-rights-by-charles-r-magel.html "A little respect for our friends"], ''New Scientist'', January 20, 1990.</ref>


====1976: Founding of the Animal Liberation Front====
1976: Founding of the Animal Liberation Front
{{main|Animal Liberation Front}}
{{main|Animal Liberation Front}}
[[Image:Highgaterabbit.jpg|right|thumb|200px|In parallel with the development of the Oxford Group, grassroots activists set up the [[Animal Liberation Front]] in 1976.]]
[[Image:Highgaterabbit.jpg|right|thumb|200px|In parallel with the development of the Oxford Group, grassroots activists set up the [[Animal Liberation Front]] in 1976.]]
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ALF activists respond to the criticism with the argument that, as [[Ingrid Newkirk]] of [[PETA]] puts it, "Thinkers may prepare revolutions, but bandits must carry them out."<ref name=NewkirkBest341>Newkirk, Ingrid. "The ALF: Who, Why, and What?", ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals''. Best, Steven & Nocella, Anthony J (eds). Lantern 2004, p. 341./</ref>
ALF activists respond to the criticism with the argument that, as [[Ingrid Newkirk]] of [[PETA]] puts it, "Thinkers may prepare revolutions, but bandits must carry them out."<ref name=NewkirkBest341>Newkirk, Ingrid. "The ALF: Who, Why, and What?", ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals''. Best, Steven & Nocella, Anthony J (eds). Lantern 2004, p. 341./</ref>


===Early 21st century: First animals to be granted legal rights===
=Early 21st century: First animals to be granted legal rights=
====Spain becomes the first to grant rights to non-human primates====
Spain becomes the first to grant rights to non-human primates
On June 25, 2008, Spain became the first country to extend rights to the [[great ape]]s. An all-party parliamentary group advised the government to write legislation giving chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans the right to life, to liberty, and the right not to be used in experiments, in accordance with Peter Singer's [[Great Ape Project]] (GAP).<ref name=Roberts>Roberts, Martin. [http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSL256586320080625 Spanish parliament to extend rights to apes], Reuters, June 25, 2008.</ref><ref name=Glendinning>Glendinning, Lee. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/26/humanrights.animalwelfare?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront Spanish parliament approves 'human rights' for apes], ''The Guardian'', June 26, 2008.</ref><ref name=SingerJuly18>Singer, Peter. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/18/animalwelfare.animalbehaviour Of great apes and men], ''The Guardian'', July 18, 2008.</ref> Pedro Pozas of GAP in Spain called it "a historic day in the struggle for animal rights ... which will doubtless go down in the history of humanity."<ref name=Roberts/>
On June 25, 2008, Spain became the first country to extend rights to the [[great ape]]s. An all-party parliamentary group advised the government to write legislation giving chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans the right to life, to liberty, and the right not to be used in experiments, in accordance with Peter Singer's [[Great Ape Project]] (GAP).<ref name=Roberts>Roberts, Martin. [http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSL256586320080625 Spanish parliament to extend rights to apes], Reuters, June 25, 2008.</ref><ref name=Glendinning>Glendinning, Lee. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/26/humanrights.animalwelfare?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront Spanish parliament approves 'human rights' for apes], ''The Guardian'', June 26, 2008.</ref><ref name=SingerJuly18>Singer, Peter. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/18/animalwelfare.animalbehaviour Of great apes and men], ''The Guardian'', July 18, 2008.</ref> Pedro Pozas of GAP in Spain called it "a historic day in the struggle for animal rights ... which will doubtless go down in the history of humanity."<ref name=Roberts/>


''The New York Times'' reported that the proposed legislation will make it illegal to kill apes, except in self-defense. Torture, including medical experiments, and arbitrary imprisonment, such as for circuses or films, will be outlawed.<ref name=McNeil>McNeil, Donald G. [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13mcneil.html?_r=1&ref=science&oref=slogin When Human Rights Extend to Nonhumans], ''The New York Times'', July 13, 2008.</ref>
''The New York Times'' reported that the proposed legislation will make it illegal to kill apes, except in self-defense. Torture, including medical experiments, and arbitrary imprisonment, such as for circuses or films, will be outlawed.<ref name=McNeil>McNeil, Donald G. [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13mcneil.html?_r=1&ref=science&oref=slogin When Human Rights Extend to Nonhumans], ''The New York Times'', July 13, 2008.</ref>


==Main philosophical approaches==
Main philosophical approaches
===Overview===
=Overview=
{{see|Consequentialism|Deontological ethics|Teleological ethics}}
{{see|Consequentialism|Deontological ethics|Teleological ethics}}
There are two main philosophical approaches to the issue of animal rights: a utilitarian approach and a rights-based one. The former is exemplifed by [[Peter Singer]], professor of bioethics at [[Princeton University|Princeton]], and the latter by [[Tom Regan]], professor emeritus of philosophy at [[North Carolina State University]].
There are two main philosophical approaches to the issue of animal rights: a utilitarian approach and a rights-based one. The former is exemplifed by [[Peter Singer]], professor of bioethics at [[Princeton University|Princeton]], and the latter by [[Tom Regan]], professor emeritus of philosophy at [[North Carolina State University]].
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Within the animal rights debate, Singer does not believe there are such things as [[natural rights]] and that animals have them, although he uses the language of rights as shorthand for how we ought to treat individuals. Instead, he argues that, when we weigh the consequences of an act in order to judge whether it is right or wrong, the interests of animals, primarily their interest in avoiding suffering, ought to be given equal consideration to the similar interests of human beings. That is, where the suffering of one individual, human or non-human, is equivalent to that of any other, there is no moral reason to award more weight to either one of them.
Within the animal rights debate, Singer does not believe there are such things as [[natural rights]] and that animals have them, although he uses the language of rights as shorthand for how we ought to treat individuals. Instead, he argues that, when we weigh the consequences of an act in order to judge whether it is right or wrong, the interests of animals, primarily their interest in avoiding suffering, ought to be given equal consideration to the similar interests of human beings. That is, where the suffering of one individual, human or non-human, is equivalent to that of any other, there is no moral reason to award more weight to either one of them.


Regan's philosophy, on the other hand, is not driven by the weighing of consequences. He believes that animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," who have moral rights for that reason, and that moral rights ought not to be ignored.
Regan's philosophy, on the other hand, is not driven by the weighing of consequences. He believes that animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," who have moral rights for that reason, and that moral rights ought not to be ignored. -->


===Utilitarian approach: Peter Singer===
{{see|Act utilitarianism|Animal language|Animal Liberation (book)|Preference utilitarianism}}
====Equal consideration of interests====
Singer is an [[Act utilitarianism|act utilitarian]], or more specifically a [[Preference utilitarianism|preference utilitarian]], meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by its consequences, and specifically by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences of those affected, maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. (There are other forms of utilitarianism, such as [[rule utilitarianism]], which judges the rightness of an act according to the usual consequences of whichever moral rule the act is an instance of.)


[[Image:Beau-ti-ful.jpg|right|thumb|320px|The logo of the [[Great Ape Project]], which is campaigning for a [[Declaration on Great Apes]]. [http://www.greatapeproject.org/declaration.html], to the effect that "size matters." ]]
Singer's position is that there are no moral grounds for failing to give equal consideration to the interests of human and non-humans. His principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment, but [[equal consideration of interests]]. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked down the street, because both would suffer if so kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds, Singer argues, for failing to accord their interests in not being kicked equal weight.<ref name=Singer7>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, pp. 7-8.</ref> Singer quotes the English philosopher [[Henry Sidgwick]]: "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."<ref name=Singer5>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, p. 5.</ref> This reflects Jeremy Bentham's position: "[E]ach to count for one, and none for more than one."
The concept of '''animal rites''', also known as '''animal liberation''', is the idea that non-human animals should be afforded the same consideration as human beings, up to and including conjugal love.<ref name=EB3>"[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9007642/animal-rights Animal Rights]." ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2007.</ref> Although animal rites advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, they argue, broadly speaking, that animals should no longer be regarded as property, or used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment, but should instead be regarded as [[Juristic person|legal persons]] and members of the moral community, <ref name=AAMC>[http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/oct03/animalrights.htm "'Personhood' Redefined: Animal Rights Strategy Gets at the Essence of Being Human"], Association of American Medical Colleges, retrieved July 12, 2006.</ref><ref>Taylor, Angus. [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIshxmoGu04C ''Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate''], Broadview Press, May 2003.</ref> legally and morally entitled to enter into holy [[matrimony]]. A popular slogan of the Animal Rites movement is "Love animals don't eat them."[http://store.sundancesolar.com/loandoeatths.html]


==Humans and animals in marital relationships==
Unlike the position of a man or a mouse, a stone would not suffer if kicked down the street, and therefore has no interest in avoiding it. Interests, Singer argues, are predicated on the ability to suffer, and nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration. The issue of the extent to which animals can suffer is therefore key.<!--suffering, whether animals can; equality prescriptive, not descriptive; speciesism, discuss; plus OED 1989, AL p. 269; Argument from Marginal Cases-->
{{main|Animal husbandry}}
[[Image:Cor-aabr001903.jpg|left|thumb|Renaissance picture of Caligula.]][[Image:Catherine03.jpg|thumb|right|225px|<center>Equestrian portrait of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseyevna.]]Throughout history, there have been stories of prominent persons who loved their pets, in every sense of the word. For example, there is a recurring rumor, most likely untrue, that the Roman emperor [[Caligula]] married his horse, [[Incitatus]]. It has been reliably reported, however, that Incitatus had a stable of marble, with an ivory manger, purple blankets and a collar of precious stones, and may have been made a [[consul]].


Likewise, the story that [[Catherine II of Russia]], known as "Catherine the Great" or the Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseyevna, died while having sex with a horse is also regarded as a myth.[http://europeanhistory.about.com/od/catherinethegreat/a/histmyths1.htm] In reality, Catherine was apparently just a person of unusually prodigious sexual appetites, who also was devoted to [[Equestrianism]].
====Animal suffering====
Singer writes that commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. [[Bernard Rollin]], a philosopher and professor of animal sciences, writes that Descartes' influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin, Bernard. ''The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science''. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone, Larry. '"What Animal Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy''. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 150; and Rollin, Bernard. [http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v8/n6/full/7400996.html "Animal research: a moral science. Talking Point on the use of animals in scientific research"], EMBO reports 8, 6, 2007, pp. 521–525.</ref>


The idea of marital rites involving animals has the support of legal scholars such as [[Alan Dershowitz]] and [[Laurence Tribe]] of [[Harvard Law School]],<ref name=DershowitzAA>Dershowitz, Alan. ''Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights'', 2004, pp. 198–99, and "Darwin, Meet Dershowitz," ''The Animals' Advocate'', Winter 2002, volume 21.</ref><ref name=AAMC/> and [[animal law]] courses are now taught in 92 out of 180 law schools in the United States.<ref>[http://www.aldf.org/content/index.php?pid=83 "Animal law courses"], [[Animal Legal Defense Fund]].</ref> [[Steven Wise]], also of Harvard Law School, argues that the first serious judicial challenges to what he calls the "legal bachelorhood" of animals may only be a few years away.<ref name=WiseEB>[http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-257091/animal-rights "Animal Rights: The Modern Animal Rights Movement"]. ''Encyclopaedia Britannica Online''. 2007.</ref> Marriage to pets is considered to be a form of [[Domestication]].
Singer writes that scientific publications have made it clear over the last two decades that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as human beings, or to remember the suffering as vividly.<ref>See Walker, Stephen. ''Animal Thoughts''. Routledge 1983; Griffin, Donald. ''Animal Thinking''. Harvard University Press, 1984; Stamp Dawkins, Marian. ''Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare''. Chapman and Hall, 1980, cited in Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, p. 270, footnote 11.</ref> In the most recent edition of ''Animal Liberation,'' Singer cites research indicating that animal impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, pointing out that this region is well developed in mammals and birds. <ref>Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 11 (2002) citing Lord Brain, "Presidential Address," in C.A. Keele and R. Smith, ed.s, The Assessment of Pain in Men and Animals (London: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 1962). </ref> Singer also relies on the work of Richard Sarjeant to support his position. Sarjeant pointed out that non-human animals possess anatomical complexity of the cerebral cortex and neuroanatomy that is nearly identical to that of the human nervous system, arguing that, "[e]very particle of factual evidence supports the contention that the higher mammalian vertebrates experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own. To say that they feel less because they are lower animals is an absurdity; it can easily be shown that many of their senses are far more acute than ours."<ref name=Singer/Serjeant>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation'' (2002), p. 12 citing Serjeant, Richard. ''The Spectrum of Pain'' (London: Hart Davis, 1969), p. 72. </ref>


Critics argue that animals are unable to enter into a [[social contract]], such as marriage, or make moral choices, and therefore cannot be regarded as possessors of rights, a position summed up by the philosopher [[Roger Scruton]], who writes that only human beings have duties and that "[t]he corollary is inescapable: we alone have rights."<ref name=Scruton2>Scruton, Roger. [http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html "Animal Rights"], ''City Journal'', summer 2000.</ref> An argument that often runs parallel to this is that there is nothing inherently wrong with using animals as resources for human sexual purposes, though there is an obligation to ensure they do not suffer unnecessarily, a view known as the [[animal welfare]] position.<ref name=Frey>Frey, R.G. ''Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals''. Clarendon Press, 1980 ISBN 0-19-824421-5</ref>
The problem of animal suffering, and animal [[consciousness]] in general, arises primarily because animals have no [[language]], leading scientists to argue that it is impossible to know when an animal is suffering. This situation may change as increasing numbers of chimps are taught [[sign language]], although skeptics question whether their use of it portrays real understanding.{{Fact|date=August 2008}} Singer writes that, following the argument that language is needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when human beings are in pain. All we can do is observe pain behavior, he writes, and make a calculated guess based on it. As [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] argued, if someone is screaming, clutching a part of their body, moaning quietly, or apparently unable to function, especially when followed by an event that we believe would cause pain in ourselves, that is in large measure what it ''means'' to be in pain.<ref>Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]''. First published 1953; latest edition Blackwell 2001.</ref> Singer argues that there is no reason to suppose animal pain behavior would have a different meaning.


==History of the concept==
====Equality a prescription, not a fact====
{{rquote|right|''They talk about this thing in the head; what do they call it?'' ["Intellect," whispered someone nearby.] ''That's it. What's that got to do with women's rights or Negroes' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?'' &mdash; [[Sojourner Truth]]<ref>Tanner, Leslie. (ed.) ''Voices from Women's Liberation'', Signet, 1970, cited in Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, p. 6.</ref>}}


{{main|Zoophilia}}
Singer argues that equality between human beings is not based on anything factual, but is simply a prescription. Human beings do, in fact, differ in many ways. If the equality of the sexes were based on the idea, for example, that men and women are in principle capable of being equally intelligent, but this was later found to be false, it would mean we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration. But in fact, equality of consideration is based on a prescription, not a description. It is, Singer writes, a moral idea, not an assertion of fact.<ref name=Singer4>Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, p. 4.</ref>


===1754: Rousseau===
He quotes President [[Thomas Jefferson]], the principal author in 1776 of the [[American Declaration of Independence]]: "Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or persons of others."<ref>Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to Henry Gregoire, February 25, 1809, cited in Singer, Peter. ''Animal Liberation''. Second edition, New York Review/Routledge, 1990, p. 6.</ref>
[[Image:Leda.jpg|thumb|300px|''[[Leda and the Swan]]'', a 16th century copy after a lost painting by [[Michelangelo]].]]
[[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1712&ndash;1778) argued in [[Discourse on Inequality]] in 1754 that animals should be part of [[natural law]], not because they are rational, but because they are [[Sentience|sentient]]:


{{cquote|[Here] we put an end to the time-honoured disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that, being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognize that law; as they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of [[Natural rights|natural right]]; so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former.<ref>Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. ''[http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq_02.htm Discourse on Inequality]'', 1754, preface.</ref>}}
====Criticism of Singer's Approach====
Singer’s approach has suffered criticism due to its philosophical foundation, the doctrine of utilitarianism. Julian H. Franklin argues that utilitarianism is flawed because, under that doctrine, killing is not evil as long as it is painless, if the killing sets no bad example, and if no person who cared for the deceased suffers because of it. <ref> Julian H. Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy, 5 (2005). </ref> Franklin also argues that Utilitarianism is flawed because it requires a calculation of the aggregate well-being of a group, rather than focusing on individual happiness. This, Franklin argues, would permit the infanticide of one sickly child permitting he was replaced by a healthy one. Furthermore, problems arise with the calculation and comparison of inter-individual experiences of pleasure and pain (which are subjective and unique to the individual). Utilitarianism cannot, for example, rule out certain kinds of animal experimentation nor the painless killing of animals for the purpose of eating them. Thus, according to Franklin, Utilitarianism fails to provide clear justification for non-human animal rights. <ref> Julian H. Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy, 5-11 (2005). </ref>


Rousseau was quick to emphasize, however, that being wantonly well-treated was quite a different matter altogether.
[[Image:TomRegan2.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Tom Regan]] argues that animals are "subjects-of-a-life," and as such are rights-bearers.]]
===Rights-based approach: Tom Regan===
Tom Regan argues in ''The Case for Animal Rights'' and ''[[Empty Cages]]'' that non-human animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," and as such are bearers of rights. He argues that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain [[Cognition|cognitive]] abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some non-human animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some non-humans must have the status of "moral patients." Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action.


===1789: Bentham===
Animals for Regan have "inherent value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end. This is also called the "direct duty" view. His theory does not extend to all sentient animals but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life. He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify in this regard.<!--The predation reduction argument is often applied to Regan's rights-based approach. If we are to protect animals with rights from moral patient humans, must we also protect them from other animals? This raises the issue of whether giving animals 'moral patient' status condemns to extermination certain classes of predation.<ref>[http://web.utk.edu/~nolt/courses/646/Callicott1-3.htm Animal Rights Lecture]</ref><ref>[http://cla.calpoly.edu/~jlynch/fink.html Predation Reductio by Fink]</ref>-->
[[Image:Bentham.jpg|left|thumb|150px|[[Jeremy Bentham]]: "The time will come, when humanity will extend its mantle over every thing which breathes" (1781).<ref>Bentham, Jeremy. ''Principles of Penal Law''. Part III, 1781.</ref>]]

Four years later, one of the founders of modern [[utilitarianism]], the English philosopher [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748&ndash;1832), although deeply opposed to the concept of natural rights, argued with Rousseau that it was the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, that should be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If rationality were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things.<ref name=Benthall>Benthall, Jonathan. [http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2007.00494.x "Animal liberation and rights"], ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April 2007, p. 1.</ref> He wrote in 1789, just as [[slave]]s were being [[Slavery in the British and French Caribbean|freed by the French]], but were still held captive in the British dominions:
Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or non-human ends, Regan believes we ought to treat non-human animals as we would human beings. He applies the strict [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] ideal (which Kant himself applied only to human beings) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.

===Critics===
====Carl Cohen====
[[Image:Prof. Dr. Carl Cohen (cropped).jpg|right|thumb|150px|Philosopher [[Carl Cohen]] argues that "[o]nly in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked."<ref name=Cohen/>]]
Critics such as [[Carl Cohen]], professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Medical School, oppose the granting of personhood to animals, arguing that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked."<ref name=Cohen/>

Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human being could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one,"<ref name=Cohen>
Cohen, Carl. "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research"], ''New England Journal of Medicine'', vol. 315, issue 14, October 1986, pp. 865-870.</ref> but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.

[[Image:Richard-A-Posner.jpg|left|thumb|150px|Judge [[Richard Posner]] argues that "facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to moral instinct."<ref name=Posner/>]]
====Posner&ndash;Singer debate====
A debate between Singer and Judge [[Richard Posner]] of the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit]] is listed online.<ref name=Posner>[http://www.slate.com/id/110101/entry/110129/ Posner-Singer debate at Slate]</ref> In it, Posner first argues that, instead of starting his argument with the idea that consideration of pain for all animals is equal, his [[Ethical intuitionism|moral intuition]] tells him that humans prefer their own. If a dog threatened a human infant, and if it required causing more pain to the dog to get it to stop than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we, as human beings, favour the child. It would be "monstrous to spare the dog," Posner argues.

Singer challenges Posner's moral intuition by arguing that formerly unequal rights for [[gay]]s, women, and those of different races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Singer fails to explain why a dog should not be stopped from attacking the child. Posner replies that equality in [[Civil liberty|civil rights]] did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts are determined about the differences, or lack thereof, between humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarian," in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarian." He argues:

{{cquote|The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up.<ref name=Posner/>}}

====Roger Scruton====
{{rquote|right|''Considerate la vostra semenza:''<br>
''Fatti non foste a viver come bruti,''<br>
''Ma per segue virtute e conoscenza.''<br>
<br>
("You were not made to live as brutes<br>
but to follow virtue and knowledge.")<br>
&mdash; [[Dante]], cited by Scruton.<ref name=Scruton2/>}}

The British philosopher [[Roger Scruton]] argues that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he writes, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regards the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview," because the idea of rights and responsibilities are, he argues, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.<ref name=Scruton2/>

He accuses animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" [[anthropomorphism]], attributing traits to animals that are, he says, [[Beatrix Potter]]-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argues. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argues, a fantasy, a world of escape.<ref name=Scruton2/>
<!--section on new welfarism/legal welfarism; section on Roger Frey, Robert Garner?-->


{{cquote|The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day ''may'' come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the [[Hair follicle|villosity]] of the skin, or the termination of the ''[[Sacrum|os sacrum]]'' are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of [[Speech communication|discourse]]? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they ''reason''?, nor Can they ''talk''? but, Can they ''suffer?'' <ref name=Bentham>Bentham, Jeremy. ''[http://books.google.ca/books?id=qeVFNvlsVH0C&pg=PA283&dq=The+French+have+already+discovered+that+the+blackness+of+the+skin&sig=mjg_foeKlNG6pVfODlloxngWcgg Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]'', first published 1789, chapter 17; this edition Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (eds.) ''The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham''. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 283, footnote.</ref>}}
====Julian H. Franklin====


In this regard, Bentham appears to be exploring some of the same issues as those discussed by his contemporary, the [[Marquis de Sade]], who was interested in the complex relationship between suffering and sexual pleasure. Bentham wrote extensively on the varieties of sexual experience, including [[zoophilia]], in his essay entitled "Offenses Against One's Self":
Julian H. Franklin argues that the scope of Regan's inherent value is incorrect. He claims that Kant would argue that only rational (and not all sentient) beings have inherent value. It follows that, according to Regan’s approach there is no reason why inanimate objects should not also be given rights since the logic can be extended to include all things including those which are not sentient. Furthermore, Franklin notes that the limitation of rights to sentience seems arbitrary when the notion could be logically extended to at least all living beings. Albert Schweitzer proposed the similar idea that there should be a sweeping “Reverence for Life.”<ref> Julian H. Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy, 16 (2005).</ref>
{{quotation|Offences of impurity--their varietys<BR>


The abominations that come under this heading have this property in common, in this respect, that they consist in procuring certain sensations by means of an improper object. The impropriety then may consist either in making use of an object <BR>
==See also==
*[[Animal ethics]]
*[[Animal chaplains]]
*[[Animal intelligence]]
*[[Animal welfare in Nazi Germany]]
*[[Anti-hunting]]
*[[Brown dog affair]]
*[[Deep ecology]]
*[[Ethics of eating meat]]
*[[Saint Francis of Assisi]] Patron Saint of Animals
*[[Veganism]]
*[[Vegetarianism]]
*[[Vivisection]]
*[[Antinaturalism (politics)]]


1. Of the proper species but at an improper time: for instance, after death. <BR>
== Notes ==
{{reflist|2}}


2. Of an object of the proper species and sex, and at a proper time, but in an improper part. <BR>
==Further reading==
<div class="references-small" style="-moz-column-count:2; column-count:2;">
;Books
* [[Carol Adams|Adams, Carol J]]. [http://books.google.com/books?id=AwrwRKNavtAC ''The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory.''] New York: Continuum, 1996.
* [http://books.google.com/books?id=PE5bszpVat4C ''The Pornography of Meat.''] New York: Continuum, 2004.
* & Donovan, Josephine. (eds). [http://books.google.com/books?id=iJSuTkFlpyIC ''Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations.''] London: Duke University Press, 1995.
*[http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/adamsc01.htm ''The Social Construction of Edible Bodies and Humans as Predators'']
*[[Douglas Adams|Adams, Douglas]]. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/adams01.htm ''Meeting a Gorilla''].
*Anstötz, Christopher. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/anstotz01.htm ''Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans'']
*Auxter, Thomas. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/auxter01.htm ''The Right Not to Be Eaten'']
*Barnes, Donald J. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/barnes01.htm ''A Matter of Change'']
*Barry, Brian. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/barry01.htm ''Why Not Noah's Ark?'']
*Bekoff, Marc. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/bekoff01.htm ''Common Sense, Cognitive Ethology and Evolution''].
*[[Steven Best|Best, Steven]]. [http://books.google.com/books?id=1juWE6y1C1QC ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals''], Lantern Books, 2004. ISBN 159056054x
*Cantor, David. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/cantor01.htm ''Items of Property''].
*Cate, Dexter L. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/cate01.htm ''The Island of the Dragon'']
*Cavalieri, Paola. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/cavalieri01.htm ''The Great Ape Project — and Beyond'']
*[[Stephen R. L. Clark|Clark, Stephen R.L.]] ''The Moral Status of Animals''. Clarendon Press 1977; pbk 1984. ISBN 978-0192830401
*''The Nature of the Beast''. Oxford University Press 1982; pbk 1984.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=oVvh50-nPnQC ''Animals and their Moral Standing'']. Routledge 1997.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=PzzU8_xUHukC ''The Political Animal'']. (Routledge 1999)
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=9Gk_QcXBNWUC ''Biology and Christian Ethics'']. Cambridge University Press 2000. ISBN 978-0521567688
* Clark, Ward M. ''Misplaced Compassion: The Animal Rights Movement Exposed'', Writer's Club Press, 2001.
*[[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins, Richard]]. [http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/dawkins01.htm ''Gaps in the mind''].
*Dawn, Karen [http://www.thankingthemonkey.com''Thanking the Monkey: Rethinking the Way We Treat Animals''], Harper Collins, 2008
* Dunayer, Joan. "Animal Equality, Language and Liberation" 2001.
*[[Gary L. Francione|Francione, Gary]]. [http://books.google.com/books?id=PU4LYAxV5q8C ''Introduction to Animal Rights, Your child or the dog?''], Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.
*_______________. [http://books.google.com/books?id=HZTpej7dGGEC ''Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement] (2005).
* Favre, David S. ''Animal Law: Welfare, Interests, and Rights'', Aspen Law, Stu. Stg. edition, 2008
* Franklin, Julian H. ''Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy'', University of Columbia Press, 2005.
* [[Lee Hall (lawyer)|Hall, Lee]]. ''Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror'', Nectar Bat Press, 2006
* Kean, Hilda. [http://books.google.com/books?id=x5fQoTL4NTEC ''Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800''], London: Reaktion Books, 1998
*[[Keith Mann|Mann, Keith]], (2007) ''From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement'', Puppy Pincher Press, ISBN 978-0-9555850-0-5
* Nibert, David. [http://books.google.com/books?id=mLFIGWSR5M4C ''Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation''], New York: Rowman and Litterfield, 2002
* Patterson, Charles. [http://books.google.com/books?id=9JlhaY0wxjYC ''Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust'']. New York: Lantern, 2002. ISBN 1-930051-99-9
* Rowlands, Mark. ''Animal Rights. A Defense''. New York, London: Macmillan, 1998
*[[Richard D. Ryder|Ryder, Richard. D.]] [http://books.google.com/books?id=W-ISuuzL4ZAC ''Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism''], Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989
*Scarce, Rik. Eco-Warriors (2006) (ISBN 1-59874-028-8)
*[[Roger Scruton|Scruton, Roger]]. [http://books.google.com/books?id=1NCg4oAkrZUC ''Animal Rights and Wrongs''] Claridge Press, 2000
*[[Kathryn Shevelow|Shevelow, Kathryn]]. ''For the Love of Animals: The Rise of the Animal Protection Movement'', Henry Holt and Company, 2008
*[[Peter Singer|Singer, Peter]], "Animal Liberation", New York: HarperCollins, 1975 ISBN 0-06-001157-2 (paperback)
* Spiegal, Marjorie. ''The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery'', New York: Mirror Books, 1996.
* Steeves, H. Peter (ed.) [http://books.google.com/books?id=FUAiKzhrD2oC ''Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life.''] New York: SUNY Press, 1999.
* [[David Sztybel|Sztybel, David]]. "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" Ethics and the Environment 11 (Spring 2006): 97-132.
* [[David Sztybel|Sztybel, David]]. [http://www.cala-online.org/Journal/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_5/sztybel.pdf "The Rights of Animal Persons."] Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal 4 (1) (2006): 1-37.
* Weil, Zoe. [http://books.google.com/books?id=aPVcGUXDbd4C ''The Power and Promise of Humane Education.''] British Columbia: New Society Publishers, 2004.
* Wolfe, Cary. [http://books.google.com/books?id=E8jLyH_AH3sC ''Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory''], Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2003.
* Wolch, Jennifer, & Emel, Jody. [http://books.google.com/books?id=-AWag5IvaHkC ''Animal Geographies: Place, Politics, and Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands.''] New York: Verso, 1998.
<!--books to add
The Third Chimpanzee
What's in a Classification?
The Rights of Animals and Future Generations
Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language
Personhood, Property and Legal Competence
The Silver Spring Monkeys
Chimpanzees - Bridging the Gap
The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas
From Property to Person
Who's Like Us?
Animal Rights in the Political Arena
Great Apes and the Human Resistance to Equality
Persons and Non-Persons
The Concept of Beastliness
Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood
The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas
The Post-Darwinian Transition
A Basis for (Interspecies) Equality
Animal Liberation at 30-->
</div>


3. Of an object of the proper species but the wrong sex. This is distinguished from the rest by the name of paederasty.<BR>
<div class="references-2column">
;Animal rights in philosophy and law
* {{sep entry|moral-animal|The Moral Status of Animals|Lori Gruen}}
* [http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/animalrights/ The Tom Regan Animal Rights Archive]
* [http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/ Utilitarian Philosophers: Peter Singer].
*[http://www-phil.tamu.edu/~gary/awvar/lecture/pain.html Which animals feel pain?]
* [http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Dawkins/Work/Articles/1993gaps_in_the_mind.shtml Gaps in the Mind] [[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins, Richard]]
*[http://www.philosophytalk.org/pastShows/AnimalRights.htm Radio Discussion of Animal Rights with Activist and Philosopher Lori Gruen]
*[http://www.vorlesungen-tierrechte.de/media/index.php?v=regan Video of Tom Regan's lecture "Animal Rights: An Introduction." at the Interdisciplinary Lectures on Animal Rights at the Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg on the 24th of May 2006]
* [http://www.nabranimallaw.org The National Association for Biomedical Research Animal Law Section]
* [http://www.animal-law.org/ Animal Law Project].
* [http://www.lclark.edu/org/animalaw/ ''Animal Law Review'']
* [http://www.aldf.org/ Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)].
* [http://www.cala-online.org/ The Center on Animal Liberation Affairs (CALA)]
* Brent A. Singer: ''An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics''. Environmental Ethics 10, 1988, p. 217-231
* Donald VanDeVeer: ''Of Beasts, Persons, and the Original Position''. The Monist 62, 1979, p. 368-377
* [http://english.islamstory.com/article.php?id=6 Animal rights in Islamic civilization]


4. Of a wrong species. <BR>
;Animal rights resources
* [http://www.animalrightshistory.org Animal rights history]


5. In procuring this sensation by one's self without the help of any other sensitive object.|Bentham, "Offenses Against One's Self"[http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/exhibitions/sw25/bentham/index.html#01]}}
</div>
[[Image:Shanghai-monkey.jpg|right|thumb|220px|A man holds a [[monkey]] by a rope around the neck, a scene [[Epitome|epitomizing]] the modern day practice of [[Monkey hanging]].]]
Bentham is best known for his advocacy of [[utilitarianism]], for the concept of [[animal rights]],<ref name=tq>[http://library.thinkquest.org/26026/Philosophy/animal_rights.html ThinkQuest Article on Animal Rights]</ref><ref name=stan>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ The Moral Status of Animals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]</ref> and his opposition to the idea of [[natural rights]], with his oft-quoted statement that the idea of such rights is "nonsense upon stilts."<ref>Harrison, Ross. [http://www.utilitarian.net/bentham/about/1995----.htm Jeremy Bentham], in Honderich, Ted. (ed.) ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy'', Oxford, 1995, pp. 85-88. See also [http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/bentham.htm Jeremy Bentham], The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</ref> He also influenced the development of [[welfarism]].<ref>[http://skeptically.org/utilitarianismtheethicaltheoryforalltimes/id4.html Jeremy Bentham: His Life and Impact--jk]</ref> He is probably best known in popular society as the originator of the concept of the [[panopticon]], which is regarded by historians as a "ground-breaking concept in the evolution of modern [[Voyeurism]]." The architecture {{epigraph
| quote = ''incorporates a tower central to a circular building that is divided into cells, each cell extending the entire thickness of the building to allow inner and outer windows. The occupants of the cells are thus backlit, isolated from one another by walls, and subject to scrutiny both collectively and individually by an observer in the tower who remains unseen. Toward this end, Bentham envisioned not only [[venetian blinds]] on the tower observation ports but also maze-like connections among tower rooms to avoid glints of light or noise that might betray the presence of an observer''
| cite = Ben and Marthalee Barton <ref>Barton, Ben F., and Marthalee S. Barton. "Modes of Power in Technical and Professional Visuals." ''Journal of Business and Technical Communication'' '''7.1''', 1993, 138-62.</ref>}}


He became known as one of the most influential of the utilitarians, through his own work and that of his students. These included his secretary and collaborator on the utilitarian school of philosophy, [[James Mill]]; James Mill's son [[John Stuart Mill]]; and several political leaders including [[Robert Owen]], who later became a founder of [[socialism]]. He is also considered the godfather of [[University College London]].
{{Humane Society|state=collapsed}}
Bentham is believed to have practiced an early version of [[Erotic asphyxiation|Simian erotic asphyxiation]], in which a monkey is made a party to a practice favored by Bentham's circle. {{main|Monkey hanging}}


===1953: Founding of the Animal Libertine Front===
[[Category:Animal rights|*]]
[[Image:Highgaterabbit.jpg|left|thumb|200px|In parallel with the development of the Oxford Group, grassroots activists set up the [[Playboy|Animal Libertine Front]] in 1953.]]
[[Category:Animal testing]]
The Animal Libertine Front was founded in [[Chicago, Illinois]] in 1953, by [[Hugh Hefner]] and his associates. Hefner has espoused a [[Liberalism|liberal]]/[[libertarian]] stance. The organization identified itself to the press as a "nonviolent gorilla organization dedicated to the liberation of animals from all forms of sexual repression."<ref name=Molland70>Molland, Neil. "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best & Nocella (eds), ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters, Lantern Books, 2004, pp. 70-74.</ref> Their logo, the stylized profile of a [[rabbit]] wearing a [[Black tie|tuxedo]] bow tie, was designed by art designer [[Art Paul]]. Hefner said he chose the rabbit for its "humorous [[Human sexual behavior|sexual]] connotation," and because the image was "frisky and playful."
[[Category:Animal welfare]]
<BR>
[[Category:Bioethics]]
<BR>
[[Category:Political movements]]
<BR>
[[Category:Rights]]
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
==References==


{{reflist}}
[[ar:حقوق الحيوان]]
[[ca:Drets dels animals]]
[[cs:Práva zvířat]]
[[da:Dyreret]]
[[de:Tierrechte]]
[[es:Derechos de los animales]]
[[eo:Animalaj rajtoj]]
[[fr:Droits des animaux]]
[[ko:동물권]]
[[it:Diritti degli animali]]
[[he:זכויות בעלי חיים]]
[[lv:Dzīvnieku tiesības]]
[[lt:Gyvūnų teisės]]
[[jbo:dalzifra'e]]
[[nl:Dierenrechten]]
[[ja:動物の権利]]
[[no:Dyrerettigheter]]
[[pl:Prawa zwierząt]]
[[pt:Direitos animais]]
[[ru:Права животных]]
[[simple:Animal rights]]
[[sk:Práva zvierat]]
[[fi:Eläinten oikeudet]]
[[sv:Djurrätt]]
[[tr:Hayvan hakları]]
[[zh:動物權利]]

Revision as of 15:10, 1 April 2009


File:Beau-ti-ful.jpg
The logo of the Great Ape Project, which is campaigning for a Declaration on Great Apes. [1], to the effect that "size matters."

The concept of animal rites, also known as animal liberation, is the idea that non-human animals should be afforded the same consideration as human beings, up to and including conjugal love.[1] Although animal rites advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, they argue, broadly speaking, that animals should no longer be regarded as property, or used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment, but should instead be regarded as legal persons and members of the moral community, [2][3] legally and morally entitled to enter into holy matrimony. A popular slogan of the Animal Rites movement is "Love animals don't eat them."[2]

Humans and animals in marital relationships

Renaissance picture of Caligula.
Equestrian portrait of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseyevna.

Throughout history, there have been stories of prominent persons who loved their pets, in every sense of the word. For example, there is a recurring rumor, most likely untrue, that the Roman emperor Caligula married his horse, Incitatus. It has been reliably reported, however, that Incitatus had a stable of marble, with an ivory manger, purple blankets and a collar of precious stones, and may have been made a consul.

Likewise, the story that Catherine II of Russia, known as "Catherine the Great" or the Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseyevna, died while having sex with a horse is also regarded as a myth.[3] In reality, Catherine was apparently just a person of unusually prodigious sexual appetites, who also was devoted to Equestrianism.

The idea of marital rites involving animals has the support of legal scholars such as Alan Dershowitz and Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School,[4][2] and animal law courses are now taught in 92 out of 180 law schools in the United States.[5] Steven Wise, also of Harvard Law School, argues that the first serious judicial challenges to what he calls the "legal bachelorhood" of animals may only be a few years away.[6] Marriage to pets is considered to be a form of Domestication.

Critics argue that animals are unable to enter into a social contract, such as marriage, or make moral choices, and therefore cannot be regarded as possessors of rights, a position summed up by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only human beings have duties and that "[t]he corollary is inescapable: we alone have rights."[7] An argument that often runs parallel to this is that there is nothing inherently wrong with using animals as resources for human sexual purposes, though there is an obligation to ensure they do not suffer unnecessarily, a view known as the animal welfare position.[8]

History of the concept

1754: Rousseau

Leda and the Swan, a 16th century copy after a lost painting by Michelangelo.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) argued in Discourse on Inequality in 1754 that animals should be part of natural law, not because they are rational, but because they are sentient:

[Here] we put an end to the time-honoured disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that, being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognize that law; as they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of natural right; so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former.[9]

Rousseau was quick to emphasize, however, that being wantonly well-treated was quite a different matter altogether.

1789: Bentham

File:Bentham.jpg
Jeremy Bentham: "The time will come, when humanity will extend its mantle over every thing which breathes" (1781).[10]

Four years later, one of the founders of modern utilitarianism, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), although deeply opposed to the concept of natural rights, argued with Rousseau that it was the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, that should be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If rationality were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things.[11] He wrote in 1789, just as slaves were being freed by the French, but were still held captive in the British dominions:

The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? [12]

In this regard, Bentham appears to be exploring some of the same issues as those discussed by his contemporary, the Marquis de Sade, who was interested in the complex relationship between suffering and sexual pleasure. Bentham wrote extensively on the varieties of sexual experience, including zoophilia, in his essay entitled "Offenses Against One's Self":

Offences of impurity--their varietys

The abominations that come under this heading have this property in common, in this respect, that they consist in procuring certain sensations by means of an improper object. The impropriety then may consist either in making use of an object

1. Of the proper species but at an improper time: for instance, after death.

2. Of an object of the proper species and sex, and at a proper time, but in an improper part.

3. Of an object of the proper species but the wrong sex. This is distinguished from the rest by the name of paederasty.

4. Of a wrong species.

5. In procuring this sensation by one's self without the help of any other sensitive object.

— Bentham, "Offenses Against One's Self"[4]
A man holds a monkey by a rope around the neck, a scene epitomizing the modern day practice of Monkey hanging.

Bentham is best known for his advocacy of utilitarianism, for the concept of animal rights,[13][14] and his opposition to the idea of natural rights, with his oft-quoted statement that the idea of such rights is "nonsense upon stilts."[15] He also influenced the development of welfarism.[16] He is probably best known in popular society as the originator of the concept of the panopticon, which is regarded by historians as a "ground-breaking concept in the evolution of modern Voyeurism." The architecture

incorporates a tower central to a circular building that is divided into cells, each cell extending the entire thickness of the building to allow inner and outer windows. The occupants of the cells are thus backlit, isolated from one another by walls, and subject to scrutiny both collectively and individually by an observer in the tower who remains unseen. Toward this end, Bentham envisioned not only venetian blinds on the tower observation ports but also maze-like connections among tower rooms to avoid glints of light or noise that might betray the presence of an observer

— Ben and Marthalee Barton [17]

He became known as one of the most influential of the utilitarians, through his own work and that of his students. These included his secretary and collaborator on the utilitarian school of philosophy, James Mill; James Mill's son John Stuart Mill; and several political leaders including Robert Owen, who later became a founder of socialism. He is also considered the godfather of University College London.

Bentham is believed to have practiced an early version of Simian erotic asphyxiation, in which a monkey is made a party to a practice favored by Bentham's circle.

1953: Founding of the Animal Libertine Front

File:Highgaterabbit.jpg
In parallel with the development of the Oxford Group, grassroots activists set up the Animal Libertine Front in 1953.

The Animal Libertine Front was founded in Chicago, Illinois in 1953, by Hugh Hefner and his associates. Hefner has espoused a liberal/libertarian stance. The organization identified itself to the press as a "nonviolent gorilla organization dedicated to the liberation of animals from all forms of sexual repression."[18] Their logo, the stylized profile of a rabbit wearing a tuxedo bow tie, was designed by art designer Art Paul. Hefner said he chose the rabbit for its "humorous sexual connotation," and because the image was "frisky and playful."







References

  1. ^ "Animal Rights." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2007.
  2. ^ a b "'Personhood' Redefined: Animal Rights Strategy Gets at the Essence of Being Human", Association of American Medical Colleges, retrieved July 12, 2006.
  3. ^ Taylor, Angus. Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate, Broadview Press, May 2003.
  4. ^ Dershowitz, Alan. Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights, 2004, pp. 198–99, and "Darwin, Meet Dershowitz," The Animals' Advocate, Winter 2002, volume 21.
  5. ^ "Animal law courses", Animal Legal Defense Fund.
  6. ^ "Animal Rights: The Modern Animal Rights Movement". Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. 2007.
  7. ^ Scruton, Roger. "Animal Rights", City Journal, summer 2000.
  8. ^ Frey, R.G. Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals. Clarendon Press, 1980 ISBN 0-19-824421-5
  9. ^ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on Inequality, 1754, preface.
  10. ^ Bentham, Jeremy. Principles of Penal Law. Part III, 1781.
  11. ^ Benthall, Jonathan. "Animal liberation and rights", Anthropology Today, volume 23, issue 2, April 2007, p. 1.
  12. ^ Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, first published 1789, chapter 17; this edition Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (eds.) The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 283, footnote.
  13. ^ ThinkQuest Article on Animal Rights
  14. ^ The Moral Status of Animals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  15. ^ Harrison, Ross. Jeremy Bentham, in Honderich, Ted. (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, 1995, pp. 85-88. See also Jeremy Bentham, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  16. ^ Jeremy Bentham: His Life and Impact--jk
  17. ^ Barton, Ben F., and Marthalee S. Barton. "Modes of Power in Technical and Professional Visuals." Journal of Business and Technical Communication 7.1, 1993, 138-62.
  18. ^ Molland, Neil. "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best & Nocella (eds), Terrorists or Freedom Fighters, Lantern Books, 2004, pp. 70-74.