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Battle of Magersfontein

Coordinates: 28°58′S 24°42′E / 28.967°S 24.700°E / -28.967; 24.700
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Battle of Magersfontein
Part of Second Boer War


The Commanders:
Lord Methuen, General Cronjé,
General Wachope, General De La Rey
Date11 December 1899
Location
Magersfontein, Cape Colony, South Africa
28°58′S 24°42′E / 28.967°S 24.700°E / -28.967; 24.700
Result Boer victory
Belligerents
 United Kingdom South African Republic
Orange Free StateOrange Free State
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Lord Methuen
United Kingdom Andrew Gilbert Wauchope		 Piet Cronje
Koos de la Rey
Strength
14,964[1] 8,500[2]
Casualties and losses
948[1] 236[3]
Battle of Magersfontein is located in South Africa
Battle of Magersfontein
class=notpageimage|
Location of Magersfontein within South Africa

The Battle of Magersfontein[Note 1] (/ˈmɑːxərsfɒnteɪn/ MAH-khərs-fon-tayn) was the second of the three battles included in the Black Week of the Second Boer War. It was fought on 11 December 1899 at Magersfontein near Kimberley on the borders of the Cape Colony and the independent republic of the Orange Free State. General Piet Cronje and General De la Rey's Boer troops defeated the British troops under Lieutenant General Lord Methuen, who had been sent to relieve the Siege of Kimberley.

Background

In the early days of the war, the Boers had surrounded and laid siege to the town of Kimberley, the second biggest city in the Cape Colony and the diamond centre of South Africa. When substantial British reinforcements (an Army Corps under General Redvers Buller) arrived in South Africa, they were dispersed to three main fronts. While Buller himself advanced from the port of Durban in Natal to relieve the besieged town of Ladysmith, and a smaller detachment under Lieutenant General Gatacre secured the Cape Midlands, the reinforced 1st Division under Lord Methuen advanced from the Orange River to relieve Kimberley.

Lacking adequate ox-drawn transport[4] Methuen was forced to advance along the Cape - Transvaal railway line, making the direction of his approach obvious. Nevertheless, his army drove the Boers out of their defensive positions at Belmont, Graspans and the Modder River, and had advanced to within 16 miles (26 km) of Kimberley. The Battle of Modder River had temporarily exhausted both sides, with the British having lost a thousand men, killed and wounded in these three battles.[5] Methuen was forced to delay at the river crossing for several days while supplies and reinforcements were brought forward and the railway bridge (which the Boers had previously blown up) was repaired. In addition, the need for troops to protect his extended supply line from Boer sabotage was essential. This gave the Boers time to recover, reorganise and improve their defences.[5]

Boer defences

The primary Boer trench at Magersfontein from which the Highlanders were decimated

After the Battle of the Modder River, the Boers had at first retreated 10 miles (16 km) to the range of hills at Spytfontein (28°52′56″S 24°41′00″E / 28.882230°S 24.683372°E / -28.882230; 24.683372 (Spytfontein)), the last defensible position before Kimberley. General Koos de la Rey had been absent, having gone to the laager[Note 2] at Jacobsdal to bury his son Adriaan, killed by a shell at the Modder River.[6] He disagreed with this retreat and telegraphed his objections to President Martinus Theunis Steyn of the Orange Free State, who in turn informed President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal. Kruger suggested to Steyn that he himself should visit the front.

Steyn arrived on 4 December, and spent the next day touring the camps and defences. He then summoned a krijgsraad (council of war), at which de la Rey put forward his plans. De la Rey recommended that they should move forward from Spytfontein to Magersfontein, and also that they should entrench themselves forward of the line of kopjes.[Note 3] The Boers had learnt in earlier battles that the British artillery was superior in numbers to theirs, and would pound any high ground where they placed their guns or forces. Therefore, contrary to common practice, de la Rey convinced them to dig defensive positions at the foot of the hills, rather than on the facing slopes.[7] The trenches overlooking the receding ground sloping down towards the British axis of advance afforded the Boers surprise and protection from fire, and permitted them to make best use of the flat trajectory of their Mauser rifles.[8]

Before leaving the front, Steyn dismissed Marthinus Prinsloo, the elderly Commandant General of the Free State. Prinsloo was seen as the chief reason for the Free State Boers' defeats in earlier battles, and his departure raised the morale of the Free State burghers.[2][Note 4]

By this time, the Boers had received reinforcements with some commandos joining them from the siege lines around Kimberley and from the border of Basutoland. The remainder of Cronje's force also arrived from the desultory Siege of Mafeking. Their total force numbered 8,500 fighters, [2] with camp-followers and commandeered African labourers who performed the actual work of digging the Boer entrenchments.[9] The Boers occupied a wide crescent shaped front, extending for 6 miles (10 km) and straddling both the road and the railway line, to which Methuen's advance was bound. Their main trench was in front of the Magersfontein Kopje and was 2-mile (3.2 km) long, with another trench bending along the river to protect their escape route to Jacobsdal.[8]

British plan

Methuen's plan was to keep to his axis of advance along the railway line. He believed that the Boers were occupying the line of kopjes, as they had done at Belmont, but he had been unable to reconnoitre the position; his cavalry could approach no closer than 1 mile (1.6 km) to the Boer positions before being driven off by rifle fire.[9] The lack of reconnaissance would prove critical to the outcome of the battle.[10] He planned to bombard the Boer positions with artillery from 1650 to 1830 on 10 December, after which the Highland Brigade under Major General Wauchope, which had been sent to reinforce the 1st Division, would make a night march to launch a dawn attack on the Boers on 11 December.[11] Methuen's orders stated that his intention was to hold the enemy on the north and to deliver an attack on the southern end of Magersfontein Ridge.[12]

The advance was to be made in three columns. The first column consisted of the Highland Brigade, the 9th Lancers, the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and supporting artillery and engineer sections as well as a balloon section.[12] The second column, on the left under Major-General Reginald Pole-Carew, consisted of a battalion from the 9th Brigade, the Naval Brigade with a 4.7-inch naval gun and Rimington's Guides (a mounted infantry unit raised in Cape Town). The third column, led by Major-General Sir Henry Edward Colville, was in reserve and was composed of the 12th Lancers, the Guards Brigade and artillery, engineer and medical support elements.[12]

Methuen's orders required the first column to march directly on the south-western spur of the kopje and on arrival, before dawn, the 2nd Black Watch were to move east of the kopje where Methuen believed the Boers had a strong-point. The 2nd Seaforth Highlanders were to advance to the south eastern point of the hill, and the 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were to extend the line to the left. The 1st Highland Light Infantry was to advance as a reserve. All units were to advance in mass of quarter columns, the most compact formation in the drill-book: 3,500 men in 30 companies aligned in 90 files, all compressed into a column 45 yards (41 m) wide and 160 yards (150 m) long,[13] with the outer sections using ropes to guide the four battalions in their night march and deployment for a dawn attack.[14]

Advance to attack

An observation balloon being prepared at the Battle of Magersfontein, with the hills occupied by the Boers in the background.

A drizzle had started by mid afternoon on 10 December and continued throughout the artillery bombardment, delivered by 24 field guns, four howitzers and a 4.7-inch naval gun. Instead of "softening" the Boer positions, the lyddite explosions against the facing slopes above their trenches merely alerted the Boers to the impending attack.[13] As midnight approached, the downpour increased and the leading elements of the Highland Brigade commenced their advance.[14] Wauchope had made a similar night march in his advance on Omdurman in 1898, but this time he was faced not by flat desert terrain and clear skies, but rather by torrential rain and rocky outcrops and thorn scrub, which caused delays and annoyance. The thunderstorm and the high iron ore content of the surrounding hills played havoc with compasses of the officers appointed to navigate.[13]

The brigade was advancing in quarter column as directed by Methuen's orders. As first light approached, the storm had abated and the Brigade was on course, but the delays meant it was still 1,000 yards (910 m) from the line of hills. Wauchope's guide, Major Benson of the Royal Artillery, suggested to Wauchope that it was no longer safe to continue in closed formation and that the Brigade should deploy. Wauchope replied "...I'm afraid my men will lose direction. I think we will go a little further."[15] Still in quarter column, the Highlanders advanced further towards the unknown enemy lines, when an advancing British soldier tripped a Boer alarm wire.[16]

Battle

Highland Brigade trapped

Disposition and movement of forces

The Highlanders had advanced to within 400 yards (370 m) of the Boer trenches when the Boers opened fire on the alarm of their trip-wire. Wauchope instructed the brigade to extend its order, but in the face of such close range Boer fire the changing formation was thrown into disarray and confusion. General Wauchope was killed by almost the first volley, as was Lieutenant-Colonel G. L. J. Goff, the commanding officer of the Argylls.[17] The head of the Brigade disentangled themselves from the dead and fled.[18] Some of the Black Watch, leading the column, charged the Boer trenches. A few actually broke through and were climbing Magersfontein Kopje when they were engaged by Boer parties (including one led by General Cronje himself, who had been wandering the kopje since 0100)[19] and were killed or captured. Others were shot while entangled in a wire farm fence in front of the trenches.[3]

An attempt was made to out-flank the trenches on the right, where a number of Boers were taken prisoner, but this action was soon blocked by re-deploying Boers.[18] After sunrise, the remnants of the four battalions of the Highland Brigade were unable to advance or retreat due to Boer rifle fire, the only movement at that time being Lt. Lindsay who managed to bring the Seaforth's Maxim forward to provide a degree of support fire. It was later followed by the Lancers being able to bring their Maxim forward and into action as well.[18] Methuen ordered all available artillery to provide support fire with the howitzers engaging at 4,000 yards (3,700 m) and the three field batteries at a range of 1 mile (1,600 m), while the Horse Artillery advanced to the southern flank in an attempt to enfilade the trenches.[18] With all guns engaged, including the 4.7-inch naval gun commanded by Captain (RN) Bearcroft,[20] the Highlanders were given some respite from the Boer small-arms fire, allowing some men to withdraw. However, as with the preliminary barrage of the previous evening, most of the shot was directed at the facing slopes of the hills, rather than the Boer trenches at their foot.[18]

Reinforcements arrive

As the day progressed, British reinforcements which had originally been left to guard the camp near the Modder River started to arrive, first the Gordon Highlanders and later the 1st and 2nd Coldstream Guards. At the same time, Cronjé had launched a fresh attack on the British southern (right) flank to attempt to extend a salient to the left and behind the remaining Highlanders, effectively cutting them off from the main British force. Initially the Seaforths attempted to stem this attack and ran into the Scandinavian Corps, which they quickly neutralised. This action however forced the Seaforths to regroup, preventing them from further action to halt the Boer attempts to encircle the Highland Brigade.[21] The Grenadier Guards, with five companies of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were eventually moved to counter this attack, which only showed some sign of success after the freshly arrived battalions of the Coldstream Guards had been committed too.[18] By now, Methuen had committed all of his reserves.

The remaining Highlanders, now under command of Lieutenant Colonel James Hughes-Hallet of the Seaforths,[22] had been lying prone under a harsh summer sun for most of the day with the Boers still attempting to encircle them from the south. In the late afternoon, those that remained alive stood up and fled west towards the main British body of troops. This unexpected move left many of the field guns which had been advancing during the course of the morning, on the front line and totally exposed to the Boers. Only the lack of initiative on the part of the Boers saved the guns.[23] The gap created by the hurried withdrawal of the Highlander brigade was filled by the Gordons and the Scots Guards, but as evening approached, Methuen decided that a total withdrawal was preferable to his troops spending the night in the face of the Boer trenches.[24]

Scandinavian volunteers

Members of the Scandinavian Volunteer Corps prior to the Battle of Magersfontein.

(Refer notes section for origins of the Scandinavian Corps.) An element of approximately half of the one hundred men in the Scandinavian Volunteer Corps (refer order of battle) had been ordered to man an advance outpost at the junction of Cronje's and de la Rey's forces during the night of 10/11 December. The rest of the force was entrenched in defensive positions some 1,500 metres (1,600 yd) further northeast. In the early morning hours of 11 December, General Cronje ordered Commandant Tolly de Beer to abandon the outpost, but the order had only reached the Boer contingent who withdrew, leaving the Scandinavian section on its own.[25] It was this section which was destroyed in holding back the attack by the Seaforth Highlanders, denying them access between the hills and preventing the Scots from reaching the Boer guns.[26]

Final retreat

In the late afternoon, a Boer messenger bearing a white flag arrived at a Scots Guard outpost to say that the British could send ambulances to collect their wounded lying in front of the trenches at the foot of the Magersfontein hills. This was done by Royal Army Medical Corps and the British and Boer medical orderlies together treated the wounded until the truce was broken by fire from the British naval gun, Captain (RN) Bearcroft not having been informed of the temporary armistice. A British medical orderly was sent to the Boers with apologies, and the truce was reinstated. When the truce was officially over, G Battery, RHA; the 62nd Field Battery and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were tasked to screen reorganisations and the withdrawal of some of the British troops.[27]

At 1730 the Boer artillery, which had been silent all day, opened fire on the screening British forces.[24] This engagement signalled the end of the battle for the British and men instinctively withdrew to beyond the range of the Boer guns. Battalions and remnants of battalions retreated throughout the night and were mustered for roll-call at the Modder River camp the next morning.[28]

Aftermath

Tactical dispositions

The Boers had halted Methuen's advance to relieve the siege of Kimberley, had defeated his superior force and inflicted heavy losses, particularly on the Highland Brigade. The British were forced to withdraw to the Modder River to regroup and to await further reinforcements. Unlike previous occasions, where the Boers withdrew after an engagement, this time Cronje held the Magersfontein defence line,[3] knowing that Methuen would again be forced to continue his advance along his logistical railway "lifeline".

Losses

British

The British had lost 22 officers and 188 other ranks killed, 46 officers and 629 other ranks wounded and 1 officer and 62 other ranks missing. Of this, the Highland Brigade had amassed a killed, wounded and missing loss of 747 men. Among the battalions, the Black Watch had suffered the most severely, losing 303 officers and other ranks.[29] On 12 December, when British ambulances again went forward to collect the dead and remining wounded, they found Wauchope's body within 200 yards of Cronjé's trenches, with British reports stating that most of the Highland Brigade's dead had their backs to the enemy.[3] Conversely, Boer reports stated that the most of the dead had head injuries.[30]


Such was the day for our regiment,
Dread the revenge we will take.
Dearly we paid for the blunder
A drawing-room General’s mistake.
Why weren’t we told of the trenches?
Why weren’t we told of the wire?
Why were we marched up in column,
May Tommy Atkins enquire…
Pte Smith of the Black Watch, December 1899. Pakenham p.201

The British camp at Modder River, and subsequently also at Paardeberg, created ideal conditions for the spread of Typhoid fever. (SAMHJ Vol6) By the time the victors arrived in Bloemfontein, an epidemic broke out amongst the troops, with 10,000-12,000 taken ill, and 1,200 deaths in the city. (MacDonald, Ronald St. John) The disease ultimately took more British lives during the war than were lost though enemy action.

Boers

Monument to the Scandinavian volunteers killed while fighting for the Boers at the battle. The memorial reads: "They could not retreat. They could only fall. In memory of Scandinavians killed here."

Boer losses are disputed. The official British account of the battle records 87 killed and 188 wounded,[29] while later accounts record a total loss of 236 men.[3] As with the Boers, several different figures regarding the strength of the Scandinavian outpost exist. British sources quote 80 men[22] and Scandinavian sources between 49 to 52 men. Uddgren records 52 men based on identified names, consisting of 26 Swedes, 11 Danes, 7 Finns, 4 Norwegians and 4 of unknown nationality, of which all but five were either killed, wounded or captured.[31] The losses of native Africans working or fighting for the two sides were not recorded.

Strategic consequences

The week from 10 December to 17 December rapidly became known to troops in the field as to politicians in England as "Black Week" during which the British had suffered three defeats: the battles of Stormberg in the Cape Midlands and Colenso in Natal as well as the Battle of Magersfontein. The defeat at Magersfontein caused much consternation in Britain, particularly in Scotland where the losses to the Highland regiments were keenly felt and where Wauchope was well-known, having stood as a Parliamentary candidate.

The reverberations of the "Black Week" defeats lead to the hasty approval for large reinforcements being sent to South Africa, from both Britain and the Dominions. Although Cronje had temporarily defeated the British and held up their advance, General Lord Roberts, who had been appointed as overall Commander in Chief in South Africa, took personal command on this front, and at the head of an army reinforced to 25,000 men, relieved Kimberley on 15 February 1900. Cronje's retreating army was soon thereafter surrounded and forced to surrender at the Battle of Paardeberg on 27 February 1900.[32]

Despite the defeat, Methuen soon redeemeed his reputation and career through successes he achieved against George Villebois-Mareuil at the Battle of Boschoff,[33] although he was the only general captured by the Boers during the war.[34]

Main articles: Relief of Kimberley and Battle of Paardeberg

Order of Battle

British Forces

1st Infantry Division[35] Lieutenant-General Lord Paul Sanford Methuen GCB, GCMG, GCVO
Division Troops
A Squadron, Life Guards 12th Lancers (detached from the 1st Cavalry Brigade)
18th Field Battery, Royal Artillery 62nd Field Battery, Royal Artillery
65th Field Battery, Royal Artillery G Battery, Royal Horse Artillery
11th & 26th Field Companies, Royal Engineers[36] No 7 Field Hospital
Balloon Section, Royal Engineers Detachment, Army Service Corps
Ammunition Column Signals Detachment
Infantry Brigades
1st (Guards) Brigade: Major-General Reginald Pole-Carew 9th Brigade: Major-General Charles Whittingham Douglas
3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers
1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards 2nd Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment
1st Battalion, Scots Guards 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
No 18 Bearer Company[36] Volunteer Bearer Company[36]
No 18 Field Hospital[36] No 19 Field Hospital[36]
No 19 Company Army Service Corps[36] No 20 Company Army Service Corps[36]

The 3rd Highland Brigade was attached to the 1st Infantry Division from the 9th Infantry Division[37]

3rd (Highland) Brigade Major General A.G. Wauchope CB
2nd Battalion, Black Watch 1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders 1st Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders
No 1 Bearer Company[36] No 8 Field Hospital[36]
No 14 Company, Army Service Corps[36]

The below units were deployed for communication line protection duties and as such were under command of Major-General Methuen.[38]

Communication protection duties
9th Lancers 2nd Battalion, Yorkshire Light Infantry (Two companies)
Rimington's Guides

Boer Forces

South Western Military Force General Piet Cronjé
(Figures represent strengths at time of mobilisation, actual strengths deployed at Magersfontein were lower)[39]
Commandos under command of General A. Cronje[40]
South African Republic Zoutpansberg Commando (1,287) South African Republic Part of Potchefstroom Commando (Total of 3,000)
Orange Free State Fauresmith Commando (1,560) Orange Free State Ladybrand Commando (1,113)
Orange Free State Elements of Orange Free State Burghers South African Republic Transvaal State Artillery section. (2x 7.7 cm FK 96 Guns)
Commandos under command of General Piet Cronjé[40]
Orange Free State Hoopstad Commando (799) Orange Free State Kroonstad Commando (2,561)
Orange Free State Bloemhof Commando (800) Orange Free State Boshof Commando (1,030)
Sweden Norway Scandinavian Volunteer Corps[Note 5] (100)
South African Republic Transvaal State Artillery section. (2x 7.7 cm FK 96 Guns and 2x QF 1 pounder pom-pom guns)
Commandos under command of General Koos de la Rey[40]
Orange Free State Wolmaransstad Commando (400) South African Republic Part of Potchefstroom Commando
South African Republic Lichtenburg Commando (850) Orange Free State Jacobsdal Commando (250) (under command of General Albrecht)
South African Republic Transvaal State Artillery section. (1x 7.7 cm FK 96 Gun and 3x QF 1 pounder pom-pom guns)

Victoria Cross Awards

Three Victoria Cross awards were made for the action at Magersfontein:[41]

Notes

  1. ^ Spelt incorrectly in various English texts as "Majersfontein", "Maaghersfontein" and "Maagersfontein"
  2. ^ Encampment or wagon park
  3. ^ Hill or ridge
  4. ^ Citizen soldiers or territorial soldiers
  5. ^ The Scandinavian Volunteer Corps (Skandinaviska Kåren) was not a corps, but rather the size of a company. Following the outbreak of war, a meeting was held in Pretoria on 12 October 1899 between members of the Scandinavian Organization in Transvaal (Skandinaviska Organisationen i Transvaal) and the South African Republic (ZAR) military staff with the intention of forming a Scandinavian volunteer unit to support the Boer republic against the British. The offer was accepted by the ZAR government and the military organisation proceeded to issue the corps with Mod. 1888 Mauser rifles and 90 horses. Clothes suitable for use as uniforms were bought and supplied by the Scandinavian Organization in Transvaal comittée. On the first day of recruitment, 68 Scandinavians volunteered for duty. The corps, now numbering 100 men was ordered to the Mafeking front on 16 October 1899 and joined the forces of General Piet Cronje at Reitvlej near Mafeking on 23 October 1899. The corps saw its first action with the Boers at Mafeking. Uddgren pp 8 - 19
  6. ^ In the UK National Archive Victoria Cross listings, the local for Captain Towse' award is incorrectly listed as Majesfontein instead of Magersfontein. The regiment and date are however correct.

Citations

  1. ^ a b Maurice Appendix 6
  2. ^ a b c Kruger (1960), p.130
  3. ^ a b c d e Pakenham p.206
  4. ^ Miller, p.85
  5. ^ a b Conan Doyle p.150
  6. ^ Pakenham (1979), p.199
  7. ^ Creswicke p.172
  8. ^ a b Ralf, p. 178
  9. ^ a b Pakenham p.200
  10. ^ Miller, p. 185
  11. ^ Creswicke pp. 172-173
  12. ^ a b c Maurice pp.312-315
  13. ^ a b c Pakenham (1979), p.203
  14. ^ a b Creswicke p.173
  15. ^ Pakenham p.204
  16. ^ Conan Doyle p.154
  17. ^ Maurice p.319
  18. ^ a b c d e f Conan Doyle, pp. 155-157
  19. ^ Kruger (1964), pp.131-132
  20. ^ Maurice p.321
  21. ^ Maurice p.327
  22. ^ a b Conan Doyle p.162
  23. ^ Conan Doyle p.159
  24. ^ a b Conan Doyle pp. 160-161
  25. ^ Uddgren p.46
  26. ^ Uddgren p.47
  27. ^ Maurice p.330
  28. ^ Conan Doyle p.161
  29. ^ a b Maurice, pp.329-330
  30. ^ Saks, 2001
  31. ^ Uddgren p.86
  32. ^ Kruger
  33. ^ Miller, pp. 185-186
  34. ^ Pakenham, p 583
  35. ^ Maurice Appendix 7
  36. ^ a b c d e f g h i j German General Staff Vol II p.238
  37. ^ Maurice Appendix 10
  38. ^ Maurice Appendix 1
  39. ^ Maurice Appendix 3
  40. ^ a b c Maurice, Maps Vol I, Map 13 and 13(a)
  41. ^ "Victoria Cross Registers". National Archives (UK).

References

Books

Websites

See also

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