|Born||1 May 1948|
Sinj, FPR Yugoslavia
|Allegiance|| Yugoslavia (until 1991)|
|Commands held||General Staff (1998–2000)|
|Battles||Croatian War of Independence|
Croatian War of Independence
Domazet-Lošo (then a captain) defected to the Croatian Army in autumn 1991. He became actively involved in military operations and organized the military intelligence services. He became the head of the Office for Strategic Research (1991), and the head of the Intelligence Service of the Croatian Army Headquarters (1992).
In 1992, he and Ante Gotovina were the chief commanders of the Livno front and the large area of military operations covering the northern and central Dalmatia, southern Bosnia and Herzegovina. His biggest strategic successes include the planning of major operations in Croatia and Bosnia (Operation Flash, Operation Storm, Operation South Move) and the fight against enemy intelligence, as well as the incursions into the enemy camp - the most spectacular being the wiretapping of Slobodan Milošević in his Belgrade headquarters.
After the retirement
He was forced into retirement in 2000, after he and eleven other generals signed an open letter accusing the Croatian president Stjepan Mesić of participating in the attempt to denigrate and criminalize the Croatian War of Independence and its participants. 
Ever since his days in the Yugoslav Army, Domazet-Lošo has been publishing numerous expert articles on the issues of war, navy and submarines. He is a prominent military analyst in the area of geostrategy. His most important work in that area is Hrvatska i veliko ratište (Croatia and the Large Front, 2002). He published his last two books, Gospodari kaosa (Masters of Chaos), in 2005 and Klonovi nastupaju (Clones perform), in 2007.
Domazet-Lošo was interrogated by the representatives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 2002.
In December 2010, Amnesty International stated that, based on the May 2008 trial judgment of Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac regarding war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers in the Operation Medak Pocket, Domazet-Lošo and his superior Janko Bobetko had command responsibility and should be prosecuted. In January 2011 the Ministry of Justice reported that "inquests are being made" in the case of Domazet-Lošo, but noted that the ICTY transferred files related to him saying they had a "lack of evidence" to bring forth a case. Domazet-Lošo then held a press conference in which he rejected these accusations calling them pressure on Croatia in its process of accession to the European Union.
- Davor Butković (2002-11-23). "Generali uzvraćaju udarac Domazetu". Jutarnji list (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 2012-10-15. Retrieved 2018-03-14.
- "Najviši hrvatski dužnosnici postaju lutkama na koncu!". Slobodna Dalmacija (in Croatian). 2000-11-21. Retrieved 2010-11-21.
- Drago Hedl (2002-02-04). "Što je otkrilo prisluškivanje Miloševića" (in Croatian). Zagreb, Croatia: AIM - Alternate Information Network. Retrieved 2010-11-21.
- Anita Malenica (2010-05-14). "Okrugli stol HIP-a: "Hrvatska nakon 20 godina, kako dalje"". Večernji list (in Croatian). Retrieved 2010-11-21.
umirovljeni admiral Davor Domazet Lošo govorio je o novim strategijama u napadu na Hrvatsku
- "Croatia urged to speed up war crimes prosecutions". Amnesty International. 2010-12-09. Retrieved 2010-12-09.
- "Ministarstvo pravosuđa: Haag nije tražio Lošu, ali radimo izvide". Večernji list (in Croatian). 2011-01-18. Retrieved 2011-01-28.
- "Domazet Lošo: Pritisak Amnesty Internationala na Hrvatsku" (in Croatian). Croatian Radiotelevision. 2011-01-20. Retrieved 2011-01-28.[permanent dead link]
- Davor Domazet - Lošo (2000). "How Aggression Against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared". National Security and the Future. Zagreb, Croatia: St. George Association. Retrieved 2010-11-21.