Nuclear close calls
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A nuclear close call is an incident that could start an unintended nuclear war. These incidents typically involve a perceived imminent threat to a nuclear-armed nation which could lead to retaliatory strikes against the perceived aggressor. The damage caused by international nuclear exchange is not necessarily limited to the participating nations, as the hypothesized rapid climate change associated with even small-scale regional nuclear war could threaten food production worldwide—a scenario known as nuclear famine.[1] Despite a reduction in global nuclear tensions after the end of the Cold War, many of the more than 16,000 nuclear weapons currently in existence are ready for immediate use.[2] Tensions between a number of nuclear-armed states remain high, maintaining the possibility of accidental nuclear war. This is a list of nuclear close calls and other related nuclear incidents in chronological order.
1950s
- 5 November 1956
- During the Suez Crisis, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received a number of simultaneous reports—including unidentified aircraft over Turkey, Soviet MIGs over Syria, a downed British bomber, and unexpected maneuvers by the Soviet fleet through the Dardanelles—that appeared to signal a Soviet offensive. Considering previous Soviet threats to utilize conventional weapons against France and Great Britain, U.S. forces believed these events could trigger a NATO nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. In fact, all reports of Soviet action turned out to be erroneous, misinterpreted, or exaggerated. The perceived threat was due to a coincidental combination of events, including a wedge of swans over Turkey, a fighter escort for the Syrian president, a British bomber brought down by mechanical issues, and scheduled exercises of the Soviet fleet.[3]
1960s
- 5 October 1960
- Radar equipment in Thule, Greenland mistakenly interpreted a moonrise over Norway as a large-scale Soviet missile launch. Upon receiving a report of the supposed attack, NORAD went on high alert. However, doubts about the authenticity of the attack arose due to the presence of Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev in New York as head of the USSR's UN delegation. [4][5]
- 24 November 1961
- Staff at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters (SAC HQ) simultaneously lost contact with NORAD and multiple Ballistic Missile Early Warning System sites. Since these communication lines were designed to be redundant and independent from one another, the communications failure was interpreted as either a very unlikely coincidence or a coordinated attack. SAC HQ prepared the entire ready force for takeoff before already overhead aircraft confirmed that there did not appear to be an attack. It was later found that the failure of a single relay station in Colorado was the sole cause of the communications problem.[4]
- 27 October 1962
- At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet patrol submarine B-59 almost launched a nuclear-tipped torpedo while under harassment by American naval forces. One of several vessels surrounded American destroyers near Cuba, the B-59 dived to avoid detection and was unable to communicate with Moscow for a number of days.[6] The USS Beale began dropping practice depth charges to signal the B-59 to surface, however the Soviet submarine took these to be real depth charges.[7] With low batteries affecting the submarine's life support systems and without orders from Moscow, the commander of the B-59 believed that war may have already begun and ordered the use of a 10 Kt nuclear torpedo against the American fleet. The submarine Political officer agreed, but commander of the sub-flotilla Vasili Arkhipov persuaded the captain to surface and await orders.[8][9]
- On the same day, an American U-2 spy plane is shot down over Cuba, and another U-2 flown by U.S. Air Force Captain Charles Maultsby strays 300 miles into Soviet airspace. Despite orders to avoid Soviet airspace by at least 100 miles, a navigational error takes the U-2 over the Chukotka Peninsula, causing Soviet MIG interceptors to scramble and pursue the aircraft.[3][10] American F102-A interceptors armed with GAR-11 Falcon nuclear air-to-air missiles (each with a .25 Kt yield) were then scrambled to escort the U-2 into friendly airspace.[11] Individual pilots were capable of arming and launching their missiles.
- 9 November 1965
- The Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert after a massive power outage in the NE United States. Several nuclear bomb detectors—used to distinguish between regular power outages and power outages caused by a nuclear blast—near major U.S. cities malfunctioned due to circuit errors, creating the illusion of a nuclear attack.[3]
- 23 May 1967
- A powerful solar flare accompanied by a coronal mass ejection interfered with multiple NORAD radars over the Northern Hemisphere. This interference was initially interpreted as intentional jamming of the radars by the Soviets, thus an act of war. A nuclear bomber counter-strike was nearly launched by the U.S.[12]
1970s
- 9 November 1979
- A computer error with an operational computer at NORAD headquarters led to alarm and full preparation for a nonexistent large-scale Soviet attack.[4] NORAD notified national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski that the Soviet Union had launched 250 ballistic missiles with a trajectory for the United States, stating that a decision to retaliate would need to be made by the president within 3 to 7 minutes. NORAD computers then placed the number of incoming missiles at 2,200.[13] Strategic Air Command was notified, nuclear bombers prepared for takeoff, and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) crews were presumably placed on alert. Within six minutes of the initial response, satellite and radar systems were able to confirm that the attack was a false alarm.[14] Commenting on the incident, U.S. State Department adviser Marshall Shulman stated that "false alerts of this kind are not a rare occurrence. There is a complacency about handling them that disturbs me."[13] In the months following the incident there were 3 more false alarms at NORAD.
1980s
- 15 March 1980
- One of four Soviet missiles launched from a submarine near the Kuril Islands is detected by an American early warning sensor and determined to be heading towards the United States.[4]
- 26 September 1983
- Several weeks after the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over Soviet airspace, a satellite early-warning system near Moscow reported the launch of one American Minuteman ICBM. Soon after, it reported that 5 missiles had been launched. Convinced that a real American offensive would involve many more missiles, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Air Defense Forces refused to acknowledge the threat as legitimate and continued to convince his superiors that it was a false alarm until this could be confirmed by ground radar.[15][16]
1990s
- 25 January 1995
- Russian President Boris Yeltsin became the first world leader to activate a nuclear briefcase after Russian radar systems detected the launch of a Norwegian Black Brant XII research rocket being used to study the Northern Lights.[17] Russian strategic missile submarines were put on alert in preparation for a possible retaliatory strike.[18] When it became clear the rocket did not pose a threat to Russia and was not part of a larger attack, the alarm was cancelled. Russia was in fact one of a number of countries earlier informed of the launch; however, the information had not reached the Russian radar operators.[4]
2010s
- 23 October 2010
- Commanders at a U.S. Air Force base in Wyoming lost most forms of command, control, and security monitoring over 50 nuclear ICBMs for approximately 45 minutes. The missiles were taken offline after a suspected hardware problem caused multiple errors with control computers.[19] Although military officials maintain that the missiles remained under control and were not susceptible to outside attempts to gain control, former Air Force launch officer Bruce G. Blair expressed concerns that missiles in this status could be vulnerable to launch attempts by hackers or compromised missile crews.[20]
See also
- List of military nuclear accidents
- Nuclear and radiation accidents and incidents
- Nuclear winter
- Nuclear terrorism
- Mutually assured destruction
- Vulnerability of nuclear plants to attack
- World War III
References
- ^ Fromm, M.; Stocks, B.; Servranckx, R.; et al. (2006). "Smoke in the Stratosphere: What Wildfires have Taught Us About Nuclear Winter". Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union. 87 (52 Fall Meet. Suppl.). Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union: Abstract U14A–04. Bibcode:2006AGUFM.U14A..04F. Archived from the original on October 6, 2014.
{{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Ian Lowe, "Three minutes to midnight", Australasian Science, March 2016, p. 49.
- ^ a b c Philips, Alan F. "20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War". Nuclear Files. Retrieved 5 April 2016.
- ^ a b c d e "Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). Union of Concerned Scientists. Retrieved 5 April 2016.
- ^ Carlson, Peter (2009). K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist. PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-58648-497-2.
- ^ Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, Vintage, Random House, 2009.
- ^ "Chronology of Submarine Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis". National Security Archive of the George Washington University. Retrieved 15 November 2010.
- ^ Edward Wilson (2012-10-27). "Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the man who stopped nuclear war". The Guardian. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
- ^ Noam Chomsky (2004). Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt. p. 74. ISBN 0-8050-7688-3.
- ^ Michael Dobbs (June 2008). "Lost in Enemy Airspace". Vanity Fair. Retrieved 29 August 2016.
- ^ "Air-to-air Missile Non-comparison Table". X-Plane. Retrieved 29 August 2016.
- ^ Wall, Michael D. (9 August 2016). "How a 1967 Solar Storm Nearly Led to Nuclear War". Space.com. Retrieved 12 August 2016.
- ^ a b "The 3 A.M. Phone Call". The National Security Archive. George Washington University. 1 March 2012. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
- ^ "CBC Digital Archives". CBC.
- ^ Hoffman, David (10 February 1999). "I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut". Washington Post. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
- ^ Shane, Scott. "Cold War's Riskiest Moment". Baltimore Sun, 31 August 2003 (article reprinted as The Nuclear War That Almost Happened in 1983). Archived from the original on 19 August 2006.
{{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in:|publisher=(help); Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Hoffman, David (15 March 1998). "Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die". Washington Post Foreign Service.
- ^ "January 25, 1995--The Norwegian Rocket Incident". United States European Command. 23 January 2012. Archived from the original on 21 September 2012.
- ^ Ambinder, Marc (26 October 2010). "Failure Shuts Down Squadron of Nuclear Missiles". The Atlantic. Retrieved 11 August 2016.
- ^ Blair, Bruce (11 November 2010). "Could Terrorists Launch America's Nuclear Missiles?". TIME. Retrieved 11 August 2016.
