Noemvriana

The Noemvriana (Template:Lang-el, "November Events") of November-December 1916 was a political dispute and eventually armed confrontation in Athens between the royalist government of Greece and the Anglo-French forces over the issue of Greece's neutrality during World War I.

Although friction between the two sides existed from the beginning of the war, the unconditional surrender of Fort Rupel (a significant military fort at Macedonia) on May 1916 to the Germano-Bulgarian forces was the first event that led to Noemvriana. The Allies feared the possibility of a secret alliance between the royalist government and the Central Powers, which would place in grave danger their army in Macedonia established earlier that year. Intensive diplomatic negotiations between the pro-German King Constantine and Allied diplomats took place through out the summer. The king wanted for Greece to maintain her neutrality, while the Allies wanted demobilization of the Greek army and surrender war material equivalent to what was lost at Fort Rupel as guarantees of Greece's neutrality. However, failure to reach a satisfactory solution and the destruction of the Greek Macedonian by the Bulgarians led to the military coup of Thessaloniki by Venizelists military officers at the end of summer. Later on the former Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who from the very beginning of the war was on the side of the Allies, established a separate administration in northern Greece to prepare an army for liberating areas lost to Bulgarians and effectively splitting Greece into two entities.

The active involvement of the Allies and the division of Greece sparked several anti-Allied demonstrations in Athens. In late October a secret agreement was reached between the king and the Allied diplomats, but pressure from the military advisers forced the king to abandon the agreement. In an attempt to enforce the Allies their demands, they landed a small contingent in Athens on 1 December [O.S. 18 November] 1916. However, it met organized resistance and an armed confrontation took place for a day till a compromise was reached. After the evacuation of the Allied contingent from Athens the following day, a royalist mob raged through the city for three days targeting supporters of Venizelos. The incident became known as the Noemvriana in Greece, which was using the Old Style calendar at the time, and drove a deep wedge between the Venizelists and their political opponents, deepening what would become known as the National Schism.

Following the events of November, the Allies, determined to remove King Constantine, established a naval blockade on the areas supporting him. After the resignation of the king on 15 June 1917, Greece now unified (under the leadership of Venizelos) joined the war on the side of the Allies. The entrance of the Greek army provided the numerical superiority the Allies needed on the Macedonian front. Soon the Allied army defeated the Germano-Bulgarian forces in the Balkans followed by the liberation of Serbia and the conclusion of the World War I.

Background: Greece 1914-1916

Further information: National Schism

Constantine confers with Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and members of the Greek General Staff prior to the Conference of Bucharest that ended the Balkan Wars.

Greece had emerged victorious from the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, with her territory almost doubled, but found herself in a difficult international situation. The status of the Greek-occupied eastern Aegean islands was left undetermined, and the Ottoman Empire continued to claim them, leading to a naval arms race and mass expulsions of ethnic Greeks from Anatolia. In the north, Bulgaria, defeated in the Second Balkan War, harbored revanchist plans against Greece and Serbia. The two countries were bound by a treaty of alliance which promised military assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack, but in August 1914, the danger would emerge from a different quarter altogether: the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia and the outbreak of the First World War.

Greece, like Bulgaria, initially maintained neutrality, but as the war continued, both warring camps began wooing the two countries. At this point the first rifts appeared among the Greek leadership: the Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, an ardent admirer of Great Britain, supported entry in the war on the side of the Allies, while King Constantine, who had been educated in Germany, married to the Kaiser's sister, and a deep admirer of Prussian militarism, anticipated a German victory. He advocated a course of neutrality which was favorable to the Central Powers.

In early 1915 the British offered Greece "territorial concessions in Asia Minor" if it would participate in the upcoming Gallipoli Campaign. Venizelos supported this idea, but run into the opposition from the king and his military advisors. As a result, Venizelos submitted his resignation on 21 February 1915. Venizelos' Liberal Party won the May elections, and Venizelos again formed a government. When Bulgaria mobilized against Serbia in September 1915, Venizelos ordered a Greek counter-mobilization and called upon the Anglo-French to establish themselves in Thessaloniki in order to aid Serbia. Indeed, the Allies, with the general Maurice Sarrail, began landing on 22 September 1915 and started entrenching themselves around the city. Despite vote of confidence in the Greek parliament on Venizelos intention of helping Serbia, the king unconstitutionally dismissed Venizelos and the parliament, making the breach between the two men and their followers irreparable. The Liberals boycotted the December elections. In the same month, the French occupied Corfu, where the remains of the Serbian Army were gathered before being sent to Thessaloniki.

Causes

Surrender of Fort Rupel

King Constantine I in German Field Marshal's uniform. His pro-German sympathies caused him to favour a course of neutrality in the First World War.

Sarrail's movements and "demonstrations" toward the north, based on Bulgarian intelligence, had caused some concern in at the German Supreme Command, although it was obvious that a major offensive was unlikely. The "demonstrations" persuaded the Chief of General Staff of the Central Powers, Erich von Falkenhayn, of the necessity of occupying certain strategic positions in the Greek territory, and specifically Fort Rupel. Hence, on 9 May 1916, Falkenhayn informed Athens of the imminent advance of German-Bulgarian forces. In reply, Athens requested Germany to abandon the projected advance and the occupation of Fort Rupel by minimising the importance of Sarrail's movements. On 23 May, Falkenhayn provided guarantees that the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Greece and the rights of the citizens will be respected. And on 26 May, despite an official protest by the Greek government, a Bulgarian force of 25,000 men headed by German cavalry crossed the Greek border. The Greek forces at Fort Rupel surrendered, and all the war material was acquired by the German-Bulgarian forces. However, despite the assurances of the Germans, the Bulgarians began a systematic dislocation of the Greek population from the countryside to big cities, namely Serres, Drama and Kavala. Their goal was then to surround these cities and then capture them. The German attempts to restrain the Bulgarian territorial ambitions were partially successful, but on 4 September Kavala was under Bulgarian control.

Reactions of Venizelos and the Allies

The surrender of Fort Rupel produced a deplorable impression. The Allies were convinced that the German-Bulgarian advance was the result of a secret agreement between Athens and the Central Powers, especially when they had received assurances that no Bulgarian force will enter into Greek territory. In effect, for the Allies this event violated the neutrality of Greece and disturbed the balance in the Balkans. The Allied press, especially in France, demanded swift actions and retaliatory measures against Greece for the security of their forces in Macedonia. On the other hand, the surrender of Fort Rupel for Venizelos and his supporters meant the beginning of the destruction of Greek Macedonia. On 29 May, Venizelos proposed to Sir Francis Elliot (English Minister in Athens) and Jean Guillemin (French Minister in Athens) that he should go to Thessaloniki with General Panagiotis Danglis and establish a provisional government and mobilize the army to fight against the Bulgarians. Venizelos pledged that there would be no movement against the king or the dynasty; on the contrary, he hoped according to Elliot's report "success of his action and pressure of the public opinion might at the last moment convert His Majesty". His proposal would have the French support, however it met strong opposition from Britain, forcing Venizelos to make no preparations without the Allies' support.

On 9 June a conference took place in London by the Allies to decide what measures should be taken against Greece after the easy surrender of Fort Rupel, which in their view greatly disturbed the balance in the Balkans. One of the conclusions was the demobilization of the Greek army and navy. King Constantine anticipating the far-reaching demands from the protecting powers ordered a partial demobilization on 8 June. However, the tension between the royal government and the Allies continued, because anti-Allied activities in Athens were taking place and no effort was made by the Greek Government to prevent or restrain these incidents. On 12-3 June a mob wrecked the Venizelist newspapers Nea Ellas, Patris, Ethnos, and Estia. Following this, the same mob gathered and jeered around the British Legation. The police made no effort to restrain them or done anything after the wreckage of the newspaper offices. The disorder in Athens provided political ammunition to France to persuade Britain that more extreme measures are needed. On 17 June London decided "that it was absolutely necessary to do something to bring the king of Greece and his Government to their senses".

Military coup of Thessaloniki

Further information: Movement of National Defence

The "Triumvirate of National Defence": (L-R) Admiral Kountouriotis, Venizelos, and General Danglis.

On 27 August 1916, there was a demonstration in Athens, where Venizelos announced to the public his complete disagreement with Crown's policies. The king, said Venizelos had merely become victim of his malicious political advisers whose aims were to destroy the fruits of Goudi revolution. Additionally, Venizelos appealed to the king to remain above politics and should pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. "If this proposal does not lead to success", concluded Venizelos, "then there are other means to protect the country from complete catastrophe". But the king refused to accept a committee of the Venizelist demonstration and persisted against any compromise.

Two days later Venizelist army officers, who had the support of the allied army, organised a military coup in Thessaloniki and proclaimed the "Provisional Government of National Defence". Despite the support of the Allied army the provisional government was not officially recognized by the Allied powers, who had mixed feelings about it, nor Venizelos thought that there were mature conditions in Greece for such move, with the exception right after the surrender of Fort Rupel. George Leon, agrees with the Venizelos' criticism noting that without the support of allied army the movement would have failed immediately. This had the effect to further polarize the population between the royalists (also known as anti-Venizelists), who supported the crown, and Venizelists, who supported Venizelos. The newly founded separate "provisional state" included Northern Greece, Crete and the Aegean Islands. Significantly, these areas comprised the "New Lands" won during the Balkan Wars, and where Venizelos enjoyed broad support, while "Old Greece" was mostly pro-royalist. Venizelos along with Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis and General Panagiotis Danglis agreed to form a provisional government and on 9 October they moved to Thessaloniki and assumed command of the National Defence to oversee the Greek participation in the allied war effort. The triumvirate, as the three men became known, had formed this government in direct conflict with the Athens' political establishment. According to a British diplomat:

Not only has Mr Venizelos' action put fresh spirit its promoters here [Thessaloniki], but it has encouraged recruits to come forward from Macedonia where, as I have reported, very little enthusiasm had hitherto been manifested... The Committee of National Defence must now have at its disposal nearly twenty thousand men.

Nevertheless, Venizelos from the very beginnings of the provisional government continued to make appeals to the king to join forces and made ample clear that the sole aim of the provisional government was to organise a force for the liberation of Macedonia. This is reflected in a letter where Venizelos wrote:

...I think that the political orientation of the movement is very clear. We want to build an army in order to recover... the territories occupied by our hatred enemy and fulfil our treaty obligations to Serbia, and thus removing the stigma from the face our nation. After this, and naturally when the war is over, we shall request the convocation of a [national] assembly, not to change the structure of the state, or the dynasty, or restrict the prerogatives of the Crown as stipulated in the constitution, but in order to explain, elucidate, and safeguard these prerogatives as much as possible so that no king in the future will tell the representatives of the popular sovereignty that in the great national questions he was right to disregard the popular will and to impose his own views because he considers himself responsible before God.

Venizelos' moderation did not convince many or even among his own followers. It was only after the end of the year 1916 and the Noemvriana (described below) that he pushed for a radical solution.

Constantine-Bénazet agreement

French politician Paul Bénazet.

In the following months after the creation of provisional government in Thessaloniki in late August, negotiations between the Allies and king intensified. The Allies wanted further demobilisation of the Greek army as a counterbalance of the unconditional surrender of Fort Rupel by the royalist government and military evacuation of Thessaly to insure the safety of their troops in Macedonia. On the other hand the king wanted assurances that the Allies would not officially recognise Venizelos' provisional government or further support it, guarantees that Greece's integrity and neutrality will be respected, and any war material surrendered to the Allies will be returned after the war. After several fruitless negotiations it came as a surprise to French deputy Paul Bénazet on 23 October when the king not only agreed to some of the demands of the Allies (evacuation of Thessaly by the Greek army) but also volunteered most of the war material and the entire navy with ammunition. The only request from the king to Bénazet was that the agreement to remain secret in order not to expose Greece to the risk of war with the Central Powers.

The Bénazet-Constantine agreement was confirmed (by Elliot and Guillemin) on 25 October, and the next day Allied commander Vice Admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet was received audience by Constantine. Thus on 3 November, du Fournet, acting on the agreement and using the sinking of two Greek merchant ships by a German submarine as a pretext, demanded the surrender of the light war ships and the occupation of Salamis arsenal by the French. The Greek government yielded under protest, and on the 19 October, the partial disarmament of the main Greek warships began, while the Allies towed away 30 lighter craft. Three weeks later the French took over the Salamis naval base completely, and began employing the Greek ships with French crews.

However, the agreement Constantine-Bénazet proved to be short-lived. Leon offers two main reasons. First, further developments in the north seemed to indicate that Venizelos was planing a further push towards to the south (occupation of Katerini with Sarrail's approval on 2 November) and second opposition to the disarmament within his entourage and pressure exerted by the military in Athens led the king to abandon his agreement with Bénazet. Venizelos action at Katerini met with some disapproval among the Allied circles and among his own associate in Athens. Answering these criticisms Venizelos wrote to A. Diamandidis:

I am certainly very sorry that our advance to Katerini has caused displeasure among the foreigners [the Allies] and criticism among our friends there. But our friends should allow me to say that they are suffering of incurable conservatism, which, had it influenced us, would have rapidly succeeded to stifle our movement due to lack of life. For the foreigners, whose friendly feelings I do not doubt, it is natural to think only of their own difficulties and to ignore ours.

The advancement toward Katerini was not an attempt by Venizelos to jeopardise the agreement of the king with Bénazet, since the advancement was planned on 14 October long before the realisation of the agreement. Leon concludes it was caused by information that royalist government in Athens was promoting subversive activities to paralyse the organization and administration of areas under control of the Provisional government.

Last diplomatic efforts before the events

The seizure of Greek flotilla coupled with the Katerini incident caused much excitement in Athens and led to some anti-Allied demonstrations. Indeed, the Franco-British violations of Greece's territorial integrity throughout 1916 had offended the Greek national honour and therefore increased the Constantine's popularity, especially in areas of "Old Greece". In spite the king's promises to Bénazet and other Allied Minister, officers who requested to join the Provisional Government for the express reason to fight the Bulgarians were confined and charged with "desertion to the rebels". Moreover, a growing movement had been developed in the army among lower officers, led by military officers Ioannis Metaxas and Sofoklis Dousmanis, determined to oppose disarmament and the surrender of any war materials to the Allies.

French vice-admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet.

The following days the diplomatic attempts for finding a solution to satisfy all sides were fruitless. However, the Allies continued to pressure the government of Athens. On 24 November, du Fournet presented a new ultimatum ending on 1 December to the government of Athens demanding the immediate surrender of at least ten mountain batteries. Du Fournet received approval by his government two days later, but was instructed not to take possession the demanded material with the use of force. The admiral made a last effort to persuade the king to accept France's demands. He advised the king that according to his orders he would land an Allied contingent, with aim to occupy certain positions in Athens until his demands were satisfied. In reply, the king indicated that he was pressed by the army and the people not to submit to disarmament, and refused to make any commitment. However, he promised that the Greek forces would receive orders not to fire against the Allied contingent.

Despite the gravity of the situation both the royalist government and the Allies let the events take their own course. The royalist government decided to reject the admiral's demands on 29 November and armed resistance was organised. By 30 November military units and royalist militia (the epistratoi, "reservists") from surrounding areas have been recalled and gathered in and around Athens (in total over 20,000 men) and occupied strategic positions, with orders not to fire unless fired upon. On the other hand, the Allied authorities failed in their assessment of the prevailing temper. A diplomat characteristically insisted that the Greeks were bluffing, and in the face of force they would "bring the cannons on a plater"; a viewpoint that Du Fournet also shared.

Noemvriana

The battle of Athens

On early morning of 1 December [O.S. 18 November] 1916 the Allies landed a 3,000-strong marine force in Piraeus, and headed towards Athens. When these troops reached their designated positions they found them occupied by Greek troops. For more than two hours both sides stood facing each other; but soon a rifle went off by mid-morning and thus the battle of Athens began. Each side blamed the other for firing first. Once the battle had spread the king requested a ceasefire proposing a compromise solution. Du Fournet lacking in numbers and supplies readily accepted the offer. However, before any agreement was reached the battle was resumed. The Greek battery from Arditos Hill fired some rounds at the entrance of Zappeion where the admiral had established his headquarters. As a result the Allied squadron from Phaliron bombarded sections of the city, mostly around the Stadium and near the Palace. Discussions soon were resumed and a compromise was reached; the king agreed to surrender six mountain batteries instead of ten that the Admiral demanded. By late afternoon the battle was ended. The Allies had suffered 194 casualties, dead and wounded, and the Greeks excepting civilians, 82. By early morning of 2 December, all Allied forces had been evacuated.

The role of the Venizelists during the battle has been intensely contested. According to Admiral Louis du Fournet, the allied forces were greatly assisted by secretly armed Venizelists that used a number of buildings as strongholds, surprisingly attacking passing Greek units and trying to pin them down. Their participation was allegedly so extended that lead Admiral du Fourne to claim in his report that he had been involved in a civil war. These strongholds continued fighting after the night evacuation of the Allied marines and until the next day (2 December) when gradually fire ceased and capitulated; within them large quantities of weapons and ammunition were discovered, still wrapped in French canvas in which it had arrived. The surrendered Venizelists were led to prison followed by crowds hooting, cursing and spitting them so that their escorts saved them from being lynched with great difficulty. On the other hand, other historians deny the assumption that the Venizelists collaborated with the Allied forces: Pavlos Karolidis, a contemporary royalist historian, argues that no Venizelist supported the intruders, and that during the raids that followed in prominent Venizelists' houses, no arms where found apart from very few knifes.

Destruction of Athens

The alleged collaboration of the anti-royalists with the intruders turned the royalist mob against the city's Venizelists. The following three days they ransacked their houses and shops, while 35 people were murdered. Chester says that most of those who were killed were refugees from Asia Minor. Many hundreds were imprisoned and kept in solitary confinement. Karolidis characterizes the imprisonment of certain prominent Venizelists, such as Emmanuel Benakis (mayor of Athens), as a disgrace. Some authors argue that Benakis was not only arrested and imprisoned but also ill-treated. Seligman describes that they were only released 45 days later on account of the categorical demand of the Entente ultimatum, which was accepted on 16 January. Abbot asserts that during the night evacuation of the Allied forces many persons with criminal records and in the payroll of the Franco-British Secret Services slipped out of the capital that they had allegedly terrorized for nearly a year. Due to his failure Admiral du Fournet was relieved from his command.

Aftermath

The incident became known as the "November events" in Greece, which was using the Old Style calendar at the time, and marked the culmination of the National Schism.

Political situation in Greece and Europe

Venizelos reviews a section of the Greek army on the Macedonian front during the First World War, 1918. He is accompanied by Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis (left) and General Maurice Sarrail (right).

On 2 December [O.S. 19 November] 1916, Britain and France officially recognised the government under Venizelos as the lawful government, effectively splitting Greece into two separate entities. On 7 December [O.S. 24 November] 1916, Venizelos' provisional government officially declared war on the Central Powers. In reply, a royal warrant for the arrest of Venizelos was issued and the Archbishop of Athens, under pressure by the royal house, anathematised him.

In France, where the presidency of Aristide Briand, a leading proponent of engaging with Constantine to bring about a reconciliation of the two Greek administrations, was now threatened by the events in Athens and a reorganization of the government was necessary for balancing the political landscape. In Britain, three days later, prime minister H. H. Asquith and foreign minister Sir Edward Grey resigned and were replaced by Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour, respectively. The change in the British leadership proved to be particularly important for the political developments in Greece, since Lloyd George was a known Hellenophile, an especially warm admirer of Venizelos and dedicated to resolving the Eastern Question. Unwilling to risk a new fiasco, but determined to solve the problem, the Allies established a naval blockade around southern Greece, which was still loyal to the king, and that caused extreme hardship to people in those areas.

With the fall of the Romanovs in Russia (who was refusing the French proposals for Constantine's removal from the throne) in the February revolution, it paved the way for the other two protecting powers of Greece, France and Great Britain, to adopt a more hard attitude toward to Constantine. In June they decided to invoke their obligation as "protecting powers", who had promised to guarantee a constitutional form for Greece at the time the Kingdom was created, to demand the king's resignation. Constantine accepted and on the 15 June 1917 went to exile, leaving his son Alexander on the throne as demanded (whom the Allies considered as pro-Entente), instead of his elder son and crown prince, George. His departure was followed by the deportation of many prominent royalists, especially army officers such as Ioannis Metaxas, to exile in France and Italy.

The course of events paved the way for Venizelos to return in Athens on 29 May 1917 and Greece, now unified, officially entered the war on the side of the Allies. Subsequently the entire Greek army was mobilized (though tensions remained inside the army between supporters of the monarchy and supporters of Venizelos) and began to participate in military operations against the Central Powers army on the Macedonian front.

The Macedonian front

Painting depicting Greek military units in the WWI Victory Parade in Arc de Triomphe, Paris. July 1919.

Further information: Macedonian front (World War I)

By the fall of 1918, the Greek army numbering 300,000 soldiers, was the largest single national component of the Allied army in the Macedonian front. The presence of the entire Greek army gave the critical mass that altered the balance between the opponents in the Macedonian front. Under the command of French General Franchet d'Esperey, a combined Greek, Serbian, French and British force launched a major offensive against the Bulgarian and German army, starting on 14 September 1918. After the first heavy fighting (see battle of Skra) the Bulgarians gave up their defensive positions and began retreating back towards their country. On 24 September the Bulgarian government asked for an armistice, which was signed five days later. The Allied army then pushed north and defeated the remaining German and Austrian forces that tried to halt the Allied offensive. By October 1918 the Allied armies had recaptured all of Serbia and were preparing to invade Hungary. The offensive was halted because the Hungarian leadership offered to surrender in November 1918 marking the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Their surrender caused the end of the First World War since Germany had no forces to stop the Allies in entering Germany from the south, thus proving the breaking of the Macedonian front as the decisive event of the war and the participation of the Greek army the catalytic factor. Accordingly Greece earned a seat at the Paris Peace Conference under Venizelos.

Notes

^ i: The most pronounced violation was when the Allies occupied the island of Corfu and used it as a base to gather the remains of the Serbian army. The Allies informed Athens of their intention a few hours before the first ships reaching the island.

References

Books

• Abbott, G. F. (2008). Greece and the Allies 1914-1922. BiblioBazaar, LLC. ISBN 9780554394626.
• The Encyclopædia Britannica. The Encyclopædia Britannica, Company ltd. 1922.
• Burg, D. F. (1998). Almanac of World War I. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0813120721. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Chester, S. M. (1921). Life of Venizelos, with a letter from His Excellency M. Venizelos (PDF). London: Constable. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Clogg, R. (2002). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521004799.
• Dutton, D. (1998). The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 9781860640797.
• Fotakis, Z. (2005). Greek naval strategy and policy, 1910-1919. Routledge. ISBN 9780415350143.
• Gibbons, H. A. (1920). Venizelos. Houghton Mifflin Company.
• Hickey, M. (2007). First World War: Volume 4 The Mediterranean Front 1914-1923. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 184176373X.
• Karolidis, Pavlos (–Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos)(1925), History of the Hellenic Nation (Volume VI). Eleftheroudakis (in Greek).
• Kitromilides, P. (2006). Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 0748624783. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Leon, G. B. (1974). Greece and the Great Powers 1914-17. Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Markezinis, S. (1968). Political History of modern Greece, Volume 4. Papyros.
• Paxton, Hibben (2009). Constantine I and the Greek People. BiblioBazaar, LLC. ISBN 9781110760329.
• Seligman, V. J. (1920). Victory of Venizelos (PDF). {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Vatikotes, P. (1998). Popular autocracy in Greece, 1936-41: a political biography of general Ioannis Metaxas. Routledge. ISBN 978-0714648699.

Journals

• Ion, Theodore P. (1910). "The Cretan Question". The American Journal of International Law. 4 (2). American Society of International Law: 276–284. doi:10.2307/2186614. JSTOR 10.2307/2186614. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)