Siege of Namur (1914)
| Siege of Namur | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Western Front of World War I | |||||||
 Map of the city and Fortified Position of Namur | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 German Empire Austria-Hungary |
 Belgium France | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Karl von Bülow Max von Hausen |
Augustin Michel | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 107,000 | 35,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 300 killed, 600 wounded or missing |
c. 15,000 (including 6,700 taken prisoner) | ||||||
The Siege of Namur (French: Siège de Namur) was a battle between Belgian and German forces around the fortified city of Namur during World War I. Namur was defended by a ring of modern fortresses, known as the Fortified Position of Namur and guarded by the Belgian 4th Division. When the siege began on 20 August, the German forces used the lesson of the Battle of Liège (4–16 August) and bombarded the forts using heavy siege artillery loaned from Austria-Hungary before attacking with infantry. French troops sent to relieve the city were defeated at the Battle of Charleroi and only a few managed to participate in the fighting for Namur. The forts were destroyed by the bombardment of the super-heavy artillery and although much of the Belgian 4th Division was able to withdraw to the south, the Belgian fortress troops were forced to surrender on 24 August.
Battle
Background
General Karl von Bülow, commander of the German Second Army, established an Army Detachment under the command of General Max von Gallwitz with his Guard Reserve Corps, XI Corps taken from the Third Army of General Max von Hausen and a division of the 7th Reserve Corps, with c. 107,000 men which advanced on Namur on 16 August 1914. Namur was garrisoned by about 37,000 fortress troops and infantry of the Belgian 4th Division (under Augustin Édouard Michel).[1] The Belgian goal was to hold the Fortified Position of Namur until the French Fifth Army could arrive to relieve them. After attacking the Fort de Marchovelette on 20 August, Army Detachment Gallwitz started general fire the next day. At the same time, hoping to prevent the French Fifth Army from reinforcing, the Second Army attacked in the direction of Charleroi. This action was successful, with only one French regiment making it to Namur.[1]
Siege
During the siege of Namur the Germans employed the lessons learned from their assault on the Fortified Position of Liège which was similar to the fortifications at Namur. At Liège German infantry had attempted to capture the city by coup de main and then resorted to bombardment by super-heavy siege artillery, at Namur the Germans waited for the siege guns to arrive from Liège and began a bombardment on 21 August 1914. The guns included Austrian Skoda 305 mm howitzers and 420 mm Big Bertha howitzers, firing from beyond the range of the forts' guns. The forts had the same chatacteristics of the Liège forts, having been built to withstand bombardment by 210-millimetre (8.3 in) artillery. By the evening of 23 August the forts were in ruins and Namur was evacuated by General Michel and the 4th Division. Belgian fortress troops fought on and the last fort was surrendered on 25 August.[2]
The Belgian forts made little provision for the daily needs of their wartime garrisons, locating latrines, showers, kitchens and the morgue in the fort's counterscarp, a location that would be untenable in combat. This had profound effects on the forts' ability to endure a long assault. These service areas were placed directly opposite the barracks, which opened into the ditch in the rear of the fort (i.e., in the face towards Liège), with lesser protection than the two "salient" sides.[3] This arrangement was calculated to place a weaker side to the rear to allow for recapture by Belgian forces from the rear, and in an age where mechanical ventilation was in its infancy, allowed natural ventilation of living quarters and support areas. However, the concept proved disastrous in practice. Heavy shellfire made the rear ditch untenable, and German forces were able to get between the forts and attack them from the rear.[4] The massive German bombardment drove men into the central massif, where there were insufficient sanitary facilities for 500 men, rendering the air unbreathable, while the German artillery destroyed the forts from above and from the rear.[5]
Aftermath
Analysis
The Germans had reversed the tactics used at Liège, against the similar fortifications of Namur by waiting for the siege train from Liège to bombard the forts before attacking with infantry. The Belgian fortifications held the German advance for several days longer than the Germans had anticipated, which allowed Belgium and France more time to mobilize and prevented the Germans from falling on an unprepared Paris.[6] The Belgian army had c. 15,000 casualties of whom c. 10,000 were from the 4th Division, which withdrew to the south behind the French Fifth Army. The division was moved to Le Havre and then by sea to Ostend, arriving on 27 August and then re-joined the field army at Antwerp.[7] The authors of Der Weltkrieg, the German Official History recorded the taking of 6,700 Belgian and French prisoners, the capture of twelve field guns and a loss of 900 German casualties, of whom c. 300 were killed.[8]
References
- ^ a b Tyng 1935, p. 99.
- ^ Tyng 1935, pp. 99–100.
- ^ Donnell 2007, p. 32.
- ^ Donnell 2007, p. 36.
- ^ Donnell 2007, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Donnell 2007, pp. 53–54.
- ^ Tyng 1935, p. 100.
- ^ Reichsarchiv 1925, p. 416.
Bibliography
- Donnell, Clayton (2007). The Forts of the Meuse in World War I. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-114-4.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Reichsarchiv (1925). Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande: 1 Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Die digitale Landesbibliothek Oberösterreich 2011 ed.). Berlin: Mittler. OCLC 163368678. Retrieved 13 January 2014.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Tyng, S. (1935). The Campaign of the Marne 1914 (Westholme Publishing 2007 ed.). New York: Longmans, Green and Co. ISBN 1-59416-042-2.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
External links
