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Discussion with Damian on logical contradiction

Brews writes "An inescapable contradiction between the intuition of free will and the scientific view arises with nomological determinism". This is incorrect, and I doubt the sources say this. A contradiction is two statements which cannot both be true, or both false. Intuition cannot contradict causal determinism in this sense. The current text "It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law" is better, because 'difficult to reconcile' is not as strong as 'contradictory'.

On the current text, this doesn’t quite get the problem right either. The conflict is between our conception of free will as making it possible to change the future, with the position that the causes of the future lie in the past, the past is necessary, therefore the future is necessary. I.e. the root of the problem is the tension between possible and necessary, not between 'causally effective', whatever that means, and 'the scientific view'. I also don't like the minute distinctions that the article insists on making. Kindness to WP's readers means clarity, and that usually means starting with the generic and moving to the specific. I.e. start with the conflict between free will and determinism = between possibility and necessity, and perhaps later, if at all, move to the fine distinctions between types of determinism. Peter Damian (talk) 19:42, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I appreciate your interest in this article, but I think you have a utopian view of making it all simple. It begins simply - some things are determined, fixed, by past occurrences and some are not. But that is the end of simplicity. Millennia of reformulations are not easily summarized, and the solution, I believe, is not to attempt to do that, but rather to identify understandable sources that present the various views and cite them. Maybe you are up for this? Maybe you have improvements over the presentation of the nomological vs physical distinction? Brews ohare (talk) 21:18, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

In connection with "inescapable contradiction", of course we are talking about a logical contradiction, not a matter of fact. And a logical contradiction between free will and determinism obviously depends upon what choice you make for each term. With the definition of free will as allowing individuals to initiate original acts and the definition of determinism as the future determined ineluctably by past events, there is a clear inescapable contradiction. That is what the quote of Vihvelin by Horst points out. Of course, that settles nothing because various authors simply change the definitions around claiming that their choice of definition better captures "what people mean" - a very vague target given that there is no empirical evidence to support such an assertion. Hence the unending dither. Brews ohare (talk) 22:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

You have not read what I wrote. A contradiction is between two statements. An intuition is not a statement, it is a feeling or a state of mind. I do not know what you mean about a 'choice' for each term. Do you mean definition? The utmost precision in the language we use for this kind of subject is essential. On your view of how to present a subject simply, as I said above, we have a duty to the readers. Do I have improvements over the causal versus physical distinction? In order to present the problem, there is no need of making it. Peter Damian (talk) 23:07, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

On your second point “With the definition of free will as allowing individuals to initiate original acts and the definition of determinism as the future determined ineluctably by past events, there is a clear inescapable contradiction.” Your definition is imprecise. You mean that free will is the capability for individuals to initiate original acts? The definition of determinism is not “the future determined ineluctably by past events”, for determinism is a kind of theory. Determinism is not the future. More sloppy language. Even if I paraphrase you, I do not see a contradiction. There is no contradiction between being able to ‘initiate original acts’ and the theory that ‘the future is determined ineluctably by past events’. It depends on what you mean by ‘original’ of course, but there again I see sloppy expression and sloppy thinking. Peter Damian (talk) 23:13, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I've been very clear that I am speaking about logical contradictions. Did you pick that up? Brews ohare (talk) 23:15, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

To avoid going in circles, try discussing Horst's quote from Vihvelin. Brews ohare (talk) 23:21, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I was speaking of logical contradiction, yes. And no, you haven't been very clear, as I have just said. Your formulation of the issues is sloppy and lacks precision. Peter Damian (talk) 23:26, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Use Vihvelin's then. Brews ohare (talk) 23:28, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I am off to bed now. (I am in London). I am looking at Vihvelin's article in the SEP. It is very wordy and hard to extract a precise definition. I will look tomorrow Peter Damian (talk) 23:43, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

I looked. Vihvelin's description is hopeless Peter Damian (talk) 07:18, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

If you think Vihvelin is incomprehensible, how about finding a source you recommend? Brews ohare (talk) 14:25, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Maybe McKenna & Coates, who refer to Vihvelin? They directly duck the issue of free will viz a viz determinism and instead frame it as an aspect of moral responsibility, a topic of great significance in free will and under-emphasized in the article Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

You will find here that my attempt to give McKenna & Coates some prominence was unsuccessful. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Maybe this is helpful? Jack Martin, Jeff H. Sugarman, Sarah Hickinbottom (2009). Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 20. ISBN 9781441910653. Traditionally, at least at the extremes, philosophical arguments concerning agency are predicated on a strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still not in a place where I can be fully involved here right now, but I'm skimming through just to see how things are going. I appreciate your involvement here Damian, it's good to have some new voices.

While I like your overall sentiment about moving from the general to the specific, one thing I think we need to be cautious about in the specifics you mention is not to start out in a way that defines free will in relation to determinism, as that biases the article in favor of incompatibilist conceptions of free will. Within the discussion of that concept of free will, I like your thoughts; but we have to also keep in mind that there are broad schools of thought that don't see a conflict at all between the two, so we should not start from a place that assumes that conflict, but somewhere even more general than that. That was the purpose of the "constraints" language that I introduced long ago, which became the most recent stable version of this article before this conflict with Brews began; we start with the almost-vacuous generalism that free will is a will that is free from something, then move into the things that it might or might not need to be free from (determinism being only one of several proposals there) to be free in the relevant way, and then into problems specific to each of those different conceptions of it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 19:10, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you! There doesn't have to be a conflict between general causal determinism (i.e. every event, whether physical or not, is caused) and free will, but that really depends on the definition of 'free will'. If everything whatsoever is determined, we have to define 'free will' as absence of restraint or something like that. Or we could, like Duns Scotus, fall back on a concept of synchronic contingency: the past could have been otherwise, although it happened that way. Or we could fall back on some epistemic notion of necessity. Alternatively, we could redefine the scope of the determinate (as Brews would like, I suspect), and restrict it to the merely physical or, with Aristotle, the 'natural'. But this all means dividing up the subject in a way that is coherent and uncluttered, but this is what the article is not, currently. Peter Damian (talk) 19:49, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

The role of the subject-object problem

The metaphysical discussion of Free will is focused upon the 'compatibilist'-'incompatibilist' framework. This constricts discussion to a rather semantic debate over definitions of 'free', of 'will', of 'determinism', and it is indeed the content of a great deal of the philosophical literature. However, as the subsection In science points out, there is a deeper aspect of the metaphysics related to the applicability of science to subjective matters like the 'intuition' of free will. According to Eddy Nahmias: "there are problems other than determinism that need to be confronted—namely, challenges to free will suggested by discoveries in neuroscience and philosophy". Understanding these challenges confronts the problems raised in the Subject-object problem and the Mind-body problem. As David M Hart suggests: "the free will-determinism distinction is grounded in the same subject-object dualism that Heidegger is so intent upon critiquing and overcoming..." Another discussion (probably less acceptable to an academic) is found in Ken Wilber's The Spectrum of Knowledge.

I suggest that a sentence alerting the reader to this situation be included in the introduction to provide readers with a clue that the semantic 'compatibilist-incompatibilist' debate is not all that is involved in the metaphysics of 'free will'. For example, at the end of the third paragraph of Free will#In Western philosophy that brings up the limitations of physical determinism, the sentence could be appended:

"Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculations, a variety of which are reviewed in the articles Subject-object problem and Mind-body problem."

Perhaps more can be said? Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

You're not asking us to take a 'cultist' like Ken Wilber seriously in a philosophy article are you Brews? Otherwise you have made the semantic point before and I have some sympathy if not full agreement. Does any third party source make the same point? ----Snowded ^TALK 19:27, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

There is Hart. If you read Wilber you'll see that he quotes at length a number of reputable opinions to establish the background of the subject- object problem. You don't have to subscribe to any cult extrapolations. The WP articles also have some useful sources. I hope you can draw upon your own knowledge of sources to provide a good starting point. I am happy to collaborate. Brews ohare (talk) 00:01, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

BTW: The quote you removed by Timpe, to the effect that the incompatibilist-compatibilist conflict is about possibilities not about whether 'free will' actually exists, ignores the more significant point that this brouhaha actually misses the issues involved in the mind-body problem and the subject-object problem. These more basic issues make clear that the incompatibilist-compatibilist argument is like arguing over whether to use chopsticks or a fork and knife when you have no food. Brews ohare (talk) 01:09, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

The fact that Wilber is even suggested is an illustration of the danger of searching the internet to find sources without some wider third party authority. I also think we need to remember there is another article on the Subject-Object problem and our job here is not to write a book on Free Will, but to provide a high level summary of the field. I'll look at Hart later ----Snowded ^TALK 04:15, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

My interest in the link to Wilbur is in his extended quotations from Suzuki, from Eddington, from Heisenberg and so on. These authors have something to say. The point of mentioning this essay is not to provide an "authoritative" source.

The subject-object problem and the mind-body problem are open-ended issues of course, and there are sources like Nagel (See for example the discussion on pp. 110 ff. "What I shall discuss are two aspects of the problem of free will..." ) that are extremely conjectural. There is also Herbert Feigl: see §III section 3. Another approach is enactivism, and the idea that the subjective and objective are not really separable in a tightly coupled feedback system where the internal and the external interact to create each other. Hutto, Sporns, Torrance, and this compilation of essays. Still another view is that an understanding of free will must ask about the role of consciousness.Caruso. I am of the opinion that there are no "answers" to free will here, but there is ample argument to establish clearly that the problem is badly formulated as a compatibilsm-incompatibilism debate. Brews ohare (talk) 15:31, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

Wilber is free to make extended reference to primary sources, but forgive me if I don't follow through on that. Cult leaders who claim to have achieved the ultimate synthesis of all know ideas lack credibility. But we do not write articles here in the way Wilber threads together said sources or extended quotes. We reflect reliable third party material. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:51, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Are you going to engage the issues actually in front of us here? Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

If you are not up for a more extended treatment, the single sentence suggested above could be appended to alert readers to this connection. Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Please don't interpret my unwillingness to engage with discussions about primary sources with my willingness to engage with the issues. You continue to refuse to accept that other editors disagree with you on synthesis. I understand you think you are right, but most of the rest of us do not. That means that efforts to synthesis primary material are going to be reverted. Refusal to help out by a temporary use of inline references while the aritlcle stabilises makes it more likely that you will snippet be reverted rather than amended, I've told you this a dozen times but compromise is not a part of your mind set.----Snowded ^TALK 17:43, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Just how do you intend to engage with the issues? Brews ohare (talk) 00:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

You have said earlier you intended to read Hart and two recently acquired Oxford Companions as an aid to joining this conversation, and above I have provided links to some additional viewpoints. Your response is complaint about reference formatting and threats of reversion of any attempt on my part to present anything concerning the works I have linked. Can you provide your ideas of some addition on this topic? Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

I've got both and there is material in them that can be used but it doesn't really support your original research in that you are making partial selections You seem to make the assumption that the only alternative to your edits is proposing alternatives. That isn't the case, if your changes do not improve the article and/or constitute synthesis then reversion is a valid response. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:28, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, you seem to have lost track of what this thread is about. It is not about valid bases for reversion. It is not about how eclectic the sources are that I have mentioned. It is about putting together a contribution about the relation between the subject-object problem and free will that is representative of the spectrum of opinion on this subject. So present what you have found. Comment upon what I have found. Then we can construct a balanced overview. This whole thing is about sources and their opinions. It is not about you or about me. Brews ohare (talk) 04:13, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, find a third party source which justifies addition or change. We don't assemble sources and is increasingly about your refusal to understand that ----Snowded ^TALK 05:10, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

"We don't assemble sources" — well, that seems to settle that. You are not going to discuss presentation of the literature and will simply revert every addition that is not from a "third-party" source. That terminates any possibility of contributing to this article, particularly because there are no third-party sources; all sources are secondary sources including your Oxford Handbooks that invite single-author contrubutions by philosophers with active interest in their own publications. I don't think you really feel this way, it is just your position when dealing with me. That is because you don't enjoy actually engaging in what the literature has to say. That is your prerogative of course, but it does impede development of WP. Brews ohare (talk) 21:31, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Brew's behaviour on this article

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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This is ottava rima all over again. Some people are unable to admit a wrong, and will go to mind bending lenghts, over years, backing narrower and narrower into a corner to defend the incomprehensible. Because that is the limit of thier ability. This is clearly what is happening here with Brews. Is WP:COMPETENCE a defence? Ceoil (talk) 17:17, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Ceoil: You exhibit impatience with summarizing the literature, which apparently contains some ideas you deplore. However, your mind set is not what is wanted on WP, but rather the opinions of published scholars. Avoiding discussion of the literature by picturesque attacks upon myself will not improve the accuracy of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 17:23, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, Wikipedia is governed by behaviour not by content resolution other than through the community and a series of agreed policies. The ongoing problem with you over multiple articles with multiple editors is that you do not feel constrained by either. You have been told time and time again that we do not synthesis primary sources but not only do you carry on doing so, you complain that other editors will not join you. You then edit war because you feel you are right and post longer and longer justifications on the talk page to the point where you drive other editors away from the articles (as you have here). You have been subject to community sanction for this behaviour but you seem incapable of learning from that sanction. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Guys, I'm sorry if I sound ill tempered, but I've been following this page and I suppose I was. But I've been down this road, and reasoned argument will not work, as evidenced by the circular route of this talk page and its many archives. A different route need to be taken, I would suggest along the lines of exhaustion. And Brews, your approach to 'summarizing the literature' is exactly the problem. Ceoil (talk) 17:42, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

The problems go deeper than anything that can be neatly solved. For example, nomological determinism seems to have been custom-written by Brews in order to support the importance of the distinction. AFAICS it is just another term for 'causal determinism', which itself is the main form of what is commonly called simply 'determinism' (the other two forms being logical d. and so-called theological d.). See also this page which I started in order to list the articles that Brews and Doyle are the main contributors to. I don't think there is anything unambiguously wrong in any of them (but I haven't been through with a fine toothed comb. The problem is that they place undue emphasis on distinctions that are not that important in the scheme of things. It may take some time to clear this all up. For example, I think Subject–object problem should be afd'd. There is no material that could not be found elsewhere, and the term itself has no fixed and accepted use that I can find. However, the fuss and bother it would cause is an immediate deterrent. Peter Damian (talk) 17:45, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the summary Peter, and welcome back. But would the fuss and bother be any worse than the hand to hand, inch by inch combat here? Ceoil (talk) 17:55, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Well I would like to be fair to Brews. However, so far it seems that 'competence' may be an issue. Peter Damian (talk) 18:01, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Ask Snowded how that is likely to turn out. Ceoil (talk) 18:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm more with Ceoil on this. Trying to be fair to Brews over this round mainly on one article and a round last year on a dozen articles, just results in longer and longer talk page comments. Competence may the the issue, but its also his practice. See the multiple attempts to change policy to support his edit warring with various forms of synthesis. Its driven at least 2/3 editors away from Philosophy articles and makes change difficult It takes a lot of stamina to deal with Brews and if you don't respond on the talk page he just reinstates disputed text, so you have to respond and the cycle continues. As Peter is finding out he also has this habit of summarising the statements of opponents to say things they did not say and then hits out at the straw man ----Snowded ^TALK 18:15, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

OK well let me see if he replies to my last question (I think he realizes by now he was talking nonsense but let's be fair). The only other solution, other than infinite patience, is a topic ban from philosophy, yes? Peter Damian (talk) 18:20, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter, he has 21 edits to this talk page alone today; every one with...<sigh>...the problem is that each needs careful unravellng, application of meaning and debunking, and ties up subject experts. Ceoil (talk) 18:29, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

There is another possibility. Remove the topic ban from Physics but impose restrictions to 1rr on all articles, a formal caution on synthesis and a restriction on talk page edits if he can't get agreement to a change. That might help things as he could be a good editor. Maybe a mentor who's judgement he has to accept. I really don't like bans but I suspect the next one would be from all articles. If banned from Philosophy he would simply move elsewhere. I think it his is retirement hobby so if the energy could be channelled it would be good. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:32, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Good. This sounds like a first option to me. Ceoil (talk) 18:41, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

If I am permitted, I'll present my view. It is that no participants save myself have made any use of sources. Instead there is an assumption by other WP editors assembled here that they know the subject, and sources are unnecessary. If instead they used their vast knowledge of the literature on free will to assemble a solidly sourced presentation of their views, things would evolve more fruitfully than with the present approach of presenting their personal assessments and formulations as fact, and castigating me for the temerity of requesting sources as backup. Brews ohare (talk) 19:20, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No, the problem is that you are both misusing the sources, and also (more problematically) you appear to misunderstand the sources. See my point above on 'physical determinism+causal determinism'. The source you are using nowhere uses this terminology, plus it is practically nonsensical -it's like saying "red+coloured". Peter Damian (talk) 19:30, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] It's possible you misread 'causal determinism' as 'causal closure'. But that means you aren't really paying attention + I never said that either + Kim does not talk about 'physical determinism + causal closure'. Physical determinism = causal closure + no uncaused physical event Peter Damian (talk) 19:38, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Its probably wise not to get further bogged down in specifics at this stage. There is enough debunking above, in the archives, etc. More general summaries of positions and habits would be better. Ceoil (talk) 19:45, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

But then he will complain that he is the only one making use of sources. I am hitting him at the very centre of this claim: namely he clearly has badly misunderstood the sources. Peter Damian (talk) 19:52, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Specifically, he has linked to an article by Jaegwon Kim (respectable philosopher), using it as a source to undermine me. But when I look at the source, it says nothing like what he claims. Peter Damian (talk) 19:53, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Also, he says things like " Is this confusing somehow? " as though I were stupid not to understand what the source says. This bullying and dishonest tactic may work with some people, but I call it what it is: bullying and dishonest. He must surely be aware what the source is saying. Peter Damian (talk) 19:55, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

And now he concedes the source did not say that. Was it an accident? But how many accidents have there been? Note it took about an hour of arguing and explanation for him to concede that. Peter Damian (talk) 20:11, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

And another problem. He has just conceded he misrepresented the source. However the source was meant to counter a misrepresented summary of what I said. So there are two levels of misdirection: (1) the straw man (2) mispresenting sources used to attack the straw man. He has conceded (2), so we have ascended up a level back to (1), so now I must explain again how I did not "propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " This game could go on forever. I have not encountered this editor before (although his legend precedes him). I have no taste for these games. Peter Damian (talk) 20:21, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: All that is here is just an attempt to present what leads to Kim's assertion that physical causal closure leaves the door open to dualism of some kind. That is it. Finito.

How you arrive at some imagined hostility on my part is a mystery. As for undermining your position, what is that? All I have to go by is your (unsourced) summary:

"the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period.

Your claim that "you are both misusing the sources, and also (more problematically) you appear to misunderstand the sources" is simply an undocumented assertion on your part. You seem to think that my use of the construction "physical determinism+causal closure" is some kind of misreading of Kim. Kim has not used this construction, but its use by me here is not some flagrant misrepresentation. Whether I need Kim's "physical clausal closure" or his "physical determinism" the only point that matters is that the door is open to nonphysical events and nonphysical causes which is stated in just so many words by Kim.

Rather than get you shirt in a knot, why not present your view carefully with some sources so we can see what you have in mind? Brews ohare (talk) 20:33, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Wow, there you go again. Further above, you wrote "physical determinism+causal determinism", directly above you write " "physical determinism+causal closure", so you misrepresent a misrepresentation. Neither of these makes sense anyway. Do you understanding anything of what you are babbling about? Either you are a skillful hoaxer, or you are merely confused. Peter Damian (talk) 20:46, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Wow indeed. Ceoil (talk) 21:16, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I am sorry to see this kind of activity on a talk page. If you all want to get serious, you can begin to address Kim's discussion. Else, goodbye. Brews ohare (talk) 21:21, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Well it's goodbye from me, for sure. Snowded asked me to help out with the article here, but it's beyond help. I would not have believed this, had I not seen it with my own eyes. Peter Damian (talk) 22:02, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Nomological determinism not proven at this level

In this edit Snowded has said: Original reference was better, maybe some change in phrasing but not your synthesis. Nomological determinism per talk page is not proven as belong to an article at this level

This one-line edit summary makes no sense. For one thing, the current paragraph Snowded has restored says:

"The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted." (my emphasis)

Obviously, the term nomological determinism appears here, making nonsense of Snowded's reason for reversion. In addition, the 'original reference' of the current paragraph also is present in the removed paragraph, adding to the confusion of Snowded's rationale.

For another thing, the current paragraph has four defects pointed out earlier:

1. The parenthetic construction ‘physical determinism (nomological determinism)’ that seems to imply these two terms are synonyms.

2. The confused treatment of what is only potential controversy between free will and the combination of physical determinism and causal closure

3. The confused idea of what physical determinism and causal closure mean.

4. The failure to draw attention to discussions of what could lie outside the physical domain, which leads naturally to the following paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness, presently just dangling in space.

Snowded has addressed not even one of these deficiencies.

Inasmuch as Snowded has made no effort to engage here, his actions have no justification. Brews ohare (talk) 00:27, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

The removed paragraph has none of the listed defects, and is well-sourced. The other sourced changes removed by Snowded reduce the value and intelligibility of the article, and Snowded has made no attempt to explain these reversions at all.

Accordingly, I have rescinded Snowded's reversions, and ask him to kindly explain himself here to explain just what exactly he finds so misleading that removal is a better option than discussion here aimed at reformulation. Brews ohare (talk) 05:52, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

I've explained this before Brews and other editors have supported my position. You cannot force editors to engage with you in discussion of primary sources. If you can find a third party source that makes the term relevant to a summary article fine, but its not mentioned in the ones we have found so far. You really have to stop assuming that because you are not happy with a response on the talk page then the response is not adequate and justifies you in edit warring. Make a more modest set of proposals here and/or get other editors involved. Get agreement to a change before you make it, make smaller changes and give other editors time to respond, use inline references until things are stable. All of that would make it more easy to work with you. Accepting when you do not have agreement and moving on is also part of this The fact that you will never let go discourages other editors from engagement. You've driven one of the best philosophy editors from this page already, possibly two. This behaviourt got you a permanent block from physics articles before and I know you want to get that changed. Probably the best way is not to continue to exhibit the behaviour which resulted in that ban ----Snowded ^TALK 10:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, I see that you have crafted a fallacious response that makes no attempt to state specifics, neither as to your espoused 'position' (which remains nonexistent, or at least unexpressed ) nor as to your 'reasons' (yet to be enunciated) for reverting a few uncontroversial sourced corrections to errors in the text. In place of specific objections that could be addressed, your reply resorts to fictional talk-page history and personal intimidation. Constructive criticism appears to be alien. A four-point list of failures of the paragraph you support has yet to register. Brews ohare (talk) 13:48, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

No Brews, you don't agree with me nor are you paying attention to reasons given before against ascribing significance to this. I'll leave it a day to give you a chance to self-revert otherwise this is edit warring. ----Snowded ^TALK 01:25, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, there is no dispute here about content. You have said nothing specific to content. So how is it possible to alter these additions to suit you, where you provide no idea about what you object to? These sentences you have reverted say exactly what the sources cited say. There is no idea of my own presented. The sourced definitions of 'nomological determinism' are verbatim quotes. They are uncontroversial and are used in the WP article nomological determinism. The limitation of physical determinism to the physical is exactly as Kim has described, and again we have verbatim quotes of noncontroversial remarks. So what, please, are your objections in specific detail regarding this content? Brews ohare (talk) 03:58, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

A four-point list of failures of the paragraph you support has received no attention from you. Yet you wish to install this sloppy paragraph with wrong information. Why ?? Brews ohare (talk) 04:01, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

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I have been following this dispute while on holiday. One thing that puzzles me is why Brews insists on highlighting the causal/physical distinction. How is it essential to the problem of free will? Peter Damian (talk) 13:06, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] I reverted the latest edit by Brews. I think I understand why he insists on this distinction.He writes:

It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws. A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted. Such a contradiction is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events. That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events.

First of all, as I have pointed out, this conflates 'confusion' with 'contradiction'. A 'contradiction' is a technical term for two statements which contradict each other, i.e. if one is true, the other must be false. The introduction needs to state why there is a contradiction between 'conscious decisions are causally effective' and ' the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws'. (Perhaps there is an implicit assumption that 'conscious decisions do not operate according to natural laws'?). Brews adds 'That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain'. This makes it clearer what he is aiming for, but only slightly. If there were causes outside the physical domain, but physical determinism were true, how could the non-physical causes have physical effects? Also, what is any of this doing in the introduction, which is meant to be a summary of the article? Peter Damian (talk) 14:54, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter: I am happy to see some attempt made to criticize the text instead of myself. The text you have supported along with Snowded says:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.[17]"

the text you and Snowded reject says:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws."[17]

What is the difference here? The difference is that the sentence you support states a strong limitation to physical laws and the scientific view, while the sentence you reject is somewhat broader in scope, suggesting a conflict with what is customarily defined as nomological determinism.

Is this a distinction that does not matter? Well, to understand the distinction one has to understand the difference between nomological determinism and physical determinism+causal closure. The paragraph you and Snowded support makes no distinction at all, indicating with a parenthetic construction that the conflict arises when " either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted."

As I have pointed out repeatedly (see my list of four problems with this paragraph) a distinction has to be made. Implied synonymy is unacceptable. Also the idea of an 'either/or' for causal closure or physical determinism needs to be replaced by an 'and'.

I am interested to discuss also your other points, but this one is the simplest to begin with as it involves only definitions that are widely accepted. Perhaps you can comment upon this point in detail? We can then proceed further. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I'd like to point out that a conflict with nomological determinism goes back to Chrysippus and Plutarch, while the restriction to physical determinism+causal closure began approximately with the views of Laplace. So if we are to frame matters in an historically inclusive manner as the header 'In Western philosophy' seems to suggest, nomological determinism is the way to start. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

If some distinction is needed here, the next few sentences of the paragraph you and Snowded reject make sense. They say:

"A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted.[2] Such conflict is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events."

I think you will agree that these statements are accurate and the sources pertinent. I have referred to Kim, but these definitions of physical determinism and causal closure are not peculiar to Kim. I am open, of course, to other sources.

Your objection is that all this constitutes too much detail. You say:

"Also, what is any of this doing in the introduction, which is meant to be a summary of the article?"

Of course, the subtopic 'In Western philosophy' is only a subtopic and not the article, but it is a very long subtopic and needs an introduction as you say. In my opinion, the clear limitations of the school of thought that "physical determinism+causal closure conflicts with free will" should appear in this introductory material. Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

(I changed 'contradiction' to 'conflict' in deference to your distinction.) Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

• I agree that the material I reverted is not very good, but that is no reason to support the addition. You say "As I have pointed out repeatedly (see my list of four problems with this paragraph) a distinction has to be made." I don't agree, on the other hand I agree that the conflation should not be made either. Why not just stick with 'causal determinism' (='nomological determinism') or just 'determinism' throughout?
• Then you say "the clear limitations of the school of thought that "physical determinism+causal closure conflicts with free will" should appear in this introductory material. The apparent conflict at the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period. Now one way of resolving the apparent conflict is by limiting the scope of the determinism as the schoolmen did. Perhaps this should be mentioned in the introduction, but we should start with the general and then move to the specific.

Peter Damian (talk) 16:48, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

You propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. If we do that it does not avoid the issue of limitations of this view. You have mentioned the objection to mental causation I think was first made to Descartes by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia: "How could the non-physical causes have physical effects?" However, this separation is the basis of many philosophical articles that have to be included, such as Hutto, Nagel and Griffith. Brews ohare (talk) 16:59, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

That door is left open by the last sentence of the rejected paragraph that leads naturally to the subsequent paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness:

"That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events."[3] Brews ohare (talk) 17:05, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

"You propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " No, did I say that?

(I said "Why not just stick with 'causal determinism' (='nomological determinism') or just 'determinism' throughout?"Peter Damian (talk) 17:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Peter, what is wrong with limiting the free will conflict to nomological determinism has been pointed out several times. The term nomological determinism in broad terms is the doctrine that all future events are determined by antecedent events. The more modest claim of physical determinism limits itself to physical events and causes. That leaves open such questions as the hard problem of consciousness considered to be an active area by many philosophers. It also allows the views of enactivism which sees the objective stance of science as artificially excluding an interactive view, making the free will conflict something of an artifact of an inapplicable methodology. Naturally these summaries are only indicative, and sourced commentary is needed for the WP article. The point is that nomological is too restrictive to allow many modern positions, while physical determinism is not. Brews ohare (talk) 04:10, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Continuation of thread

Meanwhile, can we get clear on what I propose? Peter Damian (talk) 17:29, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree that keeps it simpler. A one/two sentence summary of some of the finer distinctions in the body of the article not the lede, if NOT sourced from primary sources might be OK. At the moment the article needs clarifying if anything ----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I take it that your summary

the heart of the free will problem is between free will and (causal) determinism, period.

means something different to you than my description based upon Kim of physical determinism+causal determinism. You can refer to Kim's definitions of these two items.physical determinism,causal closure. Perhaps you can identify what you have in mind with some other source? Brews ohare (talk) 17:43, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

No, I am objecting to your statement that I "propose to remove nomological determinism from the article entirely on the basis that all that really matters is physical determinism+causal determinism. " I did not say this. I never used the expression "physical determinism+causal determinism" and I am not sure what it means. Peter Damian (talk) 17:49, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Yup, I would like clearly to understand what you mean by "physical determinism+causal determinism" Peter Damian (talk) 18:02, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

My meaning is that of Kim linked above. Is this confusing somehow? The idea in short is that of reductionism rather than antireductionism. The idea that within the physical domain all physical events are caused and caused only by physical causes. Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Kim does not say this. Where does he refer to "physical determinism+causal determinism"? Peter Damian (talk) 19:27, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Kim says:"The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t....If a physical event has a causal explanation, it has a physical causal explanation."

Kim also says (Note 8): "The closure principle should be distinguished from the thesis of physical determinism to the effect that every physical event has a physical cause. Physical causal closure would make sense even if some physical events don't have causes."

So you are right, Kim does not mention the combination of the two Nonetheless he says: "Physical causal closure ...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is." This comment is all that is needed for the paragraph you reject, and if you prefer to avoid the construction physical determinism+causal determinism, fine, it makes no difference to the gist, although the wording would change.

Of course, as I say below: "Physical determinism = causal closure + no uncaused physical event". But now I am doubting your honesty. Sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 20:08, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

I was unaware that you were proposing this equation. You will notice I proposed no equation at all. All I am after is that there is a door open to dualism in the logical construction involving physical causal closure. Accusing me of dishonesty is really beyond the pall. Brews ohare (talk) 20:39, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

" All I am after is that there is a door open to dualism in the logical construction involving physical causal closure." This is nonsensical babbling. I cannot see how you can write such nonsense unless you are deliberately provoking me Peter Damian (talk) 20:54, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I am sorry to see you use phrases like "nonsensical babbling" and "such nonsense" in what is intended to be a discussion of Kim's treatment of dualism and causal closure. Lacking any supporting quotations from Kim, you seem not to have read the linked sections which I have reported here with complete fidelity. Brews ohare (talk) 21:12, 3 May 2015 (UTC)

More nitpicking from Damian

The introduction characterises determinism as a form of constraint. Is it? Some philosophers argue that this confuses between 'voluntariness', namely acting without constraint or coercion, and 'origination', namely acting without there being any cause.

The wording of the introduction is very bad. " Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been determinism of some variety ". What does this mean? "the two most prominent common positions are named incompatibilist or compatibilist for the relation they hold to exist between free will and determinism." That is presumably a clumsy way of saying that the two main opposing positions are incompatibilism and compatibilism. But positions on what?

" Those who find free will cannot coexist with determinism are called incompatibilists, as they hold determinism to be incompatible with free will.[ " – clumsy. Why not "Incompatibilists hold that free will is inconsistent with determinism"?

"it has been widely debated throughout history is 1066-ish. Peter Damian (talk) 07:18, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

On constraint and compulsion, it's thought by some philosophers that there is a confusion between constraint and determination. See Honderich's excellent website, and this excellent paper on it, by Van Inwagen. "It is evident that determinism places me under no constraints." Peter Damian (talk) 08:12, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I believe the constraint approach you dislike was constructed by Pfhorrest, who seems to have a significant familiarity with the subject, although he is prone to express his personal opinion, probably based upon his own expertise, but not firmly backed by citations. You seem to think Honderich has a good web site (perhaps this one?) and like a paper by Van Inwagen. You will find there are many persuasive contributors to the free will discussion, ranging over millennia, many repeating the same arguments with a different technical vocabulary, and the challenge (I hope you agree) is not to arbitrate between them and rank them in some way, but to identify the basic theses and present them with citations to their proponents. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

As for the presentation, I believe a major issue in arriving at a balanced presentation is that WP editors, like everyone else, have an intuitive idea of what "free will" is, and allow that to bias their editing against views that do not match their intuitions. That bias takes the form of peremptory reversion of what are seen to be unpalatable views and assassination of opposing opinion. The common way around this problem is to make the discussion a word game, choose a definition, try to find its implications for determinism and moral responsibility, and argue that your definition fits the most "reasonable" intuition. A different way to handle the matter is to admit reductionism and physicalism have practical limits. There may be less than an infinity of possibilities, but there are enough to have occupied philosophers from before the time of Chrysippus. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Just noting here briefly to confirm that the "constraint" language was introduced to the article by me some years ago, as a way of dissolving a then-ongoing dispute about how best to open the article in a way that was not biased either for or against compatibilism or incompatibilism. A big part of that dispute was that the use of the word "determine" to refer to anything that the will might or might not be free of (or need to be free of to count as "free will") was seen as biasing the very definition of free will in favor of incompatibilism, even while trying to make room for compatiblism. I suggested we use a different word besides "determine" to indicate an impingement on freedom, and so as to leave determinism of the kind relevant to incompatibilism clearly only one of possible threats to free will, and so as not to suggest that compatibilists considered some kind of determinism a potential threat to free will, as they by definition do not.

If there is some more technical usage of the term "constraint" that I'm not familiar with that makes it too unsuitable for this purpose, I'm happy to substitute some other word instead. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:14, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Competence issues

The thread above has been locked because it involves 'behavioural' questions. I would like to address the 'brews problem' as one of competence alone. Brews simply does not take the time, or can't be bothered, to learn and understand some of the key terms of philosophical discourse, and this leads to endless talk page confusion and disruption, which in turn leads to more competent editors leaving the subject, perhaps even leaving Wikipedia. I give some examples below; if I (or anyone else) can find some more, there might be grounds for a ban on all philosophy articles.

• In this edit, brews clearly misunderstands the nature of implication. He thinks that 'p implies q' entails that p is the more general claim, q the more specific. Of course it is the other way round, which the other party picks up straight away. If p implies q, then q can be true with p being false, so q is more general. But p cannot be true with q false, so p is more specific. This is philosophical logic 101, and it is hard to continue a discussion with someone who persistently or wilfully disregards it. Note brews reply that this is nitpicking forms of implication, and that the other party (who has since left Wikipedia), has failed to respond to the issues. Yet no issue could be more basic than the implication!
• In the discussion immediately above, brews mentions a discussion "based upon [Jaegwon] Kim of physical determinism+causal determinism." Kim nowhere mentions this (which Brews eventually concedes), but then immediately trivialises it. ("You seem to think that my use of the construction "physical determinism+causal closure" is some kind of misreading of Kim. Kim has not used this construction, but its use by me here is not some flagrant misrepresentation"). But it is not trivial, for the whole article depends on a careful understanding of the terms. Briefly, causal closure obtains if every event has a physical cause, assuming it has a cause at all, thus it obtains even when some physical events have no cause. Physical determinism obtains when every event has a physical cause, i.e. the difference between physical determinism and causal closure is the stipulation of no uncaused events. Causal determinism (which is by definition the same as 'nomological determinism') obtains when every event, whether physical or not, has a cause, and so is a much stronger claim. Thus neither the expressions "physical determinism+causal closure" nor "physical determinism+causal determinism " make much sense, given that physical determinism already implies both causal closure, and causal determinism. If brews doesn't understand even these basic terms, it is pointless having these long protracted discussions.
  • Note that he later concedes all of this, but at what cost? Care about the use of terms, and perhaps just paying attention to what the other party actually says, would have avoided all this.
• Here he seems to misunderstand the nature of a 'contradiction'. I made the simple point that a contradiction can only be between propositions, and he prevaricates and obfuscates.
• A remark by John Blackburn here suggests that the problem is not confined to philosophy. " If you had read and understood the sources you claim to be basing your contributions on you would know this".
• This probably won't be allowed on Wikipedia , but this Citizendium article on the same subject was almost entirely written by Brews. It is philosophically incompetent, in my judgment. Worryingly, it points to what the Wikipedia article would look like if Brews were to continue unhindered and unconstrained, free.
• [edit] Blatantly fails to understand the precision required of philosophical discourse, see also [1].
• [edit] Use of 'subjective event' [2]
• Persistently fails to grasp WP:SYNTH , [3], in particular see this.
• Poor writing, misrepresentation of sources etc. See also the recommended rewrite.
• appears not to understand compatibilism.
• Fails to understand parallel postulate
• Quantum indeterminism nonsense

Digging a hole

This smokescreen to avoid addressing the simple defects of a paragraph in free will is an amazing escalation of intemperance and incivility, all to avoid addressing sources and instead make personalities an issue. Brews ohare (talk) 13:37, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

I have added this to the list of competence issues. Please note that questioning competence is not a 'personality issue'. Thank you. Peter Damian (talk) 14:04, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

You are deflecting discussion of the content of this paragraph to a discussion of my competence; whether you consider my competence to be an aspect of my personality is simply another diversion. Questions of competence might arise in the interpretation of sources, but so far you have not engaged in a comparison of interpretations. The key points are (i) nomological determinism is defined to include all events and therefore subjective events, while physical determinism is restricted to physical events, and (ii) Kim points out that (logically, if not in fact) that means what he calls physical causal closure allows the possibility of events and causes beyond its reach. These are simple points. They require no particular competence beyond reading the source. Yet you want instead of discussing these points to engage in evaluating my competence! Why, exactly? This complex assessment has no bearing upon your acceptance of the proposed paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 14:20, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Please see WP:COMPETENCE "disruption is disruption, and it needs to be prevented" Sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 14:30, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

There is no disruption in my asking you to consider the proposed contribution instead of your viewing such a request as a personal affront worthy of an all-out attack upon myself as a contributor in general. Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Your intense response to this simple matter of the limitations of physical determinism is out of proportion to the situation and suggests a deep visceral response rather than an intellectual one. Perhaps you could step back a bit and regain some cool? Brews ohare (talk) 14:43, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

"They require no particular competence beyond reading the source. " Clearly they do Peter Damian (talk) 14:44, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

How about commenting upon this quote from Kim. Does it disagree with the proposed paragraph? Is Kim's a minority view requiring an alternative opinion? Should the presentation of this view be made clearer? These are the type of questions to be discussed, wouldn't you say? Brews ohare (talk) 14:58, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

[4] Peter Damian (talk) 15:04, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian, this curt link to your unsupported assertion of WP:SYN is an example of passive aggression, not a real attempt to assess the accuracy of this paragraph's treatment of Kim. can you engage in assessing the presentation of Kim's remark? Brews ohare (talk) 15:16, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

[5] Peter Damian (talk) 15:27, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

I suppose you would like me to explain why it violates SYN, but this has already been explained to you by about a hundred editors before me, on this and many other issues. There is absolutely no point in engaging, and that is because it is an issue of basic competence. I'm sorry to be the one who points it out, but it has to be said. You clearly have expertise in some subjects, I mean you are or were a professor of transistors or something. But philosophy is something else. You need a basic competence even to approach the subject. Peter Damian (talk) 15:37, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

A vague reference to WP:SYN is not a substitute for pointing out how the paragraph violates policy. Apparently you refuse to do that as being a waste of your time! Of course, WP:SYN cautions against presenting opinion or conclusions that are not those of reputable sources. So a simple support for your claim of a WP:SYN infraction would consist of identifying some such unwarranted opinion or conclusion. Not too hard to do, except there are no such infractions in this paragraph. If you differ, point them out, please. Brews ohare (talk) 15:48, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Well let's take the statement "If these particular formulations are used, then a contradiction is present between concepts describing our intuition of free will and nomological determinism". There are a number of problems here. First, it says that the contradiction is between "concepts describing our intuition of free will and nomological determinism". As I have already explained, it is propositions and statements that are rightly contradictory, not "concepts describing our intuition". Second, the source does not talk about concepts describing intuition, rather, about the strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism, so you misrepresent the source. Third, the source says that "philosophical arguments concerning agency are predicated on a strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism", i.e. it is talking about the philosophical arguments, and not the claims made by those who are arguing. This is just one sentence from your proposed paragraph. The rest of the paragraph is sloppily written and illustrates again the competence problem. Peter Damian (talk) 16:04, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

On your point about 'visceral reaction', no, not really visceral, but I had the unfortunate task for many years of marking hundreds of student papers and I developed a keen sense for when things were going wrong. So perhaps 'reflexive' rather than 'visceral'. Peter Damian (talk) 16:23, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

I don't think objections like "concepts cannot be contradictory, only statements or propositions" are central difficulties. Some rewording like this later version might fix such things with 'conflict' replacing 'contradiction'? In any event, I think it is progress to be discussing the wording in place of accusations of deliberate misrepresentation and WP:SYN. You have yet to address the two main points: (1) nomological cf. physical determinism and (2) the open door to nonphysical causes and events. Perhaps you have some recommendations? Brews ohare (talk) 16:42, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

There is far more that is wrong with the article than can easily be fixed. If you want a tip, focus on definitions that clearly bring out the contradictory elements of determinism and free will. This page sets it out nicely. If we define determinism as "a person never has the ability to have done otherwise", and free will as "for at least some actions, a person has the ability to have done otherwise" you see immediately that there is an actual contradiction. If one of the statements is true, the other must be false, and on these definitions the incompatibilist wins. But a compatibilist will then challenge one of both of the definitions. Does true determinism really mean not having the ability to have done otherwise? How are we to understand the term 'ability' in the definition of free will? This would take the article in a more philosophical direction. Peter Damian (talk) 16:56, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Your link doesn't work for Safari. I don't doubt that the article free will could benefit from a complete rewrite from top to bottom. My objective is more limited: to write a paragraph that correctly separates nomological from physical determinism, and then suggests that physical determinism is limited to the physical leaving free will open to a wider discussion than a focus upon determinism. That is all the paragraph is for. The subsequent paragraph goes into the hard problem, which follows nicely from this wider focus.

The standard definition of nomological determinism does not allow this development. Physical determinism does.

Accepting that the other paragraphs in this introductory material undertake the issues you raise (perhaps inadequately) do you see a need for a paragraph like the one I have proposed? If so, are you interested in framing it? Brews ohare (talk) 17:10, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

"physical determinism is limited to the physical leaving free will open to a wider discussion than a focus upon determinism" This is incomprehensible to me. How can free will, which is a faculty of the mind, be 'open to wider discussion'? What sort of wider discussion do you have in mind, given that this is (I assume) a philosophy article? Philosophy focuses on precise definitions of concepts and principles. Your formulation of the issues is (I repeat) anything but precise. We are back to 'competence'. I don't see the point in continuing, as I have already said. Peter Damian (talk) 17:18, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Perhaps we could advance this discussion. Is it possible that 'free will' is a faculty of the mind, like memory or reason? I am unclear how that could be established. Memory and reason can be tested as abilities to answer certain questions with verifiable answers, like "Where were you yesterday?" or "if your bank balance was $100 and you spent $50, what would your balance be afterwards?" I don't think free will is a demonstrable ability. As discussed by philosophers, 'free will' is an hypothesized capacity of the mind (presently conjectural), and one type of debate revolves around the possible conflict of this hypothesis with the hypothesis of some form of determinism, say nomological or physical. By a 'wider discussion' I mean a debate as to whether the hypothesis of free will should be considered in a different context, for example enactivism, or some form of dualism. I think it is clear that some philosophers engage in this way. Do you disagree? That is the point of the proposed paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 18:35, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

It would be beyond my powers of endurance. Peter Damian (talk) 19:32, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

I think I have answered your question: "How can free will, which is a faculty of the mind, be open to wider discussion?" The answer is in two parts. 1. Free will is not a demonstrable faculty like memory, but a concept, or more accurately, a range of related hypotheses, about what might be a capacity of the mind. 2. Not being an established ability of the mind, naturally there is debate over its nature or even its existence. As a debate, it can be more narrowly or more widely based. A narrowly based debate is the historical one, confined to examining the possible conflict of various hypotheses about free will with various forms (largely archaic forms) of of the hypothesis of determinism. A more broadly based debate is based upon dualism (as you recognize, Descartes was in this camp and it persists today in some approaches to the subject-object problem). Another broadly based debate is enactivism, as represented by Evans and by Hutto. Still another is represented by Thomas Nagel and others, who hypothesize we have yet to grasp the full role of consciousness in evolution. A very popular debate is found in neurophilosophy. In short, a wider discussion is not only possible, it already exists. Brews ohare (talk) 13:43, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Closure

Brews, you have been reverted by three editors now and all three are telling you that you are engaged in synthesis. This discussion must now be considered closed and you do not have consent to make the same or similar changes without prior consent on the talk page. ----Snowded ^TALK 23:48, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

This idea of synthesis you entertain has nothing to do with WP:SYN, regardless of how many editors want tio redefine it. WP:SYN warns against editors expressing opinions or conclusions not found in reliable sources. But your erroneous view is that a violation of WP:SYN automatically results whenever multiple sources are summarized. A violation could happen of course, but it must be shown to happen by identifying the violating text and pointing out that it is not supported. You, Snowded, have never done that in all your many assertions of synthesis. In particular, in the case of this proposed paragraph which has the simple objective of correcting four listed shortcomings of the paragraph you support, and uses citations and verbatim quotes throughout, nothing is said beyond what sources say. You are simply unable to see this paragraph for the simple thing it is, an opening to the wider debate over free will that goes beyond conflicts with various ideas of determinism (most of which are archaic). Brews ohare (talk) 02:02, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

No, Brews ohare, it is not multiple other editors who "want tio redefine it". It is just you. Here: Wikipedia talk:No original research/Archive 60#A further exploration of WP:OR policy. Or here: Wikipedia talk:No original research/Archive 58#Proposed Sub-section for WP:NOR. Or here: Wikipedia talk:No original research/Archive 58#Synthesis and definitions. You clearly understand the policy (otherwise why would you seek to change it?). It's just that you think it does not apply to you. That there’s a clear consensus (as you note, "many editors") that your contributions are synthesis doesn’t matter either, as that policy is also entirely optional as far as you are concerned.

But WP:No original research and WP:Consensus are core policies. Not optional, not ones you can opt out of, certainly not ones you can rewrite based on your own minority views. That you continue to do so – continue to dispute WP:No original research, continue to ignore consensus – is simply disruptive. It has gone far beyond the bounds of reasonable behaviour and should have stopped a long time ago.--JohnBlackburne^words_deeds 14:30, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Blackburne: You are misdirecting the discussion, which is about WP:SYN, the caution against placing unsupported opinions or conclusions in articles. My point, which you ignore, is that a claim of violation is inadequate until it identifies the culprit text thought to be in violation. The simple statement that policy has been violated without indicating what exactly is the infraction is unsatisfactory for two reasons. One is that the violation may be only a supposed violation, and some discussion might resolve the issue. A second reason for identifying the culprit text is to assist the contributing editor to recognize the infraction so they can do something about it - maybe find another source. Or maybe reword things.

My contention with Snowded is that he never identifies what text he finds merits a WP:SYN flag, and context seems to suggest his view is that any summary of multiple sources is on the face of it a violation.

I think you can agree that identifying the culprit text is a desirable aspect of any invocation of violation. Brews ohare (talk) 14:50, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

It is also possible in Snowded's case that he confuses WP:SYN with WP:NPOV, taking the position that any summary of multiple sources is objectionable because it never includes all the available sources and so may result in WP:UNDUE. This confusion of policies is another reason to identify culprit text, as it may indicate confusion has occurred over the applicable policy. Brews ohare (talk) 14:56, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

A significant contributor to the inclination to avoid specifics when asserting some policy infraction is that the accusing editor just does not want to become involved, preferring a hit-and-run approach — that is, simply saying a violation has occurred and when asked to explain, avoiding engagement with unhelpful comments like "Read the policy" or "No further explanation (beyond my Edit Summary of a very few words) is necessary." This tactic my be an outgrowth of mainly dealing with vandalism, but it is inappropriate to apply it to extensively sourced, serious contributions. Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

"a claim of violation is inadequate until it identifies the culprit text thought to be in violation." But there is no culprit text with SYN. The culprit is the implication. The example on the page is good: "The United Nations' stated objective is to maintain international peace and security, but since its creation there have been 160 wars throughout the world.", which (perhaps misleadingly) implies that the objective has not been met. This is even though the two conjoined sentences are true and well-sourced. In addition, as I pointed out above, Brews has also mispresented sources, possibly because he has misunderstood them, but then there is the issue of competence, as I also point out. Add to that the initial denial of any problem, followed by trivialisation of the problem once recognised, finished off by a loss of memory about the fact that any dispute occurred in the first place. It's an incredibly frustrating thing to deal with. I am saying this as someone new to the dispute, and who has worked for many years with professional editorial teams, where this kind of problem has never occurred. Peter Damian (talk) 17:54, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

We are all wasting time, if Brews will not desist it has to be ANI time ----Snowded ^TALK 19:36, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Continuation of thread

Damian: Your remark: "But there is no culprit text with SYN. The culprit is the implication." is incorrect: there is indeed a culprit text that embodies the implication. Your example is:

"The United Nations' stated objective is to maintain international peace and security, but since its creation there have been 160 wars throughout the world."

This statement itself is, of course, the culprit text that violates WP:SYN. The explanation of its violation to the editor contributing this sentence could be:

"The word but conjoining the two halves of your sentence suggests that the portion after but has a connection to the portion before but, which is not the case. The idea that there exists a connection is not supported by either the source supporting the first half nor the source supporting the second half, so the combination of these two ideas constitutes a violation of WP:SYN unless another source can be found making this connection."

Your implication, of course, is that I have done exactly this kind of thing in the following paragraph:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws.¹ A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted.² Such a contflict is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause,³ and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events.⁴ That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events.⁵

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

² Nomological determinism often is taken to be the "notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws":Duco A. Schreuder (2014). Vision and Visual Perception. Archway Publishing. p. 505. ISBN 9781480812949. Others adopt the definition that "every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedent causes": Stathis Paillos (2007). "§16: Statistical explanation". In Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) Still other definitions sometimes are used.

³ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 15. ISBN 9781400840847. The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t

⁴ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness - Note 8". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 16. ISBN 9781400840847. The thesis of physical determinism to the effect that every physical event has a physical cause

⁵ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

In fact, this has not happened, and no-one has even attempted to point out an instance where something like this has occurred here. Instead we have all this blather about abstract possibilities that do not apply in this instance. Blather introduced simply because there is no intention to address this paragraph because the objective instead is to discredit its contributor and to focus upon that objective. Brews ohare (talk) 19:43, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

I have already pointed out, very carefully, how that paragraph misrepresents,synthesises and confuses. Hence my reference to the 'final step' above, of your complete amnesia about any discussion that has already taken place. You say "no-one has even attempted to point out an instance where something like this has occurred here", as though some gigantic memory blot has enveloped your brain. Peter Damian (talk) 19:49, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Baloney. You have not criticized this paragraph beyond arguing over the word "contradiction" that I have subsequently changed in the version above to "conflict". Brews ohare (talk) 19:50, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Wrong link. Peter Damian (talk) 18:23, 6 May 2015 (UTC)