Talk:Hendrik Detmers

Historiographical note

At first I intended to append this historiographical note to the article, but on reflection I decided to place it here, as it might otherwise attract vandalism by Siborne partisans (as has happened at e.g. the Willem Jan Knoop article, to which I refer here for additional comments and references).

The charge of the Detmers brigade at Waterloo is often "written out of the battle" by Anglophone historians who deny that it ever happened, starting with William Siborne and all who uncritically copied him. Siborne states in his Siborne, William. "The Waterloo Campaign 1815". Retrieved 23 March 2013.p. 591:" ...[the Detmers brigade] only joined the Front Line (on the left of Maitland's Brigade) at the time of the General Advance." (this central claim is repeated again and again at other places, but this will suffice here). How did Siborne arrive at this claim? De Bas en 'TSerclaes in vol. 2 of their history of the battle, chapter "Le Model of Waterloo, plan relief du champ de bataille, par le capitaine Siborne" in: Bas, F. de and J. de T'Serclaes de Wommersom. "La campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas d'après les rapports officiels néelandais: Waterloo". pp. 412–444. Retrieved 23 March 2013., give an explanation on the basis of what they found in the Siborne papers in the British Museum. Briefly, the explanation is that Siborne had to fix his model of the battle (see Siborne-wiki-article, referred to above) at certain times during the battle. For this he selected the "high points" of the battle, at which the model shows the disposition of the troops of the two armies at the approximate times. It was difficult to prove a "negative" (i.e. that the Dutch Detmers brigade had never performed its decisive charge, as claimed in the Dutch after-battle reports, like the one referenced in the external links of this article), so Siborne arrived at the ingenious solution of showing that at the asserted time of the charge the entire Dutch 3rd Division was still in its reserve position. He "proved" this by asking a number of loaded questions of a number of British officers, present at the battle, like general Vivian and major-general Sir Thomas W. Taylor (a captain at the time of the battle), about the movements of the Dutch troops to which they answered in general: "We have not seen this." This denial was enough proof for Siborne. (De Bas and T'Serclaes, pp. 434-437). Against this De Bas and T'Serclaes offer as positive proof that the charge took place as they describe it: 1. the after-battle report of the 3rd Dutch division (referenced in this article); 2. the angry letter general Chassé, the commander of the division sent to Lord Hill, on 5 July 1815, describing the actions of the Detmers brigade, and Lord Hill's reply (De Bas and T'Serclaes, pp. 421-423). To this we can add the eye-witness account, quoted in this article, of captain Edward Macready as cited by Hamilton-Williams; he ridicules the Dutch soldiers, but proves at the same time by his testimony that they were there.

The example of Siborne's animus against the Detmers and Aubrême brigades of the 3rd Dutch division (the Aubrême brigade "could only with difficulty be dissuaded from running away" (p. 591)) is just one of the many of his slanderous treatment of those troops. But this will suffice here.--Ereunetes (talk) 23:37, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

There was a great deal of confusion about the attack and the repulse of the Guard. The British 1st Foot Guards were awarded the title of Grenadiers because they defeated the Grenadiers of the Old Guard. Except they didn't. The Old Guard did not take part in the attack at all, they remained in reserve, formed in square about 300 metres behind the battalions of the Middle Guard, which may have been a reason for the hesitation of the Middle Guard when they were confronted by the British defenders in strength. The reason that no eye-witnesses saw Detemer's counter attack is indeed because it didn't happen, not here. On this side of the Brussel's Road. The Middle Guard attack was by battalions of the Chassuers a pied. When the fire of the British guards caused them to check and return fire, the British recklessly advanced from their protected positions and across the sunken road, quickly realising their predicament they returned to cover. The French battalions formed square to receive a flanking attack from the 3rd Brigade of Light infantry to the right of the Foot Guards and their combined fire drove the French Chasseurs back in confusion.

However on the other side of the Brussels Road, Halkett's 5th brigade were getting the worst of their exchange with 2 battalions of the Middle Guard Grenadiers. The British battalions were in a more forward position beyond the sunken road and had been receiving artillery fire from the French until their ammunition was spent. As the French Grenadiers continued to advance, many of the British officers were incapacitated and less capable men took their place. The most senior officer remaining after Maj-General Halkett was carried off the field when a musket ball pierced both his cheeks was Lt-col Elphinstone, commander of the 33rd Foot (reputed to be the least esteemed officer in the entire army.) An imprudent order to retreat to the sunken road resulted in a headlong rout, with a number of Sergeants being tasked to run all the way back to Brussels with their regimental colours and standards wrapped around them under their tunics, (giving rise to the story that the battle was almost lost.) The 33rd Foot did lose their colors. Wellington sent an aide to restore order to the broken regiments. The Prince of Orange then led a charge against the French, which prevented them from pursuing the British with their bayonets at their backs. The charge caused the French to check' but the attack broke up and the Prince was wounded. At this point Wellington ordered the Dutch divisional commander Chasse to charge the French and Detmer's Brigade was sent forward. His attack was launched in between the British Foot Guards and the broken ranks of Halkett's 5th Brigade. Its target was not the battalions of the Chasseurs facing the Foot Guards on the right of the Brussels road but the Grenadiers on the left. Ensign McCready witnessed this attack because he was a junior officer in the 30th foot in the 5th Brigade, not in the Foot Guards.

So the Grenadiers were routed by Detmer's attack but it was not in the place that the British assumed the French Grenadiers were on the field, in the aftermath of the Battle. In the fog of war visibility would have been reduced to less than 100 metres. Legend has it that the Grenadiers of the Old Guard were routed by the British 1st Foot. They were Chasseurs of the Middle Guard, so nobody saw Detmers attack in that area. Given the praise and the title Grenadiers, bestowed upon the 1st Foot (the senior British infantry formation) for routing the legendary Old Guard, it would be very difficult to accept a revised version of the Battle in which the Old Guard did not even attack, but retired in good order covering the general retreat of the French army. 84.71.9.184 (talk) 10:39, 1 July 2022 (UTC)

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