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Archive 1Archive 2

Original research

Lots of unsourced material in here, some looking like original research. --Zerotalk 00:18, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

Title

There is a footnote on the title that it is often known in the literature as the "McMahon-Hussein Correspondence". That name appears to be the more common usage, and the name it was referred to when I learned about it. It also has a 3:2 lead in Google searches (but I'm also incredibly surprised that both results are very low in numbers). I'm going to change the order, as there appears to be no good reason to keep it at the less popular name. Lexicon (talk) 13:56, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

More statements Clarifying McMahon

Did Britain Promise Palestine to the Arabs?

Based on the ambiguous Hussein-McMahon correspondence, pro-Arab sources have maintained that the British had promised Palestine to the Arabs, as part of the reward of Sharif Husain for starting the Arab revolt and overthrowing Turkish power in the Middle East.

However, British officials Denied Consistently that that was the case. A book written in 1943 documented the claims of British officials, and also gave extensive documentation of the aid that the Jews and the Zionist organization gave to the British in overthrowing Turkish rule in Palestine. [.............] [.............] "When in later years an Arab nationalist movement was born in Palestine and its leaders, in support of their opposition to the Jewish national home, invoked the correspondence that had passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca at the start of the war and incited the peasants to bloodshed and destruction of property by alleging that Britain had broken her pledge to make Palestine an independent Arab country, Sir Henry McMahon, then long since retired from government service, wrote two letters to Clarify the earlier understandings.

In the First, dated March 12, 1922, addressed to the British government, he said that he had intended to EXCLUDE PALESTINE from the area of Arab independence as fully as the Syrian coastal regions to the north. In a SECOND letter, addressed to the editor of The Times and published by that newspaper on July 23, 1937, he wrote: 'I feel it my duty to state, and do so definitely and Emphatically, that it was NOT intended by me in giving this pledge (of independence) to King Hussein to Include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was NOT Included in my pledge was well UNDERSTOOD by King Hussein.'" [pp. 115-116]

Sir Ronald Storrs, who as Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner (Sir Henry McMahon) handled the Anglo-Arab correspondence, wrote in His [book] 'Orientations': 'Palestine was EXCLUDED from the promises made to the Arabs before those British (military) operations which gave freedom to so Large a proportion of the Arab peoples.'" [p. 116]

"In the year 1937, when Palestine was plunged into chaos and bloodshed by the Arabs, and their leader, Haj Hussein Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem, again invoked the McMahon correspondence, William Ormsby Gore, who was attached to the McMahon staff in 1916, stated in the House of Commons, on July 21, 1937, 'that it NEVER was in the mind of ANYONE on that Staff that Palestine west of the Jordan was in the area within which the British Government then undertook to further the cause of Arab independence.'

Colonel Lawrence also took the view that Palestine was EXCLUDED from the areas in which Britain intended to foster Arab independence and said so in a letter to 'The Times' on September 11, 1919." [p.116]....."

http://www.zionism-israel.com/issues/British_Promises_to_Arabs.html

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.66.3.148 (talk) 19:35, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Map Illustration

I have a problem with the map "Administrative units in Near East under Ottoman Empire, to c. 1918". It is purported to be sourced from (a broken link and) a map at this web source: http://www.zum.de/whkmla/histatlas/arabworld/ottsyr19061914text.gif That source does not give an alternative name to the Vilayet of Syria, namely (Damascus). I therefore propose that the original map be used instead. Erictheenquirer (talk) 14:25, 30 September 2013 (UTC)

Since there was no objection to the deletion of the image containing the POV contained in the "Damascus in parentheses", I have deleted that image reference. Besides the POV, this action should not be a problem since the second image contains all the detail contained in the deleted image (but without the parenthetical POV). I therefore moved the remaining image into the place of the deleted image Erictheenquirer (talk) 08:17, 10 July 2014 (UTC)

Toynbee

This article has information from Friedman (although not much), but not from Toynbee. Without his views (there was a famous argument between the two--actually, between Toynbee and several others, but Friedman was the best known) this article can never be even close to complete. Lexicon (talk) 14:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

I agree that Friedman's work is critical to this subject, and I agree that this Wiki article is not complete without it (plus critiques of Friendman). As time allows I will post proposed text in Talk. Erictheenquirer (talk) 08:23, 10 July 2014 (UTC)

There is some interesting material on http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86_%D9%85%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88%D9%86 , my Arabic isn't up to cross-referencing the connections, but my vision would be that both pages end up with the union of the content of the two. 216.31.225.194 (talk) 19:02, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

I don't think that Toynbee's or Friedman views add anything to the portion of the article on the Eastern Committee Meeting. It isn't a case of Toynbee vs Toynbee, it's the Cabinet vs. the Cabinet.
Curzon chaired the meeting, and T.E. Lawrence, Lord Balfour, General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and representatives of the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, the Wax Office, and the Treasury were present. None of them questioned or denied Curzon's statement that Palestine had been promised to Hussein as part of the territories that were to be Arab and independent (and most of them were in a position to know). harlan (talk) 22:17, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
long discussion about unsourced synthesis and original research

This article is highly selective, for it omits Hussein's response to McMahon's letter of October 24, 1915, where Hussein affirms that McMahon is indeed talking about the vilayet of Beirut (which includes 40% of modern day Israel and 60% of Ottoman Palestine! See fourth link below.):

"In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships-seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain-we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut [emphasis mine] and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html or http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/18.shtml

Now, read where McMahon in his October 24, 1915 correspondence with Hussein says the following:

“2. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.” In other words, the area containing the Holy Places will remain (at least for the time being) British administered.

The ‘Holy Places’ mentioned are located in the Syrian administrative district called the ‘Mutasarrifiyet of Jerusalem’, which comprises the remaining 40% of Ottoman Palestine (or 60% of today’s Israel). -- http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Ottoman_Syria_1918.png —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.73.129.67 (talk) 14:54, 6 December 2010 (UTC) However, Nazareth, considered to have Holy Places by Christians, is located in the North District of today’s Israel, and in 1915 was located in the Vilayet of Beirut.

Also, when one reads all 10 letters exchanged between the two parties (see either first two links above), one sees that Hussein refused His Majesty's exception regarding the vilayet of Beirut! There was no agreement between the two parties as to the disposition of this area of Ottoman Syria, which means that there was no treaty on the disposition of Ottoman Syria as a whole!

By the way, Ottoman Palestine went all the way north into today's Lebanon, ending just south of Beirut (Open the map titled ‘The Map of Ottoman Empire Largest Borders’ at: http://www.ottomansouvenir.com/General/maps_of_ottoman_empire.htm). That means McMahon was correct in saying that he believed that Palestine was not promised to Hussein.

If you’re scratching your head wondering why there is no mention of Palestine in the correspondence between McMahon and Hussein, that’s because there was no administrative entity known as Palestine in the the Ottoman Empire. Palestine was the name given to an area that straddled several administrative divisions of Ottoman Syria. The term Palestine is like the name 'New England' in the United States; both not being legal/administrative areas.

This article needs to be updated with the above observations.173.73.129.67 (talk) 10:32, 6 December 2010 (UTC)


It should be pointed out here that the SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT was written on May 6, 1916 and formalized two weeks later on May 16, 1916, a full two months AFTER Hussein and McMahon couldn’t come to terms on the ‘Vilayet of Beirut’ and the ‘Mutasarrifiyet of Jerusalem’ (The last correspondence between Hussein-McMahon on the Levant was sent on March 10, 1916).

In this particular situation the British had every right to decide what they decided because Sharif Hussein made it very clear that the Arabs weren’t going to give up the ‘Vilayet of Beirut’, and the British were just as adamant that they were not going to give up the Vilayet of Beirut’ and the ‘Mutasarrifiyet of Jerusalem’.

As the winner in the war, and with no settlement with the Arabs as to the border demarcations of the Levant, the British and French had every right to create national homelands for all three religions.173.73.123.14 (talk) 04:49, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

You need to cite a published source for the proposed analysis. You seem to have forgotten that the Arabs were also viewed as victorious allied forces. The British archives revealed that commitments to Hussein were relayed from Lord Grey to Hussein by McMahon, Hogarth, Sykes, & etc. Lord Balfour wrote a memo from the Paris Peace Conference which said that Hussein was supposed to delineate the final borders under the terms of the 1915 agreement. See EL Woodward and Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. (London:HM Stationery Office, 1952), pp 340-348, ISBN:0115915540, Nº. 242, "Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia" 132187/2117/44A.
The British National Archives have declassified Cabinet files which say that various administrations misled the public about the details of the agreements with the Arab Chiefs and that Palestine had been included in the area pledged for Arab independence. There were a multitude of other agreements between the Foreign Office & India Office and other Gulf and Indian Sheiks which precluded the Allies from attempting to assert sovereignty over any Muslim Holy Places in Palestine or elsewhere. Those agreements and the promise that "Palestine (West of the Jordan)" was specifically pledged to King Husein and that "this territory shall be "Arab" and "independent." are outlined in The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 21 November 1918, CAB 24/72 (formerly GT 6506). harlan (talk) 08:59, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan,

Did you read my first comment for December 6? The work you reference, The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 21 November 1918, is an after the fact analysis based on the same spurious and selective reasoning as I found in the Wikipedia article concerning the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence. The only documents I, and any historian, should care about are the primary documents such as the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence.

As I have shown in my December 6 comment, Hussein does affirm that McMahon was indeed talking about the Vilayet of Beirut (and more then just the Vilayet of Beirut; see fourth paragraph) in his October 24, 1915 letter to Hussein, the proof being that in the follow up letter by Hussein on November 5, 1915 Hussein writes, “In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships-seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain-we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut [emphasis mine] and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather."

Hussein confirmed in that letter what McMahon had been saying for decades that, "It was my intention to exclude Palestine from independent Arabia, and I hoped that I had so worded the letter as to make this sufficiently clear for all practical purposes. My reasons for restricting myself to specific mention of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo in that connection in my letter were: 1) that these were places to which the Arabs attached vital importance and 2) that there was no place I could think of at the time of sufficient importance for purposes of definition further South of the above. It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the more Northern coastal tracts of Syria.”

Now, in McMahon’s October 24, 1915 letter to Hussein , McMahon writes, “Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.” In other words, the areas also containing the Holy Places will remain British administered. Those Holy Places are found in today’s Israel. McMahon’s October 24, 1915 letter therefore secures not only Palestine but also Lebanon for the French.

McMahon should have quoted Hussein’s return letter of November 5, 1915! If he had then there would have been no question that Hussein knew very well of Britain’s intention to hold onto Palestine, and Lebanon for the French.

As for the Arab allies in World War 1, they received Syria, Iraq and Jordan in the Levant, not to mention all of the lands south of the Levant.74.96.15.252 (talk) 20:08, 22 December 2010 (UTC)


I explained in the post above that you will need to supply published sources for any analysis that you wish to discuss or include in the article. Wikipedia is not the place to discuss your unpublished thoughts on the subject. Do you have a published source which says that Lord Balfour was guilty of faulty analysis when he wrote that the Arabs had been promised their independence and that Hussein was responsible for delineating the boundaries under the terms of the 1915 agreement? The Arabs were already the lawful inhabitants of the Arab homeland. The Ottoman's operated a military Empire. All of the lands mentioned in the Hussein correspondence were under the jurisdiction of the Arabistan Ordusu (i.e. Provincial Army of Arabistan, the land of the Arabs). See History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, Cambridge University Press, 1977,ISBN 0521291666, page 85.

The works that I cited above and the others that are cited in the article happen to be primary documents just like the McMahon letters. They contain the official Cabinet positions and analysis regarding the British obligations and commitments to the Arabs and the other Allies. Those documents have been cited and analyzed in-turn by reliable secondary sources that are also cited in the article, e.g. Doreen Ingrams.

To address your comments: The CAB files quote Lord Grey's instructions to McMahon. He was told to pledge the territories that Hussein had requested on behalf of the British government, subject to the necessary territorial reservations in connection with the interests of the other Allies within the territory lying to the West of the cites of Damascus, Homs, Hamma, and Aleppo. Those Allied interests were spelled-out precisely in the Reglement Organique Agreements of June 1861 and September 1864. Those agreements applied to Mount Lebanon, but not to Palestine. The article already explains that Britain and France were still under treaty obligations to the other allies under the terms of those agreements.

After the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire was placed under the protection of the public international law of Europe and the Sublime Porte became a member of the "Concert of Europe". See paragraph 20 in the UNESCO series "International law: achievements and prospects" [1] Eyal Benvenisti explains the historical development of the laws of belligerent occupation during the 19th Century in Europe. They were codified in the Hague Conventions and contained prohibitions against unilateral or bilateral actions regarding annexation or cessions of territory. [2] After the Armistice of Moudros was concluded, Great Britain and France still needed the consent of the other powers attending the Peace Conference, i.e. the Council of Four, the Council of Ten/The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers before it could divide-up or permanently administer the former Ottoman territory.

The minutes of the 'Council of Four Conference Held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, March 20, 1919, at 3 p.m., pages 1-8 [3] record that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was based upon the McMahon-Hussein agreement - and that the League of Nations mandate could NOT be used to break the treaty agreement with Hussein. Lloyd George and Lord Balfour were in attendance. Do you have any published source which says that Lloyd George's analysis was faulty? Article 1 of the Sykes-Picot agreement called for an Arab state or confederation of Arab states under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. Article 2 stipulated that Britain and France were required to arrange for the direct or indirect administration of the territory with the Arab state or Confederation of Arab States. Article 3 specifically stipulated that the Allies were obliged to consult with the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca regarding the administration of the International zone in Palestine. [4]. The immunity of the Moslem Holy places were guaranteed by the terms of Article 13 of the Mandate. It stipulated that nothing in the mandate could be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with their management. Article 14 stipulated that determinations regarding rights to the Holy Places were to be made by a special commission approved by the Council of the League of Nations, not Great Britain.

The first formal attempt during the Peace Conference to establish interim boundaries was an "Aide-memoire in regard to the occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandates, 13 September 1919" It divided the territory between the British, French, and Arab administered OETAs. It was premised upon the "principles of the Sykes-Picot agreement"; "the Sykes-Picot line"; and mentions "the Arab State" that the British and French governments had committed to support in Zones A and B under the terms of Sykes-Picot. The memo is available in the FRUS, but J. C. Hurewitz has it with the editor's notes from the Documents on British Foreign Policy series [5]. You need to supply published sources which say that PM Lloyd George, Lord Balfour, Lord Curzon, Lord Grey, and Lord Halifax were all mistaken or guilty of faulty analysis. harlan (talk) 23:57, 22 December 2010 (UTC)


Harlan writes:

“I explained in the post above that you will need to supply published sources for any analysis that you wish to discuss or include in the article. Wikipedia is not the place to discuss your unpublished thoughts on the subject.”

The beauty of my find is that it is all contained in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, and has been there for 95 years but nobody found it!

Harlan writes: —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.96.15.252 (talk) 04:22, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

“The Arabs were already the lawful inhabitants of the Arab homeland.”

So? Muslim, Christian and Jewish Arabs would also be the lawful inhabitants of the Arab homeland in the new arrangement in the Levant.

Harlan writes:

“The Ottoman's operated a military Empire.”

“The state organization of the Ottoman Empire was a very simple system that had two main dimensions: the military administration and the civil administration,” as the Wikipedia article on the Ottoman Empire says. “The Sultan was the highest position in the system. The civil system was based on local administrative units based on the region's characteristics. “

Harlan writes:

“All of the lands mentioned in the Hussein correspondence were under the jurisdiction of the Arabistan Ordusu.”

The Arabistan Ordusu (The provincial Ottoman Army for Arabia, which includes Ottoman Syria, the territory that McMahon and Hussein were in negotiations over ) is the provincial Army of the Ottoman Empire In Arabistan. In case you’ve forgotten, the Allies defeated the Ottoman army in the Levant!

Harlan writes:

“Do you have a published source which says that Lord Balfour was guilty of faulty analysis when he wrote that the Arabs had been promised their independence and that Hussein was responsible for delineating the boundaries under the terms of the 1915 agreement? “

Again, for some reason my December 6 and today’s comments on Hussein’s November 5, 1915 reply to McMahon, where Hussein admits that McMahon was indeed talking about the Vilayet Beirut, seems to escape you. Why?

I also posted above the following twice: McMahon also said in his October 24, 1915 correspondence with Hussein that “Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.” In other words, the area containing the Holy Places will remain British administered. That means Great Britain would also maintain control of the area south of the Vilayet Beirut.

As for why Lord Balfour says what he says (including T E Lawrence and others), I cannot delve into their minds nor explain why they wrote what they wrote AFTER the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence. All I care about is the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, which is the subject of this Wikipedia article.

Harlan writes:

“Article 14 stipulated that determinations regarding rights to the Holy Places were to be made by a special commission approved by the Council of the League of Nations, not Great Britain.”

The League of Nations did grant Great Britain the authority to create a national home for the the Jews:

“The [British} mandate formalised British rule in the Southern part of Ottoman Syria from 1923–1948. With the League of Nations' consent on 16 September 1922, the UK divided the Mandate territory into two administrative areas, Palestine, under direct British rule, and autonomous Transjordan, under the rule of the Hashemite family from Hijaz Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the McMahon Pledge of 1915.[1] Transjordan was exempt from the Mandate provisions concerning the Jewish National Home.[1][2] The preamble of the mandate declared:

The preamble of the mandate declared:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”74.96.15.252 (talk) 01:15, 23 December 2010 (UTC)


One more important point that needs to addressed again (as I mentioned on December 6 above):

"Also, when one reads all 10 letters exchanged between the two parties, one sees that Hussein refused His Majesty's exception regarding the vilayet of Beirut! There was no agreement between the two parties as to the disposition of this area of Ottoman Syria, which means that there was no treaty on the disposition of Ottoman Syria as a whole!"74.96.15.252 (talk) 08:37, 23 December 2010 (UTC)


Regarding your statements "it is all contained in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, and has been there for 95 years, ..." & "All I care about is the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, which is the subject of this Wikipedia article." McMahon's second letter to the Sherif, dated 24th October, 1915 explained that the proposed territorial modifications were "without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs". The Sherif was one of the parties to those other agreements that guaranteed Arab independence and ruled out any possibility of British administration or authority over any Islamic Holy Places.
Hussein issued an official declaration regarding the independence of Arabia ("Arabistan" in Turkish) on June 27, 1916. That declaration had been solicited by the Allied and Associated Powers and they, in-turn, legally recognized the Arabs as their co-belligerents. See "International law documents", by the Naval War College (U.S.), 1917, page 17 or International law studies, Volume 73, by Naval War College (U.S.), 1918, Proclamation of the Sherif of Mecca
There were no formal "French interests" within the territory mentioned by McMahon that could have prevented Arab independence. The British and French remained obligated to respect the autonomy of the Arab leaders of the Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shi’a, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Uniate communities under the terms of the Règlement Organique of the Lebanon. Hussein also relayed his objections in that connection through Captain Lawrence: "The main points were that he had altogether refused to permit any French annexation of Beirout and the Lebanon, 'They are Arab countries, but I will neither take them myself nor permit anyone else to take them. They have deserved independence and it is my duty to see they get it.'" See "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein", CAB 24/68 (formerly GT 6185).
"The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. CAB 24/72, dated November 9, 1918, (formerly GT 6506) that I cited above explained the commitment of the Allies under the "Reglement Organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated June 9, 1861 and "Reglement Organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated September 6, 1864. It said the government of Great Britain felt that the specific rights of autonomy secured to the inhabitants under the Reglement ought not to suffer detriment through the abolition of Ottoman suzerainty, but ought to be secured to them, if they so desire, under whatever regime may be established in this and other adjoining territories which Turkey will have to cede at the peace. It also explained that Palestine had been included in the territory Great Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent.
I see that you quoted one of my requests above that you supply published sources to support any analysis and that the article talk page is not the place to discuss unpublished theories. See the "Not a Forum notice" at the top of the page and WP:IDIDNOTHEARTHAT. FYI, WP:PSTS allows the use of material from primary sources, like the McMahon letters. However, any additional analysis or commentary has to come from reliable published sources, not from Wikipedia editors.
The article McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, along with other articles that are broadly construed to be related to the Arab–Israeli conflict, are currently subject to active arbitration remedies laid out during a 2008 Arbitration case and supplemented by community consensus in November 2010. One of the "Remedies" adopted by the ARBCOM Committee was a Reminder to Editors of the requirement to utilize reliable sources for contentious or disputed assertions.
The McMahon letters do not mention a "Jewish national home"; give the British authority over Muslim holy places; or mention Palestine. Many of the statements you made above are contradicted by the so-called "faulty analysis" contained in the official (declassified) British Cabinet Papers that were prepared on this particular subject. Those were based upon (i) policy determinations made by the General War Cabinet; (ii) Foreign Office papers; and (iii) the historical narrative compiled by the Arab Bureau at Cairo and dated 29 November, 1916. Those are all cited in "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein", CAB 24/68 (formerly GT 6185), and, in-turn, in "The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 21 November 1918, CAB 24/72 (formerly GT 6506) that I've already mentioned. harlan (talk) 20:28, 24 December 2010 (UTC)

Arbitrary Break

Harlan writes:

“McMahon's second letter to the Sherif, dated 24th October, 1915 explained that the proposed territorial modifications were "without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs". The Sherif was one of the parties to those other agreements that guaranteed Arab independence and ruled out any possibility of British administration or authority over any Islamic Holy Places.”

Where did McMahon say the British wanted to administer or have authority over any Islamic Holy Places? McMahon writes in his October 24 letter, “Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability. “ While the Dome Of the Rock is a Islamic Holy Place within the Mutasarrifiyet of Jerusalem, the Mutasarrifiyet of Jerusalem isn’t a Holy Place.

McMahon didn't say that, or a lot of the other things that you've posted. It was you who wrote above that:
"In other words, the area containing the Holy Places will remain British administered. That means Great Britain would also maintain control of the area south of the Vilayet Beirut."
In fact, the sources that I cited explained that contingent pledges regarding the Holy Places were given by the Foreign Office to the Arabs through Wingate and that they had subsequently been "brought into operation through the actions of the Sherif." On the 14th April, 1915 the Foreign Office instructed Sir Reginald Wingate, then Sirdar of the Sudan to announce that His Majesty's Government would make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that all of the Mahammedan Holy Places would remain in the hands of an independent sovereign Arab state. Wingate relayed that guarantee to Hussein through Seyyid Sir Ali Morghani, Grand Kadi of the Sudan, who was also a grandson of the Imam of Al-Haram mosque in Mecca. Later, towards the end of June the assurance was repeated in proclamations distributed throughout Egypt, Sudan, and Arabia. An official communique was also published on the 29th July, 1916, in Egypt, after the Sherif's revolt, with the authorization of the Foreign Office. It said:
"It remains the fixed policy of Great Britain to abstain from all interference in religious matters and to spare no effort to secure Holy Places of Islam from all external aggression.
"It is an unalterable point of British policy that those Holy Places should remain under independent Moslem rule and authority."
Those sources also explained that the Holy Places in Palestine (including the Mosque of Omar, Tomb of Abraham at Hebron, & etc.) had been excluded from the Sykes-Picot Brown Zone, because of the original guarantees that had been included in the Government of India's proclamation of 2 November, 1914 at the beginning of the war. harlan (talk) 19:27, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

‘"The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. CAB 24/72, dated November 9, 1918, (formerly GT 6506) that I cited above explained the commitment of the Allies under the "Reglement Organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated June 9, 1861 and "Reglement Organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated September 6, 1864. It said the government of Great Britain felt that the specific rights of autonomy secured to the inhabitants under the Reglement ought not to suffer detriment through the abolition of Ottoman suzerainty, but ought to be secured to them, if they so desire, under whatever regime may be established in this and other adjoining territories which Turkey will have to cede at the peace. It also explained that Palestine had been included in the territory Great Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent.”

Isn’t it cozy that in November 1918 a British political intelligence report tells us that ‘Palestine had been included in the territory Great Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent.’

Someone should have told McMahon this in 1915-1916 because McMahon exempts the Vilayet of Beirut for the British side, which is 40% of what is today called Israel!

The Political Intelligence section of the Foreign Office was tasked to compile a report for the General War Cabinet about the various commitments. It was based upon information supplied by the Cabinet heads, and the regional governors or commissioners. They quoted a narrative history written by the Arab Bureau at Cairo. I already explained that above. The CAB papers contain the instructions that Foreign Secretary Lord Grey cabled to McMahon in telegram No. 860, 2nd November, 1915. Those dealt with Faroki's proposed boundaries regarding French occupation. Palestine was not included. In any event, McMahon was told that, in the areas where Great Britain was free to act without detriment to the interests of France, it would recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the limits and boundaries that had been proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.
Israel and the Jewish national home were not a consideration in the McMahon-Hussein negotiations. harlan (talk) 19:27, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

“I see that you quoted one of my requests above that you supply published sources to support any analysis and that the article talk page is not the place to discuss unpublished theories. See the "Not a Forum notice" at the top of the page and WP:IDIDNOTHEARTHAT. FYI, WP:PSTS allows the use of material from primary sources, like the McMahon letters. However, any additional analysis or commentary has to come from reliable published sources, not from Wikipedia editors.”

And I said that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence is that published source that I use. It’s the published source where Hussein confirms in his November 5 letter what McMahon had been saying all the time, that being, that Palestine and Lebanon were excluded from the ‘Arab Kingdom’.

Hussein specifically says in that November 5 letter, “But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather.” Hussein confirms that McMahon is talking about today’s northern Israel and Lebanon, because today’s northern Israel and Lebanon were contained in the Vilayet of Beirut in 1915-1916!

This is another example of WP:Synth and WP:OR on your part. The CAB papers say that the commitments involving Britain's ally France were the Règlement Organique Agreements that resulted from the French Expedition of 1861. They permanently detached Mount Lebanon from the local vilayets. The Mountain Region (excluding the sea-coast) became an autonomous region with its own Mutasarrif (governor) who was directly accountable to the Sublime Porte. Under the terms of the international conventions, it was not part of the vilayets of Beirut and Allepo. McMahon attempted to equate ethnicity with religion as a preliminary to his discussion of "portions of Syria" lying to the west of a line of cities mentioned by Faroki. McMahon proposed that they "should (not would) be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries." The Sherif did not accept the premise or the proposal to annex additional vilayets to a French zone of occupation. harlan (talk) 19:27, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

“The McMahon letters do not mention a "Jewish national home"; give the British authority over Muslim holy places; or mention Palestine.”

I never said that the McMahon letters mention a "Jewish national home", or give the British authority over Muslim holy places, or mention Palestine. All I said is that in Hussein’s November 5 letter, Hussein does confirm that McMahon was talking about the Vilayet of Beirut, because Hussein says it!

I just located another passage where Hussein in his January 1 reply again references the Vilayet of Beirut, where he say’s, “In addition to which the citizens of [Vilayet of] Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you.”

Hussein says, “…the citizens of [Vilayet of] Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment…”, meaning the British proposition is not in violation of previous treaties with Arab Chiefs, otherwise Hussein would have said the dismemberment violated previous treaties with the Arab Chiefs. The British wishing to hold onto the Vilayet of Beirut is something new and original that was outside of previous treaties with the Arabs, and the Arabs just don’t like it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.231.230.89 (talk) 04:21, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Since the McMahon-Hussein negotiations came to naught, that means the British were free to do as they pleased with the land in concert with the League of Nations. And that was exactly what was done.

This is yet another example of WP:Synth and WP:OR on your part. The Cabinet papers mentioned above say that the Sherif was responding to a proposal developed by McMahon and Faroki regarding the zone of French occupation. It was relayed to Foreign Secretary Grey with a request for instructions. Grey told McMahon to accept the boundaries of Arab independence proposed by Hussein and to suggest the modifications without prejudice to the existing treaties with the Arab Chiefs. The papers also explain that, although it was never accepted by Hussein, it was the origin of the boundary between the Blue Area and Area A in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. They also mention that the concessions granted to the French under the terms of Sykes-Picot violated the international obligations of Great Britain and France with respect to the autonomy of the Arab leaders of the Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shi’a, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Uniate communities in accordance with the terms of the Règlement Organique Agreements. The Balfour Memorandum that I cited stated that Great Britain had no intention of honoring its commitments to the Arabs. "Palestine: Policy Of His Majesty's Government", CAB/24/271, formerly CP 203(37), by Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore explained that McMahon was forced to resign as High Commissioner when the Sykes-Picot Agreement and his role in those negotiations became public. He noted that it was "not generally regarded, as a creditable incident in British diplomacy." harlan (talk) 19:27, 25 December 2010 (UTC)


Conclusion:

Fact 1: There have been no treaties provided as evidence, either by the British or the Arabs, that affirm that Great Britain went back on its word within the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Fact 2: All after-the-fact protestations that Great Britain reneged on treaties with the Arabs predating the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence are invalid until such treaties are produced.

Fact 3: The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence is the basic British document detailing Britain’s plans for a post Ottoman Levant. Therefore:

Fact 4: Since the negotiations between McMahon and Hussein failed to reconcile differences on a post Ottoman Levant, the British were free to do as they pleased with the land in concert with the League of Nations.74.96.23.182 (talk) 23:50, 24 December 2010 (UTC)

I've cited the published reports of the British Cabinet which say the Sharif demanded guarantees and that they were provided. They also say that those commitments to the Arabs were brought into operation through the actions of the Sharif. The article cites a Royal Commission which examined the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. It reported that Great Britain was not free to dispose of the territory without consulting the Arabs. None of your conclusions are contained in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and, once again, you have failed to cite any other published sources. harlan (talk) 19:27, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

"It remains the fixed policy of Great Britain to abstain from all interference in religious matters and to spare no effort to secure Holy Places of Islam from all external aggression.

"It is an unalterable point of British policy that those Holy Places should remain under independent Moslem rule and authority."

That’s just what McMahon said in his October 24 letter: the British would administer the areas outside where the Holy Places exist, which doesn't rule out that Arabs couldn't control the Islamic Holy Places themselves (of course, McMahon said "Holy Places", which includes Jewish and Christian sites, not just Muslim). McMahon said, “Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.” There is only one way to guarantee the safety of the Holy Places, and that is to administer the territory outside of the Holy Places.

This has become monotonous. I'm not interested in discussing your personal interpretations of what you think McMahon said. You need to cite published analysis or move this thread to your user space. I cited the previous written commitment supplied by the Foreign Office through Reginald Wingate to Sir Ali Morghani, an Arab Chief in northern Sudan on April 15th of 1915. It was repeated in proclamations distributed throughout Egypt, Sudan, and Arabia in June of 1915. It said that all of the Islamic Holy places in the whole of Arabia would remain under the administration and authority of a Sovereign Arab State. See "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein", CAB 24/68 (formerly GT 6185),page 3. harlan (talk) 20:26, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

“Those dealt with Faroki's proposed boundaries regarding French occupation. Palestine was not included.”

Of course Palestine was never mentioned, for there was no administrative district called Palestine in the Ottoman Empire. And I never said Palestine was mentioned in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. McMahon was referring to the Vilayet of Beirut and the territory that held Holy Places. Hussein confirmed twice in his replies (November 5 and January 1 letters) to McMahon that McMahon was talking about the Vilayet of Beirut.

The minutes of the British Foreign Office and War Cabinet Eastern Committee meetings certainly do mention Palestine. They explicitly state that negotiations with Hussein and the Arabs were carried-on under multiple heads, including the Government of India, Kitchener, Wingate, McMahon, Allenby, Sykes & Picot, and Lawrence. They also explicitly state that Palestine was included in the area that Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent. You've claimed that is "selective" or "faulty" published analysis, but have not provided any other published sources of analysis which mentions those particular sources. You don'thave to read Balfour's mind. He attended the Cabinet and Peace Conference meetings where the actual decisions and pledges regarding Palestine were made. He wrote a memorandum that said the Allies simply had no intention of honoring their commitments to the Arabs - Nº. 242 'Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia' [132187/2117/44A]. In 1952 the British government declassified all of those records and published them in the "Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939", London: HM Stationery Office, 1952, ISBN:0115915540 harlan (talk) 20:26, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan says:

“Israel and the Jewish national home were not a consideration in the McMahon-Hussein negotiations.”

Again, when did I say that they were? I said that McMahon was confirmed by Hussein to be talking about the Vilayet of Beirut. Since the disagreements in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence were never resolved, that means the British/French were justified to do with the land as they felt best. Hence, LATER Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were created.

You raised the issue of Israel and the national home in your comments above about the LoN commission for the determination of religious rights and the negotiations over the boundaries of Arab independence, "The League of Nations did grant Great Britain the authority to create a national home for the the Jews" & "Someone should have told McMahon this in 1915-1916 because McMahon exempts the Vilayet of Beirut for the British side, which is 40% of what is today called Israel!"
You have repeated several blatant WP:Synth claims. The article already quotes Lord Halifax's memorandum which explains that the correspondence was carried on in Arabic on both sides and that your interpretation regarding the Vilayet of Beirut encounters several insurmountable difficulties. The word translated as "districts" in English is "vilayet". Attempts to interpret McMahon's reference to "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" as references to official vilayets is impossible. "Syria" was the name of the vilayet that included the cities of Damascus, Homs, and Homa. The portions of the vilayet of Syria west of those cities did not include Beirut, Mount Lebanon, or Jerusalem. There is only an ocean west of the Vilayet of Allepo. In any case, Lord Grey's telegram No. 860, 2nd November, 1915 to McMahon did not instruct him to exclude the Vilayet of Beirut, or the Mutesarrifiyyet of Jerusalem from the area of Arab independence. harlan (talk) 20:26, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

“I've cited the published reports of the British Cabinet which say the Sharif demanded guarantees and that they were provided. They also say that those commitments to the Arabs were brought into operation through the actions of the Sharif. The article cites a Royal Commission which examined the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. It reported that Great Britain was not free to dispose of the territory without consulting the Arabs. None of your conclusions are contained in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and, once again, you have failed to cite any other published sources.”

The Arabs were consulted, and Hussein refused the Vilayet of Beirut being exempted by the British. End of story.

And in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence Hussein doesn’t accuse Britain of breaking previous treaties! Both parties are negotiating on points outside of previous arrangements, otherwise Hussein would have said the British were backtracking on previous treaties!

Again, I want to see the previous treaties that the British backtracked on with the Arabs in 1915 and before. It’s been 95 years and they haven’t been produced by either Arabists in the British government nor by the Arabs themselves. Do you know what that means? They don’t exist!

Wikipedia says:

“The debate regarding Palestine derived from the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, but is included within the boundaries that were proposed by Hussein. Whatever McMahon had meant to say is irrelevant, because the actual terms used contained the pledges. Under customary treaty law, binding obligations are seldom supported by an Argument from silence.”

If Hussein hadn’t replied to McMahon in his November 5 letter explicitly saying that McMahon was talking about the Vilayet of Beirut then the Wikipedia paragraph would be true. But Hussein does say that it is the ‘Vilayet of Beirut’ that is in contention between the two sides, and Hussein repeats the ‘Vilayet of Beirut’ again in his January 1 letter. The section ‘The Thrice-Promised Land’ needs to be updated with this new discovery from the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.96.231.230.89 (talk) 05:01, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

McMahon only said "the portions of Syria" west of a few cities should be excluded. He did not raise any objections to Hussein's reply. The article already contains an official Memorandum written by Lord Halifax which rules out the interpretation that you suggest. The various treaties are listed, quoted, and analyzed for you in the Cabinet papers that I've already cited above. By the way, other editors are not required to perform research for you, before they add well-sourced material to the article.
The McMahon letters were not the end of the story. The narrative history supplied by the Cairo Arab Bureau says that the negotiations with Hussein were taken-up by Sykes and Picot. See "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein", CAB 24/68 (formerly GT 6185), page 8. I also provided you a link to the 'Council of Four Conference Held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, March 20, 1919, at 3 p.m. which was attended by Prime Ministers Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando - and President Wilson. Lord Balfour and General Allenby also attended. [7] That meeting resulted in the dispatch of the King-Crane Commission to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. Here is a discussion regarding the McMahon letters in which Lloyd George argued they were a binding treaty commitment.
Mr. Lloyd George said "The League of Nations could not be used for putting aside our bargain with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon intended to occupy Damascus with French troops? If he did, it would clearly be a violation of the Treaty with the Arabs.
M. Pichon said that France had no convention with King Hussein.
MR. Lloyd George said that the whole of the agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot), was based on a letter from Sir Henry McMahon' to King Hussein from which he quoted the following extracts:- "The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits of boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits of boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am empowered, in the name of the Government of Great Britain, to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:- 'Subject to the above modifications Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within territories included in the limits of boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.'-(Extract from a letter from Sir H. McMahon to King Hussein, Oct. 24, '14).
Lloyd George also said Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak.
General Allenby said it had been invaluable.
MR. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it was on the basis of the above quoted letter that King Hussein had put all his resources into the field which had helped us most materially to win the victory. France had for practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement.
The French government was aware of the other treaty commitments with the Arab Chiefs. It had given similar assurances itself regarding Arab independence and the Holy Places during the war. See for example the Anglo-French Declaration So far, this entire thread is based upon your personal interpretation of a primary source. You are ignoring talk page guidelines and repeated requests to supply published sources of analysis. harlan (talk) 20:26, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Harlan writes:

"It also explained that Palestine had been included in the territory Great Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent.”'

How can that be when we now know (thanks to Hussein's November 5 and January 1 letters) that McMahon was talking about the 'Vilayet of Beirut', which includes 40% of today's Israel, which is Palestine?

Harlan writes:

"They also explicitly state that Palestine was included in the area that Britain had pledged would be Arab and independent. You've claimed that is "selective" or "faulty" published analysis, but have not provided any other published sources of analysis, which mentions those particular sources. You don't have to read Balfour's mind.

This has become monotonous. I'm not interested in discussing your personal interpretations of what you think McMahon said. You need to cite published analysis or move this thread to your user space. I cited the previous written commitment supplied by the Foreign Office through Reginald Wingate to Sir Ali Morghani, an Arab Chief in northern Sudan on April 15th of 1915. It was repeated in proclamations distributed throughout Egypt, Sudan, and Arabia in June of 1915. It said that all of the Islamic Holy places in the whole of Arabia would remain under the administration and authority of a Sovereign Arab State. See "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein", CAB 24/68"

The Wingate Message was for the Arabian Peninsula, that is, the southern part of Arabia where Mecca and Medina are located, not the northern part of Arabia! If what you say were the case then the Turks would have re-taken the Levant and then moved further south into the peninsula and re-taken that too!

Read: Palestine, a Twice-promised Land?: The British, the Arabs & Zionism, 1915-1920 By Isaiah Friedman

http://books.google.com/books?id=BfeF1cJfoY8C&pg=PR44&lpg=PR44&dq=Memorandum+on+British+Commitments+to+King+Hussein&source=bl&ots=77E1l35R2g&sig=K579bL8gjNezFddJVkk95H37xyw&hl=en&ei=LG8dTd6lI4G78gbogImfDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Memorandum%20on%20British%20Commitments%20to%20King%20Hussein&f=false

Hussein in his correspondence with McMahon makes no reference to previous treaties that the British were violating, and Hussein confirms that McMahon was indeed talking about the 'Vilayet of Beirut' (which includes 40% of today's Israel, which the British called Palestine!), because Hussein mentions it in his November 5 and January 1 letters! Why does Wikipedia still claim that, "Whatever McMahon had meant to say is irrelevant, because the actual terms used contained the pledges. Under customary treaty law, binding obligations are seldom supported by an Argument from silence." Firstly, we know what McMahon meant because Hussein CONFIRMED it in the correspondence, so it is not irrelevant when Hussein confirms what McMahon said he was talking about; and Secondly, the correspondence between McMahon and Hussein was NEVER concluded, meaning the boundaries of the Levant were left to the British and the French (under the League of Nations) to set.

In 1920, Colonel C. E. Vickery, an accomplished Arabist went to Saudi Arabia and actually saw the original Arab text of the correspondence, and found that Palestine was not wanted by Hussein:

“I can say most definitely that the whole of the King’s demands were centered around Syria, and only around Syria. Time after time he referred to the vineyard, to the exclusion of any other claim or interest. He stated most emphatically that he did not concern himself at all with Palestine and had no desire to have suzerainty over it for himself or his successors.” -- See above: Palestine, a Twice-promised Land?: The British, the Arabs & Zionism, 1915-1920 By Isaiah Friedman.

That is why to this day the Arabs refuse to let anyone see the treaties that they say the British broke. Because they don't exist!

It wasn’t until 1921 that accusations erupted that Great Britain went back on her promises, and the reason for that is because Hussein was thrown out of Syria by the French, and Palestine was a convenient outlet for the Arab’s mounting frustrations. -- See above: Palestine, a Twice-promised Land?: The British, the Arabs & Zionism, 1915-1920 By Isaiah Friedman.

I can’t believe that anyone editing Wikipedia on this subject could neglect Isaiah Friedman’s 1992 book, ‘The Question of Palestine’ (http://books.google.com/books?id=d0iR5mS_zckC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+question+of+palestine+friedman&source=bl&ots=KK4WLpuvZc&sig=bhXvM1YOzJDNryCSS4jIhhG1vjs&hl=en&ei=uaYdTaKNJ4G78gaBpby-Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false), where the author in London actually examines the documents in question.

Isaiah Friedman’s 2000 book is mentioned only once in the Wikipedia article, and only in reference to a peripheral issue concerning the Hogarth message, as if the book has nothing else to add to this subject of the British betraying treaties made with the Arabs! Friedman’s 2000 book totally destroys the contention that the British violated treaties they made with the Arabs, and even shows Hussein not caring what happens to Palestine!74.96.19.244 (talk) 04:42, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

Real scholarship is to be included, not hacks like Friedman that even other Zionists like Benny Morris and his ilk have dealt with long ago.Historylover4 (talk) 01:20, 1 June 2012 (UTC)

Hi, it looks like the link in note #23 is broken. Here's an updated link: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4C4F7515DC39195185256CF7006F878C I would update it myself, but I don't edit often and don't feel comfortable messing with that kind of stuff. Feel free to delete this once the issue has been fixed! --Johopotalk 00:18, 28 July 2014 (UTC)

Adding to the Arab Revolt

In order to go into some implications of the Arab Revolt with regards to Arab Nationalism I propose that the following be added to the Arab Revolt section: The Arab revolt is seen by historians as the first organized movement of Arab nationalism. It brought together different Arab groups for the first time with the common goal to fight for independence from the Ottoman Empire. Much of the history of Arabic independence stemmed from the revolt beginning with the kingdom founded by Hussein. After the war was over, the Arab revolt had implications. Groups of people were put into classes based on if they had fought in the revolt or not and what their rank was. In Iraq, a group of Sharifian Officers from the Arab Revolt formed a political party which they were head of. Still to this day the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan is influenced by the actions of Arab leaders in the revolt.[1] This would follow the last sentence in the section about the British advance. If anyone wants to comment on these changes, please let me know on this talk page. Drafferty28 (talk) 18:19, 31 October 2016 (UTC)

It starts to depart from the scope of this particular article. What you've proposed is already covered in the Arab Revolt article. Does that source argue that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence was responsible for Arab Nationalism, via the Arab Revolt? If not, what is the relevance? Ibadibam (talk) 22:03, 31 October 2016 (UTC)

Nonexistent speech of Lord Robert Cecil

I am deleting the uncited text "Among the earliest statements on the matter was a month after the Balfour Declaration was released, when Lord Robert Cecil declared to the House of Commons: "Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judea for the Jews", finding no contradiction between its commitments." The reason is that no such thing ever happened. The complete verbatim record of the House of Commons is online and all of Lord Robert Cecil's contributions can be viewed here for 1917 and here for 1918. In fact these words are from a speech Lord Robert Cecil made to a Zionist gathering at the Opera House to celebrate the Balfour Declaration. It's dirt easy to find references, see this for example, or the full speech here. Cecil does not state that he was presenting the policy of the British government. This is best left out altogether. Zerotalk 06:01, 4 November 2016 (UTC) Ah, you're correct. Thanks! --Monochrome_Monitor 08:33, 4 November 2016 (UTC)

Proposed merge with McMahon letters

McMahon letters is mainly just a primary source which could be copied to Wikisource. McMahon–Hussein Correspondence is an older and much more detailed article on the same topic. Ibadibam (talk) 23:06, 19 April 2016 (UTC)

Support Makeandtoss (talk) 16:57, 24 May 2016 (UTC)

 Done Oncenawhile (talk) 22:07, 5 November 2016 (UTC)

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Lawrence quote

Asserting something is highly notable does not seem to be a reasonable policy based argument for having the section about the Arab Revolt consist mostly of T.E Lawrence quotes, even if we seem to really really like his POV. Kindly provide sources that show this (and the other) quotes deserve such prominence. Also, per ONUS you should leave the material out until you gain consensus for its inclusion. Kindly self-revert. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 21:25, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

I am fine to cut it down, but it should be in there as a notable moment in the historiography of it all. It it quoted by numerous scholars who have analyzed the topic of this article, e.g. Kedourie (p. 316), Georgina Howell (p.268), R J M Pugh (p.168), Schneer (p.323) and J M N Jeffries (p.146). Kedourie wrote that Lawrence's "accusation that the British had acted in bad faith has been given a very wide currency not only by his writings, but also by Terence Rattigan's play Ross, and the Panavision technicolor film Lawrence of Arabia".
Oncenawhile (talk) 22:08, 8 January 2017 (UTC)
That's nice, but a lot of stuff is quoted by numerous scholars, and we don't make extensive block quotes with a blue background out of them. You can certainly say Kedourie says that a play and a movie popularized Lawrence's opinion that the British acted in bad faith, though. We summarize secondary sources here, as I'm sure you're aware. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:45, 8 January 2017 (UTC)
I agree we should use WP:RS to summarize primary sources not quote them inside the article.-Shrike (talk) 06:48, 9 January 2017 (UTC)
T.E. Lawrence had a leading role in the Arab Revolt, and his quotes relating to the essence of the revolt are notable. Unless scholars have refuted what have been said as Lawrence has a reputation of twisting stories to his own benefit. Makeandtoss (talk) 13:41, 9 January 2017 (UTC)
No one says it isn't important but we don't usually use WP:PRIMARY --Shrike (talk) 13:55, 9 January 2017 (UTC)
Then the problem is easily solved by adding content from the scholars mentioned by Oncenawhile. Makeandtoss (talk) 14:41, 9 January 2017 (UTC)

I note that Oncenawhile has not substantiated with secondary sources the overuse of PRIMARY quotes from T.E Lawrence. I'm removing the hugely UNDUE blue background quote box, but leaving the other one in even though I think even that alone is UNDUE and we should be using a summary of a secondary source. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 01:49, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

Note: this conversation is now continuing below. Oncenawhile (talk) 10:27, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

Primary sources and copyvio

It was already previously noted that primary sources is not acceptable to use in such contentious matters if no secoundary WP:RS will be added I will remove unsourced and text that rely on WP:PRIMARY also there is a copyvio violation from journal of Journal of Contemporary HistoryShrike (talk) 15:12, 18 May 2017 (UTC)

All the primary sources in here are in many many many secondary sources. This is an incredibly well researched topic. Which ones are you concerned about? Oncenawhile (talk) 20:02, 18 May 2017 (UTC)
I have filled in the ones you tagged. Oncenawhile (talk) 20:17, 18 May 2017 (UTC)
I have added secondary sources to the rest and removed the tag. Oncenawhile (talk) 09:59, 20 May 2017 (UTC)
The Toynbee quote is fair use. It is highly relevant and not replaceable given Toynbee's involvement. In addition, as another editor noted elsewhere "From a Stanford libraries guideline on US copyright law, I note the following: "Because the dissemination of facts or information benefits the public, you have more leeway to copy from factual works such as biographies than you do from fictional works such as plays or novels"
Oncenawhile (talk) 20:24, 18 May 2017 (UTC)
Lawrence quote is notable. Mentioned several times in several secondary reliable sources. Makeandtoss (talk) 12:11, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
Agreed. For example, as noted above, it is described in Kedourie (p. 316), Georgina Howell (p.268), R J M Pugh (p.168), Schneer (p.323) and J M N Jeffries (p.146). Kedourie explains that Lawrence's claim in the quote gained very wide currency. Oncenawhile (talk) 15:35, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
The issue that was brought up above (and in my edit summary) is WEIGHT, not notability (which really doesn't mean much in the context of specific text going into an article). You obviously don't have consensus to include that quote so prominently. WP:ONUS is policy as part of WP:CONS, if you weren't aware. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 16:41, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
So we are agreed this is a question of style and judgement. Two editors think it is an important quote and should remain in the article, and two are not so sure. Doesn't appear to be any consensus for removal then. Oncenawhile (talk) 17:26, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
First of all, no, WEIGHT is part of NPOV which is a policy, it's not a matter of "style" and no, the WP:ONUS is explicitly put on those who want to include, as you well know.
Since you admit there is no consensus on whether to include this or not, Makeandtoss violated ONUS when restoring it. I hope he won't do it again. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:57, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
WP:WEIGHT is very important, and the Lawrence quote is clearly appropriate weight here given how well known and widely published it is.
The quote has been in the article since 2016. If you wish to remove it, you need consensus.
Oncenawhile (talk) 21:39, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
That's funny. When you say that it has been in the article "since 2016" you mean December 31st, 2016? And I removed it a week later and started the discussion above, in which it is clear that there is no consensus to include it and never was. That I didn't get around to removing it doesn't make it grandfathered in, or do you have some policy you'd like to provide us with that says otherwise? As opposed to WP:ONUS that explicitly says the onus is on you to find consensus to include?
I will be removing this text that has no consensus in the next few days and anyone who restores it without consensus will be knowingly violating policy. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:32, 19 May 2017 (UTC)
I agree that, as a major agent in British-Arab relations, Lawrence's view should be represented in the article. But the use of a long quotation, set apart from the text without context, does place undue weight on this viewpoint, and crowds the article (see WP:QUOTEFARM and WP:LONGQUOTE). This quotation should be placed in a footnote, per LONGQUOTE. It can also be summarized in the article text—ideally including secondary-source analysis. Ibadibam (talk) 05:24, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

Hiya. I agree with Ibadibam. Even T.E. Lawrence requires a backup from secondary sources that his view is "mainstream", meaning that the objective facts he supposes are in fact accepted generally. On the other hand the inclusion of the subjective without objective context veers into an appeal to emotion, ie "perfect fool", "bitterly ashamed". In this sense Lawrence's description of his shame, in such long form, uses pathos to provide undue weight to the Arab view that the British betrayed the Arabs, with no dissenting pathos. The quote as its now utilized (in separate quotebox) strikes me as very problematic stylistically. It would be better to use less of the quote and describe it in wikistyle, aka "T.E. Lawrence, known as Lawrence of Arabia for blahblahblah (something about arab relations and the british and wwI), felt xyz, saying 'foo'".--Monochrome_Monitor 15:42, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

  • What is interesting is that the sources in the google books link I provided had a shortened version of the quote, perhaps we can introduce that as a compromise. Makeandtoss (talk) 16:26, 20 May 2017 (UTC)
That's odd. Where does it come from? Because if they just shortened it themselves it complicates attribution a lot.--Monochrome_Monitor 18:11, 20 May 2017 (UTC)
Doesn't complicate anything. They obviously didn't shorten it themselves, cause the shortened quote is the same across the different sources. Makeandtoss (talk) 21:29, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

Finding appropriate sources for this page

As has been noted by Zero and possibly others as well, this page needs some fixing up here and there. By way of background (even though the author is a professor and OBE, it is a group blog and so probably would not fully meet the WP definition of reliable secondary, however some apparently reputable sources are then given within the article and these can be tracked down in due course) http://www.balfourproject.org/the-mcmahon-promise/ is a fairly decent summary of the "Palestine was included" position and picks up on a lot of the papers and events that need a fully reliable secondary for effect. Anyone has reliable secondary (and/or high quality primary) source materials on these points, that would be useful.Selfstudier (talk) 11:44, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

Lead

I have removed the line

"Elie Kedourie says that the letter was not a treaty, and even if it were considered to be a treaty, Hussein completely failed to fulfill his promises from his 18 February 1916 letter."

added by Nice a few days ago. There are multiple sources with a contrary position so this is not NPOV. Nor do I think that the precise legal status of the correspondence is a matter of sufficient weight for the lead. I would be quite happy to have a section in the article "Legal Status..." or similarand we can add all these POV and suitable refs there, in fact I think it would be a good idea to have such a section.Selfstudier (talk) 11:23, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

There is indeed a contrary position, which was already represented in the lead. That's why I added this. I will add it again, and you can either leave both this and Antonius in, or remove both. Any other action is an NPOV violation. I'm sure you can see how just removing the POV you don't like is a problem.
I think the matter of legal weight is very much appropriate for the lead, since various sources make all kinds of arguments based on how binding or not these letters are. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:19, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
Please feel free to take out both of them as and we can proceed as I already suggested with an appropriate section for Legal Status in the main body.(although I don't actually see what the Antonius sentence has to do with Legal Status). If you don't do it, I will.Selfstudier (talk) 19:10, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
Since you have not made the edit nor have you made any reply, I have gone ahead and made it myself. Other editors might consider expanding further upon the new section.Selfstudier (talk) 12:57, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

In doing the above I also cut out this offending POV "Referring to the 25 October 1915 letter, Antonius wrote that it is: "by far the most important in the whole correspondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the most important international document in the history of the Arab national movement... is still invoked as the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain of having broken faith with them." We can perhaps find a way to reinsert it in another way.Selfstudier (talk) 13:01, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

Per WP:LEAD: "notability of the article's subject is usually established in the first few sentences."
The single most notable point about this whole subject is that the British have been accused of breaking faith with the Arabs on the basis of the 24 October letter. A century of arguments have been about this claim, and related counterclaims.
So we need to include this point early in the lead.
Oncenawhile (talk) 13:56, 29 May 2017 (UTC)
I agree that we need to establish notability and I think its quite easy to do it without introducing a POV. To me, the notability is not that the British might or might not have breached faith it is that the issue of whether they did or not is still being debated 100 years after the event. Do you see what I mean? I could just as well put up the Churchill White Paper with the opposite view and say it is notable for that reason.(that is the other POV).Selfstudier (talk) 14:36, 29 May 2017 (UTC)
Agreed. Oncenawhile (talk) 14:38, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

In the same way that Balfour is tracked over to here, I think the lead here also needs to track over to there, that is certainly part of the notability. (if McMahon is notable in BD vice versa applies).Selfstudier (talk) 15:13, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

I did a straight copy paste of the text in the lead of Balfour Declaration (some very minor editing just so it reads properly) over to the lead here.It likely needs fixing up a bit, if we do it here or in Balfour it would then need to be in the other as well for consistency)Selfstudier (talk) 17:41, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

I think also that perhaps a major part of the notability is the secrecy, the way the whole thing came out in bits and pieces so the 1939 committee needs to be in there (that also applied to some of the documents in the other commitments section eg Hogarth). And then the 1964 declassifications. In fact it seems to me (this is OR, I apologize lol) that it is often these releases that seem to set off flurries of scholarship and argument (I am sure there are other reasons as well).Selfstudier (talk) 15:20, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

"British interpretations"

The "British interpretations" section [6] seems to me to be another huge pile of SYNTH. Who says these documents are related? Who says a certain document is a position of "the British" rather than the personal opinion of whoever wrote it? We need secondary sources threading all of these together.

I asked at NORN here, the one reply I got agrees it's SYNTH. I suggest removing the table, and if there are any sources that directly compare documents, we can report that in paragraph form as suggested at NORN. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:35, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Completely disagree, the table is a very helpful guide to any reader, you should consider adding to it (be helpful instead of being disruptive)Selfstudier (talk) 19:12, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
Please make your argument in terms of Wikipedia policy rather than ad hominem. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:15, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
WP:Disruptive_editing and WP:FIXTHEPROBLEM. Better for you? Selfstudier (talk) 19:42, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
Argument (1): you need to get consensus.
Argument (2): your post at NORN was made prior to our discussions at Talk:Balfour Declaration, at which you were made aware that Kedouri threads most of those sources together.
Oncenawhile (talk) 19:34, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
Argument (1): As you know very well by now, the ONUS is on those who want to include. But either way that doesn't explain how this huge table of quotes from primary sources is appropriate both in terms of WEIGHT and in terms of OR/SYNTH.
Argument (2): If Kadourie "threads most of those sources together", let's start by you removing the ones he doesn't? Or would you like me to just remove anything not sourced to Kedourie? Then we can see what's left and if it complies with policy. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:54, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
(1) ONUS applies to WP:V. These are impeccably sourced. You need consensus for a synth allegation, because such a claim is inherantly subjective. And in this case, such a claim is inherently nonsense. As you know, for a synth allegation to hold water, there must be a "conclusion not explicitly stated by any of the sources." Should you sidestep this crucial challege, it will be clear that your claim has no basis.
(2) That is not how Wikipedia lists work. Imagine if all lists in the encyclopedia needed to be from a single source! Oncenawhile (talk) 05:47, 29 May 2017 (UTC)
WP:What_SYNTH_is_not appears to be appropriate here once again, in particular "If you want to revert something on the grounds that it's SYNTH, you should be able to explain what new thesis is being introduced and why it's not verified by the sources. You don't have to put the whole explanation in the edit summary, but if someone asks on the talk page, you should have something better ready than "Of course it's SYNTH. You prove it isn't." The burden of proof is light: just explaining what new assertion is made will do, and then it's up to the other editor to show that your reading is unreasonable. But in any disagreement, the initial burden of proof is on the person making the claim, and the claim that something is SYNTH is no exception."
Please look at the very top of WP:NOTSYNTH. You see where it says that it is "not one of Wikipedia's policies or guidelines"? You can quit posting it all over the place, it's worthless in terms of policy. WP:SYNTH on the other hand is policy - "a widely accepted standard that all editors should normally follow", it says so right on the top of the page. Also, if you think I didn't explain what the SYNTH is, you haven't been reading my posts. Which wouldn't surprise me, considering your responses. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:54, 28 May 2017 (UTC)
You have ignored his point. Please explain to us what new thesis is being introduced by these sources. Oncenawhile (talk) 05:47, 29 May 2017 (UTC)
He also incorrectly states that SYNTH is a policy, it isn't - "SYNTH is not a policy. It's part of a policy: no original research. If a putative SYNTH doesn't constitute original research, then it doesn't constitute SYNTH. The section points out that synthesis can and often does constitute original research. It does not follow that all synthesis constitutes original research." Selfstudier (talk) 09:40, 29 May 2017 (UTC)
A. SYNTH is a policy. Where did you get that quote from?
B. The table is obviously meant to imply that all these statements represent "the British", and that they carry equal weight whether they're part of a cabinet meeting, a white paper or the musings of an involved individual. You obviously need a source tying them together. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:57, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
That is not a thesis or conclusion. "The British" doesn't mean anything, and the introductory sentence above the table is plain and descriptive.
As you well know by now, we have numerous sources tying these together: Kedouri, Friedman and Toynbee&Friedman. This topic is exclusively analyzed in the scholarly domain by quoting these sources.
Anyway, this whole conversation is nonsense unless you can answer this question: what conclusion do you believe is being implied that is not in the sources?
Oncenawhile (talk) 23:16, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
I just explained that above. It's in fairly plain English. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:18, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
The burden of proof is on you here. You have made a claim of synth, and other editors have called you out on it. Vague handwaving is not going to strengthen your case. Oncenawhile (talk) 23:22, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
I hope the RfC below will help you understand. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:44, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I have explained several times now that SYNTH is not a policy (it is also discussed in response to you on the Balfour Declaration talk page) and that that statement comes from the page What Synth is Not, ~SYNTH is part of No OR policy not a policy in it's own right.Selfstudier (talk) 10:23, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

Material alleged as NPOV at Balfour Declaration page

After objections from the usual suspect(s) and in the absence of a consensus I have removed the following alleged non NPOV material from the Balfour page (see there for discussion of it), editors may consider whether any or all of it needs inclusion here at this page.

According to Huneidi, the British Government's interpretation of the what had been "intended" and the resulting nature of the contradictions evolved over the subsequent years – from 1916 until at least the end of 1918 the Foreign Office had considered Palestine to have been included in the area of Arab independence committed to Hussein,{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65–70}{efn|group=lower-alpha|For example, in a 5 December 1918 Cabinet Eastern Committee meeting, chaired by Lord Curzon, and at which Balfour was in attendance, the minutes revealed that in laying out the government's position Curzon had explained that "Palestine was included in the areas as to which Great Britain pledged itself that they should be Arab and independent in the future."{sfn|Ingrams|2009|p=48|ps=: Ingrams cites the UK Archive files PRO CAB 27/24}} whereas the opposite view was stated publicly in the 1922 Churchill White Paper (the British Government's first formal statement of policy on Palestine),{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65-70}{efn|group=lower-alpha|On 27 March 1923, Lord Grey, who had been the Foreign Secretary during the McMahon–Hussein negotiations, stated in the House of Lords that he entertained serious doubts as to the validity of the then British government's interpretation of the pledges which he, as foreign secretary, had caused to be given to Hussein.ref>House of Lords debate, HL Deb 27 March 1923 vol 53 cc639-69</ref>}} and by the time of the 1939 committee set up to consider the correspondence, it avoided taking a position on the matter altogether.{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65-70}} According to Kedourie, McMahon had intended to exclude Palestine from the beginning.{sfn|Kedourie|1976|p=247}} Biger states that Palestine was not included in the area discussed between McMahon and Hussein, and that "the British government constantly claimed that Palestine was never promised to Hussein".{sfn|Biger|2004|p=48}}

Selfstudier (talk) 16:53, 8 June 2017 (UTC)

Low quality map (1918)

@Makeandtoss: May you please write down your arguments, why this map should be included?--Kopiersperre (talk) 11:55, 27 June 2017 (UTC)

It shows the depth of the territorial negotiations. The question should be; why should this map be excluded? Makeandtoss (talk) 13:55, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
There is no good reason to exclude this map, it (and the source of it) serve a purpose useful to this article. User Kopiersperre is also trying to delete it at the Balfour Declaration page where it is equally useful and has deleted it at Arab revolt page. This seems asomewhat unhelpful if the only reason is the lack of availability of a high res scan of a 100 year old map.Selfstudier (talk) 14:54, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
Agree, it should not be deleted. It is the only available digitised copy of the only known British Government map showing Palestine in the Arab area (it may also be the only British Government map of the McMahon promise ever). It is thus of great historical importance, as it illustrates the evolving nature of the dispute here given the well known later position stated by the British Government on the matter. Onceinawhile (talk) 15:21, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
  1. ^ Khalid, Rashid; Anderson, Lisa; Muslih, Muhammad; Simon, Reeva (1991). The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 189. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)