User:MrsGussieFinkNottle/Greek Coup of 21st April 1967
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Greek Coup of 21st April 1967
On the 21st April 1967, and prior to elections which had been announced for 28th May, army officers under the leadership of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, with the cooperation of Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos (commander of the Armour Training Centre in Athens), Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos and others, seized power in a revolt which they called the "Nation-Saving Revolution" or the "Revolution of 21st April". The participants justified their actions as necessary to avoid anarchy which was being planned by centre-left groups [1], but which they failed to demonstrate persuasively. The country and its institutions were occupied for 7 years, until 24th July 1974, when the Regime of the Colonels collapsed during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. On the 8th January 1975 the Greek parliament characterised the revolt of 21st April as a coup.
Prevailing Political Situation
[edit]After the Greek Civil War, despite the defeat of the communist armed forces (DSE) and the exile of the leaders of the communist party (KKE), there was widespread fear of communism. Governments took measures such as the banning of the KKE and the displacement of dissenters. Some officers of the armed forces, the police, the KYP (the national information service) and others considered that politicians were not taking sufficient measures or were not capable of dealing with the danger and they acted autonomously by creating the so-called "parakratos". They created groups of officers who met and decided upon common actions without being accountable to or being under then control of politicians. Simultaneously, through false reports and provocations they attempted to persuade that the left had organised actions for the capture of power. The governments during this period, in the 1950's and 1960's, were not able to check the parakratos either because they did not realise the danger to democracy or because the King intervened on their behalf, thinking that the members of the parakratos were mainly royalists. Examples of actions by the parakratos were the Pericles plan[2], the violence and rigging of the Greek legislative election, 1961, and the murder of the MP Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963.
The actions of these anti-democratic right-wing groups intensified after the victory of the Centre Union (EK) in the elections of 1963 under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou who, although anti-communist, believed that political persecution of the communists strengthened rather than weakened them. The plotters of the coup feared a renewed victory by the Centre Union in the forthcoming elections, a victory which would strengthen the faction of Andreas Papandreou and might lead to the cleansing of far right elements of the army - a cleansing which would certainly include many of the leading elements of the movement. (which movement? the parakratos?). The previous attempt by the government to check the power of the army had led to a clash with the King and the Iuliana. Reelection of the Centre Union would make an intervention by the King more difficult. At the same time anti-American statements by Andreas Papandreou, the hand of friendship which he extended to the United Democratic Left, and his encouragement of friendship to the countries of the Warsaw Pact had disconcerted right-wing institutions and foreign elements, including the Americans. Because of the advanced age of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou appeared to be his natural successor should the Centre Union win the forthcoming elections.
Υπήρχαν πολλές αναφορές στο ενδεχόμενο πολιτειακής εκτροπής, whilst senior army officers under Lieutenant General Grigorios Spandidakis (chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff) planned a coup with the tolerance, if not the encouragement, of King Constantine II. These scenarios concerned the removal from power of the Centre Union should they win the forthcoming elections, and the suspension of certain articles of the constitution.
The officers who eventually executed the coup on April 21, 1967 moved faster than expected and surprised everyone. The regime justified the seizure of power, arguing that there was a risk of the seizure of power by the Communists. The plotters claimed that they had discovered seventy trucks loaded with fake military uniforms, which the communists would use to execute a coup. The officers did not present evidence of the threat and soon they abandoned the pretext of the upcoming communist danger.
Account of the Coup
[edit]The Conspirators Hesitate
[edit]Colonel George Papadopoulos, Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos and Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos met at the headquarters of the armoured divisions in Goudi at 11.30pm on the 20th April. Papadopoulos still had not received information which he needed and proposed to postpone the coup for 24 hours. (The information related to an anonymous telephone call that day to the wife of Colonel Lazaris stating that politicians were aware of the plans for that evening). Pattakos refused the postponement and the disagreement between the two lasted some time. Eventually Pattakos announced to his co-conspirators that he would commence the coup whether they followed him or not, at which point the others agreed. The first movements of units began shortly after 1am on 21st April.
Control of Communications
[edit]First to move were units of commandos (LOK). These were key to success of the coup, which could only prevail if these units succeeded in occupying all of the telecommunication centres without the alarm being raised. It was important that neither the King, generals nor government were informed before the essential goals of the movement had been completed. Telecommunications – the building of ΕΡΤ, television, radio stations, phone centre and army wireless installations - were occupied between 01:00 and 01:30 without alarm being raised. The roads were peaceful, since tanks and convoys of trucks had yet to move. The soldiers moved quickly and silently in small groups to predetermined targets without provoking attention or curiosity; a single jeep full of soldiers was not unusual at that time in Athenian streets.
Forgery of the King's Signature – Prometheus Plan
[edit]Papadopoulos had prepared a written command, which ordered the movement of the necessary army units, forging the signature of the King, which was read to the bleary troops. Then Papadopoulos sent the code word for the activation of the "Prometheus Plan", an emergency plan of NATO, which was for the forceful takeover of power by the army with the aim of neutralising communist insurrection, in case of the invasion of Greece by Soviet forces. This plan placed all army units under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Defence, or the chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff General Spandidakis, or of the King, strictly forbidding troops from obeying any other order. ?Really? Doesn't make much sense.
Spandidakis, a confidante of the King, was replaced by Odysseas Angelis who, making use of his new office, gave the order to the 3rd Army in Thessalonika to implement the Prometheus Plan throughout the country.
References
[edit]- ^ "Έθνος" newspaper 24th April 1967 front-page article with title: "Σχέδιον μαχητικής εκδηλώσεως της Κεντροαριστεράς προεκάλεσε την ανάληψιν της Αρχής υπό του Στρατού"
- ^ US Department of State Archives, 1964-1968, Vol 194
External links
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