User:RekonDog/Scout and Sniper Company

The United States Marine Corps Scout and Sniper companies were the first amongst the division's reconnaissance assets. They existed around the same exact moment with 1st and 2nd Marine Division were created. In 1941, each regiment had a scout and sniper platoon. They were assigned to the regimental Headquarters and Service Company. These companies were used in variety of tasks and, on occasion in severe combat,, were used as "spare" rifle companies.

While the two Marine divisions, (1st and 2nd Marine Division), were still fresh, many of the regimental intelligence sections (G-2) approached reconnaissance differently than the VAC's FMF Amphib Recon Company. Many of their scouts and snipers platoons were reinforced with tanks for speed and added firepower. These later developed into the Light Armored Reconnaissance that are presently operating in the Marine Regiments today. Also, later Division recon companies (later battalions) were born from the scouts and snipers companies, also forging the Marine Corps modern Scout Sniper teams that are existence.

Organization

I Amphibious Corps (I MAC)

The I Amphibious Corps (later III MAC) approached its reconnaissance assets in southwest Pacific more differently than the V Amphibious Corps's FMF Amphib Recon platoons in Central Pacific.

Training

See also: Alamo Scouts Training Center

Each of the specialized schools were followed by individual training back in the Corps's parent organization. This was normally scheduled by the company commander or the battalion commander. Each unit had its own means of training its Marines from the lessons learned from previous organizations's last recon entry behind enemy territory. They kept individual and unit training at a high level of proficiency.

In general, all scout and snipers were trained in scouting and patrolling. And to include escape and evasion, land/maritime orientation, knife fighting, close-quarter combat, weapons and demolition, combat swimming, compass swims, hydrographic surveying, and etc. Many of which were exceptional marksman and sharpshooters. Most of these courses and training were conducted within the Marines's own training function. However, some were sent to train with the Royal Marines in England. And other specialized schools developed around the areas of the Pacific.

Colonel Edmond John Buckley, the chief intelligence officer of General A. A. Vandegrift's D-2 staff, discerned the need of Amphibious reconnaissance training requirements for the 1st Marine Division's scouts. He understood the uses of rubber boats and combat swimming that can be vital in future operations; ultimately gaining stealth and incursions in scouting ahead for enemy forces.

In April, 1943, Colonel E. J. Buckley organized his staff to train scouts and members of other services. The eight-week course was set up at 5th Marine Regiment's area on Mornington Peninsula in Australia. This course was instructed by 1st Lieutenant Holly Whyte. Lt. Whyte gained his recon skills while serving with the 1st Marines on Guadalcanal. The first class of students were mostly combat experienced recon Marines from each of the division's infantry regiments that fought on Guadalcanal. Although scouting and patrolling, field sketching and land navigation were mostly refresher training; rubber boats and amphibious reconnaissance was very new. The nearby, adjacent Phillips Bay was used routinely for rubber boat and training.

Lieutenant Bradbeer of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7), Marine Gunner Gibbons from the D-2 section, Sergeant Mike Mantas from 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5), and Lieutenant R. B. Firm, Assistant R-2 of 5th Marines, were about three-fourths of completing the course when General Walter Krueger of Sixth Army requested that they should report to another school in Cairns, Australia.

The Alamo Scouts Training Center was established by Lt. Commander Bill Coultas of the Royal Australian Navy. Coultas organized the group into four different teams with a Marine on each team led by an Australian patrol officer. Each group contained three officers and six enlisted members from the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), who were all veterans of the Middle East Campaign, and from the United States Seventh Fleet. In addition, three officers from the 32nd U.S. Army Division, three Australians who had been patrol officers in New Guinea before the war, and twenty natives contributed by the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO), and the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). The natives were chosen for their knowledge of various locales of New Guinea and New Britain; they had been in Japanese-occupied areas and by various means had made their way back to Allied territory.

The eight week course rehearsed each team in specific objectives in the Japanese occupied areas around Gasmata, Finschafen, Cape Gloucester, and Arawe. They trained in sophisticated ambushes and raids, intensive physical conditioning, continuous rubber boat work, and at least three hours a day on pidgin English. The teams then moved to Fergusson Island in the D'Entrecasteaux group of the Louisiade Archipelago just off the eastern tip of New Guinea where they practiced ambushing each other.

Bradbeer and Firm were pulled back to Guadalcanal to the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious component— the 3rd Marine Division. Retained by I Amphibious Corps (I MAC), Bradbeer and Firm were briefed on the pending Treasury Islands missions by Marine Raider Major Richard T. Washburn, who was schooling Raiders and division scouts on amphibious reconnaissance. Washburn's teams were about to depart on an amphib recon mission of the Shortland and Treasury Islands. The whole unit was ostensibly designated as the "Special Service Unit #1".

History

Lt. Colonel "Wild Bill" Whaling overlooking map of Guadalcanal with accompanying officers

In 1941, Lieutenant Colonel William "Wild Bill" Whaling, the executive officer of 5th Marine Regiment visualized and perceived the use for specialized missions encompassing reconnaissance at the division-level, which would be conducted above the normal infantry battalion-level in scouting and patrolling. He recommended to General Alexander Vandegrift the need of a special "Scout and Sniper unit" for the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal. Upon approval, each of the three rifle companies that were used during the Guadalcanal campaign were tasked in sending one their best field craft Marines to devise the scout-sniper unit with each regiment containing a Scout and Sniper Platoon within the regimental headquarters and service company. This was the birth of division reconnaissance.

Most of these Marines were skilled marskmen and outdoorsmen. General Vandegrift appointed Lt. Colonel Whaling to start a school where the selected Marines received intense additional training. While some Marines weren't selected and were sent back to their units, others took their place and the "Whaling Group" was available to scout and spearhead operations. Initially, they acted as guides in movement of units from one area to another and were able to confirm unit locations in the thick jungle foliage. They later conducted independent patrols into areas of critical interests to the Division.

It wasn't before long many of the regiments requested their scouts to be heavily reinforced with tanks. The mechanized recon scouts proved to be very efficient in reconnaissance in force (RIF). They would ride on top the tanks and rapidly be inserted behind the enemy lines and "look" for the enemy. Whenever encountered, they would fall back and immediately report to the battalion commander of its new findings Althought, the division commander retained the amphibious and ground reconnaissance to its company level and took advantage of its sniper development. Those scout and sniper platoons later formed the Marine Scout Sniper and Surveillance and Target Acquisition platoons.

By 1944, The Marine divisions contained elements of scout/snipers, armored recon teams, and ground and amphib recon platoons within the division. Marines from the recently disbanded Raider and the Paramarine battalions filled most of the vacancies. The division commander at that time reassembled the separate division assets. This formation consolidated collectin more efficiently under the Commanding General and his Intelligence (G-2) and Operations (G-3) staffs.

World War II

See also: VAC Amphib Recon Company

Prior to the arrival of Marines in this area of the Pacific War, the Australians had already established a network of deep reconnaissance agents known as the Australian Coastwatchers. They operated not only on coasts, but deep in jungles as well. Initially, some Marines became part of the unit.

Tarawa, November 1943

Main article: Battle of Tarawa

Prior to D-Day of November 10, no prior preliminary pre-D-Day reconnaissance was performed prior to their landing except the submarine periscope photography performed by Capt. James Jones, of VAC Amphib Recon Company aboard the USS Nautilus. The Marine recon units of 2nd Marine Division participated in seizure and occupation of Tarawa operation.

A Scout-Sniper Platoon of 2nd Marine Regiment led by 1st Lieutenant William D. Hawkins were the first unit to land on Betio in the Tarawa Atoll, the site of a strategically important airfield. He was tasked in securing the island ramp on one of the two long piers extending into the lagoon. Hawkins and his recon-scout platoon raced ahead of the first wave in two Higgins Boats and landed on the pier. He charged up the ramp with his scouts but were taken under heavy machine gun fire. Since there were petrol drums at the end of the pier were in the line of enemy fire, he sent most of his Marines back down the ramp then proceeded with only five men, four scouts and one combat engineer with a flamethrower. Once they burned and had blown up every hiding place left on the pier, they withdrew to the boat.

Hawkins then commandeered three LVTs and transferred his men from both LCVPs to these for the trip to shore where they joined their regiment for the rest of the battle. Lt. Hawkins was later killed during this action and was posthumously received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Another Scout-Sniper Platoon from 8th Marines assisted in the main assault landing on D-Day.

The Company D (Scouts), 2nd Tank Battalion worked extensively in the seizure and occupation of other islands in the Tarawa Atoll. Other than Betio, it included Eita and many unnamed islets between Betio and Bairiki. The adjacent atolls of Abaiang, Marakei and Maiana were landed for inspection of fortifactions, supplies or recent occupancy.

Another separate mission, a Scout-Sniper Platoon of 2nd Marine Regiment led by 1st Lieutenant William D. Hawkins were the first unit to land on Betio in the Tarawa Atoll, the site of a strategically important airfield.

New Britain, December 1943

Forming the southern of the Bismarck Sea and the Bismarck Archipelago, the island of New Britain was focused for seizure by General MacArthur as it would mean control of the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits. Planning began and decision was made to first seize Arawe Peninsula, an island, a town, a plantation and the Japanese occupation forces situated on the southern coast, sixty miles south across island from Cape Gloucester. Cape Gloucester was tasked for seizure by Major General William H. Rupertus, the landing force commander of the northern elements.

General Rupertus turned to 1st Marine Division's Scouts Company Chief, 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, to lead a team of several Marine scouts to conduct amphibious reconnaissance patrols of New Britain. D-Day was determined on December 26 1943. They landed on New Britain on September 24 1943 at night by rubber boats from three PT boats #110, #325 and #327 of Motor Torepedo Boat Squadron 21, bringing Royal Australian Navy Lieutenant Kirkwall Smith, a former australian coastwatcher who knew the area, and two natives.

For nine days, they've paddled throughout the prospective landing beaches, locating coastal-defense guns, sketched the beaches and evaded the Japanese patrols in the area. Upon time of returned back to their PT boat pickup, they couldn't establish radio contact, so they paddled out into the Dampier Strait until they were able to get contact by radio to arrange recovery. Bradbeer's patrol were able to uncover that japanese troop strength on New Britain was about seventy-five hundred men.

Forty-five days later of November 1943, Bradbeer accompanied Lieutenants Firm and Smith, and Ensign Gipe (a Navy hydrographer) and their small team and again landed from three PT boats an another proposed beaches. However, never landing on the proposed landing beach, it was quickly negated due to the cliffs just in land from the beach.

By December 26 1943, six days prior to D-Day, or D-6, Bradbeer and 1st Lieutenant Joseph A.L. Fournier each split the recon patrol, taking six their Marines to reconnoiter remaining portions of the island; Bradbeer and his team went north,Fournier's team reconned the south. Hours later, they both confirmed of the usability of the selected landing beaches, reporting only lightly defended. Momentarily within a few more hours both teams were recovered by their PT boats. While returning, a japanese barge opened fire onto Bradbeer's PT boat, injuring three of the PT crew personnel. US Navy Lieutenant Paul T. Rennell, the PT boat's captain, was able to break contact and evade the Japanese safely. The reconnaissance they provided were the third and the last preliminary amphibious reconnaissance for the New Britain operation.

Eniwetok, February-March 1944

Main article: Battle of Eniwetok

The Planning for the seizure of Eniwetok began when the fighting was still taking place on Kwajalein. The D-Day for Eniwetok was scheduled for February 17 1944. Eniwetok is made up of forty islets or more and was given the operation codename, DOWNSIDE. The preliminary pre-D-Day amphibious reconnaissance was performed by both Captain Edward Katzenbach's designated 4th Marine Division's Company D (Scout), 4th Tank Battalion, and Captain James Jones's Amphibious Reconnaissance Company of the V Amphibious Corps.

The landing plan emplaced four phases, on D-Day, three islets in the north of the atoll were to be seized. Two were to be used for artillery bases, Aistu and Rujioru -codenamed CAMELIA and CANNA. Bogen Island, or ZINNIA, lies north of the islet of Engebi (FRAGILE). ZINNIA was tasked to be seized by Katzenbach's 4th Division Scouts while Jones's Company were ordered to recon and seize CAMELIA and CANNA. Katzenbach and his scouts fought the heavy surf and fierce 25-knot winds and instead forced them to land on an island next to ZINNIA. By 0327 on D+1, the scout Marines crossed over to Bogen declared it secured.

General Thomas E. Watson, assistant division commander of 4th Marine Division ordered both the amphib recon and scout companies to continue reconnoitering, seizing and clearing other islands in the atoll, moving south toward the islet of Japtan, or LADYSLIPPER. While VAC Amphib Recon Company were operating on Parry island, or LILAC, in the eastern-side, Katzenbach's Scouts were clearing the islands and coral outcroppings on the western-side of DOWNSIDE. Once Katzenbach reached the larger islet of Rigii (POSY), 20-miles west of LILAC, and were engaged by hostile fire from the Japanese defenders; the scouts killed nine japanese before declaring POSY secured.

After the seizure of both Aitsu and Rujioru, artillery emplaced on the two islands and were used in fire support for the occupation landing forces on Engebi, or FRAGILE. General Watson attached the 2nd Separate Tank Company from 22nd Marines and Captains Jones's and Katzenbach's recon and scout companies to the Army 106th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion) and designated the reinforced unit as 3rd Battation, 106th Infantry (3/106) as reserve.

At 0908, the Marines hit the beach for the main assault of 1st and 2nd Battalions of 22nd Marine Regiment. 3rd Battalion were called in early to follow in trace. At 1230, both the VAC Amphib Recon Company and 4th Division Scout Company were ordered to augmented the 22nd Marines. Jones's Company reported to 1st Battalion and Katzenbach's Company reported to 2nd Battalion, both landing at 1320. On February 23 1944, the Eniwetok Atoll was declared secured, closing Operation DOWNSIDE.

Guam, July 1944

During the Marines' recapture of Guam, the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (before its formation into 6th Marine Division) each had its own reconnaissance company. Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd split the 3rd Division's recon (scouts) company into its three platoons to attached each noe to the brigade's regiments, the 4th and 22nd. The 22nd Marine Regiment's commander, Colonel Merlin F. Schneider, kept his regiment's assigned recon platoon close to the command post (CP). They were used to for rapid deployment on recon missions for the regimental commander, or when not being used on a specific mission, they guarded the CP.

At night, a landing was made on W-Day, General Shepherd and each of his regimental commanders waited for the usual nightly Japanese counterattacks. The japanese forces was led by japanese Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga of the 38th Regiment from the Imperial Japan Arm's 29th Division. At 2130, Colonel Suenaga probed his attacks at the juncture of the regimental boundaries between the 3rd Marine Division's 4th Marines and the Marine Brigade's 22nd Marines. The enemy charged in force and overran the forward Marine lines and began to penetrate the thinly held rear areas. Using grenades, small arms, mortars, bayonet and close quarters combat, they were ablet to hold of the attacking japanese army.

However, one japanese element during their counterattack managed to reach the 75-mm pack howitzer artillery position before they were ultimately stopped by the gun crews. A Japanese company of infilitrators approached the regimental command post. At this point, the Marine defenders, all hands—clerks, cooks, and supernumeries—rallied around 1st Lt. Dennis Chavez, Jr. recon platoon. They too immediately stopped the Japanese attack. By dawn, the Japanese 28th Infantry Regiment was eliminated. Colonel Suenaga was wounded and later killed in these attacks.

Withing the 1st Marine Prov. Brigade, on the night of 25-26 July 1944, Colonel Craig, the commanding officer of 9th Marines and the adjoining 21st Marines (3rd Marine Division) were concerned about the front line that was left open. Craig opted to use his regimental scout platoon to help fill the gap between the regiments. At about 2330, a forward operating post reported increased activity. By midnight, artillery and mortar fire bombarded the area starting another major counterattack by the japanese. As a consequence, the lightly armed scout platoon was forced to fall back.