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At the outbreak of war the Ottomans had been concerned Russia would attempt to seize their territory. Following [[Battle of Tannenberg|Russia's failures]] in its operations against Germany, this seemed unlikely. [[Enver Pasha]], the pro-German Ottoman War Minister, began to move his defensive policy towards an aggressive one.<ref name= peace70>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=70}}</ref> On 26 September Enver Pasha ordered the closing of the [[Dardanelles]] to foreign shipping without the consultation of his advisers. The following week he informed [[Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim]], the German ambassador to the Empire, that the anti-war [[Grand Vizier]], [[Ahmet Tevfik Pasha]], was no longer in control of the situation.<ref name= peace70/>
At the outbreak of war the Ottomans had been concerned Russia would attempt to seize their territory. Following [[Battle of Tannenberg|Russia's failures]] in its operations against Germany, this seemed unlikely. [[Enver Pasha]], the pro-German Ottoman War Minister, began to move his defensive policy towards an aggressive one.<ref name= peace70>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=70}}</ref> On 26 September Enver Pasha ordered the closing of the [[Dardanelles]] to foreign shipping without the consultation of his advisers. The following week he informed [[Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim]], the German ambassador to the Empire, that the anti-war [[Grand Vizier]], [[Ahmet Tevfik Pasha]], was no longer in control of the situation.<ref name= peace70/>


On 9 October Pasha told von Wangenheim that he had won the sympathy of Prime Minister [[Talaat Pasha|Mehmed Talaat]] and Halil Bey, President of the [[Chamber of Deputies (Ottoman Empire)|Chamber of Deputies]], and that he planned on securing the support of [[Djemal Pasha]], Minister of the Navy. If that failed, he would provoke a [[Council of Ministers (Ottoman Empire)|Cabinet]] crises and create a pro-war government.<ref name= peace71>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=71}}<ref/> After gaining Djemal's sympathies, the conspiring Ottomans informed the Germans that they would go to war as soon as they received the equivalent of two million [[Ottoman lira|lira]] in gold, money the Germans knew the Ottoman Empire would need to fund a war. The money was shipped through [[Romania during World War I#Before the war|neutral Romania]], and the last of it arrived on 21 October.
On 9 October Pasha told von Wangenheim that he had won the sympathy of Prime Minister [[Talaat Pasha|Mehmed Talaat]] and Halil Bey, President of the [[Chamber of Deputies (Ottoman Empire)|Chamber of Deputies]], and that he planned on securing the support of [[Djemal Pasha]], Minister of the Navy. If that failed, he would provoke a [[Council of Ministers (Ottoman Empire)|Cabinet]] crises and create a pro-war government.<ref name= peace71>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=71}}</ref> After gaining Djemal's sympathies, the conspiring Ottomans informed the Germans that they would go to war as soon as they received the equivalent of two million [[Ottoman lira|lira]] in gold, money the Germans knew the Ottoman Empire would need to fund a war. The money was shipped through [[Romania during World War I#Before the war|neutral Romania]], and the last of it arrived on 21 October.


Informants working for [[Mikhail Nikolayevich von Giers]], the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, forwarded the information about the payments to Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Sazonov]]. Sazonov had suspected the Ottomans' and Germans' intentions, and warned the Russian naval commanders in [[Sevastopol|Sebastopol]] to be prepared for an attack. On 21 October, Admiral Kazimir Ketlinski assured the foreign minister that the [[Black Sea Fleet]] was "completely ready" for action.<ref name= sean111/>
Informants working for [[Mikhail Nikolayevich von Giers]], the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, forwarded the information about the payments to Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Sazonov]]. Sazonov had suspected the Ottomans' and Germans' intentions, and warned the Russian naval commanders in [[Sevastopol|Sebastopol]] to be prepared for an attack. On 21 October, Admiral Kazimir Ketlinski assured the foreign minister that the [[Black Sea Fleet]] was "completely ready" for action.<ref name= sean111/>
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== Raid ==
== Raid ==
On 27 October, the Ottoman fleet put to sea under the guise of performing maneuvers. Pasha had originally envisioned an encounter at sea in which the Ottoman's would claim self-defence, but Admiral Souchon conceived a direct assault on Russian ports. He would later say his intention was "to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war."<ref name= peace72>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=72}}<ref/> The German battlecruiser, now known as ''Yavuz Sultan Selim'', was to sail with two destroyers and a gunboat to attack Sebastopol. The light cruiser ''Breslau'', now known as ''Midilli'', protected cruiser {{ship|Ottoman cruiser|Hamidieh||2}}, and the torpedo cruiser {{ship|Ottoman cruiser|Berk-i Satvet||2}} were to attack Novorossiysk and Feodosia.<ref name= GM>{{harvnb|Miller|1999|p=}}</ref> Three destroyers were detailed for Odessa. On the way, one of these destroyers experienced engine trouble and was forced to turn back.
On 27 October, the Ottoman fleet put to sea under the guise of performing maneuvers. Pasha had originally envisioned an encounter at sea in which the Ottoman's would claim self-defence, but Admiral Souchon conceived a direct assault on Russian ports. He would later say his intention was "to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war."<ref name= peace72>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=72}}</ref> The German battlecruiser, now known as ''Yavuz Sultan Selim'', was to sail with two destroyers and a gunboat to attack Sebastopol. The light cruiser ''Breslau'', now known as ''Midilli'', protected cruiser {{ship|Ottoman cruiser|Hamidieh||2}}, and the torpedo cruiser {{ship|Ottoman cruiser|Berk-i Satvet||2}} were to attack Novorossiysk and Feodosia.<ref name= GM>{{harvnb|Miller|1999|p=}}</ref> Three destroyers were detailed for Odessa. On the way, one of these destroyers experienced engine trouble and was forced to turn back.


Russian naval officers were under specific instruction not to fire first on the Ottomans in the event of a confrontation. The Russian government wanted to make it clear to any third party that the Ottomans would be the ones to instigate hostilities.<ref name= sean111/>
Russian naval officers were under specific instruction not to fire first on the Ottomans in the event of a confrontation. The Russian government wanted to make it clear to any third party that the Ottomans would be the ones to instigate hostilities.<ref name= sean111/>
Line 79: Line 79:
Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, still fearing that the Russians would accept the Ottoman apology, decided to interfere. Just before the message was sent, Pasha inserted a passage that accused the Russians of instigating the conflict. On 1 November the message arrived in [[Petrograd]]. Foreign Minister [[Sergey Sazonov]] responded with an ultimatum, demanding that the Ottomans expel the German military mission. The Ottomans rejected this proposal.<ref name= sean112/>
Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, still fearing that the Russians would accept the Ottoman apology, decided to interfere. Just before the message was sent, Pasha inserted a passage that accused the Russians of instigating the conflict. On 1 November the message arrived in [[Petrograd]]. Foreign Minister [[Sergey Sazonov]] responded with an ultimatum, demanding that the Ottomans expel the German military mission. The Ottomans rejected this proposal.<ref name= sean112/>


That same day British forces in the Mediterranean carried out Churchill's orders by attacking Ottoman shipping off of the port of [[İzmir]]. That night at an Ottoman Cabinet meeting, the Grand Vizier's anti-war faction was forced to accept that the Empire was at war, and that there was little they could do to avoid conflict.<ref name= peace73>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=73}}<ref/> The Russians declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 2 November 1914. Admiral [[Andrei Eberhardt]], who had been informed of the raid as it occurred, ordered Russia's fleet to put to sea to retaliate, and, if possible, intercept the Ottoman battlecruiser. The belligerent forces would eventually encounter each other on 18 November in the [[Battle of Cape Sarych]].<ref>{{harvnb|Hall Jr.|2010|p=117}}</ref>
That same day British forces in the Mediterranean carried out Churchill's orders by attacking Ottoman shipping off of the port of [[İzmir]]. That night at an Ottoman Cabinet meeting, the Grand Vizier's anti-war faction was forced to accept that the Empire was at war, and that there was little they could do to avoid conflict.<ref name= peace73>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=73}}</ref> The Russians declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 2 November 1914. Admiral [[Andrei Eberhardt]], who had been informed of the raid as it occurred, ordered Russia's fleet to put to sea to retaliate, and, if possible, intercept the Ottoman battlecruiser. The belligerent forces would eventually encounter each other on 18 November in the [[Battle of Cape Sarych]].<ref>{{harvnb|Hall Jr.|2010|p=117}}</ref>


On 3 November British warships bombarded outer forts in the [[Dardanelles]]. Two days later [[United Kingdom|Britain]] extended their declaration of war to the Ottoman Empire, as did [[France]].
On 3 November British warships bombarded outer forts in the [[Dardanelles]]. Two days later [[United Kingdom|Britain]] extended their declaration of war to the Ottoman Empire, as did [[France]].


Critics in Britain, including [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]] [[Lloyd George]], blamed [[Winston Churchill]] for the war with the Ottomans for several years to come. In the meantime, Churchill tried to promote the advantages of the conflict, such as the possibility of territorial gains in the [[Middle East]]. This reason would ultimately bring [[Military history of Italy during World War I|Italy]] and [[Balkans]] nations like [[Greece during World War I|Greece]] into the war.<ref name= peace74>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=74}}<ref/>
Critics in Britain, including [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]] [[Lloyd George]], blamed [[Winston Churchill]] for the war with the Ottomans for several years to come. In the meantime, Churchill tried to promote the advantages of the conflict, such as the possibility of territorial gains in the [[Middle East]]. This reason would ultimately bring [[Military history of Italy during World War I|Italy]] and [[Balkans]] nations like [[Greece during World War I|Greece]] into the war.<ref name= peace74>{{harvnb|Fromkin|2010|p=74}}</ref>
The Porte finally declared war on the [[Triple Entente]] on 11 November. Three days later [[Ottoman Sultan]] [[Mehmed V]] called for a [[Jihad]] campaign by [[Sunni]] and [[Shia]] [[Muslims]] against the Western powers.<ref>{{harvnb|Reynolds|2011|p=122}}</ref>
The Porte finally declared war on the [[Triple Entente]] on 11 November. Three days later [[Ottoman Sultan]] [[Mehmed V]] called for a [[Jihad]] campaign by [[Sunni]] and [[Shia]] [[Muslims]] against the Western powers.<ref>{{harvnb|Reynolds|2011|p=122}}</ref>



Revision as of 21:41, 2 August 2016

Black Sea Raid
Part of World War I

Oil tanks in Novorossiysk harbour burn following bombardment
DateOctober 29, 1914
Location
Result

Ottoman victory

Belligerents
 Ottoman Empire  Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Ottoman EmpireGerman Empire Wilhelm Souchon Russian Empire Andrei Eberhardt
Strength
1 battlecruiser
1 light cruiser
1 protected cruiser
1 torpedo cruiser
4 destroyers
1 gunboat
Shore defences
1 pre-dreadnought
1 minelayer
1 gunboat
3 destroyers
Casualties and losses
1 battlecruiser damaged 1 minelayer scuttled
1 gunboat sunk
1 destroyer damaged
Numerous merchant vessels damaged or destroyed[Note 1]
Unknown human losses[Note 2]
The merchantmen casualties include 1 British ship sunk and 1 French ship damaged.[6]

The Black Sea Raid was an Ottoman naval sortie against Russian ports in the Black Sea on 29 October 1914, supported by Germany, that brought the Ottoman Empire into World War I. The attack was conceived by Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha, German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, and the German foreign ministry.

Germany had been hoping that the Ottomans would enter the war to support them, but the Porte in Istanbul was undecided. The pro-German Enver Pasha began secretly communicating with the German ambassador on bringing the Empire into the war. Attempts to secure widespread support in the government failed, so Pasha decided conflict would have to be instigated. With the help of the Ottoman naval minister and German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, Pasha arranged for the Ottoman fleet to go out to sea on 29 October to supposedly perform maneuvers. They were to provoke Russian vessels and then accuse them of inciting war. Instead, Souchon raided the Russian coast in a flagrant display of hostility, causing little lasting damage but enraging the Russians.

Attempts by anti-war officials in Istanbul to apologize for the incident were botched by Pasha. The British quickly retaliated with naval attacks in the Dardanelles. The Russians declared war on 2 November, followed by the British and the French three days later. The Ottomans didn't officially declare war until 11 November.

Background

Ever since the ratification of the Ottoman–German alliance, Germany had been hoping to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war. This came even closer to fruition when the German battlecruiser SMS Goeben and the light cruiser SMS Breslau took shelter in Istanbul from the British, enraging the Russians. From that point, on a number of Ottoman officials began planning a strategy to provoke the Entente.

At the outbreak of war the Ottomans had been concerned Russia would attempt to seize their territory. Following Russia's failures in its operations against Germany, this seemed unlikely. Enver Pasha, the pro-German Ottoman War Minister, began to move his defensive policy towards an aggressive one.[7] On 26 September Enver Pasha ordered the closing of the Dardanelles to foreign shipping without the consultation of his advisers. The following week he informed Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, the German ambassador to the Empire, that the anti-war Grand Vizier, Ahmet Tevfik Pasha, was no longer in control of the situation.[7]

On 9 October Pasha told von Wangenheim that he had won the sympathy of Prime Minister Mehmed Talaat and Halil Bey, President of the Chamber of Deputies, and that he planned on securing the support of Djemal Pasha, Minister of the Navy. If that failed, he would provoke a Cabinet crises and create a pro-war government.[8] After gaining Djemal's sympathies, the conspiring Ottomans informed the Germans that they would go to war as soon as they received the equivalent of two million lira in gold, money the Germans knew the Ottoman Empire would need to fund a war. The money was shipped through neutral Romania, and the last of it arrived on 21 October.

Informants working for Mikhail Nikolayevich von Giers, the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, forwarded the information about the payments to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov. Sazonov had suspected the Ottomans' and Germans' intentions, and warned the Russian naval commanders in Sebastopol to be prepared for an attack. On 21 October, Admiral Kazimir Ketlinski assured the foreign minister that the Black Sea Fleet was "completely ready" for action.[3]

On 22 October 1914, Pasha covertly presented a series of plans to the German ambassador on how to bring the country into the war. The Germans approved of an attack on Russian naval forces.[6] At the last minute Talaat and Halil changed their minds and resolved that the Ottomans should keep the gold and remain neutral. Talaat soon reverted to his old position. Pasha gave up on trying to unify the government to pass a declaration of war, and concluded that the Russians would to need to be provoked to declaring war to instigate desirable action.[8] He told the Germans this on 23 October, and assured them that he would only need Minister Djemal's support. Pasha passed down attack orders to Wilhelm Souchon, captain of the Goeben, who, along with his ship, had been transferred to the Ottoman Navy.[9]

On 25 October, Ambassador Girs forwarded one of his informant's predictions to Sazonov: the attack would take place on 29 October.[3]

Raid

On 27 October, the Ottoman fleet put to sea under the guise of performing maneuvers. Pasha had originally envisioned an encounter at sea in which the Ottoman's would claim self-defence, but Admiral Souchon conceived a direct assault on Russian ports. He would later say his intention was "to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war."[10] The German battlecruiser, now known as Yavuz Sultan Selim, was to sail with two destroyers and a gunboat to attack Sebastopol. The light cruiser Breslau, now known as Midilli, protected cruiser Hamidieh, and the torpedo cruiser Berk-i Satvet were to attack Novorossiysk and Feodosia.[6] Three destroyers were detailed for Odessa. On the way, one of these destroyers experienced engine trouble and was forced to turn back.

Russian naval officers were under specific instruction not to fire first on the Ottomans in the event of a confrontation. The Russian government wanted to make it clear to any third party that the Ottomans would be the ones to instigate hostilities.[3]

Odessa

Shortly after 03:00 on 29 October, the destroyers Muavenet and Gairet entered the harbour of Odessa. From a distance of less than 70 yards, a torpedo was launched into the Russian gunboat Donetz, quickly sinking it. The two destroyers proceeded to damage shore installations, five oil tanks, and a sugar refinery.[6] Several merchantmen were also damaged.

The Russians managed to radio a warning to the forces in Sebastopol. By the time the Yavuz arrived, the coastal artillery was manned.

Sebastopol

Just before 06:30, Yavuz sighted Sebastopol and proceeded to bombarded the port for 15 minutes.[6] During this time she exchanged fire with the pre-dreadnought Georgii Pobedonosets and shore batteries.[11] Three heavy caliber shells from the batteries managed to damage the Yavuz before she withdrew.[2] The loaded Russian minelayer Prut happened upon the attack and scuttled herself to avoid being detonated. Since Prut's arrival had been expected, the defensive minefield around the port was inoperative. By the time it was activated 20 minutes later, the Ottomans had cleared the area.[12] Three Russian destroyers attempted to pursue, but their attack dissolved after the lead ship was struck by the battlecruiser's secondary armament.

Feodosia

Novorossiysk harbour bombarded by the cruiser Midilli

At around the same time Hamidieh arrived off of Feodosia. Seeing no signs of armed opposition, a German and a Turkish officer went ashore to warn the civilian population before bombarding the port two hours later.[13][6]

Novorossiysk

Shortly before 10:50, Berk-i Satvet sent a shore party to warn the defenceless population of Novorossiysk, before opening up with her guns. She was soon thereafter joined by the Midilli, which had been busy laying mines in the Kerch Strait.[6] Midilli fired a total of 308 shells, sinking several Russian grain cargo ships and destroying about 50 oil tanks.[3] On her way back to Ottoman territory, Midilli attempted to cut Sebastopol's undersea cable with Varna, Bulgaria, but failed.[14]

Aftermath

On the afternoon following the raid, Souchon radioed Istanbul that Russian ships had "shadowed all movements of the Turkish fleet and systematically disrupted all exercises," and as such had "opened hostilities."[11] The Russians attempted but were unable to pursue the Ottoman fleet. The raiding force returned to Ottoman waters on 1 November.

The Ottoman press reported on the action on 31 October, claiming that the Russians had planned on mining the Bosphorus and destroying their fleet without a formal declaration of war. As such, the Ottomans had retaliated after an engagement at sea by bombarding the Russian coast.[5]

Russia's Black Sea Fleet was not seriously damaged by the raid. The gunboat Donetz was later raised and returned to service.[12] German military officers were disappointed by the limited extent of the attack, which ultimately achieved more political goals than strategic ones.[1]

Ramifications

Enver Pasha

A two-day political crisis followed the raid. It was obvious to the Ottoman government what Enver Pasha had allowed to occur. As soon as the news of the attack reached Istanbul, the Grand Vizier and the Cabinet forced Pasha to wire a ceasefire order to Souchon. Several officials, including the Grand Vizier, threatened to resign in protest. Four later would, including Minister of Finance Mehmet Cavit Bey.[15] Though many in the government thought it opportune to attack Russia, party unity was regarded as vital and a letter of apology was soon drafted. On 31 October Pasha informed the Germans of the planned apology and said there was nothing he could do.[10]

The British, ill-informed of the situation in Istanbul, believed the entire Ottoman Porte was conspiring with the Germans. The British Cabinet sent an ultimatum to the Ottomans, demanding that they remove Admiral Souchon and his German subordinates from their posts and expel Germany's military mission,[10] which consisted of approximately 2,000 men.[16] The Ottomans did not comply. On 31 October, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, acting on his own initiative, ordered British forces in the Mediterranean to commence hostilities against the Ottoman Empire. This wasn't carried out immediately, so the Ottomans were unaware of what had transpired.[10] The Russian Foreign Ministry withdrew Ambassador Girs from Istanbul.[6]

Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, still fearing that the Russians would accept the Ottoman apology, decided to interfere. Just before the message was sent, Pasha inserted a passage that accused the Russians of instigating the conflict. On 1 November the message arrived in Petrograd. Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov responded with an ultimatum, demanding that the Ottomans expel the German military mission. The Ottomans rejected this proposal.[16]

That same day British forces in the Mediterranean carried out Churchill's orders by attacking Ottoman shipping off of the port of İzmir. That night at an Ottoman Cabinet meeting, the Grand Vizier's anti-war faction was forced to accept that the Empire was at war, and that there was little they could do to avoid conflict.[17] The Russians declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 2 November 1914. Admiral Andrei Eberhardt, who had been informed of the raid as it occurred, ordered Russia's fleet to put to sea to retaliate, and, if possible, intercept the Ottoman battlecruiser. The belligerent forces would eventually encounter each other on 18 November in the Battle of Cape Sarych.[18]

On 3 November British warships bombarded outer forts in the Dardanelles. Two days later Britain extended their declaration of war to the Ottoman Empire, as did France.

Critics in Britain, including Prime Minister Lloyd George, blamed Winston Churchill for the war with the Ottomans for several years to come. In the meantime, Churchill tried to promote the advantages of the conflict, such as the possibility of territorial gains in the Middle East. This reason would ultimately bring Italy and Balkans nations like Greece into the war.[19] The Porte finally declared war on the Triple Entente on 11 November. Three days later Ottoman Sultan Mehmed V called for a Jihad campaign by Sunni and Shia Muslims against the Western powers.[20]

Notes

  1. ^ The number of merchantmen damaged and destroyed is disputed. Erickson claims that only 6 vessels were lost.[1] Tucker states that the total casualties from the entire raid amount to 6 vessels sunk and 12 damaged.[2] McMeekin maintains that 14 vessels alone were sunk at Novorossiysk.[3]
  2. ^ Most sources do not list any statistics on Russia's human losses. Kieser states that the Ottomans "took dozens of crew prisoners-of-war."[4] The Ottoman press claimed that 75 sailors were captured.[5]

References

Citations

  1. ^ a b Erickson 2001, p. 36
  2. ^ a b Tucker 2014, p. 263
  3. ^ a b c d e McMeekin 2011, p. 111
  4. ^ Kieser 2015
  5. ^ a b New York Times Company 1917, p. 1032-1033
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h Miller 1999
  7. ^ a b Fromkin 2010, p. 70
  8. ^ a b Fromkin 2010, p. 71
  9. ^ A ́goston, Masters 2010, p. 599
  10. ^ a b c d Fromkin 2010, p. 72
  11. ^ a b Sondhaus 2014, p. 107
  12. ^ a b Halpern 2012
  13. ^ Erickson 2001, p. 35
  14. ^ Sondhaus 2014, p. 108
  15. ^ Kent 2005
  16. ^ a b McMeekin 2011, p. 112
  17. ^ Fromkin 2010, p. 73
  18. ^ Hall Jr. 2010, p. 117
  19. ^ Fromkin 2010, p. 74
  20. ^ Reynolds 2011, p. 122