Statement (logic): Difference between revisions
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* {{citation |last=Ruzsa |first=Imre |title=Bevezetés a modern logikába |series=Osiris tankönyvek |publisher=Osiris |publication-place=Budapest |year=2000 |isbn=963 379 978 3}} |
* {{citation |last=Ruzsa |first=Imre |title=Bevezetés a modern logikába |series=Osiris tankönyvek |publisher=Osiris |publication-place=Budapest |year=2000 |isbn=963 379 978 3}} |
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* Jasa Xenakis, "Sentence and Statement", "Analysis" Vol. 16, No. 4 (Mar., 1956), pp. 91-94 http://www.jstor.org/pss/3326478 |
* Jasa Xenakis, "Sentence and Statement", "Analysis" Vol. 16, No. 4 (Mar., 1956), pp. 91-94 http://www.jstor.org/pss/3326478 |
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* Peter Millican, "Statements and Modality Strawson, Quine and Wolfram." |
* Peter Millican, "Statements and Modality Strawson, Quine and Wolfram.", http://philpapers.org/rec/MILSAM-2 |
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{{philosophy of language}} |
{{philosophy of language}} |
Revision as of 20:19, 12 November 2010
In logic a statement is a declarative sentence that is either true or false. A statement is distinct from a sentence in that a sentence is only one formulation of a statement, whereas there may be many other formulations expressing the same statement. The term "statement" may refer to either a sentence or the idea expressed by a sentence. Philosopher of language, Peter Strawson has advocated the use of the term "statement" in preference to proposition. Strawson used the term "Statement " to be such that two declarative sentences make the same statement if they say the same of the same thing. Thus the term "statement" may to refer to a sentence or something made (expressed) by a sentence. In either case they are purported truth bearers.
Examples of sentences that are (or make)statements:
- "Socrates is a man."
- "A triangle has three sides."
- "Paris is the capital of Spain."
The first two (make statements that) are true, the third is (or makes a statement that is) false.
Examples of sentences that are not (or do not make)statements:
- "Who are you?"
- "Run!"
- "Greenness perambulates"
- "I had one grunch but the eggplant over there."
The first two examples are not declarative sentences and therefore are not (or do not make) statements. The third and forth are declarative sentences but, lacking meaning, are neither true nor false and therefore are not (or do not make) statements.
Statement as an abstract entity
In some treatments "statement" is introduced in order to distinguish a sentence from its information content. A statement is regarded as the information content of an information-bearing sentence. Thus, a sentence is related to the statement it bears like a numeral to the number it refers to. Statements are abstract, logical entities, while sentences are grammatical ones.[1][2]
See also
Notes
- ^ Rouse
- ^ Ruzsa 2000, p. 16
References
- A. G. Hamilton, Logic for Mathematicians, Cambridge University Press, 1980, ISBN 0521292913.
- Rouse, David L., "Sentences, Statements and Arguments", A Practical Introduction to Formal Logic (PDF)
- Ruzsa, Imre (2000), Bevezetés a modern logikába, Osiris tankönyvek, Budapest: Osiris, ISBN 963 379 978 3
- Jasa Xenakis, "Sentence and Statement", "Analysis" Vol. 16, No. 4 (Mar., 1956), pp. 91-94 http://www.jstor.org/pss/3326478
- Peter Millican, "Statements and Modality Strawson, Quine and Wolfram.", http://philpapers.org/rec/MILSAM-2