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==Hitler's demands== |
==Hitler's demands== |
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[[Image:MunichAgreement .jpg|framed|right|Chamberlain holds the paper containing the resolution to commit to peaceful methods signed by both Hitler and himself on his return from Germany in September 1938. He said: <blockquote>My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.</blockquote>]] |
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In March 1938 Germany had annexed [[Austria]] with the ''[[Anschluss]]''. It was widely <br>expected that Czechoslovakia's [[Sudetenland]], with its substantial [[ethnic German|German]] population led by the [[Nazism|Nazi]] politician [[Konrad Henlein]], would be Hitler's next demand. [[France]] and the [[Soviet Union]] both had alliances with Czechoslovakia, but both were unprepared materially and politically for war. Indeed, Soviet dictator [[Joseph Stalin]] and Soviet Russia were very wary of any capitalist alliances. The French were under the leadership of [[Édouard Daladier]]. None of the powers in western Europe wanted war. They severely overestimated German dictator [[Adolf Hitler]]'s military ability at the time, and while [[UK|Britain]] and France had superior forces to the Germans they felt they had fallen behind, and both were undergoing massive military rearmament to catch up, Hitler, on the other hand, was in just the opposite position. He far exaggerated German power at the time and was desperately hoping for a war with the west which he thought he could easily win. He was pushed into holding the conference, however, by Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]] who was unprepared for a Europe-wide conflict, and was also concerned about the growth of German power. The German military leadership also knew the state of their armed forces and did all they could to avoid war. |
In March 1938 Germany had annexed [[Austria]] with the ''[[Anschluss]]''. It was widely <br>expected that Czechoslovakia's [[Sudetenland]], with its substantial [[ethnic German|German]] population led by the [[Nazism|Nazi]] politician [[Konrad Henlein]], would be Hitler's next demand. [[France]] and the [[Soviet Union]] both had alliances with Czechoslovakia, but both were unprepared materially and politically for war. Indeed, Soviet dictator [[Joseph Stalin]] and Soviet Russia were very wary of any capitalist alliances. The French were under the leadership of [[Édouard Daladier]]. None of the powers in western Europe wanted war. They severely overestimated German dictator [[Adolf Hitler]]'s military ability at the time, and while [[UK|Britain]] and France had superior forces to the Germans they felt they had fallen behind, and both were undergoing massive military rearmament to catch up, Hitler, on the other hand, was in just the opposite position. He far exaggerated German power at the time and was desperately hoping for a war with the west which he thought he could easily win. He was pushed into holding the conference, however, by Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]] who was unprepared for a Europe-wide conflict, and was also concerned about the growth of German power. The German military leadership also knew the state of their armed forces and did all they could to avoid war. |
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Revision as of 23:50, 31 August 2007
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For the annual global security meeting held in Munich, see Munich Conference on Security Policy
| Territorial evolution of Germany in the 20th century |
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The Munich Agreement (Czech: Mnichovská dohoda; Slovak: Mníchovská dohoda; German: Münchner Abkommen) was an agreement regarding the Sudetenland Crisis among the major powers of Europe after a conference held in Munich, Germany in 1938 and signed on September 29. The Sudetenland was of immense strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenses were situated there. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia in the face of territorial demands made by German dictator Adolf Hitler, and it ended up dividing that state between Nazi Germany, Poland and Hungary.
Because Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference, the Munich Agreement is commonly called the Munich Dictate by Czechs and Slovaks. The phrase Munich betrayal is also frequently used because military alliances between Czechoslovakia and France and between France and Britain were not honoured.
The agreement is considered by many as the quintessential example of appeasement. Because Hitler soon violated the terms of the agreement, it has often been cited in support of the principle that tyrants should never be appeased.
Background
The Sudetenland was an area of Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans formed a majority of the population. The Sudeten Germans had attempted to prevent the German language border areas that had formerly been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from becoming part of Czechoslovakia in 1918. They had proclaimed the German-Austrian province Sudetenland in October 1918, voting to join the newly declared Republic of German Austria in November 1918. This had been forbidden by the victorious allied powers of the First World War (the Treaty of Saint-Germain) and by the Czechoslovak government, partly with force of arms in 1919. Many Sudeten Germans rejected affiliation with Czechoslovakia because they had been refused the right to self-determination promised by US president Wilson in his Fourteen Points of January 1918.
Hitler's demands
My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.
In March 1938 Germany had annexed Austria with the Anschluss. It was widely
expected that Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland, with its substantial German population led by the Nazi politician Konrad Henlein, would be Hitler's next demand. France and the Soviet Union both had alliances with Czechoslovakia, but both were unprepared materially and politically for war. Indeed, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and Soviet Russia were very wary of any capitalist alliances. The French were under the leadership of Édouard Daladier. None of the powers in western Europe wanted war. They severely overestimated German dictator Adolf Hitler's military ability at the time, and while Britain and France had superior forces to the Germans they felt they had fallen behind, and both were undergoing massive military rearmament to catch up, Hitler, on the other hand, was in just the opposite position. He far exaggerated German power at the time and was desperately hoping for a war with the west which he thought he could easily win. He was pushed into holding the conference, however, by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini who was unprepared for a Europe-wide conflict, and was also concerned about the growth of German power. The German military leadership also knew the state of their armed forces and did all they could to avoid war.
In the lead up to the conference, the great powers of Europe mobilized their forces for the first time since World War I. Many thought war was inevitable and that a peace agreement that would satisfy everyone would be impossible to attain.
Resolution
A deal was reached, however, and on September 29, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. The Czechoslovak government capitulated (September 30) and agreed to abide by the agreement. The settlement gave Germany the Sudetenland starting October 10, and de facto control over the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitler promised to go no further.
Reactions
Chamberlain received an ecstatic reception upon his return to Britain. At Heston Aerodrome, west of London, he made the now famous "Peace for our time" speech and waved the agreement to a delighted crowd. Though the British and French were pleased, as were the German military and diplomatic leadership, Hitler was furious. He felt as though he had been forced into acting like a bourgeois politician by his diplomats and generals.
Winston Churchill denounced the Agreement in the House of Commons:
We have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat...you will find that in a period of time which may be measured by years, but may be measured by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi régime. We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude...we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road...we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies: "Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting". And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.
Hitler now regarded Chamberlain with utter contempt. A British diplomat in Berlin was informed that Hitler viewed Chamberlain as "an impertinent busybody who spoke the ridiculous jargon of an outmoded democracy. The umbrella, which to the ordinary German was a symbol of peace, was in Hitler's view only a subject of derision".[1] Also, Hitler had been heard saying: "If ever that silly old man comes interfering here again with his umbrella, I'll kick him downstairs and jump on his stomach in front of the photographers".[2]
Joseph Stalin was also very upset by the results of the Munich conference. The Soviets had not been represented at the conference and felt they should be acknowledged as a major power. The British and French, however, mostly used the Soviets as a threat to dangle over the Germans. Stalin concluded that the West had actively colluded with Hitler to hand over a country to the Nazis, causing concern that they might do the same to the Soviet Union in the future, allowing the partition of the USSR between the western powers and the fascist powers. This fear influenced Stalin's decision to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939.
The Czechoslovaks were also very angry with the Munich settlement. With Sudetenland gone to Germany and later southern Slovakia (one third of Slovak territory) taken by Hungary and the area of Cieszyn Silesia by Poland (the disputed area west of the Olza River, so-called Zaolzie - 801.5 km² with a population of 227,399), Czecho-Slovakia (as the state was now renamed) lost its border defences with Germany and without them its independence became more nominal than real. In fact, Edvard Beneš, the then-President of Czechoslovakia, had the military print the march orders for his army and put the press on standby for a declaration of war. Czechoslovakia also lost 70% of its iron/steel, 70% of its electrical power, 3.5 million citizens and the famous Škoda Works to Germany as a result of the settlement.[3]
After Hitler personally inspected the Czech fortifications, he privately admitted to Joseph Goebbels that ‘We would have shed a lot of blood,’ and said that it was fortunate things turned out the way that they did.[4]
Invasion of the remainder of Czechoslovakia
Germany stated that the incorporation of Austria into the Reich resulted in borders with Czechoslovakia that allowed Germany to be encircled by the Western Powers. [5] In 1937, the Wehrmacht had formulated a plan called Operation Green Fall Grün for the invasion of Czechoslovakia [6] which was implemented as Operation Southeast on 15 March 1939--Churchill's prediction was fulfilled as Nazi armies entered Prague and proceeded to occupy the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia, which was transformed into a protectorate of the Reich. The eastern half of the country, Slovakia, became a separate pro-Nazi state.
Prime Minister Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realising his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed, and immediately began to mobilize the British Empire's armed forces on a war footing. France did the same. Although no immediate action followed, Hitler's move on Poland in September started World War II in Europe.
In Chamberlain's own words
- "My good friends, for the second time in our history a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time." Chamberlain's reference is to Beaconsfield's return from the Congress of Berlin in 1878.
- "I asked Hitler about one in the morning while we were waiting for the draftsmen whether he would care to see me for another talk….I had a very friendly and pleasant talk, on Spain, (where he too said he had never had any territorial ambitions) economic relations with S.E. Europe, and disarmament. I did not mention colonies, nor did he. At the end I pulled out the declaration which I had prepared beforehand and asked if he would sign it. As the interpreter translated the words into German Hitler said Yes I will certainly sign it. When shall we do it? I said "now", and we went at once to the writing table and put our signatures to the two copies which I had brought with me." (Chamberlain in a letter to his sister Hilda Chamberlain, 2 October 1938)
See also
References
- ^ Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle (Macmillan, 1959), p. 122.
- ^ Ibid, p. 135.
- ^ Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich
- ^ Irving, David. "Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich". P. 474,
- ^ Reinhard Müller, Deutschland. Sechster Teil (München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1943), pp. 116-130.
- ^ Herzstein, Robert Edwin The Nazis (Time-Life Books World War II Series) New York:1980 Time-Life Books Page 184
- Krejčí, Oskar: "Geopolitics of the Central European Region. The view from Prague and Bratislava" Bratislava: Veda, 2005. 494 p. (Free download)
- Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein (editors) The Munich crisis, 1938 : prelude to World War II, London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass Inc, 1999.
- William L. Shirer The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York: Touchstone Press, 1959.
- Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John Munich: prologue to tragedy, New York: Viking Press, 1965.
External links
- The Munich Agreement - Text of the Munich Agreement on-line
- British Pathe newsreel (includes Chamberlain's speech at Heston aerodrome)
- The Munich Agreement: Dreams of Peace that Led to War
- Ruins of the Reich (Vol I) - An inside look of Hitler's Munich headquarters